Hill v. Garda CL Nw., Inc.Hill v. Garda CL Nw., Inc.
Under Washington law, an employer who violates the MWA owes its employees double exemplary damages unless certain exceptions apply.
We hold that Garda has failed to prove a bona fide dispute based on waiver. We also hold that aggrieved workers may recover both double exemplary damages under
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Garda operates an armored transportation service delivering currency and other valuables throughout Washington State. Typically, two Garda employees, a driver and a messenger, guard these valuables during transport. To ensure the safety of those employees and their cargo, Garda requires its drivers and messengers to remain vigilant at
Plaintiffs Lawrence Hill, Adam Wise, and Robert Miller are former Garda drivers and messengers. They argue that Garda‘s policy of prohibiting drivers and messengers from taking vigilance-free rest breaks and meal periods violates
The trial court certified the plaintiff class (hereafter “Plaintiffs“). CP at 932-34. It then ruled that
The Plaintiffs sought double damages pursuant to
The trial court rejected Garda‘s arguments and granted the Plaintiffs prejudgment interest and double damages for their missed rest breaks and meal periods, starting two weeks from the date that Pellino was issued. CP at 3810, 3821. The trial court held that Garda did not have the requisite intent to deprive the workers of their rest breaks and meal periods earlier because prior to Pellino it was fairly debatable whether
Garda appealed several issues concerning liability.4 It also appealed the award of double damages but only as to the meal period violations (not the rest break violations). Lastly, Garda appealed the Plaintiffs’ recovery of both prejudgment interest and double damages for the same violations.
Garda petitioned this court for review and the Plaintiffs cross-petitioned. We denied Garda‘s petition but granted Plaintiffs’ cross-petition on the issues of double damages and prejudgment interest. Hill v. Garda CL Nw., Inc., 189 Wn.2d 1016, 403 P.3d 839 (2017).
ANALYSIS
I. Garda Failed To Carry Its Burden of Showing the Statutory Bona Fide Dispute Defense to Double Damages Based on Waiver
A. Under RCW 49.52.052 and .070, an Employer Is Liable for Double Damages for Wage Violations Unless It Carries the Burden of Showing That a Statutory Defense Applied
The trial court‘s decision that Garda violated
Under those statutes, an employer who “pay[s] any employee a lower wage than the wage such employer is obligated to рay such employee” “shall be liable . . . to judgment for twice the amount of the wages unlawfully . . . withheld by way of exemplary damages, together with costs of suit and a reasonable sum for attorney‘s fees” if the employer withheld the wages (1) “[w]ilfully and [(2)] with intent to deprive the employee of any part of his or her wages” and (3) the employee did not “knowingly submit[] to such violations.”
The standard for proving willfulness is low—our cases hold that an employer‘s failure to pay will be deemed willful unless it was a result of “‘carelessness or err[or].‘” Wash. State Nurses Ass‘n, 175 Wn.2d at 834 (quoting Morgan, 166 Wn.2d at 534 (quoting Schilling, 136 Wn.2d at 160)); see also
Under our prior decisions, the burden is on the employer to show the existencе of such a bona fide dispute. Wash. State Nurses Ass‘n, 175 Wn.2d at 834 (citing Schilling, 136 Wn.2d at 165).
And under our prior decisions, a bona fide dispute has both an objective and a subjective component. The employer must have a “‘genuine belief‘” in the dispute at the time of the wage violation. See Chelan County, 109 Wn.2d at 301 (quoting Ebling v. Gove‘s Cove, Inc., 34 Wn. App. 495, 500, 663 P.2d 132 (1983)). That is the subjective component. In addition, that dispute must be objectively reasonable—that is, the issue must be “fairly debatable.” Schilling, 136 Wn.2d at 161; see Wash. State Nurses Ass‘n, 175 Wn.2d at 836 (examining reasonableness
Thus, despite the statute‘s focus on the employer‘s intent, our decisions state that whether an employer acts “[w]ilfully and with intent to deprive” within the meaning of
B. Garda Failed To Carry Its Burden of Showing the Statutory Bona Fide Dispute Defense to Double Damages Based on Collective Waiver
1. The Trial Court Rejected All Four Bona Fide Disputes Proposed by Garda
At trial, Garda argued that there was a bona fide dispute about whether the Plaintiffs were entitled to vigilance-free meal periods because it questioned
(1) whether Plaintiffs’ meal and rest break claims were preempted by the Federal Aviation Administration Authorizаtion Act (“[FAAAA]“); (2) whether Plaintiffs’ meal break claims were preempted by Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (“LMRA“), . . . (3) whether Plaintiffs waived their meal break claims by individually signing acknowledgment forms stating that the employee individually agreed to the terms of the applicable Labor Agreements[, and (4)] whether the Labor Agreements are the type of “CBAs” [Department of Labor & Industries administrative policy] ES.C.6 § 15 is intend[ed] to address [(given that this court questioned the characterization of the plaintiffs’ labor agreements as CBAs in Hill v. Garda CL Nw., Inc., 179 Wn.2d 47, 50 n.1, 308 P.3d 635 (2013)].
CP at 3437, 3444. The trial court rejected Garda‘s claims of a bona fide dispute on all four grounds. CP at 3817-19. With regard to question 1, it found that Garda did not “‘genuinely believe[]‘” in the FAAAA preemption argument at the time of the wage violation. CP at 3811, 3819. This ruling on question 1 is a factual conclusion. With regard to questions 2 and 3, it rejected Garda‘s LMRA preemption and individual waiver arguments as objectively unreasonable. CP at 3817-19. The trial court ruled that Garda‘s LMRA preemption argument was “meritless” because the law was clear that the LMRA does not apply to claims based solely on state statutory and regulatory requirements. CP at 3818-19. As for Garda‘s argument that the Plaintiffs had individually waived their meal periods when they signed acknowledgements agreeing to be bound by the terms of their respective CBAs, the trial court ruled that that argument was unreasonable because the CBAs on which Garda‘s individual waiver arguments were predicated did not purport to waive the “‘on-duty’ meal breaks” that the Plaintiffs were seeking to enforce. CP at 3818. These rulings on questions 2 and 3 are legal conclusions. Finally, the trial court did not provide a reason for rejecting Garda‘s fourth claim that the labor agreements signed by the workers were not the type of CBAs that are subject to provision 15 of the Department of Labor and Industries’ Employment Standard ES.C.6 (2005), which bars waiver of meal period rights in CBAs. Because it made no factual finding on that point, we treat its decision on question 4 as a legal one, not a factual one.
2. The Court of Appeals Reversed Based on the Bona Fide Dispute Summarized at (4), Above: Whether a CBA Can Waive the State Law Right to Meal Breaks
The Court of Appeals reversed, finding that Garda did have a bona fide dispute
3. We Reverse; Even If Washington Law Were Unclear about the Waivability of “On Duty” Meal Period Rights through CBAs, Garda Never Argued that the Plaintiffs Waived the “On Duty” Meal Period Right That the Plaintiffs Are Seeking To Enforce
There was no bona fide dispute about whether the Plaintiffs waived their right to a paid, on duty meal period. Indeed, even Garda acknowledges that the Plaintiffs retained the right to a paid, on duty meal period. Instead, Garda argued that the Plaintiffs waived their right to off duty meal periods and that they received their on duty meal periods. E.g., Garda‘s Reply to Answer & Cross Pet. for Reviеw at 1-2 (“Garda argued below, as it has consistently throughout this litigation, that the Drivers intentionally and knowingly waived off-duty meal periods either in the agreements negotiated by the Drivers Associations or by individually signing the acknowledgments of the same. . . . Garda also argued that there was no wage violation because the Drivers were paid for such on-duty meal breaks.” (emphasis added)).
Based on that argument, Garda concludes that because the Plaintiffs were paid for a full day, including the time during which they ate while working, they were given and paid for “on duty” meal periods as required by
But that‘s not what an “on duty” meal period, as contemplated by
It is undisputed that Garda failed to provide the Plaintiffs with that type of work-free,“on duty” meal period. And it is precisely that type of work-free, “on duty” meal period on which the Plaintiffs base their claims in this case: the Plaintiffs explicitly claimed that they were deprived of such “on duty” meal periods.
Because there was no argument that the Plaintiffs waived “on duty” (as opposed to “off duty“) meal periоds in their CBAs, Garda‘s assertion of a bona fide dispute based on collective waiver was objectively unreasonable. We therefore reverse the Court of Appeals on the bona fide dispute question (4).6
Thus, even without focusing on the specific language of the Plaintiffs’ CBAs, we hold that Garda failed to establish a bona fide dispute based on collective waiver because Garda never actually argued there was waiver of the particular type of rights the Plaintiffs sought to enforce here, that is, “on duty” meal periods.
4. The Plaintiffs’ CBAs Support Their Undisputed Assertion That They Did Not Waive Their “On Duty” Meal Periods in Those Agreements
The specific language of the Plaintiffs’ CBAs, however, provides further support for
The first type of meal period clause stated that driving routes would be scheduled without a designated, prescheduled lunch break and explained that the employees would instead be provided a paid, on duty lunch break. Eight CBAs contained one of three variations of that clause:
- Street and ATM (automated teller machines) routes will be scheduled without a designated lunch break; thus employees will not be docked for same. In the event a truck crew on a Street or ATM route wishes to schedule a nonpaid lunch break, they must notify their supervisor. (CP at 390 (2004-09 Mt. Vernon Labor Agreement), 454 (2004-08 Seattle Labor Agreement), 536 (2005-08 Tacoma Labor Agreement).)
- Street routes as well as ATM routes will be scheduled without a designated lunch break thus employees will not be docked for same. In the event a truck crew on a street or ATM route wishes to schedule a nonpaid lunch break, they must notify their supervisor. (CP at 497 (2007 Spokane Work Rules).)
- Street routes will be scheduled without a designated lunch break; thus employees will not be docked for same. In the event a truck crew on a street route wishes to schedule a nonpaid lunch break, they must notify their supervisor. (CP at 578 (2009 Wenatchee Labor Agreement), 622 (2006-09 Yakima Labor Agreement), 433 (2006-09 Pasco Labor Agreement),7 1513 (2006-09 Wenatchee labor agreement).)
The second type of meal period clause guaranteed the employees a paid on duty meal pеriod and stated that if the employees wanted an unpaid off duty meal period instead, then the employees must make arrangements with their supervisor. Seven of the Plaintiffs’ CBAs contained that clause:
The Employees hereto agree to an on-duty meal period. Employees may have an off duty meal period if they make arrangements with their supervisor in advance of the need or provided the supervisor with a written request to renounce the on-duty meal period in exchange for an off-duty meal period.
CP at 413 (2009-12 Mt. Vernon Labor Agreement), 478 (2008-11 Seattle Labor Agreement), 516 (2008-11 Spokane Labor Agreement), 558 (2009-12 Tacoma Labor Agreement); 1140 (2013-16 Mt. Vernon Labor Agreement), 4239 (2013-16 Seattle Labor Agreement), 1669-70 (2011-14 Spokane Labor Agreement).
The third type of meal period clause purported to waive all meal period rights but then indicated that the employees still had a right to a paid, on duty meal period. Three of their CBAs contained that clause:
The Employees hereto waive any meal period(s) to which they would be otherwise entitled. Employees will be paid at their regular hourly rate to work through any such meal period(s). Notwithstanding this waiver, employees may eat meals within their vehicles while on route so long as they can do so in a safe manner. Employees may take an unpaid off-duty meal period if they make arrangements with their supervisor at least one day in advance of the need or provide their supervisor with a written request to renounce the on-duty meal period in exchange for an off-duty meal period.
CP at 1163 (2010-13 Pasco labor agreement), 601 (2010 Wenatchee Labor Agreement), 646 (2010-13 Yakima Labor Agreement).
Thus, none of the Plaintiffs’ 18 CBAs actually waived their right to an on duty meal period, which is the right the Plaintiffs seek to enforce in this lawsuit.
5. The LMRA Does Not Bar This Court from Reading the Parties’ CBAs, Nor Does It Preempt the Plaintiffs’ State Law Claim
Garda argues that it is impermissible for this court to interpret the language of those agreements, despite the fact that Garda is the party that raised their language as a basis for its bona fide dispute defense. Garda claims that this court is barred from referring to that language because section 301 of the LMRA,
Garda is incorrect. Because Garda raised the language and characterizes it as supporting its argument, this court has a duty to read that language and decide whether Garda is correct about that characterization. As the Ninth Circuit summarized of the holdings of the relevant United States Supreme Court decisions on this point,
[I]n order for complete preemption to apply, “the need to interpret the CBA must inhere in the nature of the plaintiff‘s claim. If the claim is plainly based on state law, § 301 pre-emption is not mandated simply because the defendant refers to the CBA in mounting a defense.” [Cramer v. Consol. Freightways, Inc., 255 F.3d 683, 691 (9th Cir. 2001); see also Gregory v. SCIE, LLC, 317 F.3d 1050, 1052 (9th Cir. 2003); Humble v. Boeing Co., 305 F.3d 1004, 1008 (9th Cir. 2002).]
Valles v. Ivy Hill Corp., 410 F.3d 1071, 1076 (9th Cir. 2005) (emphasis added). The Plaintiffs’ claims in this case are “plainly based on state law.” The fact that Garda “refers to the CBA in mounting a defense” does not turn it into an LMRA claim. Neither does reading the CBAs themselves.
Garda also argues that if we choose to spend too much time addressing the language of the CBAs that it raised, then the Plaintiffs’ claim must be considered fully preempted. This reflects a misunderstanding of the reach of LMRA preemption. As the Court of Appeals said in its discussion of that issue, and in reliance on controlling United States Supreme Court law, “[S]ection 301 preemption does not apply to every dispute between an employer and a union employee. ‘[I]t would be inconsistent with congressional intent under [section 301] to pre-empt state rules that prosсribe conduct, or establish rights and obligations, independent of a labor contract.‘” Hill, 198 Wn. App. at 349 (emphasis added) (second and third alterations in original) (quoting Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 212, 105 S. Ct. 1904, 85 L. Ed. 2d 206 (1985)).
This holding remains good law, and the WAC on which the Plaintiffs rely is a state rule that prescribes rights “independent of a labor contract.”
Garda argues one final aspect of LMRA preemption. It contends that “the Plaintiffs’ claims stem from negotiable rights, which they have waived in their CBAs.” Id. at 351. And Garda is correct that in the line of cases in which the United States Supreme Court “has sought to preserve state authority in areas involving minimum labor standards,” Valles, 410 F.3d at 1076, that court has said that “[section] 301 [of the LMRA] cannot be read broadly to pre-empt nonnegotiable rights conferred on individual employees as a matter of state law.” Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 123, 114 S. Ct. 2068, 129 L. Ed. 2d 93 (1994) (emphasis added). Garda relies on this premisе to argue the converse, i.e., that the meal period protection at issue here was a negotiable right and, hence, the LMRA preempted the Plaintiffs’ claims and the Plaintiffs lack the ability to make any argument that the CBA actually preserved their negotiable right.
But a CBA cannot waive the employees’ right to the protection of even a negotiable state law right unless it does so in “clear and unmistakable language.” As the Ninth Circuit recently explained, in a passage relying solely on controlling United States Supreme Court law:
Finally, we have held that “§ 301 does not permit parties to waive, in a [CBA], nonnegotiable state rights” conferred on individual employees. Balcorta [v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 208 F.3d 1102, 1111 (9th Cir. 2000)]. As the Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized, “Congress is understood to have legislated against a backdrop of gеnerally applicable [state] labor standards.” Livadas, 512 U.S. at 123 n. 17. Section 301 must not be construed to give employers and unions the power to displace state regulatory laws. See Cramer, 255 F.3d at 697; Humble, 305 F.3d at 1009; Associated Builders & Contractors, Inc. [v. Local 302 Int‘l Bhd. of Elec. Workers], 109 F.3d [1353, 1357-58, amended and superseded on reh‘g, 1997 WL 236296 (9th Cir. 1997)]. Where, however, under state law waiver of state rights may be permissible, “the CBA must include ‘clear and unmistakable’ language waiving the covered employee‘s
state right ‘for a court even to consider whether it could be given effect.‘” See Cramer, 255 F.3d at 692 (quoting Livadas, 512 U.S. at 125).
Valles, 410 F.3d at 1076 (footnote omitted). We agree.
Thus, even if Washington‘s state law meal period protection is considered collectively negotiable—a question we do not reach—the language in the Plaintiffs’ CBAs on which Garda relies certainly did not waive that protection in clear and unmistakable languаge. As discussed above, the agreements did not waive the protection of true on duty meal periods at all. Instead, as Garda acknowledges, the CBAs retained the protection of true on duty meal periods. Thus, it was unreasonable for Garda to claim a bona fide dispute based on waiver.8
C. Garda‘s “Knowing[] Submi[ssion]” Defense and Its Other Bona Fide Dispute Defenses Should Be Addressed on Remand
Given our limited grant of review, we remand to the Court of Appeals to address Garda‘s remaining statutory defenses to double damages, including whether there was a bona fide dispute based on FAAAA preemption and whether the Plaintiffs knowingly submitted to Garda‘s meal period violation.
II. Workers May Recover Both Double Exemplary Damages under RCW 49.52.070 and Prejudgment Interest under RCW 19.52.010 for the Same Wage Violation
The trial judge awarded the Plaintiffs back wages from 2006 to 2015 for the vigilance-free meal periods and rest breaks of which they were deprived. CP at 3808, 3814-17. It also awarded double exemplary damages from 20119 to 2015. CP at 3821. Finally, it awarded prejudgment interest, but only on the back wages, not on the double exemplary damages. CP at 3822. Garda does not dispute the Plaintiffs’ ability to recover prejudgment interest for the type of wage claims raised here. See Stevens v. Brink‘s Home Sec., Inc., 162 Wn.2d 42, 50, 169 P.3d 473 (2007) (classifying judgments for back wages as liquidated and therefore eligible for prejudgment interest (citing Hansen v. Rothaus, 107 Wn.2d 468, 472, 730 P.2d 662 (1986))). Instead, Garda argues that the Plaintiffs cannot recover both prejudgment interest and double exemplary damages for the same wage violation; Garda argues that would constitute impermissible
Whether an award of double exemplary damages under
To answer this question, we must consider whether the harms compensated by
They do not.
By contrast, prejudgment interest under
Because the compensatory function of prejudgment interest and the punitive function of exemplary damages are different, there is no bar on awarding both for the same underlying wage violation.
Garda‘s reliance on federal cases applying the federal double liquidated damages provision of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA),
The federal provision was enacted in 193810—a year before Washington adopted our double dаmages provision.11 The federal provision entitles the plaintiff to double damages “as liquidated damages” when the employer violates certain federal wage and hour laws.
This distinction between double damages as “exemplary damages” under
Unlike Washington‘s prejudgment interest law which uses “liquidated damages” to refer to readily calculable damages, the FLSA uses “liquidated damages” as an approximation for actual damages where the damages аre “too obscure and difficult of proof” to calculate. Overnight Motor Transp. Co. v. Missel, 316 U.S. 572, 583-84, 62 S. Ct. 1216, 86 L. Ed. 1682 (1942); see also Brooklyn Sav. Bank v. O‘Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 709, 65 S. Ct. 895, 89 L. Ed. 1296 (1945). Liquidated damages under the FLSA are therefore “compensation, not a penalty or punishment by the Government.” Overnight Motor, 316 U.S. at 583. For that reason, the United States Supreme Court has held that prejudgment interest is not available in addition to double damages under the FLSA since the double damages provision already compensates the employee for the delay in wages. Brooklyn Sav. Bank, 324 U.S. at 715. To hold otherwise, the Court explained, would “produce the undesirable result of allowing interest on interest.” Id. (citing Cherokee Nation v. United States, 270 U.S. 476, 490, 46 S. Ct. 428, 70 L. Ed. 694 (1926)).
No such “interest on interest” problem results under
The Court of Appeals’ reliance on Ventoza v. Anderson, 14 Wn. App. 882, 545 P.2d 1219 (1976)—a timber trespass case—is likewise misplaced. In Ventoza, a plaintiff landowner was harmed when the defendant cut 16 acres of trees belonging to the plaintiff without his permission. Id. at 886. The trial court awarded the plaintiff treble damages under
Indeed, several other jurisdictions expressly allow prejudgment interest on the compensatory portion of a damages award but deny it on the punitive portion of the award. See, e.g., Matanuska Elec. Ass‘n v. Weissler, 723 P.2d 600, 610 (Alaska 1986) (“[P]rejudgment interest may be awarded on the compensatory portion but not on the punitive portion of the award.” (citing Andersen v. Edwards, 625 P.2d 282, 289-90 (Alaska 1981))); Salvi v. Suffolk County Sheriff‘s Dep‘t, 67 Mass. App. Ct. 596, 608-09, 855 N.E.2d 777 (2006) (upholding award of prejudgment interest on back pay but not on punitive damages). Like these jurisdictions, the trial court in this case awarded prejudgment interest on only the compensatory portion of their damages award, not the punitive, double damages award. CP at 3821 (awarding “prejudgment interest . . . on the back pay owed“). The trial court did not award prejudgment interest on the exemplary double damages.
We hold that
CONCLUSION
Garda failed to prove a bona fide dispute based on the purported waiver of Plaintiffs’ state law right to on duty meal breaks in their CBAs. In addition, the Plaintiffs can recover both double exemplary damages under
Mary Fairhurst
WE CONCUR:
Stephens, J.
Wiggins, J.
Madsen, J.
González, J.
Yu, J.
JOHNSON, J. (concurring in part/dissenting in part)—While the majority correctly concludes that, in general, a plaintiff may recover both prejudgment interest under
Garda and its employees entered a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) establishing working conditions justified by the nature of the employment: an armored truck service where employees are armed and transporting valuable cargo. Given the nature of their occupation, Garda employees must be alert and attentive the entire time they are at work.
The language in the CBAs is clear: “Employees hereto waive any meal period(s) to which they would otherwise be entitled” (Clerk‘s Papers (CP) at 601 (2010 Wenatchee Labor Agreement), 646 (2010-13 Yakima Labor Agreement)) and truck routes “will be scheduled without a designated lunch break” (CP at 390 (2004-09 Mt. Vernon Labor Agreement), 433 (2006-09 Pasco Labor Agreement), 497 (2007 Spokane Work Rules), 536 (2005-08 Tacoma Labor Agreement), 578 (2009 Wenatchee Labor Agreement), 622 (2006-09 Yakima Labor Agreement)). Even though Garda was ultimately held liable for unpaid wages, it was not unreasonable for Garda to perceive this language as a clear waiver of employees’ meal periods and not merely an agreement to on-duty meal periods. Because liability for wages is not at issue, whether these words constituted actual waiver is not at issue. Instead, the focus is on Garda‘s state of mind and whether its actions were willful for purposes of double damages.
In holding that Garda willfully withheld wages, the majority fails to recognize our precedent in Champagne v. Thurston County, 163 Wn.2d 69, 82, 178 P.3d 936 (2008) and Washington State Nurses Ass‘n v. Sacred Heart Medical Center, 175 Wn.2d 822, 834, 287 P.3d 516 (2012). “Generally, an employer who follows the provisions of a CBA ‘with respect to overtime wages and compensatory time’ does not willfully deprive employees of wages or salary.” Wash. State Nurses Ass‘n, 175 Wn.2d at 834 (quoting Champagne, 163 Wn.2d at 82). Here, Garda operated according to the CBAs signed by its employees—given the nature of the job, there were no scheduled meal breaks and employees needed to remain vigilant at all times while working. When there is an agreement and the employer pays wages based on that agreement, as Garda did here, such action negates a finding of willfulness. Champagne, 163 Wn.2d at 82. Furthermore, the plaintiffs have presented no evidence of deception or bad faith surrounding the creation of the CBAs.
Until today, under certain circumstances, employers and employees could waive statutorily required rest and lunch breaks as long as an employment agreement existed that provides adequate comрensation for forgoing what the statute otherwise required. Iverson v. Snohomish County, 117 Wn. App. 618, 622, 72 P.3d 772 (2003) (affirming summary judgment for the employer because the employee “failed to produce any evidence that the reality of his employment contradicts the collective bargaining agreement” stating that he would need to perform tasks during meal breaks). The majority‘s decision undermines the right of employees to bargain collectively with their employers. Under the majority‘s decision, CBAs arguably are no longer binding agreements, and neither employers nor employees will have any incentive to adhere to their terms.
That Garda followed the terms of the CBA is sufficient to negate a finding of willfulness; the Court of Appeals should be affirmed.
Johnson, J.
Owens, J.
Fairhurst, C.J.
Notes
Any employer who violates the provisions of section 206 [(titled “Minimum wage“)] or section 207 [(titled “Maximum hours“)] of this title shall be liable to the employee or employees affected in the amount of their unpaid minimum wages, or their unpaid overtime compensation, as the case may be, and in an additional equal amount as liquidated damages. . . . The court in such action shall, in addition to any judgment awarded to the plaintiff or plaintiffs, allow a reasonable attorney‘s fee to be paid by the defendant, and cоsts of the action.
(Emphasis added.) Like its federal counterpart,Any employer and any officer, vice principal or agent of any employer who shall violate any of the provisions of
RCW 49.52.050 (1) [(rebate of wages)] and (2) [(willful and intentional deprivation)] shall be liable in a civil action by the aggrieved employee or his or her assignee to judgment for twice the amount of the wages unlawfully rebated or withheld by way of exemplary damages, together with costs of suit and a reasonable sum for attorney‘s fees: PROVIDED, HOWEVER, That the benefits of this section shall not be available to any employee who has knowingly submitted to such violations.