Hughes v. StateHughes v. State
The evidence presented at trial showed the following. On November 23, 2017, Appellant shot and killed Dre‘Landon as Appellant fled the Brown family home. Appellant admitted to shooting Dre‘Landon but claimed that it was done in self-defense because Dre‘Landon was chasing him down the stairs of the Brown family home with a gun.
Earlier that evening, Appellant sneaked into the home of Reed and her teenage grandchildren — Marjorie Brown, Absolom Brown, Dre‘Landon, and Jaymareion Brown — to meet with Marjorie, who had recently given birth to Appellant‘s child. Appellant was carrying a loaded gun and a backpack with a few rounds of loose ammunition. Reed had banned Appellant from her home and from contact with
After Jaymareion and Dre‘Landon saw a photo on social media of Appellant, Marjorie, and their child in what looked like Marjorie‘s bedroom, the two brothers confronted Marjorie at her bedroom door. When she denied that Appellant was in the room, Jaymareion pushed into the room with Dre‘Landon following behind. Not seeing Appellant in the room, Jaymareion opened the closet door to find Appellant hiding inside. Appellant then pointed a gun at Jaymareion, who exclaimed, “So you‘re going to bring a gun into our house.” When Appellant did not respond, Jaymareion said, “Bro, just leave.” Appellant pointed his gun at both brothers, who remained still, as he first exited the closet and then the room.
Seconds later, as Appellant proceeded downstairs, Dre‘Landon left Marjorie‘s room and followed Appellant down the stairs. When Appellant reached the bottom of the stairs, rather than go out the nearby front door, Appellant stopped, turned around, and shot Dre‘Landon twice in the chest and once more as he fell. Meanwhile,
Jaymareion ran back down the stairs to find Dre‘Landon bleeding on the floor. Jaymareion attempted to stop the bleeding and called the police. Jaymareion saw no gun near his brother.
While Jaymareion tended to his brother‘s wounds, Marjorie went out the front door to look for Appellant. Upon finding him, she agreed to grab their child, get the keys to the family car, and leave with him. She went back inside, took the child, and brought him to Appellant. She then returned to the house to pack her things, but Reed stopped her from leaving until the police arrived.
By the time the police arrived, Dre‘Landon was dead. The police found and arrested Appellant one block from the house. In searching the home for Appellant‘s firearm, the police found a few rounds of loose ammunition in the backpack Appellant had left inside Marjorie‘s closet. A specialized canine unit also searched the
A series of confrontations had occurred between Appellant and various members of Dre‘Landon‘s family in the months leading up to the shooting death of Dre‘Landon. Initially, Dre‘Landon‘s family had lived in Roswell, where Appellant and Marjorie met at school and started dating. According to Reed, Marjorie‘s behavior started to change when she began dating Appellant. She began running away with Appellant and started drinking, using drugs, and breaking into and sleeping in abandoned places. Reed also heard that Appellant had “beat up” Marjorie. These events led Reed to prohibit the two teenagers from seeing each other, including barring Appellant from her home.
Sometime later, while walking down a trail behind the family home, Absolom saw Appellant with another unidentified person. Absolom told Appellant to wait, went home, and returned with Jaymareion and Dre‘Landon. Absolom noticed that Appellant appeared to be holding an AR-15-style rifle. Absolom, scared, began to move away before realizing the rifle was only a BB gun. The unknown person with Appellant then approached the three brothers and asked whether Absolom wanted to fight. Jaymareion interjected that no one would fight his brother without also fighting him. Appellant then threatened to kill the brothers.
At some point, Reed invited Appellant to talk with her. Reed made it clear to Appellant that he was not allowed in the family home. Immediately following this discussion, Reed found her car vandalized: all four tires had been slashed and the windshield broken. Appellant admitted to Marjorie that he had vandalized Reed‘s car; Marjorie told the rest of the family.
Finally, in the summer of 2017, to give Marjorie “a clean break away from all that badness” in Roswell, Reed moved the family to a new home in Forsyth County. In November 2017, Marjorie gave birth to Appellant‘s child. After the move to Forsyth County, Reed once again prohibited Appellant from being in the family home and told Marjorie not to tell Appellant their new address. Marjorie, however, told Appellant the new address and continued her relationship with him.
Evidence is intrinsic when it pertains “to the chain of events explaining the context, motive, and set-up of the crime,” and is admissible so long as it is “linked in time and circumstances with the charged crime, . . . forms an integral and natural part of an account of the crime, or is necessary to complete the story of the crime for the jury[.]” Heade v. State, Case No. S21A0409, 2021 WL 2518631, at *4 (decided June 21, 2021) (citation and punctuation omitted). “There is no bright-line rule regarding how close in time evidence must be to the charged offenses, or requiring evidence to
Here, the evidence that Appellant vandalized Reed‘s car was a part of the chain of events leading to the charged crimes. Occurring amidst a series of escalating threats and acts of violence by Appellant and members of Dre‘Landon‘s family, it showed the tension in the relationship between the persons involved in this case, was a precipitating cause for the family‘s relocation from Roswell to Forsyth County, and explained, in part, why Appellant was not permitted in Reed‘s home the night of the shooting. When considered in light of the other evidence in this case, we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion by concluding that the evidence that Appellant vandalized Reed‘s car was reasonably necessary to complete the story for the jury and was therefore intrinsic evidence. See Clark v. State, 306 Ga. 367, 374 (829 SE2d 306) (2019) (concluding that evidence was intrinsic in part because it explained why appellant was not welcome in the victim‘s home).
Of course, intrinsic evidence may be “excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.”
As explained above, Appellant‘s vandalism of Reed‘s car was probative in explaining the context of the charged crimes and the increasingly hostile relationship between Appellant and Reed and members of her family. The trial court was within its discretion to determine that the prejudicial impact of this act was not unfair and did not substantially outweigh its probative value. Appellant, therefore, has failed to show that the trial court abused its discretion
2. Appellant claims that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance for failing to elicit testimony at trial that Dre‘Landon had a gun during a prior incident involving Appellant and for failing to object to several pieces of testimony regarding the numerous prior conflicts between Appellant and members of Dre‘Landon‘s family. We disagree.
To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Appellant must show both that his trial counsel‘s performance was deficient and that he suffered prejudice as a result. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (104 SCt 2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984). An appellant must satisfy both prongs of the Strickland test, and if he fails as to one prong, “it is not incumbent upon this Court to examine the other prong.” Smith v. State, 296 Ga. 731, 733 (770 SE2d 610) (2015) (citation and punctuation omitted). To establish deficient performance, an appellant “must overcome the strong presumption that his . . . counsel‘s conduct falls within the broad range of reasonable professional conduct and show that his counsel
(a) Appellant asserts that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to introduce evidence at trial that Appellant was assaulted by Dre‘Landon with a gun in a prior incident. At the pretrial hearing on Appellant‘s motion for immunity, Appellant testified that eight months prior to the shooting of Dre‘Landon, Dre‘Landon drove past Appellant and pointed a gun at him, placing him in fear of being shot. Trial counsel, however, did not elicit this same testimony at trial. Appellant argues that this failure was not only constitutionally deficient but also was prejudicial because the critical issue in the case was whether Dre‘Landon had a gun, putting
Even assuming trial counsel‘s failure to elicit this testimony at trial was deficient, Appellant has failed to show prejudice. Although the testimony, had it been elicited at trial, may have shown that Dre‘Landon had access to a gun eight months earlier, the evidence was very strong that only Appellant had a gun on the night Dre‘Landon was shot: no one ever saw Dre‘Landon with a gun, and Appellant‘s gun was the only useable one found at the scene, which was searched by the police with a canine unit trained to detect guns. See Henderson v. State, 310 Ga. 708, 714 (854 SE2d 523) (2021) (concluding that exclusion of testimony was harmless where evidence of guilt was “very strong“). Further, the testimony would have shown merely another in a long list of incidents of prior threats or violent acts between Appellant and members of Dre‘Landon‘s family leading up to the shooting. See Byers v. State, __ Ga. __ (857 SE2d 447, 451) (2021) (concluding that exclusion of testimony was harmless where it was essentially cumulative of other evidence). Appellant has therefore failed to show that the outcome of the trial
(b) Appellant further claims that his trial counsel was constitutionally deficient for failing to object to several pieces of testimony regarding the numerous prior incidents of conflict between Appellant and members of Dre‘Landon‘s family. Specifically, Appellant argues that trial counsel should have objected to the following: (1) Reed‘s testimony regarding why her family left Roswell; (2) her testimony that Appellant beat Marjorie; (3) Absolom‘s and Jaymareion‘s testimony regarding Appellant‘s sexually derogatory comments about Marjorie; (4) and Absolom‘s and Jaymareion‘s testimony about the incident on the trail involving Appellant and a BB gun.
Appellant has failed to prove that his trial counsel acted deficiently in choosing not to object to this testimony. “Reasonable
Here, at the motion for new trial hearing, trial counsel explained his trial strategy. He sought to show that Appellant was a loving and interested father who was at Reed‘s home for peaceful purposes and that the shooting would never have occurred but for the aggression of Dre‘Landon. The prior confrontations and incidences of violence between Appellant and members of Dre‘Landon‘s family supported the defense‘s theory that the bad blood between the parties contributed to Appellant‘s reasonable fear of them, which in turn supported his claim of self-defense. Given trial counsel‘s “founded, reasonable belief that [Appellant] was best served by using this evidence to his advantage instead of objecting to it, counsel‘s decision amounted to reasonable trial strategy that does not constitute deficient performance.” Griffin, 309 Ga. at 867.
Well, it was mainly because of her being involved with him because she was running off, she was staying with him. They were at a hotel there in Roswell. And I even went to that person and asked them to let me know if they find her. Then I was informed that she had been beat up by him.
The prosecutor immediately stopped Reed saying, “I don‘t want to go into any of that, okay,” redirecting her to identify whether Appellant was the person she had just explained Marjorie was running off with.
At the motion for new trial hearing, trial counsel explained that he did not object to Reed‘s comment because Reed had been promptly stopped and redirected by the prosecutor and that he believed it best not to object to this off-hand comment so as to not draw further attention to it. Appellant has failed to show that this
3. Appellant claims that the harm of the alleged cumulative errors by the trial court and trial counsel must be assessed under State v. Lane, 308 Ga. 10, 17-18 (838 SE2d 808) (2020). As explained above, however, there are not multiple errors from which to assess cumulative harm. See Cox v. State, 306 Ga. 736, 743 (832 SE2d 354) (2019) (“[W]e evaluate only the effects of matters determined to be error, not the cumulative effect of non-errors.” (citation and punctuation omitted)).
4. Finally, Appellant argues that the case must be remanded for reconsideration of his motion for immunity because the trial court wrongly considered his duty and failure to retreat as a ground for denying him immunity under
To avoid trial, a defendant bears the burden of proof to show that he is entitled to immunity by a preponderance of the evidence. See Bunn v. State, 284 Ga. 410, 413 (667 SE2d 605) (2008). On appeal, the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the trial court‘s ruling, and the trial court‘s findings of fact and credibility determinations are accepted if there is any evidence to support them. See Hipp v. State, 293 Ga. 415, 418 (746 SE2d 95) (2013).
Jaymareion and Reed testified and denied Appellant‘s version of events. They explained that the brothers had not been loud and threatening, that Dre‘Landon did not leave the room, mention a gun,
In its order, the trial court laid out this testimony and explained that although “prior difficulties” between Appellant and members of Dre‘Landon‘s family could have given Appellant “a reasonable fear of further violence . . . in general[,]” Appellant based “his need to shoot Dre‘Landon on the fact that he could not get out of the front door, which gave Dre‘Landon, armed with a gun, time to get downstairs and confront him.” (Emphasis supplied.) The trial court then explained that Appellant was able to leave Marjorie‘s room, that “[n]o gun was found” near Dre‘Landon, and that it found Jaymareion‘s and Reed‘s testimony that Dre‘Landon did not have a gun more credible than Appellant‘s version of events. This led the trial court to conclude:
[Appellant] has not proved to the [c]ourt by a preponderance of the evidence that he could not open the front door and that he shot to defend himself from an armed person. The [c]ourt does not discount all of the testimony presented by [Appellant] in this case, but finds
that [Appellant] had placed himself in a position to exit [] Reed‘s home without further violence and elected to shoot the unarmed victim anyway. Thus, while there is evidence supporting [Appellant‘s] claim for self-defense, the [c]ourt finds that [Appellant] has not carried his burden of proof for the purpose of obtaining immunity.
(Emphasis supplied.)
In summary, the trial court concluded that Appellant‘s claim of self-defense was founded on his testimony that he was unable to escape the armed, pursuing Dre‘Landon. However, given that Appellant was able to leave Marjorie‘s room unharmed and that the trial court did not credit Appellant‘s testimony that Dre‘Landon had a gun, the trial court concluded that Appellant failed to prove that he was in reasonable apprehension of fear of imminent death or great bodily injury from Dre‘Landon in order to justify his use of deadly force. Given these findings, the trial court was authorized to find that Appellant failed to carry his burden to prove that he was entitled to immunity. See, e.g., Arnold v. State, 302 Ga. 129, 132 n.6 (805 SE2d 94) (2017) (concluding that the trial court‘s decision to deny motion for immunity was “wholly supported by [the court‘s]
Appellant argues, however, that the trial court‘s repeated references to his failure to retreat undermine its denial of his motion for immunity by showing that the court improperly relied on Appellant‘s failure to retreat. Although
Judgment affirmed. Nahmias, C. J., and Peterson, Warren, Bethel, Ellington, McMillian, and LaGrua, JJ., concur.