Harris v. State, 314 Ga. 51

Harris, a school-bus driver, was tried and convicted of homicide by vehicle in the first degree and reckless driving after a student’s death; she moved for a new trial alleging juror misconduct.
During a hearing on the motion, two jurors admitted Googling the difference between first- and second-degree offenses; at least one testified that she told the panel that first degree was a felony and second degree a misdemeanor.
The trial court found extrajudicial information had been procured or shared, but ruled Rule 606(b) of the Evidence Code precluded the presumption of prejudice and applied a "no reasonable probability" standard, denying a new trial.
The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that juror research about the severity of charges (sentencing) — as opposed to substantive law or evidence — was harmless as a matter of law.
The Supreme Court of Georgia vacated and remanded, holding the trial court and Court of Appeals applied incorrect legal standards: Rule 606(b) limits juror testimony but does not displace the presumption of prejudice, the State must prove harmlessness beyond a reasonable doubt, and sentencing-related extrajudicial information can be prejudicial.

Issue	Harris' Argument	State's Argument	Held
Whether a presumption of prejudice attaches when jurors consult extrajudicial information despite Rule 606(b)	Presumption applies when juror misconduct with potential to harm is shown	Rule 606(b) and Evidence Code preclude or displace the presumption by barring juror testimony about deliberations	Presumption of prejudice remains available; Rule 606(b) limits admissible juror testimony but does not alter substantive presumption
Proper standard the State must meet to prove misconduct harmless	State must disprove prejudice beyond a reasonable doubt	Trial court applied a lower "no reasonable probability" standard	State must prove harmlessness beyond a reasonable doubt for juror-misconduct claims
Whether extrajudicial sentencing information is categorically harmless	Sentencing information can bias verdicts and is not per se harmless	Court of Appeals: sentencing/severity information (not substantive law/evidence) cannot be inherently prejudicial	Sentencing-related extrajudicial information can be prejudicial; it is not automatically harmless; remand for trial-court factfinding

Burney v. State, 309 Ga. 273 (2020) (presumption of prejudice from juror misconduct; State must prove harmless beyond a reasonable doubt)
Beck v. State, 305 Ga. 383 (2019) (Rule 606(b) bars juror testimony about internal deliberations but allows testimony on extraneous prejudicial information)
Dixon v. State, 302 Ga. 691 (2017) (reversal for irregular jury conduct requires showing verdict inherently lacked due process)
Bobo v. State, 254 Ga. 146 (1985) (harmlessness inquiry: no reasonable possibility misconduct contributed to conviction)
Sims v. State, 266 Ga. 417 (1996) (juror misconduct that is an immaterial irregularity is harmless)
Foster v. State, 306 Ga. 587 (2019) (Georgia’s bifurcated trial system requires verdicts without consideration of punishment)
Bellamy v. State, 272 Ga. 157 (2000) (improper to instruct jurors on possible sentences during guilt phase)