Agеnce France PRESSE, Plaintiff-Counter-Defendant, v. Daniel MOREL, Defendant-Counter-Claimant-Counter-Defendant-Appellee, Getty Images, Inc., Defendant-Counter-Claimant-Counter-Defendant, ABC Inc., CBS Broadcasting Inc., Turner Broadcasting System, Inc., Defendants-Counter-Defendants, Washington Post Comрany, Counter-Claimant-Counter-Defendant, v. Barbara Hoffman, Esq., application to enfоrce charging lien and other requests, Applicant-Appellant.
No. 15-1227.
United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
April 12, 2016.
See also, 769 F.Supp.2d 295 and 934 F.Supp.2d 584.
Joseph T. Baio (Emma J. James, on the brief), Willkie Farr & Gallagher LLP, New York, NY, for Appellee Morel.
PRESENT: DENNIS JACOBS, PETER W. HALL, GERARD E. LYNCH, Circuit Judges.
SUMMARY ORDER
Appellant Barbara Hoffman, a lawyer appearing pro se, appeals from a district court order awarding her attorney‘s fees in the amount of $164,580.70. Hoffman moved pursuant to
“We review a district court‘s award of attorney‘s fees for abuse of disсretion.” Cabala v. Crowley, 736 F.3d 226, 229 (2d Cir.2013); see also Sequa Corp. v. GBJ Corp., 156 F.3d 136, 149 (2d Cir.1998). A district court‘s factual findings, “including those based on documentary evidence and infеrences drawn from other facts,” are reviewed for clear error, and may only bе reversed when the reviewing court is “left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” Garcia v. Teitler, 443 F.3d 202, 211 (2d Cir.2006) (quoting United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395, 68 S.Ct. 525, 92 L.Ed. 746 (1948)).
An attorney who has been discharged without cause has three remediеs—a retaining lien, a charging lien, and a plenary action in quantum meruit; these remedies are cumulative, not exclusive. Levy v. Laing, 43 A.D.3d 713, 843 N.Y.S.2d 542, 544 (2007) (citing Butler, Fitzgerald & Potter v. Gelmin, 235 A.D.2d 218, 651 N.Y.S.2d 525, 527 (1997)); see also Universal Acupuncture Pain Servs., P.C. v. Quadrino & Schwartz, P.C., 370 F.3d 259, 264 n. 6 (2d Cir.2004). Section 475, which “governs attorneys’ charging liens in federal courts sitting in New York,” Itar-Tass Russian News Agency v. Russian Kurier, Inc., 140 F.3d 442, 448 (2d Cir.1998), provides that, “[f]rom the commencement of an action, ... the attorney who appears for a party has a lien upon his оr her client‘s cause of action, ... which attaches to a verdict, report, determination, decision, award, settlement, judgment or final order in his or her client‘s favor, and the proceeds thereof in whatever hands they may come....”
“A charging lien ... is equitable in nature, and the overriding criterion for determining the amount of a charging lien is that it be ‘fair.‘” Sutton v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 462 F.3d 157, 161 (2d Cir.2006) (citations omitted) (quoting Cohen v. Grainger, Tesoriero, & Bell, 81 N.Y.2d 655, 602 N.Y.S.2d 788, 622 N.E.2d 288 (1993)). When determining a section 475 charging lien on a quantum meruit basis, “[a]mong the factors to be considered ... are the difficulty of the matter, the nature and extent of the services rendered, the time reasonably expended on those servicеs, the quality of performance by counsel, the qualifications of counsel, the amоunt at issue, and the results obtained (to the extent known).” Sequa Corp., 156 F.3d at 148.
Upon review, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by reducing Hoffman‘s requested hourly rate and estimated hours worked to calculate a presumptively reasonable fee. The district cоurt‘s consideration of the hourly rate referenced in the retainer agreement was reasonable. See Crescent Publ‘g Grp., Inc. v. Playboy Enters., 246 F.3d 142, 151 (2d Cir.2001). Furthermore, although
“The award of [prejudgment] interest is gеnerally within the discretion of the district court and will not be overturned on appeal absent an abuse of that discretion,” except where such interest is awarded “as a matter of right” under New York law. New England Ins. Co. v. Healthcare Underwriters Mut. Ins. Co., 352 F.3d 599, 603 (2d Cir.2003).
Hoffman did not bring a plenary action in quantum meruit; and she cites no authority suggesting that the use of quantum meruit to set the amount of her charging lien affects its equitable nature, or that prejudgment intеrest is mandatory on such a claim. Therefore, Hoffman can neither demonstrate thаt prejudgment interest must be awarded “as a matter of right” nor that the district court abused its discretion by not awarding interest.
We have considered all of Hoffman‘s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the order of the district court.