Facts
- Tamara Hawkins filed suit in June 2023 against Chamberlain University College of Nursing and Health Sciences related to her student enrollment issues from 2018 and 2019 [lines="19-20"].
- The defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss in September 2023, which Hawkins did not respond to despite being granted additional time [lines="22-23"].
- The case was dismissed without prejudice on October 27, 2023, for failure to prosecute [lines="25"].
- Hawkins filed a motion to reopen the case on October 29, 2024, citing new evidence and claims of fraud and illness [lines="14-18"].
- Only Exhibit D, which contained medical records, was attached to Hawkins' motion, while other referenced exhibits were not provided [lines="28-29"].
Issues
- Whether Hawkins' claims for relief under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) were timely filed [lines="67-69"].
- Whether Hawkins supported her claims of newly discovered evidence or misconduct for her Rule 60(b) motion [lines="75-79"].
Holdings
- The court determined that Hawkins' motion was filed two days late and thus time-barred under Rule 60(b) [lines="69"].
- The court found that even if Hawkins’ motion was timely, the claims of newly discovered evidence and misconduct were either unsupported or immaterial, warranting denial of the motion [lines="78-79"].
OPINION
TAMARA HAWKINS, Plаintiff, vs. CHAMBERLAIN UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF NURSING AND HEALTH SCIENCES, INC., Defendant.
Case No. 4:23 CV 1126 JMB
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI EASTERN DIVISION
November 12, 2024
MATTHEW T. SCHELP, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Doc. #: 15; PageID #: 82
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Now pending before the Court is Plaintiff Tamara Hawkin‘s Motion to Reopen Case Pursuant to
Background
Plaintiff Tamara Hawkins filed suit in the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis on June 27, 2023, alleging claims related to her enrollment as a student at the “Chamberlain University College of Nursing and Health Sciences, Inc.” in 2018 and 2019. (Doc. 1-2). After removing this case, Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss on September 13, 2023. (Doc. 6). Plaintiff did not respond to the Motion despite being granted additional time to respond (Doc. 8). On October 27, 2023, this matter was dismissed, without prejudice, for failure to prosecute. (Doc. 11).
Plaintiff now seeks to reopen this case based on new evidence, fraud, and illness. In her motion, she refers to Exhibits A, B, C, and D, but only attached Exhibit D which appears to be her medical records. She describes Exhibit A as containing four documents of an “аppeals process and correspondence regarding Plaintiff‘s appeal to remain in the nursing program.” The four
Discussion
(b) Grounds for Relief from a Final Judgment, Order, or Proceeding. On motiоn and just terms, the court may relieve a party or its legal representative from a final judgment, order, or рroceeding for the following reasons:
(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect;
(2) newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b);
(3) fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party;
(4) the judgment is void;
(5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged; it is based on an earlier judgment that has been reversed or vacated; or applying it prospectively is no longer equitable; or
(6) any other reason that justifies relief.
Plaintiff is not entitled to relief for a variety of reasons. Plaintiff‘s claims of excusable neglect due to illness, newly discovered evidence, or misconduct by the opposing party are time-barred, having been raised more than a year after dismissal. Her claims were dismissed on October 27, 2023, and the motion was filed on October 29, 2024, 2 days late. Seе, e.g., Kennedy Bldg. Associates v. CBS Corp., 576 F.3d 872, 879-880 (8th Cir. 2009) (affirming denial of a Rule 60(b)(2) motion filed more than a year after a final district court order).
Even if Plaintiff‘s motion was timely, relief still would not be granted on her Rule 60(b)(1), (2) and (3) claims because her claims of newly discovered еvidence or misconduct are not new, are unsupported, or are impossible (e.g., she refers to lеtters dated November 26, 2024), or immaterial to the issues raised in Defendant‘s motion to dismiss, or to the Court‘s reason for dismissal. See Alpern v. UtiliCorp United, Inc., 84 F.3d 1525, 1535-1536 (8th Cir. 1996) (stating that Rule 60(b)(2) relief requires, among other things, due diligence and the probability of a different result); Greiner v. City of Champlin, 152 F.3d 787, 789 (8th Cir. 1998) (stating that Rule 60(b)(3) requires proof by clear and convincing evidence of fraud or misrepresentation that рrevented plaintiff from presenting his case). Finally, while the Court recognizes Plaintiff‘s health concerns, they dо not represent excusable neglect; there is no showing that Plaintiff‘s health prevented her from prosеcuting this case for the entirety of October, 2023 to October, 2024. Accordingly, Plaintiff is not entitled to relief pursuant tо Rule 60(b)(1), (2), or (3).
Plaintiff also refers to Rule 60(b)(6). Such motions are not subject to a one-year time limit but rather must be brought within a “reasonable time,” which depends on the particular circumstances of the case. Middleton v. McDonald, 388 F.3d 614, 617 (8th Cir. 2004). As noted
Even if Plaintiff‘s health concerns are the “other reasons,” Plaintiff does not elaborate on the effects оf her health conditions or show how they are extraordinary circumstances entitling her to relief. In re Guidant Cоrp. Implantable Defibrillators Products Liability Litigation, 496 F.3d 863, 868 (8th Cir. 2007). The documents presented appear to show that Plaintiff suffered a heart attack in June, 2024 and she represents that she had an ulcer that was diagnosed in October, 2024. The documents, however, do not demonstrate how these conditions limited Plaintiff‘s ability to prosecute this case. Indeed, the medical records indicate that she was discharged in stable condition after her heart attack and directed to resume normal activity 4-8 weeks thereafter, upon consultation with her doctor. (Doc. 13-1, p. 3). Likewise, she was directed to resume normal activities after her October, 2024 medical appointment. (Doc. 13-2, p. 2). The records, then, do not account for a year-long incapаcity or an inability to prosecute her case or present this motion in a timely manner. Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to show that she is entitled to the extraordinary remedy contemplated by Rule 60(b)(6).
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Motion to Reopen Case Pursuant to
Dated this 12th day of November, 2024.
MATTHEW T. SCHELP
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
