HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v Rini

Aug 5, 2026
2025-01524
Versions:2026 NY Slip Op 04845

HSBC Bank USA, National Association, etc., respondent, v Patricia Rini, appellant, et al., defendants.

Supreme Court of the State of New York, Appellate Division, Second Judicial Department

Decided on August 5, 2026

2025-01524, (Index No. 618923/18)

Betsy Barros, J.P.

Helen Voutsinas

Donna-Marie E. Golia

Phillip Hom, JJ.

Justin F. Pane, P.C., Bohemia, NY, for appellant.

Atlas | Solomon LLP, New York, NY (Jason D. St. John of counsel), for respondent.

[*1]

DECISION & ORDER

In an action to foreclose a mortgage, the defendant Patricia Rini appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Aletha V. Fields, J.), dated January 29, 2025. The order granted the plaintiff‘s motion, inter alia, to vacate a stipulation of discontinuance dated February 7, 2024, and to restore the action to the court‘s active calendar to the extent of directing a hearing on the issue of whether the defendant Patricia Rini breached a conditional agreement to settle the action.

ORDERED that on the Court‘s own motion, the notice of appeal is deemed to be an application for leave to appeal, and leave to appeal is granted (see CPLR 5701[c]); and it is further,

ORDERED that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, and the plaintiff‘s motion, among other things, to vacate the stipulation of discontinuance dated February 7, 2024, and to restore the action to the Supreme Court‘s active calendar is denied.

In September 2018, the plaintiff commenced this action against the defendant Patricia Rini (hereinafter the defendant), among others, to foreclose a mortgage on certain real property located in Coram. The defendant moved, inter alia, pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(8) to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against her for lack of personal jurisdiction. In an order dated September 2, 2020, the Supreme Court, among other things, denied that branch of the defendant‘s motion.

The defendant appealed from the order dated September 2, 2020. In a decision and order dated July 19, 2023, this Court reversed the order insofar as appealed from and remitted the matter to the Supreme Court, Suffolk County, for a hearing to determine whether the defendant was properly served with process pursuant to CPLR 308[2] and a new determination thereafter of that branch of the defendant‘s motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(8) to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against her for lack of personal jurisdiction (see HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v Rini, 218 AD3d 664, 665).

The Supreme Court scheduled a hearing to determine the propriety of service of [*2] process upon the defendant. Prior to the hearing, the plaintiff and the defendant entered into a conditional agreement to settle the action, which included a term for a loan modification for the defendant. After placing the conditional agreement on the record, the court stated that it would retain jurisdiction over the action.

The plaintiff and the defendant subsequently executed a stipulation of discontinuance dated February 7, 2024, which was then filed with the Supreme Court. Pursuant to the stipulation of discontinuance, the plaintiff withdrew the complaint and discontinued the action, the defendant withdrew her answer and counterclaims, and all claims interposed in the action were discontinued. Notably, the stipulation of discontinuance was silent as to whether the court retained jurisdiction for any purpose.

In November 2024, the plaintiff moved, inter alia, to vacate the stipulation of discontinuance and to restore the action to the Supreme Court‘s active calendar, arguing that the defendant failed to complete the paperwork for the loan modification to which the plaintiff and the defendant conditionally agreed. The defendant opposed the motion. In an order dated January 29, 2025, the court granted the plaintiff‘s motion to the extent of directing a hearing on the issue of whether the defendant breached the conditional agreement to settle the action. The defendant appeals.

“‘A motion must be addressed to a pending action‘” (Riccio v Kukaj, 219 AD3d 1540, 1541-1542, quoting Urso v Panish, 94 AD2d 701, 701-702). A court lacks jurisdiction to entertain a motion after the action has been unequivocally terminated by the execution of an express, unconditional stipulation of discontinuance (see Riccio v Kukaj, 219 AD3d at 1541-1542; Beneficial Homeowner Serv. Corp. v Francis, 209 AD3d 957, 959; Cambridge Integrated Servs. Group, Inc. v Johnson, 107 AD3d 1588, 1589) “or actual entry of judgment in accordance with the terms of the settlement” (Teitelbaum Holdings v Gold, 48 NY2d 51, 53).

Here, the Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the plaintiff‘s motion, among other things, to vacate the stipulation of discontinuance and to restore the action to the court‘s active calendar. The action was unconditionally discontinued by the stipulation of discontinuance executed by the plaintiff and the defendant and filed with the court, in which the plaintiff withdrew the complaint and discontinued all claims interposed in the action, and the stipulation was silent as to the court‘s retention of jurisdiction for any purpose (see Riccio v Kukaj, 219 AD3d at 1541-1542; Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. v Goltz, 200 AD3d 646, 647; cf. Conroy v Conroy, 215 AD3d 630, 632). Accordingly, under the circumstances, the plaintiff‘s requested relief was not available by way of a motion and could only be obtained by commencing a plenary action (see Riccio v Kukaj, 219 AD3d at 1541-1542; Teitelbaum Holdings v Gold, 48 NY2d at 55-56; cf. Conroy v Conroy, 215 AD3d at 632).

The parties’ remaining contentions either are without merit or need not be reached in light of our determination.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have denied the plaintiff‘s motion, inter alia, to vacate the stipulation of discontinuance and to restore the action to the court‘s active calendar.

BARROS, J.P., VOUTSINAS, GOLIA and HOM, JJ., concur.

ENTER:

Darrell M. Joseph

Clerk of the Court