Holsomback v. WhiteHolsomback v. White
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- Before:
- Barkett, Cox, Hunt
John Wayne Holsomback, an Alabama prisoner, appeals from the district court‘s dismissal of his pro se habeas petition filed pursuant to
On cross-examination, Jeffrey was asked about several inconsistencies between his trial testimony and his prior testimony in a civil proceeding instituted by Holsomback to enforce visitation. Jeffrey responded to all of these inconsistencies by stating that he did not remember what he had said previously. (See R.1-7, Ex. A at 89-100).
Holsomback‘s conviction was affirmed on direct aрpeal, and his petition for certiorari to the Alabama Supreme Court was denied. He subsequently filed three state petitions for post-conviction relief. The state court held evidentiary hearings on claims raised in the first two petitions but ultimately denied all three petitions. Proceeding pro se, Holsomback then filed a federal habeas petition in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama. Upon the magistrate judge‘s recommendation, the district court dismissed Holsomback‘s petition.
On appeal, Holsomback asserts the following claims: (1) the state‘s failure to disclоse certain medical records in its possession violated Holsomback‘s right to due process under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963); (2) the trial court erred in not requiring the prosecutor to elect the particular incident of sodomy for which conviction was sought; (3) his sentence was based on uncharged allegations of sodomy and therefore violated Holsomback‘s right to due process; (4) the trial court‘s failure to give a clarifying instruction permitted the jury to consider uncharged allegations of sodomy; (5) the trial court‘s instructions as to “reasonable doubt” were constitutionally deficient; (6) newly discovered evidence suggesting that the alleged victim
We find no merit in these claims with the exception of the last one. Because we find that Holsomback was denied the effective assistance of trial counsel, we REVERSE and REMAND.
BACKGROUND
The only evidence presented at trial on the ultimate question of whether Holsomback had sexually abused his son was Holsomback‘s and Jeffrey‘s conflicting testimony on that issue.2 Although Holsomback had also urged his trial counsel to call his and Jeffrey‘s family physician, Dr. Thomas Nolen, counsel neither interviewed Dr. Nolen nor called him as a witness. (See R.1-7, Ex. C at 13, 27, 34). In addition, although counsel was aware that Jeffrey had been examinеd for signs of sexual abuse prior to trial and that there was no medical evidence that Jeffrey had been abused
At trial, the prosecutor made reference to the lack of any medical evidence to substantiate Jeffrey‘s allegations both during jury selection and in his opening argument,3 (see R.1-7, Ex. A at 25, Ex. C at 8-9); however, Holsomback‘s attorney presented no medical testimony or other evidence concerning the lack of сorroborating physical evidence in the case. Indeed, it appears from the record that defense counsel‘s sole reference to the lack of medical evidence—apart from his objection to the prosecutor‘s opening argument—was counsel‘s attempt during closing argument to explain the absence of any testimony on that issue, stating “[a]nd you as sensible people know that the reason the doctor wasn‘t here was because there was no evidence [Jeffrey had] ever been touched or molested or abused. Am I right, that that‘s what you think?” (R.1-7, Ex. A at 229). The prosecutor responded to counsel‘s statement in his own closing argument, asking the jury, “[d]o you think that if that doctor could say for sure that that didn‘t happen, that the defense wouldn‘t have him up here saying, ‘I examined this child, and I can conclusively tell you that nobody handled’ ... [objection by defense counsel].”4
DISCUSSION
Ineffective assistance of counsel is a mixed question of fact and law subject to de novo review. Greene v. United States, 880 F.2d 1299, 1305 (11th Cir.1989). To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner must show (1) that counsel‘s performance was
In his federal habeas petition and initial appellate brief, both filed pro se,5 Holsomback challenges the adequacy of his trial counsel‘s investigation into the conceded lack of medical evidence that any sexual abuse had occurred, asserting as deficiencies in counsel‘s performance his failure to interview and call as witnesses Doctors Nolen and Williams, (see R.1-1 at 60-61, 87; Appellant‘s Pro Se Br. at 38-40), and his failure to obtain and utilize at trial the medical report prepared by Dr. Williams, (see R.1-1 at 60, 89; Appellant‘s Pro Se Br. at 40).6 As this court has repeatedly observed, “[i]t is well established that the standards governing the sufficiency of habeas
The district court rejected this claim, finding, as had the Alabamа state courts, that counsel‘s
strategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable; and strategic choices made after less than complete investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent that reasonable professional judgments support the limitations on investigation. In other words, counsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary. In any ineffectiveness case, a particular decision nоt to investigate must be directly assessed for reasonableness in all the circumstances, applying a heavy measure of deference to counsel‘s judgments.
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690-91, 104 S.Ct. at 2066-67 (emphasis added).
We cannot say that, under the circumstances of this case, the decision by Holsomback‘s trial counsel not to conduct any investigation into the conceded lack of medical evidence of sexual abuse was reasonable. Although Holsomback had been accused of sodomizing his son repeatedly over a period of several years beginning when Jeffrey was only four years old and continuing until he was ninе, a rectal examination performed shortly after the last alleged incident of sodomy found no medical evidence of sexual abuse. Despite this apparent inconsistency, however, counsel consulted no physician in order to ascertain the significance of the lack of medical evidence. Moreover, at the evidentiary hearing held on Holsomback‘s first state post-conviction petition, Holsomback‘s trial counsel recalled that his theory of the case was, simply, that “the child was not telling the truth. ... It was a question of a one-on-one casе.” (R.1-7, Ex. C at 8). Yet despite the fact that counsel
At the evidentiary hearing, Holsomback‘s trial attorney justified his decisions not to contact the physicians and not to subpoena the medical records based on his view that there was nothing to be gained from this line of investigation in light of the prosecutor‘s concession that there was no medical evidence to substantiate the allegations of sexual abuse. (See R.1-7, Ex. C at 8-9, Ex. F at 23). In particular, as to his decisiоn not to interview Dr. Williams, counsel explained that although he had anticipated that, if called as a witness, Dr. Williams would have affirmed the lack of physical evidence, (see R.1-7, Ex. C at 10-11), he elected not to contact him because
[i]f I put him on the stand, I‘m bound by what he says. On cross examination, if ... whoever was cross-examining him got him to weasel even a small bit on that element, I would have had to live with it. Since we already had as a matter of fact that there was no medical evidence the child was abused, I did not—it was a judgment call—I didn‘t feel it would be advisable to run that risk for what potential benefit might сome from it.
(R.1-7, Ex. C at 9-10). Counsel further explained that he did not subpoena Dr. Williams‘s medical report because “under a mutual discovery, if there was some medical evidence there and there was something in there that might have been harmful to [Holsomback] and we got it, then they could have used it, if we‘d put him on.” (R.1-7, Ex. C at 11). Finally, while counsel never directly addressed his rationale for not contacting Dr. Nolen, it appears from the record that counsel
We find counsel‘s justifications unpersuasive under the circumstances of this case. Had counsel interviewed the doctors, a subsequent tactical decision not to call them might have fallen well within “the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. at 2065. Having conducted no investigation into the significance оf the lack of medical evidence that Jeffrey had been sexually abused, however, Holsomback‘s counsel could not have made an informed tactical decision that the risk that the doctors might equivocate on the stand outweighed “what potential benefit might come from [their testimony].” (R.1-7, Ex. C at 10). Because counsel never actually spoke with the physicians, he remained entirely unaware—apart from his speculation that, at best, Dr. Williams would merely corroborate the lack of medical evidence—of whether and to what extent their testimony might have helped Hоlsomback‘s case. In these circumstances, we cannot say that counsel‘s decision not even to contact the physicians as part of his pre-trial investigation was professionally reasonable. Nor can we say that counsel‘s tactical decision not to pursue the medical report from Dr. Williams‘s examination was reasonable. Counsel justified his failure to subpoena the report based on his fear that the report might contain material harmful to Holsomback‘s defense which the state would be able to use against him were counsel to obtain the report. Because the report was already in the state‘s possession, (see R.1-7, Ex. F at 22-23), however, an effort by counsel to obtain the report could have had no effect on the state‘s ability
Moreover, based on Dr. Nolen‘s testimony at the evidentiary hearings held on Holsomback‘s first two state post-conviction petitions, we are also persuaded that counsel‘s failure to conduct an adequate pre-trial investigation satisfies the prejudice prong of Strickland. Holsomback‘s own attorney сharacterized the proceeding as a “one-on-one case” in which the verdict would turn on whose account the jury believed. Noting our agreement with counsel‘s characterization, we cannot say that medical testimony or other medical evidence calling into question Jeffrey‘s account of the abuse would not have made a difference in the outcome at trial.
As of the time of the second evidentiary hearing, Dr. Nolen had been a practitioner of family medicine, treating both children and adults, for eighteen years. (See R.1-7, Ex. F at 11-12). At the second hearing, Dr. Nolen wаs qualified as an expert in family medicine and all the areas it encompasses. (See R.1-7, Ex. F at 17). Dr. Nolen‘s testimony at the hearings established that both Holsomback and Jeffrey had been patients of his, Holsomback since the inception of Dr. Nolen‘s practice and Jeffrey since the age of one or two, (see R.1-7, Ex. C at 48, Ex. F at 15, 18); that he had occasion to examine Jeffrey approximately two to three times a year, (see R.1-7, Ex. C at 51-52); and that, in his examinations, he never saw any signs of sexual abuse, nor did Jeffrey exhibit the behavior patterns of a child who had been sodomized, (see R.1-7, Ex. C at 48, Ex. F at 40). He also stated thаt Holsomback did not exhibit the characteristics of a pedophile. (See R.1-7, Ex. C at 56). While Dr. Nolen had not himself been asked to examine Jeffrey “on the question of sodomy,” (R.1-7, Ex. C at 49), based on his review of both the medical report prepared by Dr. Williams and a transcript of Jeffrey‘s trial testimony, he expressed the opinion that Jeffrey‘s account of the sexual abuse was medically impossible. (See R.1-7, Ex. F at 19-20, 24, 28-29). Specifically, Dr. Nolen testified that certain physical evidence of trauma to the anal area would be apparent to a doctor
The dissent suggests that Dr. Nolen‘s testimony would not likely have been significant given that Nolеn himself never examined Jeffrey for signs of sexual abuse and appeared to have had little prior experience handling child abuse cases. However, in addition to testifying in his capacity as Jeffrey‘s treating physician since the age of one or two and on the basis of those occasions on which he personally had examined Jeffrey, Dr. Nolen also testified based upon his review of the medical report from Dr. Williams‘s rectal examination of Jeffrey and of Jeffrey‘s trial testimony. The dissent also suggests that the medical report prepared by Dr. Williams would not likely have been helpful to Holsomback‘s defense in light of the fact that the report included a final diagnosis of “sexual abuse.” We recognize that, had Holsomback‘s counsel consulted with medical personnel or otherwise investigated the medical aspect of the case, Dr. Nolen might not himself have been called as a witness, and the medical report might not have been introduced. In light of Dr. Nolen‘s testimony, however, we are persuaded that, under the specific circumstances of this case, Holsomback‘s defense was sufficiently prejudiced by his attorney‘s failure to conduct an adequate pre-trial investigation that our confidence in the trial outcome is undermined.
For all of the foregoing reasons we REVERSE and REMAND with instructions to grant the
COX, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
I respectfully dissent from the holding that Holsomback was denied the effective assistance of trial counsel. Holsomback‘s claim does not satisfy either prong of the Strickland test; he did not make the requisite showing either (1) that counsel‘s performance was deficient, or (2) that the deficient performance prejudiced the defendant. I would accordingly affirm the decision of the district court.
The relevant portion of Holsomback‘s claim, as framed by the district court, was that he “received ineffective assistance of trial counsel because his attorney (a) failed to call Dr. Nolen to testify that there was no medical evidence of physical abuse, ... [and] (e) failed to investigate and obtain medical records, school records, and counselor‘s records.” (R.2-20 at 11-12).1
As to the first prong of the Strickland test, the district court agreed with the state court‘s finding that counsel‘s decision not to obtain medical records was a reasonable tactical decision. (R.2-20 at 29). I agree. At the evidentiary hearing held on Holsomback‘s first state post-conviction petition, Holsomback‘s trial counsel testified that he did not subpoena medical records because the prosecutor told the jury that there was no medical evidence that the child had been sexually abused and because trial counsel had been told there was no physical medical evidence that the child had
The district court also agreed with the state court‘s finding that counsel‘s decision not to call Dr. Nolen to testify was a reasonable tactical decision. Counsel testified that had he called a doctor to testify, he ran the risk of the doctor wavering in his testimony. (R.1-7-Ex.C at 9-10). Further, there is no indication from the record that counsel should have been aware of the substance of the testimony Dr. Nolen later said he would have given—that it was “medically impossible” for repeated acts of abuse to have occurred without physical signs of abuse. (R.1-7-Ex.F at 24-29). Dr. Nolen never examined Jeffrey Holsomback for signs of abuse and did not treat him during the relevant time period. (R.1-7-Ex.C at 49, 54-55). This court has held that strategic or tactical decisions amount to ineffective assistance of counsel only if they are so plainly unreаsonable that no competent attorney would have chosen them. See Kelly v. United States, 820 F.2d 1173, 1176 (11th Cir.1987); see also Smith v. Dugger, 840 F.2d 787, 795 (11th Cir.1988) (noting that counsel‘s decision not to present certain evidence or to choose a certain defense because of a strategic or tactical decision is afforded a strong presumption of correctness that is “virtually unchallengeable“). I cannot say, on this record, that trial counsel‘s tactical decisions were unreasonable.
I am also not convinced that counsel‘s decisions prejudiced Holsomback. At the evidentiary hearing held on Holsomback‘s first post-conviction petition, Dr. Nolen testified that he saw Jeffrey Holsomback several months after the alleged abuse occurred, but that he did not perform any tests or any examination to rule out the possibility of abuse. (R.1-7-Ex.C at 49). When asked again whether he examined the child for sexual abuse, Dr. Nolen stated that he “never saw him at a point in time after it had happened or in the time frame where it would have really been relevant” and that he was under the impression that an evaluation as to alleged sexual abuse “was being handled elsewhere.” (R.1-7-Ex.C at 54-55). Further, Dr. Nolen testified that when he was in medical school,
Likewise, I cannot say that the use of Jeffrey Holsomback‘s medical records, and specifically the report from the examination conducted by Dr. Williams, would have been helpful. While the record does indicate that there were no signs of tears or trauma to the viсtim‘s anus or rectum, the final diagnosis by Dr. Williams was “sexual abuse.” (R.1-1). The use of the medical records with a diagnosis of “sexual abuse” could have been more harmful than helpful to Holsomback‘s case.
I agree with the district court‘s conclusion that Holsomback failed to demonstrate that he was prejudiced by counsel‘s performance. I would affirm the decision of the district court.