HIGHLANDS AT JORDANELLE, LLC, Plaintiff, Appellee, and Cross-appellant, v. WASATCH COUNTY and Wasatch County Fire Protection Special Service District, Defendants, Appellants, and Cross-appellees. Mustang Development, LLC, et al., Plaintiffs, Appellees, and Cross-appellants, v. Wasatch County Fire Protection Special Service District, Defendant, Appellant, and Cross-appellee.
No. 20130445-CA
Court of Appeals of Utah
July 9, 2015
Rehearing Denied Sept. 8, 2015
2015 UT App 173 | 355 P.3d 1047
Joseph E. Tesch and Stephanie K. Matsumura, Park City, Attorneys for Appellant Wasatch County Fire Protection Special Service District.
Matthew C. Barneck and Chad E. Funk, Salt Lake City, Attorneys for Appellees Highlands at Jordanelle, LLC, Mustang Development, LLC, et al.
Gavin J. Anderson, Kelly W. Wright, Salt Lake City, and Bradley C. Johnson, Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Utah Association of Counties.
Judge GREGORY K. ORME authored this Opinion, in which Judges JAMES Z. DAVIS and J. FREDERIC VOROS JR. concurred.
Opinion
¶ 1 Wasatch County (the County) and the Wasatch County Fire Protection Special Service District (the Fire District) appeal the trial court‘s determination that, among other things, the County and the Fire District must refund fire-protection service fees to certain landowners. Because we determine that at least some of the service fees were reasonable, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.1
BACKGROUND1
¶ 2 The Jordanelle Reservoir, located in rural Wasatch County, was completed in 1995. Landowners wanted to take advantage of their newly created lakefront property but were stymied by dated zoning regulations that permitted only one farmhouse per 160 acres. In response, the Wasatch County Commission passed a resolution that allowed developers to seek a higher building density by applying for a “density determination.” Once the County made a density determination, it would grant the landowners the right to build multiple equivalent residential units (ERUs) on their property. But because the Jordanelle Reservoir was far from any existing fire stations, the County also determined that the developers should pay additional fire-protection service fees to build an adequate fire station in the area.2
¶ 3 The Wasatch County Commissioners,3 acting as the board of the Fire District, then passed Resolution 99-3, which authorized the Fire District to charge a monthly fee of $14.81 per ERU. Once landowners had their ERU determination, they were required to pay the monthly fee whether they started construction on the property or not. For example, Highlands at Jordanelle, LLC, the original plaintiff in this case, received a density determination of 376 ERUs. It was therefore required to pay $14.81 per ERU, a total of $5,568.56 per month, from that point forward.
¶ 4 To pay down the construction bond for the new fire station in the Jordanelle area, the Fire District charged additional fees, which it characterized as “lump-sum fees” or “bond buy-in fees.” The County originally paid for the new fire station and related
¶ 5 In 2008, Highlands brought suit against the County and the Fire District, challenging, among other things, the reasonableness of the fire-protection service fees. Other landowners filed similar lawsuits, and the lawsuits were eventually consolidated.
¶ 6 Late in 2010, the landowners moved for partial summary judgment, asking the court to order a refund of the lump-sum fees and the monthly fees. The trial court entered an order ruling that the lump-sum fees were never authorized by Resolution 99-3 and must be refunded to the landowners. It further determined that while the monthly fees were authorized by Resolution 99-3, the fees did not bear a “reasonable relationship to the actual costs of providing the services.” Accordingly, the trial court ordered a refund of the monthly fees as well.
¶ 7 In 2011, after the trial court ordered that all of the fees be refunded but before the fees were actually refunded, the Fire District used $1,450,000 to pay off the fire station bond completely, eleven years ahead of schedule. The County then conveyed title to the fire station to the Fire District.
¶ 8 Over the next two years, the trial court determined, among other things, that the County was jointly liable with the Fire District and that the two entities must refund all the fees in full. It also determined that several of the landowners had paid both monthly and lump-sum fees more than four years before filing their lawsuits and were therefore barred from recovering those amounts by the applicable statute of limitations.
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
¶ 9 On appeal, the County and the Fire District assert that the trial court erred by granting the landowners’ motion for partial summary judgment and ordering a refund of the monthly fees.4 We review a trial court‘s legal conclusions and ultimate grant or denial of summary judgment for correctness. Orvis v. Johnson, 2008 UT 2, ¶ 6, 177 P.3d 600.
¶ 10 The County asserts that the trial court incorrectly determined that the County was jointly liable with the Fire District for the lump-sum fees and the monthly fees. A trial court‘s interpretation of “precedent, statutes, and the common law are questions of law that we review for correctness.” Ellis v. Estate of Ellis, 2007 UT 77, ¶ 6, 169 P.3d 441.
¶ 11 Both the County and the Fire District challenge the trial court‘s grants of summary judgment in favor of the landowners, the court‘s awards of attorney fees and expert-witness fees, and the addition of prejudgment interest on the lump-sum fee and monthly fee refunds. As just mentioned, we review a trial court‘s legal conclusions and ultimate grant or denial of summary judgment for correctness. Orvis, 2008 UT 2, ¶ 6, 177 P.3d 600.
¶ 12 The landowners filed a cross-appeal, arguing that the trial court erred in concluding that the discovery rule did not toll the statute of limitations for some of the landowners’ claims. The applicability of a statute of limitations and the applicability of the discovery rule raise questions of law that we review for correctness. Colosimo v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Salt Lake City, 2007 UT 25, ¶ 11, 156 P.3d 806.
¶ 13 The landowners also appeal the trial court‘s determination that, under
A. Reasonableness of the Monthly and Lump-sum Fees
¶ 14 The County and the Fire District challenge the trial court‘s determination that the monthly fees were not reasonably related to the cost of the services provided and that therefore they must be refunded.
¶ 15 Utah law permits special service districts, like the Fire District, to impose “fees or charges for any commodities, services, or facilities provided by the service district.”
The nature of the service or benefit provided may also make it difficult or impossible to distribute the services or benefits equally to all who pay the fee. For such a fee to be reasonable, we have directed that it should be fixed so as to be equitable in light of the relative benefits conferred as well as the relative burdens imposed.
Id. at 911-12 (internal citation omitted). Additionally, our Supreme Court determined that “fixing the amount of a fee is a legislative act to which we grant great deference.” Id. at 917.
¶ 16 Considering the difficulty of fairly assessing fire-protection and related emergency-service fees and the great deference owed to the Fire District in adopting the legislation in question, we cannot agree that the monthly fees were unreasonable. The trial court determined that the monthly fees were unreasonable because the density determination alone did not authorize construction and therefore did not immediately create any additional costs. But the rule of V-1 Oil is that the fee must be related to the cost of providing the service or to the benefit conferred or to the need created by those who pay the fee. See id. at 911. The trial court may be correct that the cost of providing fire-protection services to the undeveloped land did not immediately increase. But the benefit conferred on the landowners and the need created by the landowners did increase following the density determinations.
¶ 17 The benefit conferred upon the landowners was significant. Once the landowners received their density determinations, they had a vested right to increased building density—in the case of Highlands, increasing its ability to develop the land to 376 ERUs. The density determination made the landowners’ property instantly more marketable, more amenable to development, and much more valuable. The fact that the area was well provisioned with a nearby fire station paid for with those fees made any potential development subject to lower fire-insurance premiums. The landowners also benefitted in ways that are harder to quantify, such as enjoying increased safety and peace of mind
¶ 18 For these benefits conferred upon the landowners, we think that a fixed fee of $14.81 per ERU, while necessarily somewhat arbitrary, is not an obviously unreasonable fee. And we are not alone. Indeed, the Fire District entered into negotiations with the original landowners to balance their desire for increased density with the concurrent need of increased fire-protection services. The result was Resolution 99-3, authorizing the monthly fee. The fact that the original landowners agreed to the monthly fee is further evidence of its reasonableness.
¶ 19 The fee was also reasonably related to the “need created” by the landowners’ aspirations to develop the area. See id. The trial court erred in ignoring the “need created,” which can admittedly be difficult to quantify, instead focusing only on the cost of providing fire protection and related services. Unlike costs for some kinds of municipal services, which can be calculated after the fact, the need for fire-protection services must be anticipated. It would be wholly unreasonable for the Fire District to have to wait until construction began and a fire broke out before it could charge any fees for fire-protection services to the area. Instead, the Fire District necessarily had to anticipate the need created by the increased density determinations. It had to build a new fire station and properly staff and equip it. This could not have been done at the very moment that the increased need was fully realized in the form of an inferno consuming actual buildings with actual occupants. Rather, the Fire District wisely treated the inevitability of fires and other emergencies in the area as a need that required action before structures were built and occupied, before a fire broke out, and before emergency services were required. By focusing solely on the cost of the services provided, the trial court failed to appreciate the need created by the increased density allowances. Considering the “great deference” owed to the Fire District in setting the fee in anticipation of future development, we must conclude that the fee is reasonable. See V-1 Oil, 942 P.2d at 917.
¶ 20 The trial court also took exception to the fact that the monthly fee was not “apportioned among properties” according to their level of development. But in V-1 Oil, our Supreme Court explicitly recognized the difficulty in distributing some types of services or benefits equally among all who pay the required fee. Id. at 911-12. Fire-protection service fees fall into this category. In the most narrow sense, the only true consumers of fire-protection services are those who have a fire. And yet, firefighters do not usually leave a bill for services rendered after they have extinguished a fire. Rather, it is standard for communities—often organized through special service districts—to pay for fire-protection services as a group and in a prospective manner, not individually and on an as-needed basis.7 In such a situation, our Supreme Court has determined that a service fee can still be reasonable if it is “fixed so as to be equitable in light of the relative benefits conferred as well as the relative burdens imposed.” Id. at 912. In this case, the fee is fixed at $14.81 per ERU. And, as we have previously discussed, this fixed fee is equitable in light of the benefits conferred upon the landowners and in light of the need created by the landowners’ increased density determinations, even though it cannot be said with any confidence that $14.75 would be too low or that $14.99 would be too high.
¶ 21 The landowners contend, however, that even if the fixed amount of the fee is reasonable, it should have been assessed gradually at each stage of development, i.e., at one rate when rough grading begins, at another when vertical construction begins, and at a yet higher rate when an occupancy permit is issued. This may, in fact, have been a fine way to assess the cost of the fire-
¶ 22 The landowners received a benefit reasonably related to the monthly fees they paid. The Fire District reasonably assessed its current needs in light of the expectation of future development. Finally, the fixed rate of the monthly fee was reasonable considering the difficulty of apportioning fire-protection costs. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court‘s decision that the County and the Fire District must refund the monthly fees.
¶ 23 The lump-sum fees, however, are a different matter. Resolution 99-3 never authorized such a charge, and both the County and the Fire District conceded during oral argument that the lump-sum fees are indefensible. We therefore affirm the trial court‘s ruling that the lump-sum fees are invalid and remand to the trial court to determine the amount that must now be refunded. Unless otherwise stated, our analysis from this point forward will focus on the lump-sum fees—the only fees remaining at issue given our decision upholding the monthly fees.
B. The County‘s Joint Liability
¶ 24 The trial court determined that the County was jointly liable with the Fire District for the refund of fees. The County, however, asserts that the Fire District is a legally separate entity whose actions cannot be imputed to the County.
¶ 25 Under Utah law, a special service district is a “quasi-municipal corporation” and a “political subdivision of the state” that is “separate and distinct from the county . . . that creates it” and that “may sue and be sued.” See
¶ 26 Indeed, by statute, the County Commission or County Council, at all relevant times, acted as the governing board of the Fire District and in this capacity controlled and had supervisory authority over all of the Fire District‘s activities. See
C. Prejudgment Interest
¶ 27 The County and the Fire District argue that the trial court erred when it awarded prejudgment interest to the landowners for the refunded fees, set at 10% per year. In general, prejudgment interest “may be recovered where the damage is complete, the amount of the loss is fixed as of a particular time, and the loss is measurable by facts and figures.” Saleh v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 2006 UT 20, ¶ 28, 133 P.3d 428. Furthermore, “[w]hen a party proves that its damages were fixed at a particular point in time—even when it does not establish that proof until trial—that party is entitled to the benefit of its money from that time. Prejudgment interest remedies this injury.” AE, Inc. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 576 F.3d 1050, 1058 (10th Cir. 2009).
¶ 28 Because of our earlier conclusion that only the lump-sum fees should be refunded, the amount of the refunds will be ascertained by the trial court on remand. This does not mean, however, that the amount of the refunds are not already complete, fixed, and measurable. See id. (discussing Utah case law and concluding that “prejudgment interest may be appropriate even if the amount of damages are ascertained at trial“).
¶ 29 The damages resulting from the unauthorized lump-sum fee payments were complete when the landowners paid the fees. The amount of damages were “fixed as of a particular time,” i.e., at the moment of payment. Saleh, 2006 UT 20, ¶ 28, 133 P.3d 428. Finally, the lump-sum fees are measurable by simple mathematical calculations. See id. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court‘s grant of prejudgment interest but only as it applies to the lump-sum fees, which the Fire District is obligated to refund.10
¶ 30 The County and the Fire District also argue that the 10% annual interest rate was too high and that the interest should be calculated from the date of the trial court‘s order and not from the date of the landowners’ payments.
¶ 31 We determine that the lump-sum fees were contractual. We recognize that service fees, unlike taxes, “must bear a reasonable relationship to the services provided, the benefits received, or a need created by those who must actually pay the fee.” V-1 Oil Co. v. Utah State Tax Comm‘n, 942 P.2d 906, 911 (Utah 1996), vacated in part on reh‘g, 942 P.2d 906 (Utah 1997). This is
As a result of [the landowners‘] promises, statements, and agreements, a bond was issued to fund the construction of a new fire station, and provisions were made to staff it with full-time fire fighters and EMTs, to purchase the necessary equipment, and to operate and maintain the newly constructed station. None of these events would have occurred, but for the consent and agreement of the developers to provide the revenue for the repayment of the bond and reimbursement of the operation and maintenance costs.
According to the Fire District‘s description, the landowners paid the lump-sum fees or “bond buy-in fees” as part of an agreement that the Fire District would use those funds to build and maintain a fire station in the Jordanelle Reservoir area. This characterization of the fees suggests that they are more analogous to contractual obligations than to taxes. Because the lump-sum fees in this context were more similar to a contract than to a tax, we conclude that the trial court was correct to apply the statutory default interest rate for most contracts, including this one, i.e., 10% per year.
¶ 32 Additionally, we affirm the trial court‘s decision to calculate the prejudgment interest from the date on which the landowners paid the lump-sum fees. It is equitable to do so because the moment of payment was the precise moment at which the landowners were deprived of their funds through an admittedly indefensible fee. There is no reason why the Fire District should be allowed to benefit from its own error. Indeed, the Fire District used the unauthorized fees to help pay off the fire station bond eleven years early and thereby greatly reduced the amount of interest it would have otherwise paid on the bond. The most appropriate resolution is to calculate the prejudgment interest from the moment the lump-sum fees were paid—a task which will be a straightforward calculation once the dates and amounts of the unauthorized payments are established.
¶ 33 We affirm the trial court‘s grant of prejudgment interest at 10% per year starting from the day the various landowners paid their lump-sum fees. We remand to the trial court to calculate the prejudgment interest as it applies to the lump-sum fee refunds only.
D. Attorney Fees
¶ 34 The Fire District asserts that the trial court erred by awarding attorney fees to Highlands, the original plaintiff in this case, under the private-attorney-general doctrine.
¶ 35 Generally speaking, under Utah law a party is entitled to an award of its attorney fees only if it is authorized by contract or by statute. Culbertson v. Board of County Comm‘rs, 2008 UT App 22, ¶ 9, 177 P.3d 621. However, a court may, by exercising its inherent equitable powers, award attorney fees to a party that has acted as a private attorney general for the benefit of the public. See id. To determine if a plaintiff is acting as a private attorney general, a court should consider whether (1) the plaintiff has vindicated an “important public policy,” (2) the plaintiff‘s “necessary costs in doing so transcend the individual plaintiff‘s pecuniary interest to an extent requiring subsidization,” and (3) the circumstances are exceptional. See id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
¶ 36 Considering, as we must, only the lump-sum fees, we determine that Highlands has vindicated an important public policy. The Fire District acted beyond its statutory authority in charging an unauthorized fee—not just to Highlands, but to other developers in the Jordanelle Reservoir area. The Fire District asserts that no other developer complained about the unauthorized fees for almost nine years. But if it were not for Highlands originally bringing its lawsuit, the
¶ 37 We also determine that these are exceptional circumstances. In Stewart v. Utah Public Service Commission, 885 P.2d 759 (Utah 1994), a public utility was charging its ratepayers an unlawfully high fee. See id. at 783. Some ratepayers challenged the fee in court, and they were opposed by both the public utility and the Utah Public Service Commission. Id. at 762. The Utah Supreme Court determined that the circumstances there were exceptional enough to warrant the equitable award of attorney fees under the private-attorney-general doctrine. Id. at 783 & n. 19.
¶ 38 The exceptional circumstances in this case are similar to the exceptional circumstances in Stewart. Here, the Fire District continued to bill the unauthorized lump-sum fees even after the trial court ordered it to refund the fees to the landowners in November 2010. In its brief, the Fire District argued that the landowners should have been precluded from even challenging the lump-sum fees under a theory of promissory estoppel. It was not until oral argument before this court that the Fire District definitively conceded that the lump-sum fees were unauthorized and indefensible. As a result, Highlands has had to undertake sustained, determined efforts to vindicate the right to a refund of the lump-sum fees. We conclude that these circumstances are exceptional and weigh in favor of awarding attorney fees to Highlands.
¶ 39 Remand for further consideration of this issue is, however, necessary. In general, attorney fees may be granted in cases of “partial success,” see Stacey Props. v. Wixen, 766 P.2d 1080, 1085 (Utah Ct.App. 1988) (dealing with contractual attorney fees), but care must be taken to “differentiate between the time spent on the successful claim and the time spent on unsuccessful claims,” see Graco Fishing & Rental Tools, Inc. v. Ironwood Exploration, Inc., 766 P.2d 1074, 1080 (Utah 1988). Care will have to be used in identifying the attorney fees that are properly allocable to securing a refund of the lump-sum fees. We have determined that Highlands and the other developers must pay the legitimate monthly service fee, so Highlands will have to bear its own attorney fees insofar as allocable to that and the other issues on which it was not successful.
¶ 40 Once the trial court has determined the amount of attorney fees Highlands incurred in vindicating its right to a refund of the lump-sum fees, it can undertake the analysis required by the second Culbertson factor, comparing the fees incurred to the amount recovered so as to gauge whether “subsidization” is in order. See 2008 UT App 22, ¶ 9, 177 P.3d 621. The trial court should also calculate the attorney fees reasonably incurred by Highlands on appeal, insofar as allocable to the lump-sum fee issue on which it prevailed.11 If the “necessary costs of litigation . . . transcend [Highlands‘] pecuniary interest” to a degree that warrants attorney fees under the private-attorney-general doctrine, the trial court should award them.12
E. The Discovery Rule
¶ 41 Mountain Resort Land Company, LLC, one of the landowners, argues in a cross-appeal that the trial court incorrectly denied its claim for a lump-sum fee refund as untimely.13 Mountain Resort asserts that the equitable discovery rule should have tolled the four-year statute of limitations.14
¶ 42 Before determining whether the equitable discovery rule applies, “the plaintiff must make an initial showing that he did not know nor should have reasonably known the facts underlying the cause of action in time to reasonably comply with the limitations period.” Berneau v. Martino, 2009 UT 87, ¶ 23, 223 P.3d 1128. Knowledge of the underlying facts may be actual or constructive. Id. After the initial showing,
[f]or the equitable discovery rule to apply, one of two situations must exist: (1) “a plaintiff does not become aware of the cause of action because of the defendant‘s concealment or misleading conduct” or (2) “the case presents exceptional circumstances and the application of the general rule would be irrational or unjust, regardless of any showing that the defendant has prevented the discovery of the cause of action.”
Id. (quoting Russell Packard Dev., Inc. v. Carson, 2005 UT 14, ¶ 25, 108 P.3d 741).
¶ 43 In this case, it appears that Mountain Resort has made its initial showing that it did not reasonably know that the lump-sum fees were invalid until it learned of Highlands’ lawsuit against the Fire District and the County. Nothing in the record indicates that Mountain Resort had actual notice that the fees were invalid until after Highlands began litigation in 2008. Nor did Resolution 99-3 provide Mountain Resort with constructive knowledge of the underlying fact, i.e., that there was no authorizing resolution or legislative act to justify the lump-sum fees. While Resolution 99-3 explicitly authorized monthly fees, it is silent on the validity or invalidity of the lump-sum fees. From all that appears, however, Mountain Resort could have reasonably assumed that the lump-sum fees were authorized by some other resolution.
¶ 44 The Fire District argues that we should indulge the general presumption that “all men . . . know the law,” see Board of Educ. v. Jeppson, 74 Utah 576, 280 P. 1065, 1069 (1929), and that therefore Mountain Resort should have known that the fees were invalid. Assuming, however, that there was a law that would indicate the underlying fact—that the lump-sum fees lacked statutory support—this presumption would also apply to the Fire District. Under the same reasoning, we would presume that the Fire
¶ 45 We now consider whether the equitable discovery rule is applicable. Mountain Resort does not appear to claim that the Fire District intentionally misled it or concealed information from it regarding the validity of the lump-sum fees. See Berneau, 2009 UT 87, ¶ 23, 223 P.3d 1128. Therefore, we must determine whether there are “exceptional circumstances” in which “the application of the general rule would be irrational or unjust.” See id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). In determining whether exceptional circumstances exist, we weigh the “hardship the statute of limitations would impose on the plaintiff in the circumstances of that case” against “any prejudice to the defendant from difficulties of proof caused by the passage of time.” Myers v. McDonald, 635 P.2d 84, 87 (Utah 1981).
¶ 46 We have already determined, in the context of attorney fees, that these circumstances are exceptional. See supra ¶¶ 37-38. In weighing whether the “hardship the statute of limitations would impose on the plaintiff” outweighs “any prejudice to the defendant from difficulties of proof caused by the passage of time,” Myers, 635 P.2d at 87, we have no doubt that the lump-sum fees are indefensible and that but for the statute of limitations, Mountain Resort would be entitled to a refund. Because the statute of limitations would bar Mountain Resort from an otherwise uncontested recovery, we conclude that the statute imposes a substantial hardship. On the other side of the scale, we consider how the passage of time has increased the difficulty of the Fire District‘s defense of the lump-sum fees. We conclude that the passage of time has not prejudiced the Fire District in the least. Indeed, it has conceded that the lump-sum fees are indefensible. No evidence or legal defense was available to the Fire District that is now unavailable as a result of the passage of time. Considering the substantial hardship imposed on Mountain Resort and the lack of prejudice resulting to the Fire District, we conclude that these are exceptional circumstances that warrant the application of the discovery rule to moderate the harsh result of applying the statute of limitations. We reverse the trial court‘s decision not to apply the discovery rule to toll the statute of limitations but only as it applies to Mountain Resort‘s claim for a refund of the lump-sum fees it paid.16
F. Relation Back of Claims
¶ 47 Pigeonhole Development, LLC, one of the cross-appellants, argues that the trial court erred in determining that one of its claims did not relate back to its original complaint and was, for that reason, untimely. After Pigeonhole purchased the right to bring claims on behalf of Prime West Jordanelle, LLC, it filed its first complaint against the Fire District and the County on November 8, 2010. More than a year later, on November 22, 2011, Pigeonhole purchased additional refund claims from PWJ Holdings, LLC, through PWJ‘s bankruptcy trustee. Pigeonhole then attempted to amend its complaint to include its claims obtained from PWJ. However, applying
¶ 48
Whenever the claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, the amendment relates back to the date of the original pleading.
¶ 49 A true identity of interest exists if (1) “the amended pleading alleged only claims that arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading” and (2) the defendant had received actual or constructive notice that the new plaintiff “would have been a proper party to the original pleading such that no prejudice would result” from preventing the defendant from using a statute-of-limitations defense that otherwise would have been available. Ottens v. McNeil, 2010 UT App 237, ¶ 43, 239 P.3d 308 (quoting Gary Porter Constr. v. Fox Constr., Inc., 2004 UT App 354, ¶ 40, 101 P.3d 371) (applying the identity-of-interest test to a plaintiff who sought to add an additional defendant). See Doxey-Layton, 548 P.2d at 906 (explaining that the identity-of-interest exception applies to “both plaintiff and defendant“).
¶ 50 On cross-appeal, Pigeonhole contends that its attempt to amend the complaint to add the PWJ claims did not add a new party. After purchasing the claims from Prime West and PWJ, Pigeonhole argues that it became the only entity with a right to pursue those claims. See Applied Med. Techs., Inc. v. Eames, 2002 UT 18, ¶ 17, 44 P.3d 699 (holding that the sale of a claim “cuts off the former plaintiff‘s right to pursue those claims“). This is true as concerns an agreement between parties to sell a claim. But as concerns the parties’ standing in court, we consider plaintiffs who have purchased their claims to have “step[ped] into the shoes of the former plaintiff.” See id. Pigeonhole has, in effect, purchased the right to step into the shoes of Prime West and PWJ. Therefore, Pigeonhole‘s effort to amend its complaint to add the PWJ claims does attempt to add a new party. Pigeonhole‘s PWJ claims are therefore time barred unless Pigeonhole can show that PWJ has a true identity of interest with Prime West independent of their connection via Pigeonhole.
¶ 51 We now examine whether PWJ‘s claims “arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be
¶ 52 Allegations of “new or different acts of misconduct” amount to new claims that cannot relate back to the original complaint. Yearsley v. Jensen, 798 P.2d 1127, 1129 (Utah 1990) (denying a motion to amend because it alleged “new and different misconduct“); Behrens v. Raleigh Hills Hosp., Inc., 675 P.2d 1179, 1183 (Utah 1983) (allowing an amended pleading because the amendment relied on a different legal characterization of the offense but did not refer to “new or different acts of misconduct“). Because Pigeonhole‘s PWJ claims allege a new act of misconduct, they fail the first element of the identity-of-interest test. It follows that Pigeonhole also fails to meet the requirements of
CONCLUSION
¶ 53 We conclude that the monthly fee of $14.81 per ERU is a reasonable fee and that the Fire District can charge the fee from the moment the County grants a density determination. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court‘s decision to the contrary.
¶ 54 We affirm the trial court‘s ruling that the lump-sum fees are invalid. We remand to the trial court to determine exactly which fees were lump-sum fees that must now be refunded.
¶ 55 Because it is legally separate from the Fire District, the County is not jointly liable to refund the lump-sum fees, attorney fees, or any other judgment or obligation for which the Fire District is liable in connection with this case. We reverse the trial court‘s determination that the County was jointly liable.
¶ 56 We affirm the trial court‘s grant of prejudgment interest at 10% per year starting from the moment each landowner paid a lump-sum fee. We remand to the trial court to calculate the prejudgment interest as it applies to the lump-sum fee refund only.
¶ 57 We mostly affirm the trial court‘s determination to award Highlands its attorney fees. We remand, however, for the trial court to determine which of Highlands’ attorney fees, below and on appeal, are allocable to the lump-sum fee issue and to reassess the amount of those costs versus the amount recovered for the purposes of applying the private-attorney-general doctrine.
¶ 58 We reverse the trial court‘s decision not to apply the discovery rule to toll the statute of limitations, but only insofar as it concerns Mountain Resort‘s claim for a refund of its lump-sum fees.
¶ 59 Finally, because Pigeonhole‘s proposed amendment to its original complaint alleges a new act of misconduct directed against a new party, it does not relate back to its original complaint. We therefore affirm the trial court‘s determination that Pigeonhole‘s PWJ claims are untimely.
¶ 60 With the guidance offered in this opinion, the trial court may now fully resolve this conflict, including determining appropriate fees and costs.18