Haynes v. HaggertyHaynes v. Haggerty
In this appeal, we consider whether the circuit court erred in granting a plea in bar of the statute of limitations in a civil action concerning alleged sexual abuse that occurred between 1971 and 1975.
BACKGROUND
On April 25, 2014, Nancy Haynes (Haynes) filed suit in the Circuit Court of Spotsylvania County against Sean Arthur Haggerty (Haggerty), seeking damages for sexual assault and battery, aggravated sexual assault and battery and intentional infliсtion of emotional distress. The complaint alleged that Haggerty, an adult, had a sexual relationship with Haynes from 1971 through 1975, while Haynes was a minor. Haynes reached the age of majority in March 1975. Haynes claimed that on May 14, 2012, her therapist was the first mental health or medical professional to diagnose her with Dysthemiс Disorder and to inform her that this ailment was a result of sexual abuse inflicted upon her during her infancy by Haggerty.
On May 19, 2014, Haggerty filed a plea in bar asserting that the suit was barrеd by the applicable statute of limitations. On January 15, 2015, the circuit court issued a letter opinion sustaining the plea in bar. The circuit court noted that the statutе of limitations applicable in 1975 had expired before the passage of
Plaintiff‘s extremely protracted failure to act though being fully aware of Defendant‘s sexual misconduct — even in the absence of a specific causal connectiоn to her current psychological diagnosis — so egregiously undermined the Defendant‘s constitutional rights to due process and deprivation of property аs to require this Court to sustain Defendant‘s Plea in Bar.
(Emphasis in original.)
Subsequently, having found
ANALYSIS
We review the circuit court‘s decision on a plea in bar of the statute of limitаtions de novo. Van Dam v. Gay, 280 Va. 457, 460, 699 S.E.2d 480, 481 (2010).
The cause of action in the actions herein listed shall be deemed to accrue as follows:
. . . .
6. In actions for injury to the person, whatеver the theory of recovery, resulting from sexual abuse occurring during the infancy or incapacity of the person, upon the later of the removal оf the disability of infancy or incapacity as provided in
§ 8.01-229 or when the fact of the injury and its causal connection to the sexual abuse is first communicated to the person by a licensed physician, psychologist, or clinical psychologist.
Haynes argues that the circuit court erred in holding that the retroactive application of
In instances where a trial court‘s decision is correct, but its reasoning is incorrect, and the record supports the correct reason, we uphold the judgment pursuant to thе right result for the wrong reason doctrine. Perry v. Commonwealth, 280 Va. 572, 580, 701 S.E.2d 431, 436 (2010). This Court may uphold a judgment even when the correct reasoning is not mentioned by a party in trial argument or by the trial court in its dеcision, as long as the record contains sufficient information to support the proper reason. Id. (“[A]n appellate court‘s examination is not limited to the evidence mentioned by a party in trial argument or by the trial court in its ruling. Rather, an appellate court must consider all the evidence admitted аt trial that is contained in the record.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
In order to avoid reaching the question concerning the constitutionality оf
If a cause of action, as to which no action, suit, scire facias, or other proceeding is pending, exists before October 1, 1977, then this chapter shall not apply and the limitation as to such cause of action shall be the same, if any, as would apply had this chapter not been enacted.
A cause of action exists when a plaintiff is injured as a result of tortious action, “and the injury need only be slight; it is immaterial that more substantial dаmage may occur at a later date.” McHenry v. Adams, 248 Va. 238, 243, 448 S.E.2d 390, 393 (1994); see also Mahony v. Becker, 246 Va. 209, 213, 435 S.E.2d 139, 141 (1993) (“Any cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress accrues and the time limitation begins to run when the tort is committed.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
The alleged abuse in this case began in 1971 and continued through the end of Haynes’ infancy. While Haynеs was not diagnosed with Dysthemic Disorder until 2012, the sexual abuse she suffered as a child inherently caused her injury when it occurred. See Starnes v. Cayouette, 244 Va. 202, 206-07, 419 S.E.2d 669, 671 (1992) (in cases of childhood sexual abuse, “thе infant plaintiff [suffers] an injury in that she experience[s] positive, physical or mental hurt each time [the abusing party commits] a wrongful act against her and her right of аction accrue[s] on that date” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). Therefore, the causes of action raised in this suit concerning activities that took place from the alleged inception of the relationship in 1971 up through the date of her birthday in March 1975 accrued when each unlawful contact occurred, and the limitations period governing these claims was tolled by the predecessor of
Thus, Haynes’ causes of action all existed before the effective date of Title 8.01 on October 1, 1977, and pursuant to
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court granting the plea in bar of the statute of limitations.
Affirmed.