Howard v. CoonrodHoward v. Coonrod
- Reporters:
- Before:
- Paul G. Byron
This cause comes before the Court on Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 24 (the ”Motion“)), filed on March 9, 2021. On April 23, 2021, Plaintiffs responded in opposition. (Doc. 35). Upon consideration, the Motion is due to be granted in part and denied in part.
I. BACKGROUND1
Plaintiffs—along with over 100 individuals—are incarcerated in the state of Florida, serving life with the possibility of parole sentences for crimes committed when they were under the age of 18 years old. (Doc. 1, ¶ 1). The Eighth Amendment2
In response to the Supreme Court‘s line of cases, Florida adopted new sentencing procedures for juvenile offenders serving life in prison. See Chapter 2014-2020, Laws of Florida (the ”2014 Juvenile Sentencing Statute“). The 2014 Juvenile Sentencing Statute requires an individualized sentencing hearing to consider the offense committed along with the defendant‘s youth before imposing a life sentence.
Plaintiffs allege that “Florida does not, however, treat all juvenile lifers the same.” (Id. ¶ 7). Plaintiffs maintain that while juveniles sentenced to life without
II. LEGAL STANDARD
A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Challenges to subject matter jurisdiction come in two forms: “facial attacks” and “factual attacks.” Lawrence v. Dunbar, 919 F.2d 1525, 1528–29 (11th Cir. 1990). Facial attacks only require the court to determine if the plaintiff has alleged a sufficient basis for subject matter jurisdiction. Id. at 1529. As such, the allegations within the complaint are assumed true for the purpose of the motion. Id. On the other hand, factual attacks challenge the еxistence of subject matter jurisdiction irrespective of what the complaint alleges. Garcia v. Copenhaver, Bell & Assocs., M.D‘s, P.A., 104 F.3d 1256, 1260–61 (11th Cir. 1997). Accordingly, courts may consider information outside of the pleadings—including testimony, affidavits, and other evidence—and may make factual findings to resolve the motion.
B. Failure to State a Claim
A motion to dismiss made pursuant to
Although mere legal conclusions or a recitation of the claim‘s elements will not pass muster, a sufficient complaint does not require detailed factual allegations. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Indeed, courts are “not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986). “While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Courts must also view the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and resolve any doubts regarding the complaint‘s sufficiency in the plaintiff‘s favor. See, e.g., Hunnings v. Texaco, Inc., 29 F.3d 1480, 1483 (11th Cir. 1994) (per curiam).
In sum, courts must (1) ignore conclusory allegations, bald legal assertions, and formulaic recitations of the elements of a claim; (2) accept well-pled factual allegations as true; and (3) view well-pled allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 67.
III. DISCUSSION
Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiffs’ Complaint because: (1) their claims are barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994); (2) they lack standing; (3) they failed to exhaust administrative remedies prior to filing suit; (4) their claims are untimely under the statute of limitations; and (5) the state of Florida already satisfies the Constitutional requirements Plaintiffs complain about. (Doc. 24). With briefing complete, the matter is ripe for review.
A. Heck Doctrine
Defendants first argue that Plaintiffs’ Complaint does not “properly sound in § 1983 because, under Heck . . . [Plaintiffs’ claims] can only be brought in a federal habeas petition.” (Id. at pp. 2–5). Specifically, Defendants argue that “a prisoner cannot use § 1983 . . . where success would necessarily imply the
[They] do not contend that their convictions or sentences are invalid or unconstitutional. They assert that Florida‘s parole system, process, and procedures deny them the meaningful opportunity for release upon demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation that the Constitution requires.
. . .
Plaintiffs seek the same judicial review process pursuant to the 2014 Juvenile Sentencing Statute afforded to juveniles sentenced to LWOP, which would require the trial court to hold a review hearing to consider the Plaintiffs’ maturation and rehabilitation to determine whether early parole release is appropriate.
. . .
In the alternative, Plaintiffs seek this Court to require Defendants to revise Florida‘s current parole process to specifically account for their demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation, their youth at the time of the original offense, and to provide a variety of other procedural protections.
. . .
Early release would not be guaranteed. Therefore, the Heck doctrine is inapplicable.
(Id.).
The Court finds that Plaintiffs’ claims are not barred by Heck. The doctrine specifically states that “habeas corpus is the exclusive remedy for a state prisoner who challenges the fact or duration of his confinement and seeks immediate or
Such is the case here. Put simply, Heck does not bar Plaintiffs’ claims that Florida‘s parole system denies them meaningful opportunity for release in violation of their Constitutional rights. As Plaintiffs correctly state, their § 1983 claims if successful, would obtain quicker or new parole hearings, and the parole board would have discretion whether or not to shorten the prisoners’ terms but because their claims would not necessarily call for speedier release, relief pursuant to § 1983 is available. See Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74 (2005); see also Hill, 878 F.3d at 210 (“The reasoning [in Wilkson] applies with equal force here, where the Plaintiffs do not seek direct release from prison or shorter sentence, but instead seek an examination of the Defendants’ policies and procedures governing access to prison programming and parole eligibility, consideration and release. [The Sixth Circuit] has already expressly found such challenges cognizable under § 1983.” (internal citation and quotations omitted)).
Defendants next argue that Plaintiffs’ Complaint must be dismissed because they lack standing to assert claims for sentence review or resentencing. (Doc. 24, pp. 5–6). Defendants maintain—in a conclusory fashion—that Plaintiffs’ claims lack traceability and redressability. (Id.).
To establish standing, a plaintiff must allege: (1) injury-in-fact; (2) a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of; and (3) that it is likely the injury will be redressed by a favorable ruling. See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992); Houston v. Marod Supermarkets, Inc., 733 F.3d 1323, 1328 (11th Cir. 2013).
The Court finds that Plaintiffs have a concrete injury that is traceable to the challenged actions of Defendants. Plaintiffs have alleged that the Defendants, through their “current policies, procedures, and customs with respect to the parole review process” violate their constitutional rights by, among other things, “fail[ing] to provide a realistic and meaningful opportunity for release upon demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation . . . .” (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 159, 165). Plaintiffs also allege that Defendants violate their constitutional rights by “depriving Plaintiffs and the other Class Members of their equal rights to judicial reconsideration as provided to those juvenile offenders serving de jure LWOP sentences.” (Id. ¶ 170). Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged that the complained of actions by Defendants caused Plaintiffs’ complained of injuries.
C. Administrative Remedies
Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ claims should be dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. (Doc. 24, pp. 6–10). Specifically, Defendants maintain that the Prison Litigation Reform Act (”PLRA“) provides that:
No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.
PLRA,
[T]he term “civil action with respect to prison conditions” means any civil proceeding arising under Federal law with respect to the conditions of confinement or the effects of actions by government officials on the lives of persons confined in prison, but does nоt include habeas corpus proceedings challenging the fact or duration of confinement in prison.
Id. at 1324. Additionally, Defendants simply state that the Eighth Circuit has held that challenges to parole procedures are governed by the PLRA.4 (Doc. 24, p. 7). Plaintiffs respond that “Defendants’ suggestion that PLRA exhaustion extends beyond complying with the state‘s prison grievance process to filing a comprehensive rulemaking petition finds no support in the plain language of the statute and is refuted by multiple Supreme Court and Eleventh Circuit cases.” (Doc. 35, p. 27). The Court agrees.
Defendants cite O‘Conner v. Carnahan, No. 3:09cv224, 2012 WL 2201522, at *14 (N.D. Fla. Mar. 27, 2012), for their argument that the PLRA exhaustion requirements apply to Plaintiffs’ claims regarding Florida‘s pаrole procedures. This does not provide any persuasive argument for Defendants’ position because the Magistrate Judge was determining whether the plaintiff‘s grievance that he was denied psychiatric medications was subject to the exhaustion requirements. This4
As such, the Court finds that the PLRA exhaustion requirement does not apply to the claims at issue challenging Florida‘s parole process.
D. Statute of Limitations
Next, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ claims are untimely and due to be dismissed under the applicable statute of limitations. (Doc. 24, pp. 10–12).
There is no federal statute of limitations for § 1983 claims, so courts must borrow the most analogous statute of limitations in the forum state. See
Plaintiffs maintain that their Complaint “alleges that Florida‘s parole system is fundamentally flawed and, as a result, Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights are violated each time they come up for review before FCOR.” (Doc. 35, p. 35). Plaintiffs state that “[a]t each step of the parole process, Plaintiffs have experienced a continuing injury by being deprived of their right to demonstrate rehabilitation and maturation.” (Id.). Thus, it is not clear from the face of the complaint that Plaintiffs’ claims are time-barred. Whether they have dеmonstrated a continuing violation is a fact-specific inquiry that is premature to address at this stage of the litigation. See Hogan, WL 467731, at *16 (holding that “whether plaintiffs have demonstrated a continuing violation is a fact-specific inquiry that, in my view, is premature to address at this stage of litigation“).
Last, Defendant maintain that Plaintiffs’ claims must be dismissed as a matter of law because Florida already satisfies Constitutional requirements. (Doc. 24, pp. 12–22).5
1. Count I: Eighth Amendment
Defendants merely state that Graham,6 Miller,7 Michel,8 and Franklin9 “forecloses any claim of cruel and unusual punishment on Plaintiffs’ part.” (Doc.10
At the outset, the Court notes that it agrees with other courts that have found that “the constitutional protections recognized by Graham, Miller, and Montgomery apply to parole proceedings for juvenile offenders serving a maximum term of life imprisonment.” See Flores v. Stanford, 18CV2468, 2019 WL 4572703, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2019). The Court finds that Plaintiffs have sufficiently pleaded Eighth Amendment violations. Plaintiffs have detailed out the ways in which Florida‘s parole system denies a “realistic opportunity for release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation,” and how such denial allegedly constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 156–61). As such an early stage in the litigation, it is improper for the Court to determine the ultimate merits of Plaintiffs’ constitutional claims and Defendants’ Motion is due to be denied as to Count I.
Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ due process claims must be dismissed because “no fundamental right is at stake,” and Plaintiffs “cannot show either a constitutionally-protected liberty interest or a constitutionally-protected inadequate process.” (Doc. 24, pp. 18–20).
The Eleventh Circuit has stated that due process claims require three elements: (1) the deprivation of a constitutionally protected liberty interest; (2) state action; and (3) constitutionally inadequate process. Grayden v. Rhodes, 345 F.3d 1225, 1232 (11th Cir. 2003). Additionally, “juvenile offenders serving a maximum term of life have a cognizable liberty interest in obtaining parole upon demonstrating maturity and rehabilitation.” Flores, 2019 WL 4572703, at *10. Graham, Miller, and Montgomery stand for the proposition that “[i]f [a parole board] determines that a juvenile offender has demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation, parole [] is required as a matter of law.” Bonilla v. Iowa Bd. of Parole, 930 N.W.2d 751, 777 (Iowa 2019) (citing Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 736; Graham, 560 U.S. at 75). Thus, “although Graham stops short of guaranteeing parole, it does provide the juvenile offender with substantially more than a possibility of parole or a mere hope of parole, it creates a categorical entitlement to demonstrate maturity and reform, to show that he is fit to rejoin society, and to have a meaningful opportunity for release.” Greiman v. Hodges, 79 F. Supp. 3d 933, 945 (S.D. Iowa 2015) (emphasis in original). These cases “therefore, confer on juvenile offenders a constitutionally protected liberty interest in meaningful parole
Having established that Plaintiffs have a cognizable liberty interest in meaningful parole review, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have sufficiently pleaded claims for due process violations. Plaintiffs plead that: (1) Defendants have deprived them of a meaningful opportunity for parole review, or release (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 9–10); (2) Defendants acted under color of state law in their capacities as members of FCOR (Id. ¶¶ 27–30, 71, 163); and (3) the current Florida parole рrocess denies Plaintiffs the opportunity to demonstrate maturity and rehabilitation, fails to take their youth at the time of their offense into consideration, and bases parole decisions entirely on the original offense (Id. ¶¶ 106–07, 112, 119, 127, 136, 149). Additionally, Plaintiffs allege that the parole process fails to meet the basic requirements of procedural due process of notice and an opportunity to be heard. (Id. ¶¶ 165, 137, 144). Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that the parole process denies them the right to effective counsel at parole hearings and the right to retain experts/investigators and/or employ psychological testing to show maturity and rehabilitatiоn. (Id.). Plaintiffs allege that they are not allowed to appear individually or through counsel at the parole hearings and consequently, that they are unable to challenge erroneous or detrimental evidence/information at the hearings. (Id.). Thus, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged claims for due process violations and Defendants’ Motion is due to be denied as to Count II.
Penultimately, Plaintiffs’ Complaint alleges that the 2014 Juvenile Sentencing Statute, Florida Statutes ch. 947, and Florida Administrative Code §§ 23-21.006 to 23-21.0161 “violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by depriving Plaintiffs . . . of their equal rights to judicial reconsideration as provided to those juvenile offendеrs serving de jure [life without parole] sentences.” (Doc. 1, ¶ 170). Plaintiffs also allege that these Florida laws “depriv[e] Plaintiffs . . . of their equal rights to judicial reconsideration as provided to those juvenile offenders serving life with parole who received judicial resentencing hearings after Atwell but before Franklin, between 2016 and 2018.” (Id. ¶ 171).
In their Motion, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs do not fall within any recognized suspect classification for equal protection purposes, do not make any claim of discrimination with respect to parole procedures, do not satisfy the required showing of invidious discrimination, and show no basis for any reasonable inference of “intentional or purposeful discrimination.” (Doc. 24, pр. 20–21). Therefore, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ equal protection claims should be dismissed. Plaintiffs respond that they have adequately pleaded all elements of an equal protection claim. (Doc. 35, pp. 16–18).
Specifically, Plaintiffs argue that they “do not contend that they fall within a suspect class but instead that Defendants have impinged upon their constitutionally-protected liberty interest as set forth in Graham and Miller.” (Id.
To establish an equal protection claim, “a prisoner must demonstrate that (1) he is similarly situated to other prisoners who received more favorable treatment; and (2) the state engaged in invidious discrimination against him based on race, religion, national original, or some other constitutionally protected basis.” Sweet v. Sec‘y, Dept. of Corr., 467 F.3d 1311, 1318–19 (11th Cir. 2006) (citing Jones v. Ray, 279 F.3d 944, 946–47 (11th Cir. 2001) and Damiano v. Fl Parole and Prob. Comm‘n, 785 F.2d 929, 932–33 (11th Cir. 1986)).
Plaintiffs’ equal protection claims fail because they have not alleged that they were treated differently than similarly situated prisoners based on “some form of invidious discrimination tied to a constitutionаlly protected-interest.” Id. (emphasis in original). Plaintiffs have not claimed that they were treated differently from others because of race, religion, or national origin.11 Id. (citing Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1, 8 (2944) (“The unlawful administration . . . of a
4. Count IV: Sixth Amendment
Finally, Defendants argue that because Plaintiffs’ Sixth Amendment claims only address sentence reviews, they must be dismissed because the Sixth
Plaintiffs argue that their Sixth Amendment claims arise from the Supreme Court‘s decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), and the line of cases that followed. Plaintiffs maintain that because they have been denied a meaningful opportunity to obtain release, their life with parole sentences amount to de facto life without parole sеntences—a sentence that exceeds their statutory maxima. (Doc. 35, p. 19).
Apprendi, however, does not provide much insight here. In relevant part, Apprendi held that “[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” 530 U.S. at 490. Specifically, the Supreme Court held that a New Jersey hate-crime statute was unconstitutional because it commissioned judges to make factual findings that enhanced their power to punish defendants beyond the maximum penalties prescribed for any given offense. Id.
In 1994, Charles Apprendi, Jr., fired a spray оf .22-caliber bullets into his neighbors’ home. Apprendi was indicted with numerous criminal offenses, none of them alleging that his actions towards his neighbors were racially motivated. Id. at 469. Apprendi pleaded guilty to possession of a firearm for an unlawful purpose, an offense which held a 10-year maximum sentence. Id. at 469–70. However, a separate New Jersey hate-crime statute authorized the imposition of a greater
Although Plaintiffs here make a clever argument, their challenges to Florida‘s parole procedures to not fall within the ambit of Apprendi and the Sixth Amendment. Apprendi imagines situations in which the jury is deprived of their duty to determine the facts underlying the crimes defendants are charged with. Here, Plaintiffs challenge the administrative procedures on the backend of a defendant‘s sentence, not the factual basis upon which the sentence lies. Their argument that the administrative procedures that make up Florida‘s parole process somehow morph their sentences into de facto life without parole sentences—thereby increasing their maximum penalties—is misplaced. See Flores, 2019 WL 4572703, at *12 (“The Court also rejects plaintiffs’ argument that defendants violate Apprendi by denying parole to juvenile offenders serving potential life terms ‘based on new fact-finding’ that plaintiffs say must be performed by a jury. . . Parole Board commissioners therefore may evaluate whether a juvenile offender
To be sure, the Eleventh Circuit has held that “[t]he Sixth Amendment applies only to ‘criminal prosecutions,’ which does not include parole revocation hearings.” U.S. v. Reese, 775 F.3d 1327, 1329 (11th Cir. 2015). Plaintiffs have not provided the Court with any case law to the contrary. As such, the Court finds that the Sixth Amendment does not apply to Plaintiffs’ challenges to Florida‘s parole procedures and Defendants’ Motion is due to be granted as to Count IV.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the aforementioned reasons, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows:
- Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss (Doc. 24) is GRANTED as to Counts III and IV;
- Defendant Motion is otherwise DENIED; and
- On or before July 16, 2021, Plaintiffs may file an Amended Complaint consistent with the directives of this Order, if they believe they can do
so in accordance with Rule 11. Failure to timely file will result in dismissal of Counts III and IV with prejudice.
DONE AND ORDERED in Orlando, Florida on June 25, 2021.
PAUL G. BYRON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Notes
Defendants also rely on Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 93 (2006), to say that the PLRA‘s exhaustion requirement is mandatory. In that case, the Supreme Court was tasked with determining whether the “exhaustion requirement requires proper exhaustion,” not whether parole procedures were considered “prison сonditions.” Id.
This argument is troubling and flawed for many reasons. First, the State cannot justify constitutional violations with the assertion that they are tough on crime. Similarly, the State cannot justify individualized constitutional violations through fearmongering in stating that recidivism rates are generally “well-established.”