Michael H. HOLLAND; Marty D. Hudson; Elliot A. Segal; A. Frank Dunham, as Trustees of the United Mine Workers Of America 1992 Benefit Plan, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. BIG RIVER MINERALS CORPORATION; Big River Coal Corporation; Pea Ridge Iron Ore Company, Incorporated; Oxide Services Corporation; Castle Rock Mining Company; Castle Rock Coal Corporation; Long Branch Energy Corporation; Pinnacle Rock Coal Corporation; Panther Branch Coal Company, d/b/a Long Branch Energy; Birchfield Mining, Incorporated; Davidson Mining, Incorporated; M.A.E.-West, Incorporated, Defendants-Appellants, v. Michael H. Holland; Michael O. McKown; Donald E. Pierce, Jr.; Elliot A. Segal, Trustees of the United Mine Workers of America 1993 Benefit Plan, Third Party Defendants-Appellees.
No. 98-2353
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit
Argued April 7, 1999. Decided June 23, 1999.
AFFIRMED
Before WIDENER, MURNAGHAN, and WILKINS, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed in part and reversed in part by published opinion. Judge WILKINS wrote the opinion, in which Judge WIDENER and Judge MURNAGHAN joined.
OPINION
WILKINS, Circuit Judge:
The Trustees of the United Mine Workers of America 1992 Benefit Plan (the “Trustees“) brought this action against
I.
The issue of health care benefits for retired coal industry workers and their dependents has a protracted history. See generally Eastern Enters., 118 S.Ct. at 2137-42 (plurality opinion) (discussing history leading to the enactment of the Coal Act); id. at 2165-66 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (same); Holland v. Keenan Trucking Co., 102 F.3d 736, 738-39 (4th Cir.1996) (same). Disputes concerning health care for miners date back to the time early in this century when such care was funded with a prepayment plan through payroll deductions and was supplied by company doctors. In the 1930s and 1940s the United Mine Workers of America (UMWA) and coal industry employers sought changes in the method of providing essential services to miners, and from the late 1940s through the early 1970s pension and medical benefits were provided by several UMWA funds created under a series of National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreements (NBCWAs), including a 1950 and a 1974 UMWA Benefit Plan. The funding for these benefits was supplied in part by a royalty on each ton of coal mined and by payroll deductions. As benefits improved under UMWA plans and the number of beneficiaries increased, other factors such as a decrease in the amount of coal produced and a rapid increase in health care costs conspired to produce financial problems for the funds. In response to these financial pressures, the 1978 NBCWA allocated to signatory employers responsibility for the health care costs of their active and retired miners. The 1974 UMWA Benefit Plan remained in place, but was responsible for providing benefits only to “orphaned” retired miners—those whose former employers were no longer in business. Additionally, signatory operators under
Despite this restructuring, the benefit plans continued to suffer financially, and by the late 1980s they were facing insolvency. Unrest concerning this situation led to an 11-month strike beginning in 1989 by mine workers against the Pittston Coal Company, which ended only after the Secretary of Labor intervened and negotiated a settlement. Thereafter, the Secretary established the Advisory Commission on United Mine Workers of America Retiree Health Benefits (the “Coal Commission“), a bipartisan commission formed to assess the financial outlook of the UMWA health benefit plans and to devise possible plans to guarantee their long-term viability. The Coal Commission concluded that retired miners were entitled to the health benefits that had been promised them and that such commitments must be honored; that a statutory obligation to fund the benefits should be imposed on current and former signatories to NBCWAs; and that some means of funding benefits for orphaned miners must be developed. After conducting hearings on the Coal Commission‘s recommendations, Congress enacted the Coal Act. Congress found:
[I]n order to secure the stability of interstate commerce, it is necessary to modify the current private health care benefit plan structure for retirees in the coal industry to identify persons most responsible for plan liabilities in order to stabilize plan funding and allow for the provision of health care benefits to such retirees.
Toward these goals, the Coal Act legislated three significant changes in health benefits for retired coal workers. First, it consolidated the 1950 and 1974 UMWA Benefit Plans into the United Mine Workers of America Combined Benefit Fund (the “Combined Fund“). See
In order to ensure that coal operators would not be able to avoid their obligations to the 1992 UMWA Benefit Plan, Congress provided that “any related person” to an operator obligated to make payments to the 1992 UMWA Benefit Plan would be jointly and severally liable for those obligations.
Section 9712(b) establishes the coverage requirements for the 1992 UMWA Benefit Plan. It provides in pertinent part:
Eligible beneficiary.—For purposes of this section, the term “eligible beneficiary” means an individual who—
(A) but for the enactment of this chapter, would be eligible to receive benefits from the 1950 UMWA Benefit Plan or the 1974 UMWA Benefit Plan, based upon age and service earned as of February 1, 1993; or
(B) with respect to whom coverage is required to be provided under section 9711, but who does not receive such coverage from the applicable last signatory operator or any related person,
and any individual who is eligible for benefits by reason of a relationship to an individual described in subparagraph (A) or (B). In no event shall the 1992 UMWA Benefit Plan provide health benefits coverage to any eligible beneficiary who is a coal industry retiree who retired from the coal industry after September 30, 1994, or any beneficiary of such individual.
The last signatory operator of any individual who, as of February 1, 1993, is not receiving retiree health benefits under the individual employer plan maintained by the last signatory operator pursuant to a 1978 or subsequent coal wage agreement, but has met the age and service requirements for eligibility to receive benefits under such plan as of such date, shall, at such time as such individual becomes eligible to receive benefits under such plan, provide health benefits coverage to such individual and the individual‘s eligible beneficiaries which is described in paragraph (2). This paragraph shall not apply to any individual who retired from the coal industry after September 30, 1994, or any eligible beneficiary of such individual.
The Trustees brought this action claiming that Coal Companies are liable to fund health benefits under
II.
A.
The first question presented is whether Coal Companies are liable under
Statutory interpretation necessarily begins with an analysis of the language of the statute. See Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 685 (1985). And, in analyzing the meaning of a statute, we must first “determine whether the language at issue has a plain and unambiguous meaning.” Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340 (1997). Our determination of whether a statute is ambiguous is guided “by reference to the language itself, the specific context in which that language is used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole.” Id. at 341. If the language is plain and “the statutory scheme is coherent and consistent,” we need not inquire further. United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 240-41 (1989). “[T]he sole function of the courts is to enforce [the statute] according to its terms.” Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917).2 If the statutory language is ambiguous, we “look beyond the language of the statute to the legislative history for guidance.” Stiltner v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 74 F.3d 1473, 1482 (4th Cir.1996) (en banc). If congressional intent is not apparent from an examination of “the legislative history, we apply the traditional tools of statutory construction.” Id.
Coal Companies first maintain that disability retirees satisfy the requirements of neither
In our view, the statutory language is reasonably susceptible to either of these two interpretations. See Robinson, 519 U.S. at 342 (holding statute is ambiguous where it “could just as easily be read to” have one meaning as another); Adler v. Commissioner, 86 F.3d 378, 380 (4th Cir.1996) (holding statute ambiguous because it was reasonably susceptible to multiple meanings). And, having determined that these provisions are ambigu
B.
Coal Companies contend alternatively that even if disability retirees may be eligible for benefits under
The plain meaning of the word “retired” is “withdrawn from or no longer occupied with one‘s business or profession.” The Random House College Dictionary 1127 (rev. ed.1980). The plain meaning of the word “retired,” therefore, does not encompass only those individuals who receive, or have applied for, pension benefits. Thus, we reject Coal Companies’ argument that only those individuals who filed applications for retirement benefits as of September 30, 1994 are eligible for coverage under
C.
In sum, we find
III.
Pea Ridge and Oxide, two “related” coal companies—i.e., ones that were not signatories to a prior agreement establishing a benefit plan but that are members of the control group of a signatory company—claim that holding them responsible for contributions to the 1992 UMWA Benefit Plan constitutes a violation of due process and a taking in violation of the Fifth Amendment because they never employed covered miners and were not within the control group when the miners were employed.
Pea Ridge and Oxide recognize that they failed to raise their constitutional arguments until their Rule 59(e) motion for reconsideration following the final decision in district court. Nevertheless, they assert that their failure to pursue the issue timely does not constitute a waiver of the constitutional argument because they satisfy an exception to the general rule of waiver. Such an exception exists, they correctly explain, when there has been an intervening change in the law recognizing an issue that was not previously available. See Curtis Publ‘g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 142-45 (1967) (plurality opinion); Holzsager v. Valley Hosp., 646 F.2d 792, 796 (2d Cir. 1981); see also Pacific Ins. Co. v. American Nat‘l Fire Ins. Co., 148 F.3d 396, 403 (4th Cir.1998) (explaining that although a Rule 59(e) motion may be granted based on, inter alia, “an intervening change in controlling law,” such “motions may not be used ... to raise arguments which could have been raised prior to the issuance of the judgment ... [or] to argue a case under a novel legal theory that the party had the ability to address in the first instance“), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1104 (1999). The intervening law exception to the general rule that the failure to raise an issue timely in the district court waives review of that issue on appeal applies when “there was strong precedent” prior to the change,
First, Eastern Enterprises cannot be viewed as effecting a change in the law of Fifth Amendment takings jurisprudence sufficient to excuse the failure to raise a takings challenge earlier. Eastern Enterprises, decided by a 4-1-4 vote, involved a challenge to the constitutionality of
Second, no strong precedent prevented Pea Ridge and Oxide from raising the due process issue earlier. In Holland, we rejected a due process challenge to the 1992 UMWA Benefit Plan, ruling that Congress did not act arbitrarily in concluding that signatories to NBCWAs promising lifetime health benefits should be required to fund those benefits. See Holland, 102 F.3d at 740-42. However, we did not address any separate argument related to liability of members of a control group of such signatories, and that issue remained an open question. Furthermore, Eastern Enterprises did not address whether the Coal Act violated the due process rights of members of a control group of signatories to NBCWAs promising lifetime health benefits for retired miners. Rather, Eastern Enterprises can only be viewed as rendering a decision that Congress acted arbitrarily in imposing retroactive liability on a signatory to NBCWAs in existence prior to those that promised lifetime health benefits to retired miners when that signatory made no promise of lifetime benefits, did not contribute to the problem that caused the funding shortfall for the promised lifetime benefits or to the need for such benefits, and was not put on notice by any governmental action during the relevant time period that it might be subjected to later liability. See Eastern Enters., 118 S.Ct. at 2151-53 (plurality opinion); id. at 2159-60 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part). The position of members of a control group upon whom liability is imposed only by virtue of that association is different from that of the NBCWA signatory in Eastern Enterprises. And, the considerations bearing upon whether Congress acted rationally in imposing retroactive liability on the NBCWA signatory in Eastern Enterprises are different than those relating to the rationality of imposing liability on members of a control group of a 1978 or subsequent benefit plan signatory, although admittedly some of the same arguments can be made with respect to both issues.
Thus, we conclude that Eastern Enterprises did not constitute a change in the
IV.
The only remaining question is whether the district court erred in imposing an “additional prefunding premium” on Coal Companies as a result of its finding that they were liable for the benefits of the disabled miners and their dependents as claimed by Trustees. In the section of the Coal Act dealing with the guarantee of benefits, Congress directed that the contribution requirement for the plan include:
the provision of security (in the form of a bond, letter of credit or cash escrow) in an amount equal to a portion of the projected future cost to the 1992 UMWA Benefit Plan of providing health benefits for eligible and potentially eligible beneficiaries attributable to the 1988 last signatory operator. If a 1988 last signatory operator is unable to provide the security required, the 1992 UMWA Benefit Plan shall require the operator to pay an annual prefunding premium that is greater than the premium otherwise applicable.
V.
Congress intended through the Coal Act to ensure promised lifetime health benefits to coal industry retirees; therefore, we construe
AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART.
