Hamon v. WeeksHamon v. Weeks
Judgment Affirmed
APPEARANCES:
Rocky Ratliff for Appellant
Staci K. Thomas for Appellee
{1} Respondent-appellant, James Weeks (“Weeks“) appeals the judgment of the Marion County Common Pleas Court, Family Division, granting petitioner-appellee, Mary Hamon (“Hamon“), a domestic violence civil protection order (“CPO“) pursuant to
{2} Weeks and Hamon are an ex-boyfriend and ex-girlfriend who resided together in 2018 through November 2019. (July 30, 2020 Tr. at 3); (Aug. 12, 2020 Tr. at 4-5).
{3} On July 30, 2020, Hamon filed a pro se petition for a domestic violence CPO against Weeks requesting the trial court to issue an ex parte (emergency) CPO.1 (Doc. No. 1). The trial court conducted an ex parte hearing, and issued a domestic violence CPO on the same date (effective until October 30, 2020). A full hearing on the petition was scheduled for August 12, 2020.2 (Doc. No. 2).
{5} Weeks timely appealed and asserts two assignments of error, which we will address together. (Doc. No. 9).
Assignment of Error No. I
The Trial Court Erred by Applying the Incorrect Standard when Issuing a Domestic Violence Civil Protection Order and Neither Competent Nor Credible Evidence Supported a Finding of an Imminent Fear of Serious Physical Harm.
Assignment of Error No. II
The Trial Court Erred When It Granted a Domestic Violence Civil Protection Order Because Appellee Failed to Establish Any Relationship as a Former Spouse.
{6} In his first assignment of error, Weeks asserts that the trial court erred by not applying the correct standard as to Hamon‘s petition. Specifically, Weeks argues that the trial court‘s findings as to Hamon‘s “imminent fear of serious physical harm” are not supported by competent, credible evidence. In his second assignment of error, Weeks argues that the trial court erred in granting Hamon‘s petition for a protection order against him, and thus, abused its discretion.
Standard of Review
{7} We review the trial court‘s decision to grant or deny a CPO under an abuse-of-discretion standard. Montgomery v. Kleman, 3d Dist. Union No. 14-19-04, 2019-Ohio-4526, 8, citing Jenkins v. Douglas, 3d Dist. Marion No. 9-06-55, 2007-Ohio-1909, 7; Kramer v. Kramer, 3d Dist. Seneca No. 13-02-03, 2002-Ohio-4383, 11. An abuse of discretion connotes that the trial court‘s decision is unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219 (1983). If there is some competent, credible evidence to support the trial court‘s decision, there is no abuse of discretion. Ross v. Ross, 64 Ohio St.2d 203, 204 (1980); Warnecke v. Whitaker, 3d Dist. Putnam No. 12-11-03, 2011-Ohio-5442, 12, citing Ross at 204 and C.E. Morris Co. v. Foley Const. Co., 54 Ohio St.2d 279, 280 (1978).
Analysis
{8} We begin with Weeks‘s contention that the trial court abused its discretion when it issued a domestic violence CPO determining Hamon to be his “former spouse” under
(a) The occurrence of one or more of the following acts against a family or household member:
(i) Attempting to cause or recklessly causing bodily injury;
(ii) Placing another person by the threat of force in fear of imminent serious physical harm or committing a violation of section
2903.211 or2911.211 of the Revised Code;(iii) Committing any act with respect to a child that would result in the child being an abused child, as defined in section
2151.031 of the Revised Code;(iv) Committing a sexually oriented offense.
(b) The occurrence of one or more of the acts identified in divisions (A)(1)(a)(i) to (iv) of this section against a person with whom the respondent is or was in a dating relationship.
{9} ““Threats of violence constitute domestic violence for the purpose of
{10}
“Family or household member” defined under the statute as:
(a) Any of the following who is residing with or has resided with the respondent:
(i) A spouse, a person living as a spouse, or a former spouse of the respondent;
(ii) A parent, a foster parent, or a child of the respondent, or another person related by consanguinity or affinity to the respondent;
(iii) A parent or a child of a spouse, person living as a spouse, or former spouse of the respondent, or another person related by consanguinity or affinity to a spouse, person living as a spouse, or former spouse of the respondent.
(b) The natural parent of any child of whom the respondent is the other natural parent or is the putative other natural parent.
(4) “Person living as a spouse” means a person who is living or has lived with the respondent in a common law marital relationship, who otherwise is cohabiting with the respondent, or who otherwise has cohabited with the respondent within five years prior to the date of the alleged occurrence of the act in question.
{11} Here, Weeks argues that Hamon was without standing to bring a domestic violence CPO petition predicated on the classification that she is a “[f]amily or household member“.4 Specifically, Weeks asserts that Hamon does not fall within the protected class of individuals that are considered “[f]amily or household member[s]” under
{12} Even if we assume without deciding that the trial court erred in its determination as to Hamon‘s designation as a “former spouse” of Weeks, in our review of the record, Hamon meets the criteria for the protected class under
{13} Harmless errors are those errors, which do not affect substantial rights, and must be disregarded by the reviewing court.
{14} Next, we address Weeks‘s assertion that the trial court erred in its determination as to the imminence of Hamon‘s fear of serious physical harm by Weeks. Essentially, Weeks argues that Hamon‘s fear was unreasonable given the history of the couple. We disagree.
{15} “A court may determine the reasonableness of the petitioner‘s fear by reference to the parties’ history and past acts of domestic violence.” Peterson v. Butikofer, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 18AP-364, 2019-Ohio-2456, ¶ 25, citing Conkle v. Wolfe, 131 Ohio App.3d 375, 383 (4th Dist.1998). Importantly, the record reveals that Weeks was not present at the full hearing on Hamon‘s petition to present any
{16} Even though Weeks asserts that there is no evidence that he physically “struck” Hamon, this assertion lacks significance given his history of violence with Hamon. The record supports that Hamon was in imminent fear of Weeks by virtue of his temper and propensities to threats. (Aug. 12, 2020 Tr. at 5-6). Hamon testified that Weeks would scream at her with such force that spittle would fly out his mouth onto her face. (Id. at 6). She further testified that in December 2019 that Weeks slammed a door shut in her face. (Id. at 7). She also testified that Weeks often threw items at her while angry that would sometimes strike her. (Id.). According to Hamon, after Weeks threated that she would never see her son again, and that, she was going to get her jaw broken, she filed for a stalking CPO. (Id. at 10-11).
{17} Moreover, Hamon testified that Weeks violated that stalking CPO four times. (Id. at 12-14); (See Petitioner‘s Exs. B, C). She testified Weeks‘s violations resulted in criminal charges and the issuance of a temporary protection order (“TPO“). (Id.). (See July 30, 2020 Tr. 5); (Petitioner‘s Exs. B, C). She further
{18} Hence, we conclude there is competent, credible evidence supporting the trial court‘s determination that Weeks placed Hamon in fear of imminent serious physical harm by the threat of force. Moreover, we cannot conclude based on the facts presented that Hamon‘s fears were unreasonable in light of Weeks‘s behavior.
{19} For these reasons, we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in granting Hamon‘s domestic violence CPO petition, and thus subsequently issuing the domestic violence CPO.
{20} Accordingly, Weeks‘s assignments of error are overruled.
{21} Having found no error prejudicial to the appellant herein in the particulars assigned and argued, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Judgment Affirmed
WILLAMOWSKI, P.J. and SHAW, J., concur.
/jlr