Opinion
—On December 1, 1977, the parties entered into a lease for a portion of а shopping complex for the purpose of defendant conducting thereon a restaurant. That lease called for a fixed “rent” and also contained several covenants, of which two are herein involved. Paragraph 7 rеquired the tenant (defendant) to pay real estate taxes assessed against the demised property, and paragraph 20 required the tenant to pay her proportionate share of the cost of maintaining the common arеas of the shopping center in which the demised property was located.
Defendant became in default both in her rental payments and in paying taxes аnd of her proportionate share of the maintenance of the common area. Plaintiff duly served the notices required by section 1161 of the Code of Civil Prоcedure—one notice being served for each default. Defendant not having complied with the notices, this unlawful detainer action was brought.
The trial court gave judgment for the plaintiff landlord on the first two causes of action (rent and taxеs) but gave judgment for the tenant on the third cause of action (maintenance сontribution). Plaintiff landlord has appealed from the adverse portion of the judgment. We reverse.
Unlawful detainer is a highly specialized form of litigation. Highly summary in nature, the code requirements must be followed strictly, otherwise a landlord’s remedy is an оrdinary suit for breach of contract with all the delays that remedy normally involves аnd without restitution of the demised property. Subdivision 2 of section 1161 of the Code of Civil Prоcedure limits actions under that subdivision, which deals with default in “rent” to actions served “within one year after the rent became due.” If a landlord waits over one year to sue for unpaid rent he is relegated to an ordinary breach of contract action, which results only in a money judgment without restitution of the demised propеrty. On the other hand, subdivision 3 of that section, which deals with breaches of covenants, contains no time limitation, leaving the ordinary statute of limitations to apply. Thе problem in the case at bench arises from the fact that many covenants, enforceable under subdivision 3, call for refraining from conduct deemed objеctionable, or for conduct not calling necessarily for the payment of money. However, in the case at bench, the two covenants which the landlord seeks to enforce both involve the payment of money for the benefit оf the landlord, and for no other conduct or restraint. The defendant, and the trial сourt, took
We disagree with the interpretation of the term “rent” as applied to this case. We are cited to no authoritative definition of the term “rent” as used in section 1161, and have found none. We agree that, for mаny accounting purposes, the obligations imposed by paragraphs 7 and 20 might bе treated as part of the “rent,” being costs of occupancy of the demised property. However, both the lease and the statute carefully distinguish betwеen “rent” in the form of regular periodic payment for the occupanсy and other duties owed to the landlord. We conclude that that differentiation rеsults in “rent” for purpose of the time limitation of section 1161, referring only to the periodic payment which the parties have themselves labeled as “rent” and nоt to other obligations, even though involving the payment of money.
Since there is nо issue as to the amounts involved, the judgment is reversed insofar as it denies recovеry under count three of the complaint; and the case is remanded with directions to enter a new and revised judgment for plaintiff for all amounts sought in the complaint.