Heffesse v. GuevaraHeffesse v. Guevara
Davidovich Stein Law Group, Niv V. Davidovich and Jodi C. Rosner, for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Legal Aid Foundation of Los Angeles, Amanda McNally, for Defendants and Respondents.
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INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff and appellant Cyril Heffesse appeals the judgment entered in favor of defendants Karina Yamileth Portillo Guevara (hereafter “Guevara“), Jonny Alexis Sanchez and Tania Portillo following the trial court‘s granting of their motion for judgment on the pleadings. Plaintiff contends the trial court erred in determining that the notice to pay rent or quit overstated the amount of rent due by including the Systematic Code Enforcement Program (SCEP) fees. Plaintiff also contends the court erred in denying him leave to amend the complaint. As explained below, we affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On November 14, 2023, plaintiff filed an unlawful detainer complaint against defendants based on a three-day notice to pay or quit. Plaintiff alleged he rented to defendants the premises located at 9639 1/2 S. Hoover St., in Los Angeles, California pursuant to a written lease agreement; defendants rented the premises at a rental rate of $1,550.00 per month payable on the first of the month; a copy of the notice was served on defendants on October 6, 2023; and defendants did not comply with the notice. Plaintiff sought $3,132.64 in past due rent, possession of the premises, damages in the amount of $51.66 per day, forfeiture of the agreement, and reasonable attorney fees and costs.
The notice, which was attached to the complaint, stated, in pertinent part, that defendant Guevara was “required to make payment payable to: Titan Asset Management LLC (Landlord) the rent for the premises amounting to the total sum of $3,132.64 calculated as follows: $23.76 which came due August 1st for the rental period from 08/01/2023 through 08/31/2023[;] $1,554.44 which came due September 1st for the rental period from 09/01/2023 through 09/30/2023[; and] $1,554.44 which came due October 1st for the rental period from 10/01/2023 through 10/31/2023” within three days or quit. (Underlining and some capitalization omitted.)
On March 27, 2024, defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on the basis that the three-day notice was “fatally defective.” Specifically, defendants argued plaintiff‘s notice overstated the rental amount due because it demanded $1,554.44 per month for September and October 2023 instead of $1,550 per month as noted in the complaint, and defendants had made payment for August 2023 which plaintiff did not account for in the notice. In
On March 28, 2024, the matter was called for non-jury trial. Plaintiff‘s counsel announced ready for trial and argued defendants’ motion should be denied as untimely. In response to the court‘s inquiry, defense counsel reiterated the arguments set forth in the motion. Plaintiff‘s counsel asserted that whether the notice overstated the amount due was an issue for a trier of fact to decide. The trial court found the motion for summary judgment was untimely and indicated the matter would proceed to trial.
Immediately thereafter, defense counsel orally moved for a judgment on the pleadings because “on the face of the complaint” plaintiff stated the rental amount per month was $1,550, yet the notice demanded payments in the amount of $1,554.44 per month. Plaintiff‘s counsel stated that she had “the lease agreement in front of [her], it‘s for $1,550 and $4 of SCEP fees. So we are demanding $1554.44 for the months of September and October.”1 The court indicated that it was unsure whether landlords are “allowed to include SCEP fees as rent in the three-day notice as opposed to a separate failure to comply with terms of the lease to pay those amounts.” Plaintiff‘s counsel argued the SCEP fees were “always permitted” to be included as “part of the rent.” Defense counsel countered the SCEP fees are “additional fees, they are not rent fees[... but instead are] the same as late charges or other fees and therefore they cannot be included in a notice.”2 The court took the matter under submission.
The court issued its ruling later that day, concluding “a SCEP fee is not ‘rent’ under LAMC3 (
DISCUSSION
LARSO Does Not Categorize SCEP Fees as Rent
In his opening brief, plaintiff contends SCEP fees are a “rental surcharge” under
Standard of Review and Applicable Legal Principles
As this case involves interpretation of legal principles and statutes and the application of law to facts that are not in dispute, we exercise de novo review as to whether judgment was properly entered. (Bawa v. Terhune (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th Supp. 1, 5 (Bawa).)
Under LARSO, “rent” is defined as “[t]he consideration, including any bonus, benefits or gratuity, demanded or received by a landlord for or in connection with the use or occupancy of a rental unit, including but not limited to monies demanded or paid for the following: meals where required by the landlord as a condition of the tenancy; parking; furnishings; other housing services of any kind; subletting; or security deposits.” (
The statutory language is clear. Under LARSO, a landlord may bring an eviction action against a tenant for the tenant‘s failure to pay rent to which the landlord is entitled, which includes the rental unit registration renewal fees and related surcharges due under
Plaintiff cites Bawa, supra, in support of his position that SCEP fees can be included with and considered rent. Plaintiff‘s reliance is misplaced. As plaintiff notes in his opening brief, Bawa held that a trivial breach (i.e., de minimus underpayment of rent) is insufficient to support an unlawful detainer action. While the plaintiff in Bawa did include the SCEP fee in the “unpaid and delinquent rent” total included in the three-day notice, whether the SCEP fees could be categorized as rent pursuant to LARSO was not at issue before the Bawa court; nor did the court consider it. “[I]t is axiomatic that a decision does not stand for a proposition not considered by the court.” (People v. Barker (2004) 34 Cal.4th 345, 354.)
Given that the clear and unambiguous statutory language has settled this issue, we need not address the role of “consideration” or lack thereof in
The Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings Was Properly Granted
On appeal from a judgment of dismissal after a pleading challenge in an unlawful detainer action, we apply a de novo standard of review. (Lee v. Kotyluk (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 719, 728.) “‘“A motion for judgment on the pleadings serves the function of a demurrer, challenging only defects on the face of the complaint.” [Citation.] As with a demurrer, “[t]he grounds for a motion for judgment on the pleadings must appear on the face of the complaint or from a matter of which the court may take judicial notice.“’ [Citation.] To withstand such a motion, ‘it is not enough that [plaintiffs] could assert a viable theory. “A [motion for judgment on the pleadings] tests the legal sufficiency of factual allegations in [the] complaint.“’ [Citation.]” (Ibid. [italics and brackets in original].) “No extrinsic evidence can be considered.” (Jayasinghe v. Lee (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th Supp. 33, 36.)
A three-day notice to pay rent or vacate the premises issued pursuant to
“‘A valid three-day pay rent or quit notice is a prerequisite to an unlawful detainer action. [Citations.] Because of the summary nature of an unlawful detainer action, a notice is valid only if the lessor strictly complies with the statutorily mandated notice requirements. [Citation.]’ [Citation.] A judgment must be reversed when it is based on a three-day notice which lacks the information required by
Here, the record reflects that the rent amount was $1,550 per month. The complaint indicates that defendant agreed to pay monthly rent of $1,550. In
Moreover, plaintiff‘s demand of payment of two different delinquent amounts based on a monthly rent amount of $1,550 listed in the complaint and the amount of $1554.44 listed in the three-day notice, creates precisely the type of ambiguity that the legislature intended to avoid in amending the unlawful detainer statutes. (See City of Alameda v. Sheehan, supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at p. 82 [“Taken together, these discrepancies result in the ambiguity and confusion that the amendment to
Leave to Amend
Plaintiff‘s contention that the trial court erred in denying leave to amend lacks merit. As a preliminary matter, we note that the record does not reflect plaintiff sought leave to amend at any point after the trial court granted the motion for judgment on the pleadings, or that the issue was brought before the trial court at any point. Nor does the record reflect that the trial court explicitly addressed whether leave to amend was granted or denied when it made its ruling. Under
Moreover, even if the claim is not forfeited, there was no abuse of discretion here. (Haley v. Dow Lewis Motors, Inc. (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 497, 506 [leave to amend a complaint is reviewed for abuse of discretion].) Plaintiff‘s failure to strictly adhere to the statutorily-mandated notice requirements made the notice “invalid on its face” as it is well settled that a defective three-day notice cannot support an unlawful detainer action. (See Levitz Furniture Co. v. Wingtip Communications, supra, 86 Cal.App.4th at p. 1038 [“Due to the summary nature of such an action, a three-day notice is valid only if the landlord strictly complies with the provisions of
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Defendants are awarded costs on appeal.
We concur:
Guillemet, J.
Kumar, Acting P. J.
Ricciardulli, J.