165 F. Supp. 3d 386
D. Maryland2016Background
- Plaintiff Stacey J. Hawkins sued law firm Robert N. Kilberg, P.A. alleging unlawful debt-collection practices arising from an apartment lease debt, bringing claims under the FDCPA, the MCDCA, and the MCPA.
- Defendant Kilberg sued on behalf of plaintiff’s former landlord in Maryland District Court and obtained judgment; plaintiff alleges debt-collection calls to her workplace and messages left with coworkers.
- Plaintiff asserted Count I (FDCPA) and Count II (MCDCA) and Count III (MCPA), where Count III rests on the theory that an MCDCA violation is a per se MCPA violation and thus entitles her to MCPA relief (including attorney’s fees).
- Defendant moved to dismiss Count III under Federal Rule 12(b)(6), invoking the MCPA exemption for “professional services” (including lawyers) in Md. Code Ann., Com. Law § 13-104(1).
- Plaintiff argued the MCPA exemption should not bar MCPA claims that merely incorporate MCDCA violations (to preserve fee-shifting), but the court declined to alter the plain statutory exemption.
- The court granted dismissal with prejudice of Count III and allowed Counts I and II to proceed to discovery.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the MCPA applies to lawyers performing debt-collection services | The MCPA should apply here because the MCDCA (which does reach lawyers) supplies the underlying violation and the MCPA’s fee-shifting should be available | MCPA expressly exempts the professional services of lawyers; debt-collection litigation is a lawyer’s professional service and thus outside the MCPA | MCPA exemption for lawyers applies; Count III dismissed with prejudice |
| Whether courts may harmonize the MCPA exemption to allow MCPA liability when MCDCA is violated | The statutes should be harmonized so MCPA attorney-fee exposure follows from MCDCA liability | Court must apply the MCPA’s plain language; it cannot rewrite the statute to harmonize differently | Court refuses to override plain statutory text; harmonization cannot overcome explicit exemption |
| Whether federal legislative history (FDCPA amendment) affects interpretation of Maryland law | FDCPA history (removal of attorney exemption) supports reading exception narrowly | Federal legislative history irrelevant to Maryland legislative text | Federal legislative history does not bear on Maryland statute; court rejects the argument |
| Whether policy concerns about a loophole justify judicial intervention | Concern that exemption creates enforcement gap and incentivizes misconduct | Statutory policy choices are for legislature, not the court | Policy concerns insufficient to overcome clear statutory exemption |
Key Cases Cited
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (pleading standard: complaints must state a plausible claim)
- Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (pleading must rise above speculative level)
- Hillman v. I.R.S., 263 F.3d 338 (4th Cir. 2001) (statutory interpretation ends with plain language absent ambiguity)
- United States v. Murphy, 35 F.3d 143 (4th Cir. 1994) (courts must apply statute as written)
- Scull v. Groover, Christie & Merritt, P.C., 435 Md. 112 (Md. 2013) (clarifies scope of "professional services" exemption in MCPA for health-care context; discussed for comparison)