HAWAII ET AL. v. OFFICE OF HAWAIIAN AFFAIRS ET AL.
No. 07-1372
Supreme Court of the United States
March 31, 2009
556 U.S. 163
JUSTICE ALITO delivered the opinion of the Court.
Argued February 25, 2009
William M. Jay argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae in support of petitioners. With him on the brief were former Solicitor General Garre, Assistant Attorney General Tenpas, then-Deputy Solicitor General Joseffer, Deputy Solicitоr General Kneedler, David C. Shilton, and John Emad Arbab.
Kannon K. Shanmugam argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Anna-Rose Mathieson, Kimberly D. Perrotta, Sherry P. Broder, Jon M. Van Dyke, Melody K. MacKenzie, William Meheula, and Hayden Aluli.*
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the State of Washington et al. by Robert M. McKenna, Attorney General of Washington, Maureen A. Hart, Solicitor General, and Jay D. Geck, Deputy Solicitor General, and by the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: Troy King of Alabama, Talis J. Colberg of Alaska, Terry Goddard of Arizona, John W. Suthers of Colorado, Bill McCollum of Florida, Thurbert E. Baker of Georgia, Lawrence G. Wasden of Idaho, Lisa Madigan of Illinois, Steve Carter of Indiana, Tom Miller of Iowa, Steve Six of Kansas, Jack Conway of Kentucky, James D. “Buddy” Caldwell of Louisiana, Douglas F. Gansler of Maryland, Michael A. Cox of Michigan, Jim Hood of Mississippi, Jon Bruning of Nebraska, Kelly A. Ayotte of New Hampshire, Gary K. King of New Mexico, Roy Cooper of North Carolina, Wayne Stenehjem of North Dakota, Nancy H. Rogers of Ohio, W. A. Drew Edmondson of Oklahoma, Hardy Myers of Oregon, Thomas W. Corbett, Jr., of Pennsylvania, Patrick C. Lynch of Rhode Island, Henry D. McMaster of South Carolina, Lawrence E. Long of South Dakota, Mark L. Shurtleff
Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the Equal Justice Society et al. by Eric K. Yamamoto; for the National Congress of American Indians by Beth S. Brinkmann, Brian R. Matsui, John E. Echohawk, and Kim Jerome Gottschalk; for the Native Hawaiian Legal Corp. et al. by Catherine E. Stetson and Jessica L. Ellsworth; for Abigail Kinoiki Kekaulike Kawananakoa by George W. Van Buren; and for Samuel L. Kealoha, Jr., et al. by Walter R. Schoettle and Emmett E. Lee Loy.
Briefs of amici curiae were filed for the Alaska Federation of Natives, Inc., by David S. Case, Carol H. Daniel, and Riyaz Kanji; for the Asian American Justice Center et al. by Jonathan M. Cohen, Mark A. Packman, Karen Narasaki, and Vincent Eng; for Current and Former Hawaii State Officials by Virginia A. Seitz and Sarah O‘Rouke Schrup; for the Hawai‘i Congressional Delegation by Sri Srinivasan; and for the Sovereign Councils of the Hawaiian Homelands Assembly et al. by Charles Rothfeld, Andrew J. Pincus, and Thomas W. Merrill.
JUSTICE ALITO delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the question whether Congress stripped the State of Hawaii of its authority to alienate its sovereign territory by passing a joint resolution to apologize for the role thаt the United States played in overthrowing the Hawaiian monarchy in the late 19th century. Relying on Congress’ joint resolution, the Supreme Court of Hawaii permanently enjoined the State from alienating certain of its lands, pending resolution of native Hawaiians’ land claims that the court described as “unrelinquished.” We reverse.
I
A
In 1893, “[a] so-called Committee of Safety, a group of professionals and businessmen, with the active assistance of
Two years later, Congress established a government for the Territory of Hawaii. See
“[T]he portion of the public domain heretofore known as Crown land is hereby declared to have been, on [the effective date of the Newlands Resolution], and prior thereto, the property of the Hawaiian government, and
to be free and clear from any trust of or concerning the same, and from all claim of any nature whatsoever, upon the rents, issues, and profits thereof. It shall be subject to alienation and other uses as may be provided by law.” §99, id., at 161 ; see also§91, id., at 159 .
In 1959, Congress admitted Hawaii to the Union. See
In 1993, Congress enacted a joint resolution “to acknowledge the historic significance of the illegal overthrow of the Kingdom of Hawaii, to express its deep regret to the Native Hawaiian people, and to support the reconciliation efforts of the State of Hawaii and the United Church of Christ with Native Hawaiians.”
“(1) acknowledges the historical significance of this event which resulted in the suppression of the inherent sovereignty of the Native Hawaiian people;
“(2) recognizes and commends efforts of reconciliation initiated by the State of Hawaii and the United Church of Christ with Native Hawaiians;
“(3) apologizes to Native Hawaiians on behalf of the people of the United States for the overthrоw of the Kingdom of Hawaii on January 17, 1893 with the participation of agents and citizens of the United States, and the deprivation of the rights of Native Hawaiians to self-determination;
“(4) expresses its commitment to acknowledge the ramifications of the overthrow of the Kingdom of Hawaii, in order to provide a proper foundation for reconciliation between the United States and the Native Hawaiian people; and
“(5) urges the President of the United States to also acknowledge the ramifications of the overthrow of the Kingdom of Hawaii and to support reconciliation efforts between the United States and the Native Hawaiian people.”
Id., at 1513 .
Finally,
B
This suit involves a tract of former crown land on Maui, now known as the “Leiali‘i parcel,” thаt was ceded in “abso-
In this case, however, OHA demanded more than monetary compensation. Relying on the Apology Resolution, respondent OHA demanded that HFDC include a disclaimer preserving any native Hawaiian claims to ownership of lands transferred from the public trust for redevelоpment. HFDC declined to include the requested disclaimer because “to do so would place a cloud on title, rendering title insurance unavailable.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 207a.
Again relying on the Apology Resolution, respondents then sued the State, its Governor, HFDC (since renamed), and its officials. Respondents sought “to enjoin the defendants from selling or otherwise transferring the Leiali‘i parcel to third parties and selling or otherwise transferring to third parties any of the ceded lands in general until a determination of the native Hawaiians’ claims to the ceded lands is made.” Office of Hawaiian Affairs v. Housing and Community Development Corporation of Hawaii, 117 Haw. 174, 189, 177 P. 3d 884, 899 (2008). Respondents “alleged that an injunction was proper because, in light of the Apology Resolution, any transfer of ceded lands by the State to third-parties would amount to a breach of trust....” Id., at 188, 177 P. 3d, at 898.
The state trial court entered judgment against respondents, but the Supreme Court of Hawaii vacated the lower court‘s ruling. Relying on a “plain reading of the Apology
II
Before turning to the merits, we first must address our jurisdiction. According to respondents, the Supreme Court of Hawaii “merely held that, in light of the ongoing reconciliation process, the sale of ceded lands would constitute a breach of the State‘s fiduciary duty to Native Hawaiians under state law.” Brief for Respondents 17. Because respondents believe that this case does not raise a federal question, they urge us to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.
Although respondents dwell at length on that argument, see id., at 19-34, we need not tarry long to reject it. This Court has jurisdiction whenever “a state court decision fairly appears to rest primarily on federal law, or to be interwoven with the federal law, and when the adequacy and independence of any possible state law ground is not clear from the face of the opinion.” Michigan v. Long, 463 U. S. 1032, 1040-1041 (1983). Far from providing a “plain statement” that its decision rested on state law, id., at 1041, the State Supreme Court plainly held that its decision was “dictate[d]” by federal law—in particular, the Apology Resolution, see 117 Haw., at 212, 177 P. 3d, at 922. Indeed, the court explained that the Apology Resolution lies “[a]t the heart of [respondents‘] claims,” that respondents’ “current claim for
Based on these and the remainder of the State Supreme Court‘s 77 references to the Apology Resolution, we have no doubt that the decision below rested on federal law.2 We are therefore satisfied that this Court has jurisdiction. See
III
Turning to the merits, we must decide whether the Apology Resolution “strips Hawaii of its sovereign authority to sell, exchange, or transfer,” Pet. for Cert. i, the lands that the United States held in “absolute fee,”
“We begin, as always, with the text of the statute.” Permanent Mission of India to United Nations v. City of New York, 551 U. S. 193, 197 (2007). The Apology Resolution contains two substantive provisions. See
The Apology Resolution‘s first substantive provision uses six verbs, all оf which are conciliatory or precatory. Specifically, Congress “acknowledge[d] the historical significance” of the Hawaiian monarchy‘s overthrow, “recognize[d] and commend[ed] efforts of reconciliation” with native Hawaiians, “apologize[d] to [n]ative Hawaiians” for the monarchy‘s overthrow, “expresse[d] [Congress‘] commitment to acknowledge the ramifications of the overthrow,” and “urge[d] the President of the United Stаtes to also acknowledge the ramifications of the overthrow....”
The Apology Resolution‘s second and final substantive provision is a disclaimer, which provides: “Nothing in this Joint Resolution is intended to serve as a settlement of any claims against the United States.”
“We must have regard to all the words used by Congress, and as far as possible give effect to them,” Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Mottley, 219 U. S. 467, 475 (1911), but that maxim is not a judicial license to turn an irrelevant statutory provision into a relevant one. And we know of no justification for turning an express disclaimer of claims against one sovereign into an affirmative recognition of claims against another.4 Cf. Pacific Bell Telephone Co. v. linkLine Communications, Inc., 555 U. S. 438, 457 (2009) (“Two wrong claims do not make one that is right“). The Supreme Court of Hawaii erred in reading
Rather than focusing on the operative words of the law, the court below directed its attention to the 37 “whereas” clauses that preface the Apology Resolution. See
First, “whereas” clauses like those in the Apology Resolution cannot bear the weight that the lower court placed on them. As we recently explained in a different context, “where the text of a clause itself indicates that it does not have operative effect, such as ‘whereas’ clauses in federal legislation ..., a court has no license to make it do what it was not designed to do.” District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U. S. 570, 578, n. 3 (2008). See also Yazoo & Mississippi Valley R. Co. v. Thomas, 132 U. S. 174, 188 (1889) (“[A]s the preamble is no part of the act, and cannot enlarge or confer powers, nor control the words of the act, unless they are doubtful or ambiguous, the necessity of resorting to it to assist in ascertaining the true intent and meaning of the legislature is in itself fatal to the claim set uр“).
Second, even if the “whereas” clauses had some legal effect, they did not “chang[e] the legal landscape and restructur[e] the rights and obligations of the State.” 117 Haw., at 190, 177 P. 3d, at 900. As we have emphasized, “repeals by implication are not favored and will not be presumed unless the intention of the legislature to repeal [is] clear and manifest.” National Assn. of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 551 U. S. 644, 662 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Apology Resolution reveals no indication—much less a “cleаr and manifest” one—that Congress intended to amend or repeal the State‘s rights and obligations
Third, the Apology Resolution would raise grave constitutional concerns if it purported to “cloud” Hawaii‘s title to its sovereign lands more than three decades after the State‘s admission to the Union. We have emphasized that “Congress cannot, after statehood, reserve or convey submerged lands that have already been bestowed upon a State.” Idaho v. United States, 533 U. S. 262, 280, n. 9 (2001) (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted); see also id., at 284 (Rehnquist, C. J., dissenting) (“[T]he сonsequences of admission are instantaneous, and it ignores the uniquely sovereign character of that event ... to suggest that subsequent events somehow can diminish what has already been bestowed“). And that proposition applies a fortiori where virtually all of the State‘s public lands—not just its submerged ones—are at stake. In light of those concerns, we must not read the Apology Resolution‘s nonsubstantive “whereas” clauses to create a retroactive “cloud” on the title that Congress granted to the State of Hawaii in 1959. See, e. g., Clark v. Martinez, 543 U. S. 371, 381-382 (2005) (the canon of constitutional avoidance “is a tool for choosing between competing plausible interpretations of a statutory text, resting on the reasonable presumption that Congress did not intend the alternative which raises serious constitutional doubts“).
*
When a state supreme court incorrectly bases a decision on federal law, the court‘s decision improperly prevents the
It is so ordered.