Hall v. HallHall v. Hall
Rendered on the 29th day of September, 2017.
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DAVID P. MESAROS, Atty. Reg. No. 0012725, ADAM R. MESAROS, Atty. Reg. No. 0089828, 7051 Clyo Road, Centerville, Ohio 45459 Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellee
MARCY A. VONDERWELL, Atty. Reg. No. 0078311, 120 West Second Street, Suite 333, Dayton, Ohio 45402 Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
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WELBAUM, J.
{¶ 2} We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in overruling Hall’s motion for contempt. A standard court order requiring “parents” to provide notice of intent to relocate did not apply, because the parties did not have children as a result of their relationship and would not be considered “parents” for purposes of the order.
{¶ 3} The trial court also did not err in denying Hall’s spousal support motion. The motion was untimely under
I. Facts and Course of Proceedings
{¶ 4} In November 2013, Kendeigh filed a divorce complaint against Hall. At that time, Kendeigh was living in the parties’ marital home on Trebein Road in Beavercreek, Ohio. A February 2014 pretrial order provided that Hall would pay Kendeigh $1,000 per month in temporary spousal support, effective February 1, 2014. Subsequently, on
{¶ 5} In the meantime, Kendeigh had filed a motion asking the court to hold Hall in contempt, due to his failure to pay temporary support. In response, Hall asked to be heard on the issue of temporary support. The trial court combined these matters and conducted a hearing on May 8, 2014. After hearing testimony, the court filed a judgment entry on May 20, 2014, finding Hall in contempt for willfully failing to pay spousal support for February, March, April, and May 2014. Hall was sentenced to 10 days in jail, but was allowed to purge his contempt by paying $3,800 in spousal support arrears and $350 in attorney fees before the sentencing date of August 13, 2014.
{¶ 6} According to the May 20, 2014 judgment entry, Hall admitted that he had paid no support after learning that Kendeigh was romantically involved with and cohabiting with Dale Lowe (referred to as her “paramour“). At the hearing, Kendeigh testified that Lowe spent an average of five nights per week at her residence, and had made no financial contributions to any expenses. Citing Perri v. Perri, 79 Ohio App.3d 845, 608 N.E.2d 790 (2d Dist.1992), the trial court reduced the temporary spousal support from $1,000 to $800 per month, effective May 1, 2014.
{¶ 7} On August 13, 2014, the trial court held another hearing, during which the parties read an agreement into the record. Based on the agreement, the court filed an order requiring the parties to file a decree of divorce and a qualified domestic relations order. The divorce decree was filed on September 16, 2014, and stated that the parties had read their agreement into the record on August 13, 2014. Among other things, the decree provided that Hall would pay Kendeigh spousal support of $800 per month for 18
{¶ 8} In addition, the decree acknowledged that Hall had paid Kendeigh $4,200 on August 14, 2014, and that he owed an arrearage of $2,400 for temporary spousal support, plus $1,500 for an attorney fee award. This amount of $3,900 was also to be paid through CSEA.
{¶ 9} The parties agreed that the trial court would retain jurisdiction over the amount of spousal support, but not the duration. Finally, the decree provided that spousal support would terminate on the death of either party or Kendeigh’s remarriage, or could be modified upon Kendeigh’s cohabitation with an unrelated male.
{¶ 10} A mandatory standard order of the court was attached to the divorce decree, and required the parties to notify CSEA in writing of their current mailing addresses, current residence addresses, telephone numbers, and so forth, and of any changes in information. Additionally, the standard order contained a provision entitled “Notice of Intent to Relocate,” which required parents to notify the court 30 days in advance before they moved to a residence other than the one listed in the court order. The parent who intended to relocate was also required to provide a copy of the notice to the other parent.
{¶ 11} The address listed on the divorce decree for Kendeigh was the Trebein Road address. Neither party appealed from the divorce judgment.
{¶ 13} On February 2, 2016, Hall filed another motion to show cause and a motion for relief from judgment. This was more than six months after Hall’s spousal support order terminated. The show cause motion was based on Kendeigh’s failure to notify the CSEA in writing of her current address. Hall’s
{¶ 14} In July 2016, Kendeigh filed a motion to dismiss, contending that the motion for relief from judgment was untimely. However, in August 2016, the trial court overruled the motion to dismiss, concluding that Hall could potentially proceed under
{¶ 15} In January 2017, the trial court filed a judgment entry overruling the motion to show cause and the
{¶ 16} Concerning the motion for relief from judgment, the court concluded that it was not timely filed, and there was no evidence of mistake, fraud, or newly discovered evidence. Specifically, the May 20, 2014 entry had found Kendeigh was cohabitating, and the spousal support was modified on that basis. Hall then voluntarily agreed to spousal support at the final hearing and stated on the record that he understood the terms of the decree.
{¶ 17} Hall now appeals from the judgment overruling his motions.
II. Alleged Contempt
{¶ 18} Hall’s First Assignment of Error states that:
The Trial Court Erred When It Failed to Find Plaintiff in Contempt of Court.
{¶ 19} Under this assignment of error, Hall contends that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to find Kendeigh in contempt of court. Hall’s argument is based on Kendeigh’s admission that she had not notified either Hall or the CSEA of her new address. According to the evidence, Kendeigh moved from the Trebein address to a new address in March 2015.
{¶ 20} “Contempt is defined in general terms as disobedience of a court order.” State ex rel. Corn v. Russo, 90 Ohio St.3d 551, 554, 740 N.E.2d 265 (2001). “The power of contempt is inherent in a court, such power being necessary to the exercise of judicial functions.” (Citations omitted.) Denovchek v. Bd. of Trumbull Cty. Commrs., 36 Ohio St.3d 14, 15, 520 N.E.2d 1362 (1988). “A common pleas court has both inherent and statutory power to punish contempts * * *.” Burt v. Dodge, 65 Ohio St.3d 34, 35, 599 N.E.2d 693 (1992), citing Zakany v. Zakany, 9 Ohio St.3d 192, 459 N.E.2d 870 (1984), syllabus.
{¶ 21} We review contempt orders for abuse of discretion. (Citation omitted.) State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Hunter, 138 Ohio St.3d 51, 2013-Ohio-5614, 3 N.E.3d 179, ¶ 21. An abuse of discretion means that a trial court acted unreasonably, arbitrarily, or unconscionably. (Citation omitted.) Id. This is a “highly deferential standard of review,” and “we will not lightly substitute our interpretation for that of the issuing court.” (Citations omitted.) Id. at ¶ 29.
{¶ 22} Upon review, we find no abuse of discretion by the trial court. “Civil contempt sanctions are designed for remedial or coercive purposes and are often employed to compel obedience to a court order.” (Citation omitted.) Corn at 554. The record reveals that a technical default may have occurred with respect to a failure to notify the CSEA of a change in address. However, the failure caused no harm, as the evidence indicated that spousal support payments were being directly deposited into Kendeigh’s bank account. Consequently, there was no remedial purpose for imposing a contempt sanction. Hall has also failed to indicate how he was affected or harmed by this technical default.
{¶ 23} Furthermore, the trial court found that failure to notify the court and Hall of an intent to relocate did not apply, because the purpose of this notice is to prevent parents from depriving another parent of parenting rights. The court’s interpretation is reasonable, particularly since the court was evaluating its own standard order. In
{¶ 24} The same observations may be made of the purpose behind an order to notify the CSEA of changes in addresses. Such a requirement would be instrumental with respect to obligors; it has little relevance to persons being paid support, particularly when support is deposited directly into their bank accounts.
{¶ 25} Based on the preceding discussion, the First Assignment of Error is overruled.
II. Civ.R. 60(B) Motion
{¶ 26} Hall’s Second Assignment of Error states that:
The Trial Court Erred When It Failed to Grant Mr. Hall’s Rule 60(B) Motion to Modify or Terminate Spousal Support.
{¶ 27} Under this assignment of error, Hall contends that he was entitled to a downward modification of his spousal support based on evidence that Kendeigh’s paramour (Lowe) was in her home for at least five nights a week. According to Hall, this results in a reasonable inference that spousal support was being used for Lowe’s benefit. Alternatively, Hall argues that the court should have granted his motion for relief from judgment, because he relied on a lease provided during discovery to make his decision to settle the divorce case. According to Hall, he only discovered later that Kendeigh was not the sole party on the lease and that Lowe was also on the lease.
The Court shall retain jurisdiction as to the amount of Spousal Support but not duration. Further, the spousal support shall be included as income to the Plaintiff and tax deductible to the Defendant. Still further, the spousal support shall terminate upon the death of either party, the remarriage of the Plaintiff, or may be modifiable upon cohabitation by the Plaintiff with an unrelated adult male.
Final Judgment and Decree of Divorce, Doc. # 56, p. 3.
{¶ 29} As a preliminary matter, we note that the decree does not allow termination of support based on cohabitation, nor does it require modification based on cohabitation. Instead, the decree says that spousal support “may” be modifiable upon cohabitation. Rather than attempting to modify support, the motion that Hall filed on February 2, 2016, sought to terminate his support obligation and recover all amounts paid, based on
{¶ 30} The trial court did not discuss modification in its decision, but addressed the
{¶ 31} The Supreme Court of Ohio has stressed its long-standing position “that an agreement for spousal support that has been entered in a divorce decree by a trial court is entitled to expectations of finality.” Mandelbaum v. Mandelbaum, 121 Ohio St. 3d 433, 2009-Ohio-1222, 905 N.E.2d 172, ¶ 15.
{¶ 32} Recently, the Supreme Court of Ohio discussed the interplay between
{¶ 33} In Morris, the court traced the development of the common law of divorce and the impact of statutory provisions, particularly those related to modification of spousal support for divorces and dissolutions. Id. at ¶ 12-28. The court discussed its early authority, which held that trial courts had authority to modify spousal support awards in
{¶ 34} The court observed that the enactment of former
{¶ 35} As a result, the court concluded that “the General Assembly swept away all the common law enunciated in Wolfe, including this court‘s holding in Law that a trial court had the authority to modify a spousal-support award if there was fraud or mistake even though the decree did not reserve jurisdiction, * * * and this court‘s holding in Newman that a trial court had the authority to modify a spousal-support award if there was ‘mistake, misrepresentation or fraud’ even though the decree did not reserve jurisdiction * * *.” (Citations omitted.) Morris at ¶ 28.
{¶ 36} After making these remarks, the court noted that it had adopted
{¶ 37} To the extent that Hall mentions modification,
{¶ 38} In the case before us, the trial court’s decision clearly indicates that the alleged change in circumstances did not qualify as substantial under any of the above definitions. The trial court focused on Hall’s testimony, which indicated that Hall learned Lowe was living with Kendeigh when he drove by her home at different times of the day and saw Lowe’s vehicles parked there. After noting this testimony, the court stressed that “Defendant acknowledged that he presented the same testimony at the May 8, 2014 hearing.” January 23, 2017 Judgment Entry, Doc. #119, p. 3. The only conclusion that can be drawn from this statement is that the court found no change in circumstances.
{¶ 39} After making these remarks, the trial court emphasized that spousal support had been reduced in May 2014 because of the cohabitation, and that Hall had from May
{¶ 40} The record contains ample evidence to support the trial court’s conclusions. At the
{¶ 41} Hall also contends in his brief that when he agreed to settle the divorce action, he relied on a lease that was provided during discovery. According to Hall, he only learned after the fact that Lowe was also on the lease.
{¶ 42} Two leases were discussed by the parties and submitted in evidence at the
{¶ 44} Accordingly, no substantial change in circumstances occurred that would allow modification of spousal support pursuant to
{¶ 45} Hall’s motion was brought under
{¶ 46} To the extent that Hall’s motion relied on
{¶ 47} The only remaining ground is
{¶ 48} Moreover, the Supreme Court of Ohio observed in Morris, in the context of a dissolution, that if parties reserve jurisdiction to modify, they may not seek relief under
{¶ 49} Furthermore, even if this were otherwise, ”
{¶ 51} As a final matter, for the reasons previously discussed, there was no fraud between the parties. More than a year before the divorce decree was filed, Hall was well aware that Kendeigh and Lowe were cohabitating. A hearing on this matter was held in May 2014, after which the trial court modified support based on cohabitation. And, as the trial court noted, Hall entered into an agreed settlement thereafter, knowing these facts.
{¶ 52} For the reasons mentioned, we find no abuse of discretion. Consequently, the court did not err in overruling Hall’s motion for relief from judgment. Accordingly, Hall’s Second Assignment of Error is overruled.
IV. Conclusion
{¶ 53} All of Hall’s assignments of error having been overruled, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
HALL, P.J. and TUCKER, J., concur.
Copies mailed to:
David P. Mesaros
Adam R. Mesaros
Marcy A. Vonderwell
Hon. Steven L. Hurley