Haynes v. Navy Federal Credit Union
282 F.R.D. 17
D.D.C.
2012
Check Treatment
Docket

James R. HAYNES, Plaintiff, v. NAVY FEDERAL CREDIT UNION, Defendant.

Civil Action No. 11-00614 (CKK)

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

April 3, 2012.

COLLEEN KOLLAR-KOTELLY, District Judge.

B. Motion for Reconsideration

In response to defendant‘s motion for a more definite statement or to dismiss or strike, plaintiffs filed a cross-motion for reconsideration of “Discovery Denials for years since approximately 1993, for correction of erroneous and omitted discovery for years between 1983 and 1993, and for an Order requiring production of withheld electronic personnel database records, and for a plenary hearing on this Motion along with the Defendant‘s Motion for a More Definite Statement.” See Docket No. 475. Plaintiffs fail to indicate in their cross-motion for reconsideration exactly which orders they seek to have the Court reconsider, but the Court notes that it has issued at least five orders denying discovery in the last four years alone. See, e.g., June 29, 2011 Minute Order (denying plaintiffs’ motion to stay order directing plaintiffs to file sixth amended complaint to allow plaintiffs opportunity to obtain discovery of purported GAO electronic database); July 22, 2010 Order, Docket No. 461, at 9 (denying plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration of order denying plaintiffs’ request for discovery of GAO electronic database, and denying discovery on the merits generally until plaintiffs file a complaint that complies with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure); Dec. 18, 2009 Op., (affirming magistrate judge‘s order granting defendant‘s motion for more definite statement and rejecting plaintiffs’ argument that they should not be required to submit a more definite statement until they are given access to the GAO‘s electronic personnel files); December 17, 2008 Minute Order (denying plaintiffs’ motion for hearing on allegedly withheld evidence); July 16, 2008 Minute Order (affirming magistrate judge‘s denial of plaintiffs’ requests for discovery of electronic databases and otherwise in support of their motion to intervene).

Plaintiffs’ cross-motion for reconsideration consists of “little more than a rehash” of the arguments previously argued by plaintiffs and rejected by the Court. . Plaintiffs have identified no “intervening change of controlling law, the availability of new evidence, or the need to correct a clear error or prevent manifest injustice.” (internal quotation omitted). Instead, plaintiffs merely assert their continuing disagreement with the Court‘s prior orders. As the Court made clear in its December 18, 2009 Opinion, granting plaintiffs’ various requests for discovery on the merits “would permit plaintiffs to bypass the pleading stage of litigation entirely, sanctioning an approach under which plaintiffs could simply allege that information held by defendant would prove their claims without actually stating what those claims are in the short and plain statement required by Rule 8(a).” Dec. 18, 2009 Op. at 16. Indeed, as the Court explained then, “[b]y focusing so extensively on the purported ‘database’ and the agency‘s allegedly wrongful withholding thereof, plaintiffs have lost sight of the pleading standards set forth in Rule 8, [and] the role of Rule 12 in permitting a defendant to test the legal sufficiency of a plaintiff‘s complaint.” Id. at 15. Accordingly, plaintiffs’ cross-motion for reconsideration of discovery denials is hereby DENIED.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, plaintiffs’ cross-motion for reconsideration of discovery denials is DENIED. Defendant‘s motion to strike plaintiffs’ sixth amended complaint is GRANTED, and plaintiffs’ sixth amended complaint is hereby DISMISSED with prejudice. An appropriate order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.

It is so ORDERED.

James R. Haynes, Washington, DC, pro se.

Amy Sanborn Owen, Benje Allen Selan, Elizabeth Shattuck Finberg, Cochran & Owen, LLC, Vienna, VA, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff James R. Haynes (“Haynes“) brings this action against Defendant Navy Federal Credit Union (“NFCU“), asserting a handful of claims relating to a home mortgage loan extended to him by NFCU.1 Before the Court is Haynes’ [32] Motion to Amend Complaint (“Motion to Amend“).2 Upon consideration of Haynes’ submissions, the relevant authorities, and the record as a whole, the [32] Motion to Amend shall be DENIED.

LEGAL STANDARD AND DISCUSSION

Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a party may amend his pleadings once as a matter of course within a prescribed time period. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(1). When a party seeks to amend his pleadings outside that time period or for a second time, he may do so only with the opposing party‘s written consent or the district court‘s leave. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(2). The decision whether to grant leave to amend a complaint is entrusted to the sound discretion of the district court, but leave “should be freely given unless there is a good reason, such as futility, to the contrary.” , cert. denied, . As the Supreme Court has observed:

If the underlying facts or circumstances relied upon by a plaintiff may be a proper subject of relief, he ought to be afforded an opportunity to test his claim on the merits. In the absence of any apparent or declared reason—such as undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, futility of amendment, etc.—the leave sought should, as the rules require, be “freely given.”

.

Through his [32] Motion to Amend, in addition to undertaking minor housekeeping matters, Haynes seeks to add a claim entitled “PER SE IRS CODE VIOLATIONS,” alleging:

Plaintiff did not receive an accurate or correct Form 1098 interest statement from the Defendant for the tax year 2010 which was due in January 2011, and the Defendant has refused to credit all interest payments for 2010. These actions are a violation of the IRC, 26 U.S.C. Sections 6001-6049. Plaintiff has a right to IRC Section 163(h) interest statements to prepare his Form 1040 tax return. Plaintiff is exposed to felonious charges if he files erroneous tax returns. Defendant is also in violation of Section 6721 et al. of the Internal Revenue Code per se. We seek $500,000 in damages and costs from the Defendant.

Pl.‘s [32-1] Proposed Second Am. Compl. at 2. For at least two reasons, the Court shall exercise its discretion to DENY Haynes’ Motion to Amend.

First, Local Civil Rule 7(m) requires a party to discuss any anticipated nondispositive motion with opposing counsel, “in a good faith effort to determine whether there is any opposition to the relief sought and, if there is an opposition, to narrow the areas of disagreement.” LCVR 7(m). This rule applies with equal force to “non-incarcerated parties appearing pro se.” Id. As this Court has recognized, this Rule serves the important salutary purpose of “pro-mot[ing] the resolution of as many litigation disputes as possible without court intervention, or at least to force the parties to narrow the issues that must be brought to the court.” (citing ). Where “a party files a nondispositive motion without certifying its compliance with Rule 7(m), the motion will be denied.” Id. (citing ). In this case, Haynes has failed to certify his compliance with Local Civil Rule 7(m) and his Motion to Amend shall be DENIED on that basis alone.

Second, the more fundamental problem with Haynes’ Motion to Amend is that, by his own admission, it seeks to resurrect the same claim that was previously dismissed by this Court when resolving NFCU‘s prior Motion to Dismiss. See . In his [12] Amended Complaint, Haynes similarly alleged that NFCU failed to provide him with “an accurate and correct interest statement” for tax-year 2010 and faulted NFCU for allegedly refusing to credit certain interest payments, all of which he contended was in “violation of the IRS code.” When NFCU argued in its Motion to Dismiss that there is no private right of action for violations of the pertinent provisions of the Internal Revenue Code, Haynes admitted that he was unable to point to a provision in the Internal Revenue Code or the accompanying regulations requiring a lender to furnish a borrower an interest statement and conceded that his claim should be dismissed to the extent it rested on alleged violations of the Internal Revenue Code and accompanying regulations. See Def.‘s [13] Mem. of P. & A. in Supp. of its Mot. to Dismiss the Am. Compl. at 10; Pl.‘s [15] Opp‘n to Def.‘s Mot. to Dismiss with P. & A. in Supp. Thereof at 5-6. Based on this explicit concession, the Court granted NFCU‘s Motion to Dismiss insofar as it sought the dismissal of that particular claim. See .

As this sequence of events makes plain, Haynes had a full and fair opportunity to respond to the merits of NFCU‘s argument and to identify the purported legal basis for his claim. But he did not do so. Instead, he elected to concede the merits of NFCU‘s argument. Despite the liberality of the standard for granting leave to amend, there is no doubt that the district court has the discretion to deny a plaintiff leave to amend his or her complaint to add claims already dismissed. See (“A [d]istrict [c]ourt has discretion to deny a plaintiff leave to amend where the plaintiff was put on notice as to the deficiencies in his complaint, but chose not to resolve them.“) (citation omitted), cert. denied, ; (district court did not err in refusing to allow plaintiff to amend complaint containing claims already dismissed). When parties are put on notice of potential deficiencies in their pleadings through a dispositive motion, they fail to “avail themselves of an opportunity to rectify the deficiencies” “at their peril.” ; (upholding the district court‘s denial of leave to amend, where district court found that the motion amounted to an attempt to “resurrect” a claim and plaintiff had the opportunity to correct the deficiencies earlier). In this case, not only did Haynes fail to promptly rectify the deficiencies in his Amended Complaint that were challenged in NFCU‘s Motion to Dismiss, he expressly conceded the merits. Cf. (district court was within its discretion to deny leave to amend a second time where plaintiffs responded to the defendants’ motion for dismissal and waited to seek leave to amend until after the motion was fully briefed and resolved by the district court). Under these circumstances, the Court finds that granting leave to amend is inappropriate and therefore Haynes’ [32] Motion to Amend shall be DENIED on this separate, independent basis.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

For the reasons set forth above, it is, this 3rd day of April, 2012, hereby

ORDERED that Haynes’ [32] Motion to Amend is DENIED; and it is further

ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court shall mail a copy of this Memorandum Opinion and Order to Haynes at his address of record.

SO ORDERED.

COLLEEN KOLLAR-KOTELLY

United States District Judge

Notes

1
Although Haynes is proceeding pro se, he is an attorney and is presumed to have knowledge of the legal system. . As a result, he is not entitled to the same level of solicitude often afforded litigants proceeding without legal representation. , aff‘d in part and vacated in part sub nom. .
2
Contrary to Haynes’ assertion, this is his second motion for leave to amend his Complaint, not his first. See Pl.‘s [10] Court Ordered Notice; [11] Order (May 31, 2011).
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