CYNTHIA HEALEY v. GOODYEAR TIRE & RUBBER CO., et al.
C.A. No. 25888
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
May 16, 2012
2012-Ohio-2170
MOORE, Judge.
APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT ENTERED IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS COUNTY OF SUMMIT, OHIO CASE No. CV 2009-04-3320
Dated: May 16, 2012
MOORE, Judge.
{¶1} Appellant, Cynthia Healey, appeals from the judgment of the Summit County Court of Common Pleas. This Court affirms.
I.
{¶2} In a prior appeal, Healey v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 9th Dist. No. 25296, 2010-Ohio-5463, ¶ 1, this Court set forth the underlying factual and procedural history as follows:
Cynthia Healey is a former employee of Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company. After she was laid off by Goodyear and several other companies declined to hire her, she sued Goodyear and Barbara Medkeff, her former supervisor, for post-employment retaliation, alleging that Ms. Medkeff had given her bad references because she had complained about gender discrimination while working for Goodyear. The trial court granted summary judgment to Goodyear and Ms. Medkeff, concluding that Ms. Healey‘s claims failed as a matter of law because she had not presented any admissible evidence that Ms. Medkeff had given her bad references. Ms. Healey [] appealed, arguing that the trial court incorrectly entered summary judgment for Goodyear and Ms. Medkeff. We affirm[ed] because Ms. Healey failed to offer any non-hearsay evidence that Ms. Medkeff gave her bad references and because she failed to present any evidence that a
causal relationship existed between the alleged bad references and her gender discrimination complaints.
{¶3} On February 19, 2010, Healey filed a
{¶4} Healey timely filed a notice of appeal. She raises three assignments of error for our review.
II.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN FINDING THAT THE EVIDENCE SUBMITTED BY [HEALEY] IN SUPPORT OF HER
{¶5} In her second assignment of error, Healey argues that the trial court erred in concluding that the evidence submitted in her
{¶6}
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under
Rule 59(B) ; (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment has been satisfied, released or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application; or (5) any other reason justifying relief from the judgment. The motion shall be made within a reasonable time, and for reasons (1), (2) and (3) not more than one year after the judgment, order or proceeding was entered or taken.
{¶7} To prevail on a motion for relief from judgment under
{¶8} The question of whether such relief should be granted is within the sound discretion of the trial court. Griffey v. Rajan, 33 Ohio St.3d 75, 77 (1987). This Court, therefore, will not reverse the trial court‘s decision absent an abuse of discretion. Kay v. Marc Glassman, Inc., 76 Ohio St.3d 18, 19-20 (1996). The phrase “abuse of discretion” * * * implies that the trial court‘s attitude [was] unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable.” Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219 (1983). When applying the abuse of discretion standard, this Court may not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court. Pons v. Ohio State Med. Bd., 66 Ohio St.3d 619, 621 (1993).
{¶9} Initially, we consider whether a
{¶10} In most instances, courts have chosen to simply address the underlying merits of the
{¶11} Some cases have broadened the language of
{¶12} In Thompson v. Russ-Pol, Inc., 11th Dist. No. 4071, 1989 WL 42973, *3 (Apr. 28, 1989), the Eleventh District expressly held “[t]o the extent that the language of
{¶13} Acknowledging these inconsistencies, we need not reach this legal issue because it was not raised by the parties, and Healey‘s
{¶14} On February 19, 2010, Healey filed a motion for relief from judgment in the trial court. In that motion, she alleged that she was entitled to relief under
{¶15} This Court‘s decision in Holden v. Ohio Bur. of Motor Vehicles, 67 Ohio App.3d 531 (9th Dist.1990), makes clear that when presenting newly discovered evidence the moving party must demonstrate: “(1) that the evidence was actually ‘newly discovered‘; that is, it must have been discovered subsequent to the trial; (2) that the movant exercised due diligence; and (3) that the evidence is material, not merely impeaching or cumulative, and that a new trial would probably produce a different result.” (Citations and quotations omitted.) Id. at 540.
{¶16} Healey failed to establish that the evidence was “newly discovered,” or that it could not have been earlier discovered with due diligence. The undisputed facts in the record indicate that certain events that occurred after the court‘s judgment entry granting Goodyear‘s motion for summary judgment allowed Healey to “recall” this prior job application. This does not constitute evidence that is “newly discovered” as anticipated by the rule. “Relief from judgment may be granted based on newly discovered evidence, but similar to
{¶17} However, even if we were to consider Healey‘s evidence, it would not affect the outcome because the trial court previously concluded, and this Court affirmed, that Healey failed
{¶18}
{¶19} A plaintiff may demonstrate a causal connection through direct evidence or “through knowledge coupled with a closeness in time that creates in inference of causation.” Meyers v. Goodrich Corp., 8th Dist. No. 95996, 2011-Ohio-3261, ¶ 28. “Close temporal proximity between the employer‘s knowledge of the protected activity and the adverse employment action alone may be significant enough to constitute evidence of a causal
{¶20} If, however, some time has elapsed between the protected activity and the subsequent adverse employment action, the employee “must produce other evidence of retaliatory conduct, namely, evidence of additional discrimination, to establish causation.” Meyers at ¶ 29, citing Mickey, 516 F.3d at 525; see also Hall v. Banc One Mgt. Corp., 10th Dist. No. 04AP-905, 2006-Ohio-913, ¶ 47 (interval of two months between complaint and adverse action “so dilutes any inference of causation that we are constrained to hold as a matter of law that the temporal connection could not justify a finding in [plaintiff‘s] favor on the matter of causal link“), reversed on other grounds by 114 Ohio St.3d 484, 2007-Ohio-4640; Ningard v. Shin Etsu Silicones, 9th Dist. No. 24524, 2009-Ohio-3171, ¶ 17 (holding that mere temporal proximity does not suffice, “especially where the events are separated by more than a few days or weeks“).
{¶21} Healey has not presented any arguments demonstrating that the trial court was unreasonable in concluding that the lapse of 12-24 months from the alleged protected activity to the subsequent adverse employment action did not create an inference of a causal connection. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d at 219. Instead, she only argues that the Wenger affidavit “brings the temporal proximity of Medkeff‘s adverse action closer to the time [she] was employed by Goodyear and her protected activity.” Without additional evidence of retaliatory conduct, Healey may not rely simply on an inference of causation. Thus, she cannot establish a prima facie case of retaliation or that a new trial would probably produce a different result.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING [HEALEY‘S]
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN FINDING THAT THIS COURT‘S DECISION IN HEALEY V. GOODYEAR TIRE & RUBBER CO., 9TH DIST. NO. 25296, 2010-OHIO-5463 IS THE LAW OF THE CASE IN THIS MATTER WITH REGARD TO THE ISSUE OF THE CAUSAL CONNECTION BETWEEN THE PROTECTED ACTIVITY ENGAGED IN BY [HEALEY] AND THE ACTS OF POST-EMPLOYMENT RETALIATION.
{¶22} In her first assignment of error, Healey argues that the trial court erred in denying her
{¶23} Because our resolution of the second assignment of error is dispositive of the issues raised, this Court declines to address the first and third assignments of error separately, as they are rendered moot. See
III.
{¶24} Healey‘s second assignment of error is overruled. Her remaining assignments of error are rendered moot. The judgment of the Summit County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common Pleas, County of Summit, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to
Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the period for review shall begin to run.
Costs taxed to Appellant.
CARR, J.
CONCURS.
BELFANCE, P. J.
CONCURS IN JUDGMENT ONLY.
APPEARANCES:
JOHN F. MYERS, Attorney at Law, for Appellant.
BRIAN J. KELLY, Attorney at Law, for Appellees.
CARLA MOORE
FOR THE COURT