HENRY UNSELD WASHINGTON v. ROBERT GILMORE, Wаrden; TRACY SHAWLEY, Warden‘s Assistant; S.P. DURCO, RHU Commander; P.E. BARKEFELT, RHU Lieutenant; A.J. MORRIS, Lieutenant; C. WILLIAMS, Lieutenant; G. CRABLE, Sergeant; J.M. SMITH, Sergeant; ROBERT NELSON, Corrections Officer; T.S. OSWALD, Corrections Officer; L. COMER, Corrections Officer; T.I. BENNETT, Property Officer/Corrections Officer; R. HENDRICKS, Corrections Officer; J. CODDY, Corrections Officer; J. HEGETER, Corrections Officer; D. FARRIER, Corrections Officer; M. STUMP, Corrections Officer; G. TAIT; J.D. SUHAN, Corrections Officer; IRMA VIHLIDAL, Health Care Administrator; B. JIN, Medical Director; M. PARK, Doctor; P. DASCANI, Doctor; M. COMER, P.A.; E. MATTES, P.A.; E. MWUARA, P.A.; P. DENNISON, Corrections Officer
No. 23-2963
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
December 18, 2024
T.S. OSWALD, Appellant
Argued: September 24, 2024
Before: KRAUSE, BIBAS, and AMBRO, Circuit Judges
(Filed: December 18, 2024)
Sean A. Kirkpatrick PENNSYLVANIA ATTORNEY GENERAL‘S OFFICE Strawberry Square 15th Floor Harrisburg, PA 17120
Anthony T. Kovalchick [ARGUED] PENNSYLVANIA ATTORNEY GENERAL‘S OFFICE APPELLATE LITIGATION SECTION 1251 Waterfront Place Pittsburgh, PA 15222 Counsel for Appellant
Samuel Weiss [ARGUED] Amaris A. Montes RIGHTS BEHIND BARS 1800 M Street NW Front 1 #33821 Washington, DC 20003 Counsel for Appellee
BIBAS, Circuit Judge.
Juries have leeway to punish and deter wrongdoers with punitive damages. Prison guard T.S. Oswald sexually abused a prisoner twice. So the jury ordered him to pay not only $20,000 in compensation fоr each assault, but also $25,000 in punitive damages for the first one and $200,000 for the second.
We will affirm the jury‘s award. Oswald denies that there was enough evidence that he committed the assault, but there was. He also challenges the punitive damages as excessive. But the assaults were blameworthy, the awards are in the range of comparable cases, and even the 10-to-1 ratio of punitive-to-compensatory damages is fitting.
I. OFFICER OSWALD SEXUALLY ASSAULTED WASHINGTON TWICE
On this appeal from a jury verdict, we view the facts in the light most favorable to the prevailing party: state prisoner Henry Washington. CGB Occupational Therapy, Inc. v. RHA Health Servs. Inc., 357 F.3d 375, 379 (3d Cir. 2004).
In 2013, Oswald and another guard came to move Washington from his cell to the prison‘s visiting room. They handcuffed Washington and hooked a tether to his cuffs. A guard “started to rub and touch [him] in a very sexual manner.” App. 109. They kept trying to push a nightstick into his rectum.
At the visiting room, “someone ... insert[ed] their finger into the cleavage of [his] buttocks.” App. 110. Washington jumped. Oswald yanked on his tether so hard that it pulled his arms “through the wicket” in the door to the visiting room. Id. The other guard prodded his testicles with the nightstick “so vigorously” that Washington collapsed “to the floor.” App. 110-11.
On the walk back to Washington‘s cell, the guards again prodded him with the nightstick, poked him with the pin or needle, and called him “honey,” “sugar,” and “blackberry.” App. 111. By the time he got bаck to his cell, “blood [was] running down the back of [his] leg” and his “crotch was all soaked with blood.” App. 112. He was “bleeding from [his] buttocks ... [a]nd ... penis.” App. 138.
Two years later, Oswald assaulted Washington again. While walking Washington back to his cell in handcuffs, Oswald fondled him all over his back and “rump,” “shove[d] his fingеr into [Washington‘s] buttocks” like he was “trying to insert his finger into [Washington‘s] rectum,” and again called him “sweet dark sugar” and “blackberry.” App. 113-14.
Washington sued Oswald under
Oswald now appeals. We review the District Court‘s denial of judgment as a matter of law de novo and its denial of a new trial for abuse of discretion. Lightning Lube, Inc. v. Witco Corp., 4 F.3d 1153, 1166-67 (3d Cir. 1993). We ordinarily review the District Court‘s denial of a motion for remittitur for abuse of discretion. Jester v. Hutt, 937 F.3d 233, 238 (3d Cir. 2019). But where, like here, we review a district court‘s “decision upholding the constitutionality” of a punitive damages award, our review is de novo. Willow Inn, Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Mut. Ins. Co., 399 F.3d 224, 230 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing Cooper Indus. v. Leatherman Tool Grp., 532 U.S. 424, 431 (2001)).
II. THERE WAS ENOUGH EVIDENCE TO FIND OSWALD LIABLE
Oswald does not deny that Washington was assaulted by someone but, as noted, disputes that there was enough evidence that he was the one who did it. In essence, he argues that Washington had to identify him by name but did not. If “a reasonable jury would not have a legally sufficient evidentiary basis” to find Oswald responsible, the District Court may grant judgment as a matter of law.
Start with the 2013 assault. Washington specifically named Oswald as one of the two guards involved; the other was an unnamed sergeant. After one of them fondled Washington‘s back and rear end and stuck his finger into Washington‘s buttocks, it was Oswald who yanked on the tether to restrain Washington. Oswald did that as part of a course of conduct in which the guards rubbed and touched Washington sexually, then kept prodding Washington‘s rear end and testicles with a nightstick, poking him with something sharp until he had bloоd down his leg and all over his crotch, and calling him sexual terms. This is sufficient evidence for a jury to find that, at a minimum, Oswald was personally involved in the constitutional violation. Though Oswald denied all this, he confirmed that he was “probably” working in Washington‘s cell block that day (August 1, 2013) and “[m]ost likely” escorted him to the visiting room. App. 158-59. The jury could reasonably have believed Washington‘s version of events over Oswald‘s and found that Oswald had sexually assaulted him in 2013.
So too with the 2015 assault. Washington testified that a guard who “was in the first event” and had since “bec[o]me a sergeant” assaulted him again. App. 113. He had said that the first assault was by Oswald and “a sergeant.” App. 110. The
III. THE JURY‘S PUNITIVE-DAMAGES AWARDS WERE NOT EXCESSIVE
Next, Oswald challenges the punitive-damages awards as excessive under both federal common law and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. But the District Court properly rejected both claims.
A. Exxon does not limit punitive damages under § 1983
Oswald argues that federal common law limits punitive damages in § 1983 suits. And he contends that the Supreme Court‘s decision in a maritime-tort casе creates a federal-common-law limit that applies here. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471 (2008). That claim misses the mark.
True, “Congress intended
But Exxon doеs not provide any common-law principles that govern here. That case arose in federal maritime jurisdiction, where the Court decides issues “in the manner of a common law court.” 554 U.S. at 489-90. In making common law, the Court held that “punitive damages in maritime law” should not exceed compensatory damages. Id. at 489, 513. But we are under a statute, not at sea. On dry land, that maritime rule does not bind us.
If there is any nonconstitutional limit on punitive damages under
Ultimately, courts “must respect the limitations Congress built into the statute.” Kunz, 538 F.3d at 678. Casеs evaluating punitive damages under the common law that governed when
B. The punitive-damages awards were not constitutionally excessive
Oswald‘s constitutional challenge is a closer issue. The Supreme Court has held that the Due Process Clause limits punitive damages. To decide whether they are excessive, we look to three “guideposts“: how reprehensible (blameworthy) the defendant was, the disparity (ratio) between the award and the harm the plaintiff suffered or could have suffered, and how the award stacks up against “civil penalties authorized or imposed in comparable cases.” State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 418 (2003) (emphasis added). Each factor favors upholding both of the jury‘s punitive-damages awards.
1. Reprehensibility. The “most important” factor is the defendant‘s blameworthiness. Id. at 419. To measure it, State Farm tells us to consider five subfactors. Id. All five support the awards here.
- Oswald physically injured Washington. Id.
- He did it on purpose. Id.
- Though Oswald injured only one victim, he did it repeatedly. Id.
- He did it not for a legitimate reason, but “maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm.” Ricks v. Shover, 891 F.3d 468, 475 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320-21 (1986)).
- And Oswald targeted one of the most vulnerable among us: a prisoner. Sexually assaulting a prisoner “offends our most basic principles of just punishment.” Id. at 473 (internal quotation marks omitted). Prisoners are “stripped ... of virtually every means of self-protection” and cannot get outside help; they depend on their guards to safeguard them. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833 (1994). Instead of safeguarding Washington, Oswald exploited his power to prey upon him. Those acts were reprehensible in every sensе of the word.
2. Ratio of punitive damages to harm. Though the punitive damages were up to ten times as big as the compensatory ones, that ratio is permissible here. The Supreme Court has refused to cap punitive damages with a “bright-line ratio.” State Farm, 538 U.S. at 425. It did warn us that “few awards [should] exceed[ ] a single-digit ratio ... to a significant dеgree.” Id. But some factors can justify higher ratios: when, for instance, economic damages are low or noneconomic damages are hard to measure. Id. The touchstone is whether the awards are “reasonable and proportionate” to the defendаnt‘s wrongdoing and the plaintiff‘s specific harm. Id. at 425-26.
The parties dispute whether we should calculate the ratio separately for each assault or combine the two. Washington argues that we should aggregate them because the jury awarded them for related wrongs. Some оf our sister circuits have conceptualized the issue this way. Bains LLC v. Arco Prods. Co., Div. of Atl. Richfield Co., 405 F.3d 764, 776 (9th Cir. 2005); see also Saccameno v. U.S. Bank Nat‘l Ass‘n, 943 F.3d 1071, 1089 (7th Cir. 2019). But that approach to aggregating does not apply here, where the jury was instructed to treat each assault discretely and did so. Aggregating the аwards would distort the jury‘s findings. When a jury doles out separate awards for separate counts, courts must consider whether each award was constitutional. That means calculating the ratios separately.
Even considered separately, both ratios pass constitutionаl muster. The first was 1.25 to 1 ($25,000 punitive to $20,000 compensatory); the second, 10 to 1 ($200,000 to $20,000). True, the latter ratio exceeds single digits but by only a penny, not “a significant degree.” State Farm, 538 U.S. at 425. And because the single-digit ratio is only a rule of thumb, not a cap, it just alerts us to look for a “special justification.” CGB Occupational Therapy, Inc. v. RHA Health Servs., Inc., 499 F.3d 184, 192 (3d Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). We have that here. Sexual assault inflicts the kind of noneconomic harm that is hard to put a price on, justifying a higher ratio. State Farm, 538 U.S. at 425.
Plus, the rationales for punitive damages are to punish wrongdoing and deter it. Id. at 416. Oswald repeated his sadistic assault, making him more blameworthy and compounding Washington‘s earlier suffering. Just as the criminal law punishes recidivists more harshly for failing to learn their lessons and choosing to flout the law again, so too does the civil law. The jury reasonably found the second assаult worse than the first and raised its punitive-damages award accordingly.
3. Comparable cases. Under State Farm‘s third guidepost, we look at what “civil penalties [are] authorized or imposed in comparable cases.” 538 U.S. at 418. Section 1983 does not list civil penalties. Outside the
If we looked at these comparators, they would at most help us gauge whether an award is so “grossly excessive” that it falls within “the zone of arbitrariness that violates the Due Process
Whether we consider only the first two factors or all three, both punitive-damages awards are constitutional. The District Court properly upheld them.
* * * * *
The jury had enough evidence to find that it was Oswаld who sexually abused Washington twice. And its two punitive-damages awards were proportional to “the enormity of his offense[s]” and the harms that they inflicted on Washington. BMW, 517 U.S. at 575 (internal quotation marks omitted). While the second award may be close to the line, it does not exceed it, so we will affirm.