The Huntington National Bank v. Stacy L. Hall, et al.
No. 20AP-449
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
September 9, 2021
[Cite as Huntington Natl. Bank v. Hall, 2021-Ohio-3111.]
(C.P.C. No. 17CV-4461) (REGULAR CALENDAR)
Rendered on September 9, 2021
On brief: Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich, Co., LPA, and Eric T. Deighton, for appellee The Huntington National Bank. Argued: Eric T. Deighton.
On brief: The Behal Law Group LLC, and John M. Gonzales, for appellant. Argued: John M. Gonzales.
APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas
LUPER SCHUSTER, J.
{¶ 1} Dеfendant-appellant, Stacy L. Hall, appeals from a judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas awarding summary judgment in favor of plaintiff-appellee, The Huntington National Bank, and denying Hall‘s summary judgment motion. For the following reasons, we affirm.
I. Facts and Procedural History
{¶ 2} In May 2017, Huntington initiated this foreclosure action against Hall and other interested parties relating to 458 Ryan Avenue, Columbus, Ohio (the “property“). The
{¶ 3} In April 2019, both Huntington and Hall moved for summary judgment. In August 2020, the trial court granted Huntington‘s summary judgment motion and denied Hall‘s summary judgment motion.
{¶ 4} Hall timely appeals.
II. Assignment of Error
{¶ 5} Hall assigns the following error for our review:
The trial court erred by granting appellee‘s motion for summary judgment and not appellant‘s.
III. Discussion
{¶ 6} Hall‘s sole assignment of error alleges the trial court erred in granting Huntington‘s summary judgment motion and denying her summary judgment motion. This assignment of error is not well-taken.
{¶ 7} An appellate court reviews summary judgment under a de novo standard. Coventry Twp. v. Ecker, 101 Ohio App.3d 38, 41 (9th Dist.1995); Koos v. Cent. Ohio Cellular, Inc., 94 Ohio App.3d 579, 588 (8th Dist.1994). Summary judgment is appropriate only when the moving party demonstrates (1) no genuine issue of material fact exists, (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and (3) reasonable minds could come to but one conclusion and that conclusion is adverse to the party against whom
{¶ 8} Pursuant to
{¶ 9} In its complaint, Huntington alleged thе personal credit line was in default, with $28,944.86 in principal owed, entitling Huntington to foreclose on the mortgage securing the loan. To properly support a summary judgment motion in a foreclosure action, a plaintiff must present evidentiary quality materials establishing: (1) that the plaintiff is the holder of the note and mortgage, or is a party entitled to enforce the instrument; (2) if the plaintiff is not the original mortgagee, the chain of assignments and transfers; (3) that the mortgagor is in default; (4) that all conditions preсedent have been met; and (5) the amount of principal and interest due. U.S. Bank Natl. Assn. v. Lewis, 10th Dist. No. 18AP-550, 2019-Ohio-3014, ¶ 23. In support of its summary judgment motion, Huntington presenting the necessary evidence supporting its foreclosure claim. Hall responded by presenting evidence that, according to her, demonstrated the loan was not in default as alleged.
{¶ 10} Resolving the issue of whether the loan was in default in the amount alleged requires review of the meaning of certain provisions in the rider. The meaning of a written contract is a questiоn of law. State v. Fed. Ins. Co., 10th Dist. No. 04AP-1350, 2005-Ohio-6807, ¶ 22, citing Long Beach Assn., Inc. v. Jones, 82 Ohio St.3d 574, 576 (1998). The
{¶ 11} The parties disagree as to whether the rider‘s debt cancellation protection terminated when Huntington canсeled the existing personal credit line debt upon Leeca Cooper‘s death in April 2011. Huntington argues that, pursuant to section 3.1.4 of the rider, the debt cancellation protection automatically terminated at that time. Conversely, Hall contends that the rider‘s section 5.0.1, not section 3.1.4, controlled any possible termination of the debt cancellation protection. Hall argues Huntington‘s cancellation of debt upon Leeca Cooper‘s death did not terminate the debt cancellation protection because none of the four circumstances set forth in section 5.0.1 occurred. She also generally asserts the intent of the parties was for Huntington to provide joint protection for the borrowers, and therefore the debt cancellation protection did not terminate upon the death of Leeca Cooper.
{¶ 12} The rider, which amended the personal credit line agreement between Huntington and Leeca and Gary Cooper, defines “Debt Cancellation Protection” as Huntington‘s “forgiveness or cancellation of all or a portion of the Minimum Monthly Payment or the Outstanding Credit Line Balance due to the occurrence of a Protected Event.” (Ex. D at 1.0 Definitions, аttached to Apr. 4, 2019 Pl.‘s Mot. for Summ. Jgmt.) A “Protected Event” is “a defined event that initiates protection” under the rider. (Ex. D at 1.0 Definitions.) The rider identifies a borrower‘s terminal medical condition diagnosis or death (“Loss of Life“) as a protected event. Thus, the rider рrovided Leeca and Gary Cooper
{¶ 13} Sections 3.1.1 and 3.1.4 of the rider provide that “[a]fter a Loss of Life,” Huntington will cancel the “Eligible Debt Amount,” which is defined as the lesser of the outstanding credit line balance, or $50,000. (Ex. D.) Any amount above that remains the obligation of the deceased‘s estate and any surviving borrower. Section 3.1.4 of the rider further states, “Upon Debt Cancellation Protection due to Loss of Life being credited to the Outstanding Credit Balance, this Rider will terminate.” (Ex. D.)1
{¶ 14} In contrast with sections 3.1.4 (Loss of Life protection) and 3.2.4 (terminal medical condition diagnosis protection), sections 5.0.1, 5.0.2, and 5.0.3 of the rider provide for the termination of Huntington‘s debt cancellation protection under circumstances that do not involve Huntington first canceling borrower debt. Sections 5.0.2 and 5.0.3 address the rights of the borrowers and Huntington to voluntarily terminate the debt cancellation protection. And section 5.0.1 provides for the automatic termination of the debt cancellation protection in four specific circumstanсes. This section states that, “[u]nless terminated earlier as described in sections 5.0.2 and 5.0.3 below, and subject to section 5.0.4[2],” debt cancellation protection under the rider ends for all borrowers “on the earlier of” the protection expirаtion date, “the pay-off and termination of Your PCL Account,” the renewal or refinancing of the personal credit line, or either of the borrowers reach 66 years old. (Ex. D.)
{¶ 15} As noted above, once proper notice was provided to Huntington indicating the occurrence of a protected event, namely Leeca Cooper‘s death, Huntington canceled the eligible debt amount. Under the plain language of section 3.1.4, the cancellation of that debt resulted in the automatic termination of the rider. Hall contends, however, that any termination of the rider involving the elimination of existing debt on the personal line of
{¶ 16} Hall also argues that the use of the term “joint debt cancellation protection” in the rider and associated disclosure documents indicated the parties’ intent that debt on the personal credit line would be canceled after each borrower died. We disagree. The fact that the coverage the Coopers purchased was referred to as “joint debt cancellation protection” in the rider and accompanying disclosure documents did not alter the application of section 3.1.4. Under the terms of the rider, both borrowers were covered in the event of a borrower death or terminal medical condition diagnosis. In that sense, it was joint protection. Thus, we reject Hall‘s contention that, despite the plain language of section 3.1.4, the use of the term “joint debt cancellation protection” in the rider and associated disclosure documents required Huntington‘s continuation of debt cancellation protection coverage until Gary Cooper‘s death.
{¶ 17} For these reasons, we find Huntington was not required to cancel the existing debt upon Gary Cooper‘s death because the rider already had terminated when Huntington canceled the existing debt upon Leeca Cooper‘s death. Consequently, the loan was in default as alleged. Because the trial court did not err in granting Huntington‘s summary judgment motion and denying Hall‘s summary judgment motion, we overrule Hall‘s sole assignment of error.
{¶ 18} Having overruled Hall‘s sole assignment of error, we affirm the judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas.
Judgment affirmed.
DORRIAN, P.J., and BROWN, J., concur.