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Horace Butler v. James Aiken, Warden, Central Correctional Institute, Travis Medlock, Attorney General, State of South Carolina
864 F.2d 24
4th Cir.
1988
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*1 motion No such not here. made. Birdseye corporations had contempt coming forward burden they

proceeding with comply. E.g., United efforts

reasonable (8th Rue, 1494-95 819 F.2d v.

States Hayes, 722

Cir.1987); v. States United Cir.1984). (11th They intro record Thus on this such efforts.

duced no contempt they were mandatory.

underlying order was denying the Government’s judgment corporations in Birdseye’s to hold

motion reversed, contempt therefore

civil will dis- the case will be remanded entry appropriate of an

trict court for sanctioning order.1 contempt

civil BUTLER, Petitioner-Appellant,

Horace

v. AIKEN, Warden, Correc Central

James Medlock, Institute, Attor Travis

tional Carolina, General, ney of South State

Respondents-Appellees.

No. 87-4004. Appeals,

United States Court

Fourth Circuit. 2, 1988.

Dec. ORDER HALL, Judge.

K.K. reconsideration Before the Court for rehearing with Horace Butler’s district court’s regard appeal of the to his petition for a writ denying his order 28 U.S.C. corpus pursuant inmate, Butler, a South Carolina § court state was convicted After ex- Lane. 1980 murder Pamela remedies, petitioned hausting state asserting a broad relief for federal habeas subsequent proceedings, civil Birdseye pass upon of the conten- do not merits 1. We criminal, illegal, wiretap or illegality be raised question can whether

25 objections to If range of constitutional Roberson. this case were before us proceedings. Finding appeal, state criminal no on direct we would in all likelihood claims, any compelled merit in of his the district court to reverse the conviction and follow, denied relief and we affirmed. Butler v. remand for a new trial. It does not Aiken, (4th Cir.1988). however, peti- that Butler is entitled to habeas rehearing suggestion re- tion for of relief based a rule of law that was not hearing subsequently denied in effect at the time of his arrest and trial. 15, on June 1988. The retroactive effect of decisions we our bulk such as Roberson in proceedings collateral Butler’s contentions for the reasons sound is determined accordance with three ly expressed by below the district court. (1) purpose factors: of the new rule of addressed, detail, only We Butler’s claim law; (2) the extent of reliance law en resulting that his confession from interro standard; forcement authorities on the old charges following on murder his (3) application effect of retroactive appearance arrest and with counsel on an justice. the administration of Allen “bright unrelated offense violated the line” 255, v. Hardy, 478 U.S. against reinterrogation established in (1986). Although 92 L.Ed.2d 199 all Arizona, relevant,

Edwards v. 101 are it is the first factor that is (1981). 68 L.Ed.2d 378 perhaps Our important only the most for it is conclusion that does not judicial bar when the new formulation “enhanc interrogation properly preceded by ap accuracy es the of criminal trials” and “goes propriate warning and waiver in accord to the heart of the truth Arizona, function,” Stumes, ance with Miranda v. Solem v. 643-45, (1966), 1341-43, L.Ed.2d 694 retroactivity appro that

was cast into immediate and most serious doubt priate. decision in Court’s Arizo — —, na v. Applying this test to the instant The Rober case, fully may we are satisfied that Butler expressly son Court held that the Edwards not claim retroactive benefit from Ro interrogation rule does bar initiated berson. The Edwards-Roberson limita following suspect’s request for counsel police interrogation tions on have separate investigation. the context of a tangential relationship most to truth find — U.S. —, are, rather, ing. They part pro light phylactic protection we determined that accorded the fifth amendment to counsel as a means of pe- establishing “guidelines Accordingly, reconsidered. we directed to the law enforce — respondents supplemen- profession.” titioner and to file ment U.S. at —, tal briefs on this issue. at 2097. The We have now appellant, unquestionably contrary supplemental received and examined that while is, briefing. present “guidelines,” conducted therefore, ripe disposition. law in strict accordance with established We, therefore, conclude that Butler matter, respon- reject As an initial may challenge presumptively his con valid distinguish dents’ effort to Roberson factu- only by demonstrating that there purposes ally. We assume for of decision of his constitutional was an actual violation appearance of counsel with Butler issue, rights dispositive that 1980. On hearing charge at a on the assault bond support the record discloses no for Butler’s conclusively which he was first arrested claim for habeas relief. demonstrated invocation of Butler’s fifth rights. undisputed local authorities amendment inter- It murder, warnings before rogation concerning provided the Lane oc- full Miranda curring during custody, questioning Butler on the Lane murder. continuous undisputed Butler twice evi- contrary to the as modified is further Edwards rule gated an unrelated offense. The knowing consent to denced his him government obtained from self-incrimi- presence of counsel without the nating about the unrelated of- statements Every court executing signed waivers. no that Butler fense. There is matter has con- considered this that has interrogation that resulted in initiated the rights was un- that the waiver cluded is, self-incriminating statements. He was voluntary. his utterly There coerced and *3 convicted the use of those statements. therefore, find a technical no reason to newly announced law violation based majority expresses the view that appellant reveals that the record when ap- Butler’s case were before it on direct protec- any fifth amendment freely waived “in com- peal, it would all likelihood” be in tions pelled to the conviction and remand reverse But, reasons, majority main- for a new trial. the we conclude foregoing For the tains, Butler’s case is before it on the because that our initial affirmance corpus, he is denial of a appro- in matter was court’s decision this relief, entitled to as the rule of law on priate substance. of his un- which he relies to bar the use on the requested poll In of the Court a confession not in effect at counselled was banc, rehearing en Chief suggestion for Specifical- the time of his arrest and trial. WINTER, Judges PHIL- Judge and Circuit ly, majority’s is that an the view SPROUSE, MURNAGHAN, LIPS, and ER- Butler’s did not tion such as violate banc; to rehear the case VIN voted Arizona, 451 wards v. U.S. RUSSELL, WIDENER, Judges (1981),until Edwards WILKINSON, HALL, CHAPMAN, “modified” Arizona v. was rehearing en banc. WILKINS voted —, 108 the panel As the has considered not de- Because Roberson was opinion that it and is of the after Butler’s conviction cided until became denied, majority of and as a the final, Butler is entitled to invoke deny rehear- judges voted to active circuit majority, only if in the view of the Rober- banc, and OR- ing en it is ADJUDGED son is held to be retroactive. DERED that the that Roberson does not meet the concludes rehearing en are de- suggestion for banc application. test for retroactive nied. making Butler’s entitlement to relief concurrences Cir- ENTERED with the retroactivity of depend upon the CHAPMAN. cuit RUSSELL and view, incorrectly majority, my con- and Roberson. strues both Edwards WINTER, L. Chief HARRISON Judge, dissenting: II. from the denial of respectfully I dissent Imprimis, I think that Butler’s confession

rehearing in because believe constitutionally under Ed- was inadmissible in viola- conviction was obtained standing alone. stated un- wards life applicable tion of constitutional “ex- conditionally suspect that a doubt, in this case. I have no is at stake police pressed his desire to deal with therefore, validity of Butler’s con- counsel, subject further through is not “exceptional question of presents a authorities until coun- 35(a). F.R.App.P. importance.” him, made available to unless sel has been further com- the accused himself initiates I. 484-85, 101 munication.” that, states, 1885. It is true correctly As the subject which the accused requested questioned about counsel when crime for interrogated was the wrongly the authorities were the offense for which holding him. thereafter, were the authorities Shortly the which holding slightest suggestion is not the counsel, But there Butler was interro- absence of that change very opening its the rules. the Court’s subject paragraph limited the Court’s Justice Indeed, expressly Stevens, writing the Court in Edwards the majority, described previous characterization of reconfirmed its the case as one in which “Arizona asks us Arizona, 384 U.S. the rule in Miranda v. exception to craft an [to rule] 1602, 16 as L.Ed.2d for cases in which want to inter command an accused’s rogate about an offense that is counsel, interrogation cease.” Ed “all unrelated to the of their in initial at 1885 451 U.S. at terrogation.” C., Fare v. Michael 2096. This the Court declined to do. In L.Ed.2d stead, expressed agreement it with an earli (1979) (emphasis er Arizona decision that Edwards equally applicable whether the interro Butler’s tri- Edwards was decided before giving was about either the offense decided, when Edwards did al. And even *4 rise to arrest or an unrelated offense. purport to create new law. Edwards then documented how the guide- simply a reconfirmation of the departed Court had never from its person that if a line articulated Miranda Miranda, Edwards, as reconfirmed in interrogation “states that he held for why and set forth the reasons it would not interrogation must attorney, an wants do so in the case before it. attorney present.” Mi- cease until an randa, at sum, says Roberson that the law is applica- Nothing in Miranda indicated been, Miranda, and has since that a sus vary to with the tion of this pect expressed his desire to deal subject of the police only through with the counsel is not Mi- the Court reviewed to further about ei recapitulating cases suspected having randa ther the crime he is ‘rigid rule that an accused’s “Miranda’s committed or other crime until coun attorney per for an se an invoca- available, sel has unless the been rights, requir- Fifth Amendment tion of his initiates further communication ” ing interrogation cease.’ that all police.* There is thus no retroac- with the at 101 S.Ct. at 1885 tivity presented in the instant case. issue Fare, merely seeks to invoke the law doing, (emphasis Upon so he tried and convicted. effect when was the Court concluded: so, right think that he has the to do and, these views to lend relief.

We reconfirm that he is entitled to habeas substance, it is in- emphasize that them PHILLIPS, MURNA- progeny consistent with Miranda and its GHAN, authorize SPROUSE ERVIN instance, authorities, at their they join in say me to this dissent. custody if he reinterrogate an accused clearly has asserted his to counsel. Thus, Court did not re-

Id.

gard its as other than a “reconfir-

mation” of Miranda. alter these rules of

Roberson did not attempt simply rejected Arizona’s * investigations." reading My what Justice Kenne- is reinforced Justice, dy, joined by the Chief wrote case who was While the in the instant majori- Roberson. He in dissent in obviously prefers of Rober this characterization ty’s characterization of the case as one in which son, as an inferior I remind the exception” to asked to "craft an the Court was appellate are bound to follow the instead that Roberson Edwards. He asserted agree majority, whether we Court first case in which the Court was "asked was the disagree. separate independent apply Edwards to

Case Details

Case Name: Horace Butler v. James Aiken, Warden, Central Correctional Institute, Travis Medlock, Attorney General, State of South Carolina
Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
Date Published: Dec 2, 1988
Citation: 864 F.2d 24
Docket Number: 87-4004
Court Abbreviation: 4th Cir.
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