MEMORANDUM
Stаcey J. Hawkins (“Plaintiff’) filed an action against Robert N. Kilberg, P.A., a Maryland law firm (“Kilberg” or “Defendant”),
Now pending before the Court is Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Count III (the MCPA count) pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (ECF No. 16.) The issues have been briefed (ECF Nos. 16-1, 18 & 19), and no hearing is required, Local Rule 105.6 (D.
1. Background
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant, a purported debt collector within the meaning of the FDCPA
Plaintiff filed a three-count action on October 19, 2015, claiming that Defendant violated certain provisions of the FDCPA (Count I) and the MCDCA (Count II) and that, by violating the MCDCA, Defendant further committed an unfair/deceptive trade prаctice pursuant to the MCPA (Count III). On December 1, 2015, Defendant filed the pending Motion to Dismiss Count III. (ECF No. 16.) Plaintiff filed a response in opposition (ECF No. 18), and Defendant replied (ECF No. 19). Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss is now ripe for decision.
II. Standard of Review
A complaint must contain “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to
III. Analysis
The MCDCA generally prohibits debt collectors from disclosing “to a person other than the debtor or his spouse” information that “affects the debtor’s reputation. . .with knowledge that the other person does not have a legitimate business need for the information.” Md. Code Ann., Com. Law § 14-202(5). Any disclosure in contravention of this provision may expose the debt collector to сivil liability. Com'. Law § 14-203. Moreover, a violation of the MCDCA is a per se violation of the MCPA. See Md. Code Ann., Com. Law § 13-301 (“Unfair or deceptive trade practices include any.. .[violation of a provision of.. .the Maryland Consumer Debt Collection Act[.]”). Plaintiff avers that Defendant violated the MCDCA through its phone calls to her place of employment; accordingly, Plaintiff believes that Defendant violated the MCPA.
In its pending Motion, Defendant does not seek dismissal of Plaintiff’s MCDCA claim (or, for that matter, her analogous FDCPA claim). Defendant does, however, seek dismissal of Plaintiffs MCPA claim (Count III) pursuant to an exemption provision in the statute, Com. Law § 13-104(1). That provision states that the MCPA does not apply to the “professional services” of certain enumerated practitioners, including lawyers. Defendant is a law firm ostеnsibly engaged in professional debt-collection services (including litigation) on behalf of its client, RMI. Thus, the exemption provision would seem to shield Defendant from liability under the MCPA.
Eager to preserve her MCPA claim with its fee-shifting potential,
But the May citation reveals the fatal defect in Plaintiffs argumеnt: statutes relating to the same subject matter are harmonized as far as possible. The Court has no authority to override an explicit exemption built into the MCPA so as to more neatly integrate that statute with another law. Indeed, were the Court to adopt Plaintiffs position, it would violate a more fundamental precept of statutory construction: “unless there is some ambiguity in the language of a statute, a court’s analysis must end with the statute’s plain language.” Hillman v. I.R.S.,
A wealth of case law reinforces the Court’s interpretation of the statute.
Plaintiffs remaining arguments do not revive her MCPA claim. She devotes almost a full page of her memorandum to a discussion of the legislative history of thе FDCPA and Congress’s decision, in 1986, to eliminate the attorney exemption under that statute. (ECF No. 18 at 7-8.) Of course, the legislative history of a federal statute has no bearing on the correct interpretation of an unrelated Maryland law. Plaintiff also frets that exempting attorney debt collectors from MCPA liability might “create a potential loophole in the MCDCA’s enforcement mechanism which could potentially result in an increase in unscrupulous debt collection conduct by law firms.” (IcL at 8.) Given that the exemption provision has been in place since 1974, and given that this Court is hardly the first to affirm that lawyers — including those specializing in debt collection, see Puffinberger,
Accordingly, the Court will dismiss Count III with prejudice, and this case will proceed to discovery on Counts I and II.
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, an Order shall enter GRANTING Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Count III (ECF No. 16).'
Notes
. Plaintiff initially named Bоnd’s Sure Serve, Inc. ("BSSI”), a Maryland corporation, and Edwin F. Cihlar, an employee of BSSI, as codefendants in this suit. However, pursuant to a private settlement agreement between the parties, the Court dismissed BSSI and Cihlar on November 18, 2015 (ECF No. 14), leaving Kilberg as the sole Defendant.
. The facts are recited here as alleged by Plaintiff, this being a motion to dismiss. See Ibarra v. United States,
. The FDCPA defines a "debt collector" as "any person who uses any instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails in any business the principal purpose of which is thе collection of any debts, or who regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another." 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6).
. The MCDCA defines a "[cjollector” as a "person collecting or attempting to collect an alleged debt arising out of a consumer transaction.” Md. Code Ann., Com. Law § 14-201(b).
. Defendant appended the relevant state docket as Exhibit 1 to its Motion to Dismiss. Because this docket is a public record, and because Plaintiff cross-references the state-court action in her Complaint, the Court may consider the contents of the docket without thereby converting Defendant's Motion into one for summary judgment. See Lewis v. Newton,
.The Court is puzzled by Plaintiff’s citations to Maryland Rule 2-322(b) and related case law. (See ECF No. 18 at 3.) It is beyond settled that motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim filed in federal court are governed by Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure — particularly where, as here, jurisdiction is premised on a federal question (arising under the FDCPA). See Rowland v. Patterson,
. While the MCDCA and the MCPA "each provide for an award of essentially the same type of actual damages” (ECF No. 18 at 2), the MCPA additionally authorizes an award of attornеy’s fees for the successful plaintiff, a perquisite not available under the MCDCA. See Allen v. Silverman Theologou, LLP, Civ. No. JFM-14-3257,
. Plaintiff does not engage with any of this extensive case law. Instead, she cites two other cases, Bradshaw v. Hilco Receivables, LLC,
. The Court is aware that the Court of Appeals of Maryland cast some doubt on this liberal interpretation of the MCPA's exemption provision in Scull v. Groover, Christie & Merritt, P.C.,
Scull is distinguishable on its facts, as that case dealt with health care practitioners rather than lawyers and relied on extrastatutory sources not applicable in this case. More importantly, however, the reasoning of Scull is compatible with the Court's reasoning here. Billing practices are plainly ancillary to thе primary services of a medical practitioner. Conversely, debt-collection services are the bread-and-butter of many law firms. Particularly where, as here, those debt-collection services encompass litigation, there is little doubt that such services fit squarely within the exemption under the MCPA.