DAVONTE HAMILTON v. WESTCHESTER COUNTY, RAUL ULLOA, Mеdical Director, JOSEPH K. SPANO, Westchester County Department of Corrections Commissioner, FRANCIS DELGROSSO, Assistant Warden, KARL VOLLMER, Assistant Warden, LEANDRO DIAZ, Acting Deputy Commissioner, CORRECT CARE SOLUTIONS, LLC
No. 20-1058-pr
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
June 30, 2021
Argued: January 8, 2021; August Term 2020
TAMARA LIVSHIZ, Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, New York, New York (Samuel Weiss and Kelly Jo Popkin, Rights Behind Bars, Washington, D.C., and Brooklyn, New York, on the brief), for Plaintiff-Appellant.
JUSTIN R. ADIN, Deputy County Attorney, for John M. Nonna, Westchester County Attorney, White Plains, New York, for Defendants-Appellees Westchester County, Joseph K. Spano, Francis Delgrosso, Karl Vollmer, and Leandro Diaz.
PAUL A. SANDERS, Barclay Damon LLP, Rochester, New York, for Defendants-Appellees Correct Care Solutions, LLC, Raul Ulloa, and Westchester County.
Appeal from an opinion and order of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Román, J.), dismissing an inmate‘s claims under
AFFIRMED in part, VACATED in part, and REMANDED.
In 2018, while incarcerated at the Westchester County Jail (the “Jail“), plaintiff-appellant Davonte Hamilton dislocated his knee and tore his meniscus when he stepped on crumbled concrete in the recreational yard. Proceeding pro se, Hamilton filed suit in the Southern District of New York, bringing claims under
As discussed more fully below, we conclude that the district court erred in categorically excluding short-term injuries from qualifying as a “disability” under the ADA. Accordingly, we VACATE the district court‘s opinion and order to the extent it dismisses Hamilton‘s ADA claim against the County, we REMAND for further proceedings as to that claim only, and we AFFIRM the dismissal of all other claims.1
BACKGROUND
The following facts are drawn from Hamilton‘s complаint, and are assumed to be true. See Ricci v. Teamsters Union Local 456, 781 F.3d 25, 26 (2d Cir. 2015).
On August 21, 2018, while playing basketball in the recreational yard at the Jail, Hamilton stepped onto a crumbled piece of concrete, dislocating his knee and tearing his meniscus. On August 27, 2018, Hamilton received medical attention at the Westchester Medical Center (the “Medical Center“), which provided him with a “knee stabilizer” and recommended that he receivе an “immediate MRI.” J. App‘x at 49. Ulloa, the medical director of CCS, the contractor responsible for treating Hamilton at the Jail, disregarded the recommendation, causing Hamilton‘s injury to “settle.” Id. Ulloa and CCS replaced his knee stabilizer with an elastic ace bandage, which failed to keep Hamilton‘s knee in alignment, resulting in “severe pain.” Id.
On or about August 28, 2018, Hamilton filed a grievance about the dilapidated condition of the courtyard with “Sergeant Hollis.” Id. at 54. Sergeant Hollis accepted Hamilton‘s grievance regarding the courtyard but did not timely respond, prompting Hamilton to file an appeal with the Jail‘s “grievance coordinator, which was never answered or responded to.” Id. While the Jail closed the courtyard where Hamilton‘s injury occurred, it did not repair the courtyard floоr, which had been in disrepair “for an extended duration (30 years).” Id. at 45.
After his injury, Hamilton had to use crutches, and felt both numbness and throbbing pain as he navigated the Jail with his “wobbling” knee. Id. at 50. Because standing caused “excruciating pain” even with crutches, Hamilton had difficulty moving around his housing unit and his own cell, which, like the courtyard, had cracked and damaged concrete flooring. Id. Because his housing unit lacked acсessibility ramps and was accessible only through stairs, he could not go outside for recreational activities after his injury.
Inside the housing unit, inmates also needed to climb over a two-and-a-half-foot step to get into the shower stalls. This caused Hamilton “excruciating pain” when getting in and out of the shower. Id. at 46. Once inside the stalls, it was “physically impractical” for Hamilton to clean himself, as he had to stand with his crutches in the shower, which lacked mats to provide traction on the slippery floors or benches or
“[T]hrough [Hamilton‘s] grievances, and other grievances filed for similar/identical claims or concerns,” the County was on notice of: (1) the damaged flooring in the courtyard, (2) the poor conditions of the housing unit “1-East” (poor ventilation, damaged flooring, lack of benches or shower rails to assist disabled inmates), and (3) the two-and-a-half-foot step into the slippery shower stalls. Id. at 49.
On or abоut September 4, 2018, Hamilton attempted to file a grievance with “Sergeant Kitt” about the heat, ventilation, and condensation in the housing unit, but Sergeant Kitt refused to accept Hamilton‘s grievance and instead stated, “I‘m sick of you f---ing crybabies this is jail handle it.” Id. at 48.
Hamilton was also subjected to strip searches after two family visits, including a September 5, 2018 visit. Because the strip-search area did not have a bench or rails for an inmate to use while undressing and dressing, Hamilton had to stand on his injured knee, causing him “severe” and “excruciating pain.” Id. at 46-47.
On September 9, 2018, Hamilton, proceeding pro se, filed the instant suit. On February 24, 2020, the district court granted the state defendants’ and medical defendants’ motions to dismiss Hamilton‘s claims. The district court‘s sole basis for dismissing Hamilton‘s ADA claim against the County was that Hamilton had “not plausibly alleged a qualifying disability under the ADA,” because temporary disabilities -- such as Hamilton‘s injuries -- “do not trigger the protections of the ADA.” J. App‘x at 29. The district court dismissed Hamilton‘s complaint without prejudice, giving him until March 27, 2020 to file an amended complaint, failing which the claims would be “deemed dismissed with prejudice.” J. App‘x at 30. Hamilton did not file an amended complaint. This appeal followed.2
On December 11, 2018, Hamilton was relocated to the Queens Private Detention Center in Jаmaica, New York.
DISCUSSION
I. Standard of Review
“We review a district court‘s grant of a motion to dismiss under
II. Applicable Law
In 1990, Congress enacted the ADA “to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities” and “to provide clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards addressing discrimination against individuals with disabilities.”
Title II, at issue here, provides that “no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.”
In reviewing a reasonable accommodation claim, “we ask whether a plaintiff with disabilities ‘as a practical matter’ was denied ‘meaningful access’ to services, programs or activities to which he or she was ‘legally entitled.‘” Wright v. N.Y.S. Dep‘t of Corr., 831 F.3d 64, 72 (2d Cir. 2016) (citation omitted). In conducting this “faсt-specific” review for reasonableness, we keep in mind that the “hallmark of a reasonable accommodation is effectiveness,” and that “a reasonable accommodation need not be perfect or the one most strongly preferred by the plaintiff, but it still must be effective.” Id. (internal quotation marks, brackets, and citations omitted).
As relevant to Hamilton‘s reasonable аccommodation claim against the County, the term “public entity,” defined to include “any State or local government” and “any department, agency, . . . or other instrumentality of a State,”
For purposes of determining whether an ADA plaintiff is a “qualified individual with a disability,”
The definition of “disability” under the ADA was previously interpreted narrowly. See Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 197-98 (2002) (The terms “major” in “major life activities” and “substantially” in “substantially limits” “need to be interpreted strictly to create a demanding standard for qualifying as disabled. . . . The impairment‘s impact must also be permanent or long term.“); Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 487 (1999) (“[T]he ADA‘s coverage is restricted to only those whose impairments are not mitigated by corrective measures.“). In 2008, however, Congress passed the ADA Amendments Act (the “ADAAA“), Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553, which broadened the definition of “disability” under the ADA. As this Court has noted, “[t]he principal purpose of the ADAAA wаs to overrule the Supreme Court‘s arguably narrow interpretation of what constitutes an ADA-qualifying disability set forth in Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., and Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, and to make clear that the substantial-limitation requirement in the definition of ‘disability’ is not an exacting one.” Woolf, 949 F.3d at 94 (footnotes omitted) (citing the ADAAA, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 2(b), 122 Stat. 3553, 3554).
With this purpose in mind, the ADAAA instructs that “[t]he term ‘substantially limits’ shall be construed broadly in favor of expansive coverage, to the maximum extent permitted by the terms of the ADA,” and “is not meant to be a demanding standard.”
The ADAAA also relaxed the temporal requirements for establishing a “disability.” As set forth in the implementing regulations, for purposes of an actual disability claim, a “disability” shorter than six months in duration now can be actionable under the ADA.
While several of our sister circuits havе acknowledged and applied the relaxed temporal requirements after the ADAAA‘s enactment in precedential opinions -- holding that transitory impairments lasting or expected to last less than six months can qualify as disabilities under the ADA -- we have not addressed the issue in a precedential opinion. In Parada v. Banco Industrial De Venezuela, C.A., 753 F.3d 62, 68 n.3 (2d Cir. 2014) (quoting
III. Application
Here, Hamilton alleges that following his knee injury on August 21, 2018, he suffered excruciating pain while daily navigating the Jail on crutches, climbing over a two-and-a-half-foot step to take showers in а slippery stall without railings, and being subjected to strip searches after family visits without benches or rails to assist him during undressing and dressing.
We do not reach the question of whether Hamilton plausibly alleges a qualifying disability under the ADA. We conclude only that Hamilton‘s claim could not be dismissed as a matter of law simply because the injury causing these limitations was temporary. In reaching that conclusion, we join the First, Fourth, and Sеventh Circuits in holding that under the expanded definition of “disability” under the ADAAA, which now covers impairments “lasting or expected to last less than six months,”
The County argues that “[t]he post-2008 law in this Circuit is consistent in holding that the ADA‘s ‘substantial limitation’ component is generally not met where an impairment is entirely short term.” County Br. at 8. In doing so, the County relies on this Court‘s non-precedential rulings in Francis v. Hartford Bd. of Educ., 760 F. App‘x 34 (2d Cir. 2019) (summary order), and De La Rosa v. Potter, 427 F. App‘x 28 (2d Cir. 2011) (summary order), as well as several district court decisions.
Quite apart from the fact that they are summary orders and therefore not binding, the County reads too much into the Francis and De La Rosa summary orders. Francis relied on De La Rosa, which was decided after the ADAAA‘s enactment, to reject the appellant‘s argument that circuit precedent regarding temporary impairments should be reconsidered following the ADAAA. See Francis, 760 F. App‘x at 36 n.1. Unlike the present case, however, De La Rosa was about whether the plaintiff was ”perceived . . . as disabled and discriminated against . . . on that basis,” and not about whether the plaintiff ”was actually disabled.” De La Rosa, 427 F. App‘x at 29 (emphases added); compare
Indeed, even after the ADAAA‘s enactment, “[a]n individual is not ‘regarded as having [a disability]’ if the public entity demonstrates that the impairment is, objectively, both ‘transitory’ and ‘minor,‘” with “transitory” statutorily defined as “lasting or expected to last six months or less.”
Of course, we agree with the County‘s assertion that “[w]hile an impairment lasting less than six months can constitute а disability since the 2008 amendments, it obviously does not follow that such an impairment will constitute a disability.” County Br. at 6-7 (emphases in original). But the district court‘s error here was to dismiss Hamilton‘s ADA claim solely because he had failed to plead that “his injury was not temporary.” J. App‘x at 29. The district court did not acknowledge the possibility that a temporary injury can constitute a qualifying disability, as long as the requirements of the ADA are mеt.
In its brief on appeal, the County repeatedly emphasizes that Hamilton‘s injury had lasted only nineteen days when he filed his complaint, arguing in essence that even if temporary injuries can qualify, a nineteen-day injury is too short-term to qualify. The statute does not suggest that there is any duration that is too short, but in any event, we need not decide if there is merit to that view of the law, for the County‘s suggestion that Hamilton suffered only a nineteen-day injury is disingenuous. Indeed, the complaint alleged
Because the district court based its dismissal of Hamilton‘s ADA claim against the County only on the threshold issue of whether his injuries were temporary, we do nоt reach the other aspects of Hamilton‘s ADA claim. Likewise, we do not reach the County‘s argument that, putting aside the issue of duration, Hamilton failed to plausibly plead a qualifying disability. We leave it to the district court to address these issues in the first instance.
We do, however, reject the County‘s alternative argument that Hamilton failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. We agree with the district court that Hаmilton plausibly alleged that exhaustion was not meaningfully available to him. See Williams v. Corr. Officer Priatno, 829 F.3d 118, 123-24 (2d Cir. 2016).
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the district court‘s opinion and order is VACATED to the extent it dismissed Hamilton‘s ADA claim against the County, the matter is REMANDED for further proceedings as to that claim only, and the dismissal of all other claims is AFFIRMED.
CHIN, CIRCUIT JUDGE