Haynes v. Haggerty, 291 Va. 301

Background

Haynes sued Haggerty in April 2014 for sexual assault/battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress based on a sexual relationship that began in 1971 while she was a minor and continued until she reached majority in March 1975.
Haynes alleges she was first diagnosed in May 2012 by a therapist who told her the disorder was caused by childhood sexual abuse by Haggerty.
Haggerty filed a plea in bar asserting the claims were time-barred by the applicable statute of limitations; the circuit court sustained the plea and dismissed the suit with prejudice.
The circuit court reasoned that applying Va. Code § 8.01-249(6) retroactively to revive an expired claim would violate Haggerty’s due process and vested statutory rights.
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Virginia considered whether § 8.01-249(6) applies to causes of action that accrued before the effective date of Title 8.01 (Oct. 1, 1977), or whether earlier limitation rules govern.
The Court concluded the causes of action accrued when the unlawful contacts occurred (1971–1975), tolled until majority, and the limitations expired in March 1977; thus § 8.01-249(6) does not apply under § 8.01-256, and the plea in bar was correctly granted.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Va. Code § 8.01-249(6) (delayed accrual for childhood sexual abuse) applies to claims that accrued before Oct. 1, 1977	§ 8.01-249(6) should revive/allow accrual upon medical diagnosis in 2012, enabling suit	§ 8.01-249(6) cannot be applied because the causes of action accrued before Oct. 1, 1977 and § 8.01-256 preserves prior limitation rules	Held for defendant: § 8.01-256 prevents application of § 8.01-249(6) to causes of action that existed before Oct. 1, 1977; claims were time-barred
Whether retroactive application of § 8.01-249(6) would violate defendant’s due process/vested rights	(Implied) Retroactive application is permissible to allow recovery based on later diagnosis	Retroactive application would deprive defendant of vested statute-of-limitations defense and violate due process	Court avoided deciding constitutionality because statutory ground disposed of the case; circuit court’s constitutional rationale unnecessary
When did Haynes’s causes of action accrue for statute-of-limitations purposes?	Accrual should occur when diagnosis/causal link was first communicated (2012) under § 8.01-249(6)	Accrual occurred at the time of each unlawful act during infancy; limitations tolled until majority and then ran, expiring in 1977	Held for defendant: accrual occurred upon each tortious act (1971–1975); limitations ran after majority and expired in March 1977
Whether the circuit court’s judgment can be upheld for a different correct reason (right result for wrong reason)	N/A	Even if the circuit court’s constitutional analysis was incorrect, the judgment can be upheld because § 8.01-256 bars use of § 8.01-249(6) here	Held: appellate court affirms under the "right result for the wrong reason" doctrine based on § 8.01-256 statutory text

Key Cases Cited

Van Dam v. Gay, 280 Va. 457 (review standard for plea in bar)
Perry v. Commonwealth, 280 Va. 572 (right result for wrong reason doctrine)
McHenry v. Adams, 248 Va. 238 (when a cause of action exists/injury rule)
Mahony v. Becker, 246 Va. 209 (accrual for intentional infliction of emotional distress)
Starnes v. Cayouette, 244 Va. 202 (infant plaintiff accrues injury at wrongful act)
Klarfield v. Salsbury, 233 Va. 277 (avoid constitutional ruling if not necessary)
Bissell v. Commonwealth, 199 Va. 397 (same principle of avoiding constitutional questions)
Commonwealth v. Doss, 159 Va. 968 (courts do not pass on constitutionality unless necessary)