HARRIS v. THE STATE.
S22G0018
In the Supreme Court of Georgia
Decided: June 22, 2022
COLVIN, Justice.
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court Rule 27, the Court‘s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any prior version on the Court‘s website and docket. A bound vоlume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and official text of the
COLVIN, Justice.
This case stems from the criminal trial of Shalita Jackson Harris, a school bus driver who was convicted of homicide by vehicle in the first degree after the bus she drove crashed, resulting in the death of a student. Following her conviction, Harris filed a motion for new trial alleging that jurors had engaged in misconduct during dеliberations by researching the available sentences for her charges. The trial court denied the motion, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. See Harris v. State, 360 Ga. App. 695, 698-699 (1) (859 SE2d 587) (2021). We granted certiorari to determine whether “the Court of Appeals err[ed] in concluding that [Harris‘s] claim of juror misconduct was not sufficiently prejudicial to require a new trial.” Because the Court of Appeals аnd trial court applied the wrong legal standards, we vacate the judgment and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
1. By way of background, Harris was indicted for homicide by vehicle in the first degree, reckless driving, two counts of homicide by vehicle in the second degree, speeding, and driving too fast for conditions. After a five-day jury trial, Harris was found guilty of homicide by vehiclе in the first degree and reckless driving.1 Upon learning of a potential juror-misconduct issue, Harris filed a motion for new trial.
The trial court held a hearing on Harris‘s motion for new trial, during which each of the 12 jurors testified. Two jurors testified that, during deliberations, they had “Googled” the difference between “first and second degree.” One of the two jurors testified that she “Googled” the term “[f]irst degree” аnd knew that some of the charges were more serious than others based on, among other things, the search results. The other juror testified that, during deliberations, she “Googled what the difference between first and second degree was,” learned that first degree was a felony and second degree was a misdemeanor, and conveyed that information to the other jurors.2
The trial court denied Harris‘s motion, concluding that juror misconduct did not warrant a new trial. As an initial matter, the court concluded that the presumption of prejudice, which this Court had previously applied upon a finding of juror misconduct, see, e.g., Holcomb v. State, 268 Ga. 100, 103 (2) (485 SE2d 192) (1997), did not survive enactment of the current Evidence Code and was therefore irrelevant in assessing prejudice under
The Court of Appeals affirmed. See Harris, 360 Ga. App. at 699 (1). Without addressing whether the trial court had applied the correct legal standard, the Court of Appeals stated:
When irregular juror conduct is shown, there is a presumption of prejudice to the defendant, and the prosecution carries the burden of establishing beyond a reasonable doubt that no harm occurred. To upset a jury verdict, the misconduct must have been so prejudicial that the verdict is deemed inherently lacking in due process.
Id. at 698 (1) (citation and punctuation omitted). The court acknowledged that, during deliberations, some of the jurors had searched for or learned about “the difference in severity of the charges.” Id. But because “the extra-judicial information obtained by some of the jurors in this case had to do with the difference in the severity of the crimes as opposed to the underlying substantive law or evidence,” the court concluded that the jurors’ actions “were not so prejudicial as to have contributed to the conviction, and were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 698-699 (1) (citation and punctuation omitted). Accordingly, the Cоurt of Appeals concluded that the trial court had not abused its discretion in denying Harris‘s motion for a new trial on this ground. See id. at 699 (1). We granted certiorari and conclude that we must vacate the Court of Appeals’ ruling and remand the case because both the trial court and the Court of Appeals relied upon incorrect legal principles in ruling on Harris‘s juror-misconduct claim.
2. “To set aside a jury verdict solely because of irregular jury conduct, [a court] must conclude that the conduct was so prejudicial that the verdict is inherently lacking in due process.” Dixon v. State, 302 Ga. 691, 694 (3) (a) (808 SE2d 696) (2017) (citation and punctuation omitted). We have long held that, in assessing whether juror misconduct meets this standard for prejudice, a court must presume that the misconduct prejudiced the verdict, and the State has a heavy burden to rebut this presumption:
When irregular juror conduct is shown, there is a presumption of prejudice to the defendant, and the prosecution carries the burden of establishing beyond a reasonable doubt that no harm occurred.
Burney v. State, 309 Ga. 273, 293 (5) (845 SE2d 625) (2020) (citation and punctuation omitted); see also, e.g., Shaw v. State, 83 Ga. 92, 98 (1) (9 SE 768) (1889) (“[W]here misconduct of a juror or of the jury is shown, the presumption is that the defendant has been injured, and the onus is upon the State to remove this presumption by proper proof,” that is, by a “show[ing]
The trial court failed to apply these principles here, erring in two respects. First, the court erred in concluding that
Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror shall not testify by affidavit or otherwise nor shall a juror‘s statements be received in evidence as to any matter or statement occurring during the course of the jury‘s deliberations or to the effect of anything upon the jury deliberations or any other juror‘s mind or emotions as influencing the juror to assent to or dissent from the verdict or indictment or concerning the juror‘s mental processes in conneсtion therewith; provided, however, that a juror may testify on the question of whether extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the juror‘s attention, whether any outside influence was improperly brought to bear upon any juror, or whether there was a mistake in entering the verdict onto the verdict form.
Here, Rule 606 (b) permitted the jurors to “testify on the question of whether extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to [their] attention” but prohibited them from testifying as to how such information affected their deliberations or the verdict.
modify our longstаnding substantive legal standards for assessing prejudice. Accordingly, the trial court erred in failing to accord a presumption of prejudice to Harris upon its finding that jurors engaged in improper extrajudicial research with the potential to deprive Harris of due process. See Burney, 309 Ga. at 293-294 (5).
Second, although the trial court correctly recognized that it was the State‘s burden to shоw that juror misconduct was non-prejudicial, it applied the wrong standard of proof in assessing prejudice. Specifically, the court determined that there was “no reasonable probability” of harm, invoking the standard typically applicable to nonconstitutional errors, rather than applying the “beyond a
The Court of Appeals properly recognized both that a presumption of prejudice attaches upon a finding of juror misconduct and that the State needed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the misconduct was non-prejudicial. See Harris, 360 Ga. App. at 698 (1). However, that court erred when it concluded as a matter of law that, while extrajudicial information obtained by a juror about “the underlying substantive law or evidence” could prejudice a defendant, extrajudicial information about “the difference in the severity of the crimes” had no potential to cause prejudice. Id. at 698-699 (1) (citation and punctuation omitted).4
The Court of Appeals’ conclusion that a juror‘s obtaining extrajudicial sentencing information is always harmless beyond a reasonable doubt conflicts with our decision in Beck. There, we vacated the denial of a motion for new trial and remanded for the trial court to consider, in accordance with the evidentiary strictures of Rule 606 (b), the defendant‘s contention that “he was denied a fair trial because jurors considered extrajudicial information regarding sentencing in reaching a verdict.” Beck, 305 Ga. at 385-387 (2). Had the Court of Appeals been correct here that only extrajudicial information concerning “the underlying substantive law or evidence” could result in prejudice, Harris, 360 Ga. App. at 698-699 (1), thеre would have been no reason for us to remand the case in Beck to consider whether “sentencing information” obtained by jurors warranted a new trial, Beck, 305 Ga. at 386-387 (2).
The Court of Appeals’ conclusion that jurors’ possessing extrajudicial sentencing information can never prejudice a defendant is also inconsistent with half a century of Georgia legislation, case law, and praсtice prohibiting jurors from considering punishment in reaching a verdict. “In 1970, [when] the General Assembly created a bifurcated trial system for felony criminal cases” that separated the guilt-innocence phase of a trial from sentencing, the legislature provided that jurors were required to “render a verdict of guilty or not guilty ‘without any consideration of punishment’ before procеeding to sentencing the defendant.” Foster v. State, 306 Ga. 587, 592 (2) (b) (832 SE2d 346) (2019) (citations omitted). “Four years later, the legislature transferred sentencing responsibility from the jury to the trial court in all felony cases in which the death penalty was not sought.” Id.
In accordance with the General Assembly‘s bifurcation of felony criminal proceedings, Georgia court have taken steps to prevent jurors tasked with rendering a verdict from being tainted with information regarding punishment. We have held that “[i]t is improper for the court to give any instruction to the jury concerning possible sentences in a felony case before the jury has determined the question of guilt or innocence.” Bellamy v. State, 272 Ga. 157, 159 (4) (527 SE2d 867) (2000) (quoting Ford v. State, 232 Ga. 511, 519 (14) (207 SE2d 494) (1974)). We have also made it clear that counsel should not inject sentencing issues into the guilt-innocence phase of a trial. See Mack v. State, 306 Ga. 607, 613 (4) (d) (832 SE2d 415) (2019) (“[L]et there be no misunderstanding: if the prosecutor‘s statements did imply that the punishment for felony murder was less than for malice murder, they would have been plainly inappropriate. . . . We . . . remind the State of its responsibility to avoid such arguments in future cases.“).
Further, for nearly 50 years now, Georgia courts have routinely instructed jurors that they “are only concerned with the guilt or innoсence of the defendant” and “are not to concern [them]selves with punishment.” Suggested Pattern Jury Instructions, Vol. II: Criminal Cases § 1.70.20 (2022) (citing Wilson v. State, 233 Ga. 479, 482 (8) (211 SE2d 757) (1975) (approving an instruction that stated “You will not concern yourself with punishment at this time“)); see also Stinski v. State, 286 Ga. 839, 852 (48) (691 SE2d 854) (2010) (holding that a similar charge “properly directed the jurors to focus their guilt/innocence phase deliberations solely on the question of [the defendant‘s] possible guilt rather than possibly being distracted by premature concerns regarding sentencing“); Roberts v. State, 276 Ga. 258, 260 (4) (577 SE2d 580) (2003) (holding that the pattern “charge is an accurate statement of the law“).5 Moreover, we have
clarified that this charge is important enough that a juror‘s inability “to follow the instruction to deliberate without considering the punishment” provides legal cause for his or her removal. Johnson v. State, 288 Ga. 803, 807 (4) (708 SE2d 331) (2011).
As we have explained, thе concern with injecting sentencing considerations into the guilt-innocence phase of a trial is that, if the jury can “discern what sentence(s) the defendant on trial is facing,” it might “use that knowledge to fashion a verdict that will result in the sentence the jury wishes to see imposed upon the defendant being tried,” rather than deciding the defendant‘s guilt or innocence based on the evidenсe and underlying substantive law provided by the court. State v. Vogleson, 275 Ga. 637, 640-641 (2) (571 SE2d 752) (2002). Although we do not hold that a juror‘s obtaining extrajudicial sentencing information is always prejudicial, the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that such information could never be “so inherently prejudicial as to require a new trial.” Harris, 360 Ga. App. at 698-699 (1) (citation and punctuation omitted).
Accordingly, we vacate the opinion of the Court of Appeals and direct the court to remand the case to the trial court to determine in the first instance whether, applying the principles of law set out above, Harris‘s motion for a new trial based on juror misconduct should be granted.
Judgment vacated and case remanded with direction. All the Justices concur.