ROBERT L. HAHN v. JOANNE HAHN
C.A. No. 11CA0064-M
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
May 7, 2012
[Cite as Hahn v. Hahn, 2012-Ohio-2001.]
APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT ENTERED IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS COUNTY OF MEDINA, OHIO CASE No. 08DR0431
WHITMORE, Presiding Judge.
{1} Plaintiff-Appellant, Robert Hahn (“Husband“), appeals from the judgment of the Medina County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division. This Court affirms in part and reverses in part.
I
{2} Husband and Defendant-Appellee, Joanne Hahn (“Wife“), married in July 1994 and had two children during the marriage. Wife maintained a position as a public school teacher throughout the marriage, but the parties also formed their own construction company, Olympic Construction Co. (“Olympic Construction“), to capitalize upon Husband‘s skills in construction. The couple borrowed money from Husband‘s parents to finance the purchase of both their marital residence and the formation of Olympic Construction. The company operated until 2001, at which point the parties dissolved it.
{4} Husband lost his job with the Union Hall in May 2007 as a result of a DUI conviction and remained unemployed for the duration of 2007. On October 19, 2007, Husband and Wife entered into a separation agreement. According to Wife, the parties signed the separation agreement as a precursor to divorce because they both recognized the marriage was over. According to Husband, the parties signed the agreement to shift the vast majority of their assets to Wife after the government launched investigations against Husband for misappropriating funds from the Union Hall while employed there as a manager. The investigations, however, never resulted in any civil or criminal liability.
{5} Husband began working as a human resources manager for Babcock & Wilcox in February 2008. He only remained with the company for a few months because he forcefully entered the marital residence and attacked Wife in July 2008. As a result of the incident, Husband was convicted of burglary and domestic violence and spent six months in jail. Babcock & Wilcox formally terminated Husband‘s employment in January 2009. From the time of his termination until the issuance of the final judgment entry in this matter, Husband never obtained other employment.
{6} During the pendency of his criminal case, Husband filed a complaint for divorce. Husband later voluntarily dismissed his complaint, but the matter nonetheless progressed
{7} Husband now appeals from the trial court‘s judgment and raises seven assignments of error for our review.
II
Assignment of Error Number One
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION UNDER
R.C. §3105 WHEN IT FOUND THE PARTIES’ SEPARATION AGREEMENT TO BE VALID AND ENFORCEABLE AND THE PROPERTY DIVISION TO BE NEARLY EQUAL.
{8} In his first assignment of error, Husband argues that the trial court erred by upholding the separation agreement the parties signed on October 19, 2007. We disagree.
{9} “Separation agreements are contracts, subject to the same rules of construction as other contracts.” Musci v. Musci, 9th Dist. No. 23088, 2006-Ohio-5882, ¶ 42. They are to be interpreted so as to honor the intent of both parties, “as evidenced by contractual language.” Miller v. Miller, 9th Dist. No. 10CA0034-M, 2011-Ohio-4299, ¶ 22. The separation agreement is enforceable “only if the parties intend to contract on its essential terms.” Shetler v. Shetler, 9th Dist. No. 00CA0070, 2001 WL 542318, *1 (May 23, 2001). The interpretation of any terms of a separation agreement is a question of law, as is the determination of whether a contract is
{10} If ambiguity in a separation agreement does exist, a trial court has the discretion to interpret the agreement and clarify the ambiguity. Ivanov at ¶ 18. Additionally, “in a divorce action a trial court may reject some of the terms of a separation agreement, make an independent ruling on those issues and incorporate the independent ruling and partial separation agreement into the divorce decree.” Kaser v. Kaser, 9th Dist. No. 2110, 1992 WL 281337, *3 (Oct. 7, 1992). Accord
{11} The plain language of the separation agreement here provides that, should either party institute a divorce action, the agreement “shall be disclosed * * * and all its terms or provisions shall therein be adopted by [the] Court and embodied in and made a part of the order of [the] Court.” Husband first argues that the trial court erred by enforcing the parties’
{12} Husband testified that the marriage between the parties fell apart more than a year before they signed their separation agreement and that, at the time he began to spend nights away from the marital residence, “the foundation of the [parties]’ relationship was over.” Husband and Wife signed the separation agreement in the office of an attorney Wife retained. Husband admitted that he only signed the agreement after revising one of its provisions. Specifically, Husband insisted on including a provision in the agreement that would allow him to retain all of his tools. He also admitted that, in accordance with the agreement‘s terms, he transferred title to the marital residence to Wife about two weeks after signing the agreement and continued to pay both the mortgage and Wife‘s car payment until he could no longer afford it.
{13} Husband maintained at trial that the separation agreement was a fraudulent document the parties created to hide their assets from various authorities. Assuming Husband‘s argument to be true, the fact that he signed the separation agreement with an ulterior motive in mind, namely to evade certain authorities, does not detract from the fact that he objectively
{14} Next, Husband argues that the trial court erred by enforcing the separation agreement because it was vague and omitted statutorily required terms. The statute upon which he relies,
{16} At the time the parties signed their separation agreement, Wife was working full time and caring for the parties’ two children at the marital residence. She provided insurance for the children and paid for their childcare expenses. Husband was unemployed and living at a house that his parents owned. He had lost his job due to a DUI and was under investigation for misappropriating union funds. The parties did not owe any joint debts other than the mortgage and the lease on Wife‘s car, and the agreement did not address spousal support or child support. The agreement did provide Wife with the marital residence, most of the items in the residence, and her car. Because the children resided with Wife, however, that arrangement minimized the disruption to their lives that might have occurred had the assets been divided more equally.
{17} Husband testified that he signed the separation agreement to appear almost “penniless” in the event he became liable for misappropriating funds and because Wife threatened to divorce him if he did not secure their assets. To the extent Husband argues that he only signed the agreement under duress, the record reflects that the difficult position in which
{18} The trial court conducted an extensive review of the parties’ separation agreement, separately considered each provision, and ultimately concluded that the agreement was valid and enforceable. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by upholding the separation agreement. Kaser, 1992 WL 281337, at *3; Helms, 1992 WL 380602, at *1. Husband‘s first assignment of error is overruled.
Assignment of Error Number Two
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW WHEN IT DETERMINED THAT PROPERTY OWNED BY A THIRD PARTY WAS MARITAL PROPERTY UNDER
R.C. §3105.171 AND AWARDED THE PROPERTY TO HUSBAND IN THE DIVISION OF MARITAL ASSETS.
{19} In his second assignment of error, Husband argues that the trial court erred by designating certain property as marital and awarding that property to Husband in the division of the marital assets. We agree.
{20} In a divorce proceeding, a trial court must classify property as either marital or separate.
{21} Husband avers that the trial court erred in its classification of five specific pieces of property: a 1986 Ford F350, a 1986 Chevy dump truck, a 1989 trailer, a 2002 Polaris ATV, and a Case backhoe. Husband‘s parents supplied Husband and Wife with the foregoing equipment for use in their company, Olympic Construction. Husband and his parents all testified that, after Olympic Construction ceased to operate, Husband returned the equipment to his parents in partial repayment of the debt he and Wife owed them for their contribution to the business. Husband produced titles for the Ford F350, Chevy, trailer, and ATV, all of which bore his father‘s name. The titles for the Ford F350, Chevy, and trailer bear an issue date of April 23, 2004. The title for the ATV bears an issue date of May 29, 2007. Husband did not produce a title for the Case backhoe. His father, Robert Hahn, testified that there was no title for the backhoe because it was farm equipment. Hahn explained that he purchased the backhoe, it was his personal asset, and he stored it on his property. He testified that the backhoe would not be available for Husband‘s use if he wanted to remove it from the property.
{22} The trial court acknowledged that Husband produced evidence that he transferred title to the equipment to his parents during the course of the marriage. Even so, the court classified the equipment as Husband‘s marital property under
{23} Husband resided at the property where the equipment was stored, but the property did not belong to him. The Reimer Road property belonged to his parents who merely permitted Husband to live there. Husband‘s father testified that he owned the equipment and it was not available for Husband‘s use. Further, all of the titles Husband introduced support the conclusion that the equipment belonged to his father. The titles were transferred during the course of the marriage, well before the parties signed their separation agreement. Wife‘s only testimony was that she did not know Husband had transferred any of the equipment. She was unable to produce any documentation to refute Husband‘s proof of the title transfers and maintained only that she believed Husband still possessed the equipment because it was kept on the Reimer Road property.
{24} There is not competent, credible evidence in the record to support the trial court‘s classification of the 1986 Ford F350, 1986 Chevy dump truck, 1989 trailer, 2002 Polaris ATV, and Case backhoe as marital property. Husband transferred the equipment to his parents during the course of the marriage and relinquished any ownership rights or interests the parties had in the equipment. Husband could not convey the equipment, remove the equipment from the property, or otherwise use it as he wished. Therefore, he did not currently own or have an interest in the equipment so as to justify its classification as marital property.
{25} Wife asserts that, even if this Court determines that the equipment was not marital property, this Court still could uphold the trial court‘s decision by construing it as a distributive award to Wife.
{26} The trial court specifically found that the equipment was marital property under
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN CATEGORIZING AID FROM A PARTY‘S PARENT AS A GIFT IN PERPETUITY THAT CONSTITUTED INCOME UNDER
R.C. §3119.01 IN THE ABSENCE OF SUPPORTING EVIDENCE.
Assignment of Error Number Four
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION UNDER
R.C. §3119.01 IN FINDING HUSBAND VOLUNTARILY UNDER/UNEMPLOYED AND IMPUTING INCOME TO HIM IN THE ABSENCE OF CREDIBLE EVIDENCE OF HIS ABILITY TO EARN THE IMPUTED INCOME.
{27} In his third and fourth assignments of error, Husband argues that the trial court erred by calculating his gross income. We disagree.
{28} “In determining the appropriate level of child support, a trial court must calculate the gross income of the parents.” Bajzer v. Bajzer, 9th Dist. No. 25635, 2012-Ohio-252, ¶ 11. “Gross income” is “the total of all earned and unearned income from all sources during a calendar year.”
{30} The trial court did not impute $32,424 to Husband. Imputed income is potential income that “the parent would have earned if fully employed.”
{31} Gross income includes “all other sources of income,” except those specifically excluded by statute.
{32} Next, Husband argues that the trial court erred by determining that he was voluntarily unemployed and by imputing $31,576 to him in potential income. For purposes of the child support statute, the term “voluntary” means “done by design or intention, intentional, proposed, intended, or not accidental. Intentionally and without coercion.” Collins, 2011-Ohio-2087, at 27, quoting Rock v. Cabral, 67 Ohio St.3d 108, 111 (1993), fn. 2. The trial court determined that Husband was voluntarily unemployed as a result of his incarceration and criminal conviction. In so holding, the trial court cited several opinions from other districts. See, e.g., Payton v. Payton, 12th Dist. No. CA2001-01-002, 2001 WL 1463057, *3 (Nov. 19, 2001); Williams v. Williams, 10th Dist. No. 92AP-438, 1992 WL 246020, *1 (Sept. 24, 1992).
{33} Although Husband captions his assignment of error as a challenge to both the trial court‘s determination of voluntary unemployment and its calculation of imputed income, Husband limits his argument to a discussion of the imputation factors. Income is only imputed after the court finds a parent voluntarily unemployed or underemployed. Misleh v. Badwan, 9th Dist. No. 24185, 2009-Ohio-842, ¶ 7 (“[T]he trial court must make an explicit finding of voluntary unemployment or underemployment before it imputes income to a parent for child support purposes.“). Husband fails to explain why the trial court erred by finding him voluntarily unemployed. Husband testified that he lost his job as a result of the two convictions he received after attacking Wife at the marital residence and that he had yet to regain any employment after serving his term of incarceration. See Payton at *3 (affirming finding of voluntary unemployment after father was incarcerated and noting that “a parent cannot avoid the duty of support owed to a minor child through intentional conduct“). In the absence of any
{34} A trial court arrives at its calculation of imputed income that a parent would have earned if fully employed based on its consideration of the following criteria:
- The parent‘s prior employment experience;
- The parent‘s education;
- The parent‘s physical and mental disabilities, if any;
- The availability of employment in the geographic area in which the parent resides;
- The prevailing wage and salary levels in the geographic area in which the parent resides;
- The parent‘s special skills and training;
- Whether there is evidence that the parent has the ability to earn the imputed income;
- The age and special needs of the child for whom child support is being calculated under this section;
- The parent‘s increased earning capacity because of experience;
- Any other relevant factor.
{35} The trial court engaged in a review of each of the foregoing factors. Husband had a college degree and was earning approximately $72,000 per year at the time he lost his job due to his convictions. Husband did not testify to any physical or mental disabilities and had experience in construction at the commercial, residential, and industrial levels. According to
{36} The trial court determined that Husband last earned $64,000 in a human resources position and that, with the $32,424 his parents contributed, Husband only had to earn an additional $31,576 per year to obtain an income level of $64,000. Consequently, the trial court imputed $31,576 to Husband. Husband argues that the trial court abused its discretion in imputing income to him because the record is devoid of any evidence that Husband had any available employment opportunities.
{37} Initially, we clarify some confusing language the trial court employed in its entry. After setting out its calculations, the trial court determined that Husband only needed to earn $31,576 to achieve a gross income level of $64,000 per year. The court then referred to the $64,000 amount as the amount it was imputing to Husband. The remainder of the court‘s entry, however, makes clear that the court was not actually imputing $64,000 to Husband. The court only imputed $31,576; the amount necessary to supplement the income Husband actually received from his parents in order to achieve a gross income level of $64,000. To the extent the trial court mistakenly referred to the entire $64,000 as imputed income in its judgment entry, we
{38} Based on our review of the record, we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion by imputing $31,576 to Husband in its calculation of his potential income. Husband asked the trial court to find his earning level to be forty hours per week based on minimum wage. He did so even though he had not worked since the time of his incarceration. By Husband‘s own testimony, therefore, some imputation of income was reasonable here. Moreover, in spite of Husband‘s testimony that he was earning approximately $72,000 at the time of his incarceration, the trial court only relied upon a $64,000 figure. Husband admitted that he had experience in numerous construction fields and that he did not know whether it might be possible for him to obtain employment as a laborer. Husband only insisted, absent any supporting evidence, that no positions in the labor industry existed. The trial court exercised its discretion and decided, after considering all the factors set forth in
{39} To summarize, the trial court here did not err by determining that the money Husband received from his parents was income and that Husband was voluntarily unemployed. Additionally, the court did not abuse its discretion in calculating Husband‘s potential and gross income levels. Husband‘s third and fourth assignments of error are overruled.
Assignment of Error Number Five
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION UNDER
R.C. §3119.022 WHEN IT CALCULATED CHILD SUPPORT OBLIGATIONS FOR 2009 AND FOLLOWING BASED UPON ESTIMATED 2011 INCOME FOR ONE PARENT AND IMPUTED INCOME FOR THE OTHER.
{41} As to his income, Husband argues that the court erred when it listed his income as $64,000 on the child support worksheet because that figure depended upon imputed income. It is proper for the trial court to include potential income as annual gross income for purposes of a child support worksheet when the court has imputed income to a parent. Rock, 67 Ohio St.3d at 112-113. We have already determined that the trial court did not err by imputing income to Husband. Consequently, Husband‘s argument that the court abused its discretion in listing an annual gross income of $64,000 for Husband on the child support worksheet lacks merit.
{42} Husband also argues that the court erred when it listed Wife‘s annual gross income as $64,086 because that figure represented her estimated income for 2011. Wife testified that her base salary at the time of the hearing was $58,745, but the trial court relied upon her projected income to reach an annual gross income level of $64,086. Husband argues that it was error for the trial court to rely upon a projected income for Wife instead of her reported 2009 income of $53,595. Disregarding the fact that a decrease of more than $10,000 in Wife‘s annual income would result in an increase of Husband‘s support obligation, Husband fails to support his argument with any legal authority. An appellant bears the burden of demonstrating error on appeal through citations to the record and applicable legal authority.
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND ERRED UNDER
R.C. §3119.79 WHEN IT ENTERED AN ORDER OF CHILD SUPPORT WITHOUT SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO OR INCORPORATION OF THE CHILD SUPPORT GUIDELINES WORKSHEET.
{43} In his sixth assignment of error, Husband argues that the trial court committed reversible error when it modified his temporary child support obligation without referencing a child support worksheet. Husband‘s argument strains credulity. The trial court completed a child support worksheet, labeled it Exhibit D, and attached it to its judgment entry. The court also specifically referenced the worksheet in its discussions of the cash medical support provision of its judgment entry. The worksheet is part of the record. Smith v. McLaughlin, 9th Dist. No. 24890, 2010-Ohio-2739, ¶ 16-18. Further, Husband is clearly aware the trial court used a worksheet, as he challenged the annual gross income figures the court used in the worksheet in his fifth assignment of error. Husband‘s argument is meritless. His sixth assignment of error is overruled.
Assignment of Error Number Seven
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND ERRED UNDER
R.C. §3119.22 WHEN IT ENTERED BOTH AN ORDER FOR CASH MEDICAL SUPPORT BASED UPON AN ATTACHED CHILD SUPPORT GUIDELINE WORKSHEET AND STATED REASONS FOR DEVIATIONS FROM THE CASH MEDICAL SUPPORT AMOUNT EXISTED FINDING THE SAME AMOUNT TO BE UNJUST, INAPPROPRIATE, AND NOT IN THE CHILDREN‘S BEST INTERESTS.
{44} In his seventh assignment of error, Husband argues that the court erred by ordering him to pay cash medical support after finding the support computation unreasonable.
{45} First, Husband reiterates his argument that the court could not order cash medical support without referencing the child support guideline worksheet. The record betrays Husband‘s assertion that the trial court failed to reference the worksheet. The court‘s judgment
{46} Second, Husband argues that the court‘s judgment entry contains inconsistent findings. Husband asserts that while the court found the guideline computation of cash medical support to be “unjust, inappropriate and not in the child(ren)‘s best interests,” the court then went on to order Husband to pay cash medical support in accordance with the guideline. A closer reading of the court‘s judgment entry reveals, however, that the court did not simply order Husband to pay the cash medical support. The applicable portions of the court‘s judgment entry read as follows:
Husband shall pay * * * cash medical support in the amount of $162.83 per month plus two percent (2%) processing charge when health insurance is not provided.
* * *
Upon receipt of notice by the Child Support Enforcement Agency that private health insurance coverage as ordered is not available at a reasonable cost, cash medical support shall be paid in the amount as determined by the child support guidelines computation worksheet attached.
(Emphasis added.) Husband‘s obligation to pay cash medical support is not absolute. Rather, it is contingent upon health insurance not being provided. The court‘s judgment entry provides that Wife is responsible for obtaining health insurance coverage for the children. The court, therefore, only ordered Husband to pay cash medical support for the children if Wife was unable to obtain insurance for the children at a reasonable cost. Husband‘s seventh assignment of error is overruled.
{47} Husband‘s second assignment of error is sustained. His remaining assignments of error are overruled. The judgment of the Medina County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division, is affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with the foregoing opinion.
Judgment affirmed in part, reversed in part, and cause remanded.
There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common Pleas, County of Medina, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to
Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the period for review shall begin to run.
Costs taxed equally to both parties.
BETH WHITMORE FOR THE COURT
APPEARANCES:
LINDA HOFFMAN, Attorney at Law, for Appellant.
DAVID L. MCARTOR and KRISTOPHER K. AUPPERLE, Attorneys at Law, for Appellee.