HAN TAK LEE v. Superintendent HOUTZDALE SCI; District Attorney Monroe County; Attorney General Pennsylvania Superintendent Houtzdale SCI; District Attorney Monroe County, Appellants.
No. 14-3876
United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.
Aug. 19, 2015
798 F.3d 159
The District Court dismissed Hansler‘s retaliation claim, finding she did not make a “valid” request for leave. This conclusion flowed from our holding that “firing an employee for a valid request for FMLA leave may constitute interference with the employee‘s FMLA rights as well as retaliation against the employee.” Erdman v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 582 F.3d 500, 509 (3d Cir.2009). The District Court reasoned that because her leave request was “premised upon the existence of a serious chronic health condition and her medical certification was a negative certification with respect to such a condition, [Hansler‘s] leave request was not a valid request entitling her to FMLA leave and, accordingly, may not form the basis for an FMLA retaliation claim.” Hansler, 2014 WL 1281132, at *13.
As we disagree with the underpinnings of this conclusion—i.e., the certification was negative and Hansler was not entitled to benefits under the Act—we hold that Hansler‘s claim should not be dismissed at this stage. Hansler alleges she attempted to invoke her right to leave, she was not advised of deficiencies in her medical certification, she was not provided a cure period, and she was fired a few weeks later as a result of her leave request. Through discovery, Hansler might be able to show that Lehigh Valley had a retaliatory motive and that the stated reason for termination was pretextual. See Lupyan v. Corinthian Colls., Inc., 761 F.3d 314, 325-26 (3d Cir.2014); Lichtenstein, 691 F.3d at 309-10.
III.
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the order of the District Court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Argued June 18, 2015.
Before: AMBRO, FUENTES, and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges.
OPINION
AMBRO, Circuit Judge.
Appellee Han Tak Lee was convicted of murdering his daughter based primarily on scientific evidence that, as the Commonwealth now concedes, is discredited by subsequent scientific developments. Lee thus filed a
I. Background1
Mr. Lee‘s daughter, Ji Yun Lee, suffered from severe mental illness throughout her life, experiencing both suicidal and homicidal ideation. She lived with her family in New York during the summer of 1989. In the early morning of July 28, police officers found Lee retrieving personal items from the street that his daughter had thrown out the window. The officers entered the house and found Ji Yun in a manic state, arguing with family members who were urging her to take her medications. The officers observed no evidence of violence against her.
At the suggestion of his pastor, Lee took his daughter the same day to Camp Hebron, a religious retreat in Monroe County, Pennsylvania. Her erratic behavior continued. Soon after arriving, Ji Yun went for a walk and returned several hours later soaking wet, having jumped into a body of water. Later that day, she became agitated and had to be physically restrained. A few hours after midnight, a fire began in the Lees’ cabin. Han Tak Lee escaped, but his daughter died.
The Commonwealth charged Lee with arson and murder. During an eight-day trial, it relied heavily on fire-science and gas-chromatography evidence to argue that Lee intentionally set the fire to kill his daughter. The defense countered that she set the fire as a suicidal act. Lee was convicted on both charges and sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.
On direct appeal, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania remanded for an evidentiary hearing on ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims. During that hearing, the Court also received evidence about developments in the field of fire science that, according to a prior panel of our Court, “provided ample reason to question the reliability of the arson investigation.” Lee v. Glunt, 667 F.3d 397, 401 (3d Cir.2012). The trial court nonetheless denied Lee‘s claims, the Superior Court affirmed, and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied appeal.
In 1995 Lee filed a pro se post-conviction petition in state court. The Commonwealth did not comply with the court‘s order to respond, and the petition remained pending until 2001 when the attorney who is now representing Lee filed leave to amend the petition. He submitted an amended petition in 2005, arguing that (1) Lee was entitled to a new trial because of newly discovered and exculpatory scientific evidence, and (2) appellate counsel was ineffective on direct appeal by failing to raise a claim of after-discovered exculpatory evidence. The Court of Common Pleas denied the petition for post-conviction relief, the Superior Court affirmed,
Lee filed a
A panel of our court reversed on appeal. Explaining that Lee‘s petition raised a due-process claim rather than a freestanding innocence claim, Lee, 667 F.3d at 403 n. 5, we ordered the District Court to grant discovery and then reconsider whether to hold an evidentiary hearing. Id. at 404-07 & n. 7. We instructed that Lee “must show that the admission of the fire expert testimony undermined the fundamental fairness of the entire trial because the probative value of [the fire expert] evidence, though relevant, is greatly outweighed by the prejudice to the accused from its admission.” Id. at 403 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted, alteration in original). We also implied that habeas relief should be denied if there is “ample other evidence of guilt.” Id. at 407 n. 13 (quoting Albrecht v. Horn, 485 F.3d 103, 126 (3d Cir.2007)).
On remand, Magistrate Judge Carlson held an evidentiary hearing and issued a Report & Recommendation (R & R) finding that “the admission of the fire expert testimony undermined the fundamental fairness of the entire trial” because the “verdict ... rest[ed] almost entirely upon scientific pillars which have now eroded.” Lee v. Tennis, No. 08-1972, 2014 WL 3894306, at *15-16 (June 13, 2014) [hereinafter R & R ]. It also found that the Commonwealth failed to show other “‘ample evidence’ of guilt upon which the jury could have relied.” Id. at *18 (quoting Albrecht, 485 F.3d at 126).
Along with a two-page memorandum, the Commonwealth filed three objections to the R & R before the District Court:
- [It] underplayed the strength of the Commonwealth‘s case in general.
- [It] overstated the importance of the differences between the spectrographs for Lee‘s pants and shirt, and the jug and the glove found at the fire scene.
- []Lee has not been exonerated by the new fire science evidence.
App. E. at 1-3.
The District Court rejected the third objection because, as explained in our prior opinion in this case, Lee‘s due-process claim does not require a showing of innocence. Lee v. Tennis, No. 08-1972, 2014 WL 3900230, *5 (M.D.Pa. Aug. 8, 2014) (citing Lee, 667 F.3d at 403 n. 5). In addition, the Court rejected the first and second objections because the Commonwealth failed to identify with specificity any legal or factual errors in the R & R. Id. In the absence of any proper objections, the District Court reviewed the R & R for clear error and adopted it without changes. Id. at *4-5. It then issued an order granting habeas relief unless the Commonwealth “retr[ied] ... or release[d]” Lee within 120 days. Id. at *7.
II. Jurisdiction
A “certificate of appealability is not required when a state ... appeals” a grant of habeas relief.
Lee first argues that the notice of appeal was untimely because the Clerk‘s Office did not file it until 31 days after entry of judgment. This is a non-starter. Under
Lee next argues that the notice of appeal cannot confer appellate jurisdiction because its format did not comply with local rules. As he points out, under
Once more we disagree. The Federal Rules require that a notice of appeal “(A) specify the party ... taking the appeal ...; (B) designate the judgment ... being appealed; and (C) name the court to which the appeal is taken.”
Lee‘s jurisdictional challenge is unpersuasive for another reason as well. In Parissi, the Supreme Court held that a clerk‘s office cannot reject a notice of appeal simply because the filing fee has not been paid.3 349 U.S. at 47, 75 S.Ct. 577 (“[U]ntimely payment of the ... fee did not vitiate the validity of petitioner‘s notice of appeal.“).4 We have similarly instructed the clerk‘s offices in the Third Circuit to “accept and retain every notice of appeal tendered whether or not accompanied by the filing fee.” Gould v. Members of the N.J. Div. of Water Pol‘y and Supply, 555 F.2d 340, 341 (3d Cir.1977). This rule applies whether a human clerk or an electronic filing system receives the notice. See Farzana K. v. Ind. Dep‘t of Educ., 473 F.3d 703, 707 (7th Cir.2007) (“The software that operates an e-filing system acts for ‘the clerk’ as far as Rule 5 is concerned; a step forbidden to a person standing at a counter is equally forbidden to an automated agent that acts on the court‘s behalf.“); Royall v. Nat‘l Ass‘n of Letter Carriers, 548 F.3d 137, 143 (D.C.Cir.2008) (“[T]he electronic case filing system‘s failure to docket Royall‘s timely submitted notice of appeal cannot be treated as a failure on his part to file timely. His situation is akin to one in which the clerk‘s office misplaces a filing and then later makes the docket entry when the filing is found.“).
As we have appellate jurisdiction, we proceed to the merits.
III. Standard of Review
A. AEDPA Deference
B. Plain Error
The District Court rejected the Commonwealth‘s first and second objections to the R & R because they failed to identify with specificity any factual or legal errors. It thus reviewed the R & R for clear error rather than conducting a de novo review. On appeal, the Commonwealth does not challenge this legal conclusion. “[W]here a party fails to file timely objections to a magistrate judge‘s R & R in a habeas proceeding, and the district court then adopts the R & R, we ... only review the R & R for plain error.” Nara v. Frank, 488 F.3d 187, 194 (3d Cir.2007). Lee argues that plain error thus applies
We therefore reverse only if there is (1) an error, (2) that is plain, (3) that “affects substantial rights,” and (4) that “seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Nara, 488 F.3d at 197 (internal quotation marks omitted).
IV. Merits
A panel of our court previously held that “Lee must show that the admission of the fire expert testimony undermined the fundamental fairness of the entire trial because the probative value of [that] evidence, though relevant, [was] greatly outweighed by the prejudice to the accused from its admission.” Lee, 667 F.3d at 403 (alteration in original) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). The District Court accepted Magistrate Judge Carlson‘s conclusion that the admission of fire-science and gas-chromatography evidence at Lee‘s trial met this standard and the Commonwealth does not challenge this determination on appeal. Instead, it merely argues that the District Court erred by accepting Magistrate Judge Carlson‘s conclusion that the trial lacked “ample other evidence of guilt.” Id. at 407 n. 13 (citing Albrecht, 485 F.3d at 126). We now turn to the evidence presented at trial, including for the sake of completeness the now discredited evidence.
A. Unreliable Evidence at Trial
1. Fire-Science Evidence
The Commonwealth does not object to Magistrate Judge Carlson‘s assessment of the fire-science evidence presented at trial. He described it as follows. State Police Fire Marshal Thomas Jones testified that the fire was caused by arson based on two sources of evidence. First, he found patterns of deep charring, alligator charring (charring shaped like alligator skin), and crazed glass (finely fractured glass), all of which were consistent with a fire deliberately started with accelerant fluids. R & R at *5. Second, he found at least eight separate points of origin located throughout the cabin. According to the R & R, this was powerful evidence that someone intentionally started eight different fires in the cabin in rapid succession. Id. That one of the points was located at the cabin‘s door “suggested that the arsonist had acted in a particularly calculated fashion, setting fire to the escape path in the cabin, and effectively entombing Ji Yun Lee within a wall of flames.” Id. at *6. Jones cited no other independent scientific evidence that arson caused the fire. Id.
According to Magistrate Judge Carlson, Jones‘s and Aston‘s testimony “constituted the principal pillar of proof tying Lee to th[e] arson fire and the death of his daughter.” Id. Their testimony “was not directly supported by any other independent chemical testing[, as] the chemical analysis of the [eight] suspected fire origin sites did not reveal any sign of the more than 60 gallons of gas and fuel oil” that Aston estimated were used to set the fire. Id.
The Commonwealth concedes that, due to scientific developments since Lee‘s trial in 1990, the basis for all of this evidence is now invalid.
2. Chromatography Evidence
The Commonwealth also does not challenge Magistrate Judge Carlson‘s assessment of the chromatography evidence presented at trial. According to the R & R, the fire-science evidence described above was bolstered by the testimony of State Police Chemist Thomas Pacewicz, who conducted a gas chromatography of the shirt and pants worn by Lee on the night of the fire and of a burned jug and latex glove recovered from the wreckage. Id. Pacewicz found no evidence of accelerants at the eight origin sites identified by Jones and Aston, but testified that the chromatography analysis of the shirt, pants, and jug all revealed hydrocarbons that “ranged from C-7 to C-22.” Id. He also testified that these results were consistent with a mixture of gasoline, kerosene, Coleman fuel and fuel oils. Id. Pacewicz thus corroborated Aston‘s testimony that this mix of chemicals was used to burn the cabin. Id. In its closing argument, the Commonwealth emphasized the mutually reinforcing link between the fire-science and chromatography evidence, which together showed that the fire was set by someone who intended to kill an occupant of the cabin and matched the mix of chemicals allegedly used to start it with the mix found on Lee‘s clothes. Id. at *8.
Magistrate Judge Carlson found, and the Commonwealth concedes, that subsequent scientific developments and retesting of surviving materials from the crime scene have undermined the reliability of Pacewicz‘s testimony. Id. at *17-18. On appeal, the Commonwealth does not rely on his testimony to show “ample evidence of guilt.”
B. What Evidence Remains?
The Commonwealth argues that three remaining sources of evidence provide the “ample” evidence needed. First, Monroe County Coroner Robert Allen and Forensic Pathologist Isidore Mihalikis concluded, based on the autopsy of Ji Yun‘s body, that the cause and manner of death were conflagration and homicide, respectively. Allen testified that the body was found on the floor of the cabin a few feet from the bathroom door “in a fetal position,” App. I at 133, under “a bunch of insulation
As Magistrate Judge Carlson noted, this inference was weak. R & R at *9. Allen and Mihalikis both acknowledged that the autopsy results were consistent with Ji Yun dying by a flashover7 rather than strangulation. App. I at 132-33, 406-407. Mihalikis found no evidence of petechiae—tiny ruptures of the capillaries caused by increased blood pressure—that are present in “most strangulation cases.” Id. at 423. And Allen and Mihalikis‘s determination that Ji Yun died by homicide was almost certainly colored by the now-debunked fire-science evidence.
Second, the Commonwealth introduced testimony that in the hours and days after the fire Lee‘s demeanor showed little sign of grief. Police Officer Leigh-Manuell, one of the first individuals on the scene, found Lee sitting across from the fire on a bench with his luggage, appearing “nonchalant.” Id. at 20-21, 27. Volunteer firefighter David Farry said Lee looked “very depressed, as if he was probably mad at himself.” Id. at 56. High school senior David Pack described Lee as “calm.” Id. at 162. Fire Marshall Jones testified that the day after the fire Lee was “very attentive” to questions asked of him, and “at times he even joked and laughed during the questioning.” Id. at 256. Detective Bortz similarly described Lee as “calm.” Id. at 621. And when Lee‘s wife arrived at the scene of the fire, she became visibly upset, and yet, according to Fire Marshall Jones, Lee “walked right by [her] like nothing happened.” Id. at 257.
Third, the Commonwealth argues that there was evidence attacking the veracity of Lee‘s account of what happened the night of the fire. Two firefighters on the scene testified that the fire started in the front of the cabin and then traveled to the back, id. at 40-41, 57-58, which conflicts with Lee‘s testimony that when he walked out the front door the fire was in the back of the house.
The Commonwealth also points to inconsistencies in six different accounts Lee gave of what happened the night of the fire. Commonwealth Br. at 36-37. The basic outlines remain the same across each account: Lee woke up in the middle of the night, smelled smoke, walked through the cabin looking for his daughter, went outside, came back in and left again. Id. Most of the “inconsistencies” identified by the Commonwealth are better characterized as minor details mentioned on some occasions and omitted on others. For example, Lee only sometimes identified specific rooms he checked when he reentered the house; only sometimes mentioned grabbing his luggage before leaving the cabin the second time; and only sometimes said that he slipped and fell on liquid after
*
Based on the evidence identified by the Commonwealth, we cannot conclude that the District Court committed an error that was plain by adopting the R & R. As Magistrate Judge Carlson explained,
[t]he Commonwealth [is] left to argue that its case ... may be proven beyond a reasonable doubt based upon alleged inconsistencies in the Korean-to[-]English interpretation of statements made by Lee in the hours following his daughter‘s death; a cultural stoicism which was construed as nonchalance; ... and autopsy results which agreed that Ji Yun Lee died from conflagration, but posited two alternate theories of this cause of death, one of which was wholly consistent with death in an accidental fire, and the other of which was supported by very little forensic evidence.
Id. at *18. Because the Commonwealth has not pointed to “ample evidence” sufficient to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt, we affirm the District Court‘s grant of habeas relief.
Jesus Emmanuel JEHOVAH, a/k/a Robert Gabriel Love, a/k/a Gabriel Alexander Antonio, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Harold W. CLARKE, Director; A. David Robinson, Deputy Director, Defendants-Appellees, and Commonwealth of Virginia; Loretta K. Kelly, Warden, Sussex I State Prison; All Employees of the Virginia Department of Corrections, In their Official, Individual, and Private Capacities, Jointly and Severally; Eddie L. Pearson, Warden; Keisha Fowlkes, Unit Manager; Ms. Evans, Records Officer; Ms. Ansah, Corporal; Armor Correctional Health Services, Inc.; Anthony King, Dr.; Mesele Gebreyes, Dr.; Benjamin Ulep, Dr., Defendants.
No. 13-7529
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.
Argued: May 12, 2015. Decided: July 9, 2015. Amended: Aug. 11, 2015.