The Motion to Dismiss has been fully briefed by the parties. (Doc. Nos. 9, 10, 13 & 16). For the reasons that follow, the Motion will be denied.
I. Factual Background
Because this matter is before the Court on a Motion to Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the facts alleged in the Complaint are considered true and construed in Gulley's favor. Philadelphia Indem. Ins. Co. v. Youth Alive, Inc.,
On July 20, 2016, Gulley began working for GM at its manufacturing facility in Spring Hill, Tennessee. During his employment, Gulley was a member of the United Auto Workers Local 1853, and covered by a CBA between GM and that Union.
On July 12, 2017, Gulley drove to work and parked in the employee parking lot. At the time he had a handgun in his vehicle, secreted in a small compartment below the steering wheel.
After walking into the plant, Gulley was asked to accompany his group leader to her desk. At the desk was a Union Committeeman and a GM Manager. Gulley was told that he needed to gather his belongings and meet with GM management in another part of the facility. After collecting his belongings, Gulley was escorted to a meeting room where he was met by a GM Labor Representative, the facility's Chief of Security, and a Maury County Deputy Sheriff.
Upon being informed that an anonymous tipster had placed a phone call to the "GM Awareline" stating that Gulley had a weapon at the facility, Gulley consented to a search of his person, locker, and vehicle. A handgun was found in Gulley's vehicle after he told the Deputy Sheriff where it was located.
Once the handgun was retrieved and photographed, Gulley returned to the meeting room and was asked by the Labor Representative why he had a gun. Gulley stated that he had the handgun in his vehicle for protection. The Labor Representative then told Gulley that she was "writing him up," and stepped out of the room. The Union Committeeman also stepped out of the room. After a couple of minutes, both returned and Gulley was handed a "Notice of Disciplinary Action or Discharge" form. The form indicated that Gulley was being discharged because he violated "Standard of Conduct # 14." (Doc. No. 1-2 at 14).
Standard of Condition # 14 is a provision in the local CBA that reads:
STANDARDS OF CONDUCT
Serious misconduct may include any of the following actions or behaviors by a team member will be sufficient grounds for corrective action ranging from reprimand to immediate discharge. In as much as all misconduct cannot be anticipated, this list is not intended to be exhaustive.
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14. Possession of weapons or explosive material on Company premises at any time.
(Doc. No. 9-1 at 16).
After being discharged, Gulley received a copy of GM's Global Security Policy ("Security Policy"), which states that "GM will not tolerate the possession of guns, dangerous devices, or other weapons while on company property, including company parking lots." The Security Policy further states that, "[u]nless this policy violates local law, it remains a violation of the policy to have weapons of any kind on GM property, event when they are kept in employees' personal vehicles." (Doc. No. 1-2 ¶ 20).
On July 16, 2017, Michael Herron, the Union Chairman, emailed Ron Rich, GM's Plan Personnel Manager, and explained that, in the Union's view, GM's policy was in conflict with
On August 9, 2017, Gulley, the Union, and GM entered into a "Grievance Settlement" that reads:
Without prejudice to the position of either party and on a non-precedent setting basis, the grievance is withdrawn by the Union. The grievant will be reinstated to his previously held position and paid for lost time.
The grievant's return to active status (report for work) will be contingent upon the outcome of a "fit for work" evaluation to be performed by GM Medical. The purpose of the exam is to determine the grievant's mental and physical ability to return to work and to ensure that the grievant does not represent a threat to himself or others. In the event of an unsatisfactory assessment, the grievant shall be reinstated as noted above and placed on a sick leave of absence until such time as he is found able to return to work."
(Doc. No. 9-3 at 1).
Gulley submitted to the request for a medical evaluation via a telephone conference on August 11, 2017 with a "Doctor Jones" hired by GM. Both Herron and a "Doctor Bruce" were present, and "both of GM's own medical professionals, Dr. Jones and Dr. Bruce, stated that Gulley was 'fit to work.' " (Doc. No. 1-2 ¶ 23). Nevertheless, GM did not return Gulley to work. Instead, GM representatives called Gulley and informed him that he needed to undergo a second evaluation on August 24, 2017. Gulley said he was not available that day.
On August 25, 2017, Gulley (or his counsel) was told by Holly Georgell, GM's in-house counsel, that Gulley would be reinstated with full pay, but would be placed on leave rather than returned to work. Five days later, he received a copy of his pay stub that indicated he was being paid $3,847.50 in back wages, which was approximately $1,000 less than he was owed.
On September 2, 2017, Gulley was told by Georgell that GM did not intend to reinstate him unless and until he successfully completed the second fit-for-duty evaluation. Gulley also received a printout indicating the $3,837.50 was for "T. Gulley Discharge Settlement." Less than three weeks later Gulley filed suit.
II. Standard of Review
Even though the Court is required to construe the well-pleaded facts from the Complaint in favor of Gulley in ruling on GM's Motion to Dismiss, those "[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level," and "state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,
III. Legal Discussion
GM's Motion to Dismissed is based on three grounds. First, it argues that Gulley's claims are preempted by Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act,
A. Section 301
Section 301 provides that "[s]uits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce ... may be brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties."
Section 301 "governs claims founded directly on rights created by collective-bargaining agreements, and also claims 'substantially dependent on analysis of a collective-bargaining agreement.' " Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams,
"[W]hen the meaning of contract terms is not the subject of dispute, the bare fact that a collective-bargaining agreement will be consulted in the course of state-law litigation plainly does not require the claim to be extinguished.' "
To aid courts in determining whether a state law claim has been preempted, the Sixth Circuit has developed a two-step inquiry. "The first step requires [a court] to determine 'whether resolving the state-law claim would require interpretation of the terms' of the CBA." Loyd v. Saint Joseph Mercy Oakland,
Here, the preemption inquiry fails at both steps. The right allegedly violated is provided by state law, specifically
(b)(1)(A) No employer shall discharge or take any adverse employment action against an employee solely for transporting or storing a firearm or firearm ammunition in an employer parking area in a manner consistent with § 39-17-1313(a).
(B) An employee discharged, or subject to an adverse employment action, in violation of subdivision (b)(1)(A) shall have a cause of action against the employer to enjoin future acts in violation of this section and to recover economic damages plus reasonable attorney fees and costs.
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(2) In any action brought pursuant to this section, the employee shall have the burden of establishing a prima facie case of discharge, or adverse employment action, based solely on the employee's transporting or storing a firearm or firearm ammunition in the employer's parking area in a manner consistent with § 39-17-1313(a).
Even though
In this case, Gulley alleges that he was a GM employee, he parked in an employee parking lot provided by GM, he possessed a valid Tennessee Handgun Permit, and he had a handgun hidden in a compartment within his locked vehicle. Gulley also alleges that he was discharged solely because he engaged in protected activity under
In arriving at this conclusion, the Court recognizes that Gulley may have a difficult time establishing that the sole reasons for his discharge was a violation of Tennessee state law. This is particularly so given Gulley's acknowledgment that the Discharge Notice listed only one reason for his discharge, specifically the violation of Standard of Conduct # 14. Indeed, Gulley's acknowledgment may well prove fatal because the statute contemplates a burden-shifting approach similar to the McDonnell Douglas paradigm such that GM is allowed to produce evidence of a legitimate non-discriminatory reason that Gulley would have to rebut.
Nevertheless, the question now before the Court is simply one of preemption and "reliance on the CBA as a defense is, in itself, insufficient to trigger preemption." Paul,
B. Grievance Settlement
GM argues that Gulley's claims are barred by the Grievance Settlement, and that his claims relating to GM's compliance with the settlement fail as a matter of law. The Court is unpersuaded by either argument.
GM cites Smith v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc.,
Furthermore, the Complaint is not limited to the issue of whether the CBA's prohibition on firearms is valid. Instead, Gulley claims that GM's "Global Security Policy" which also contains a firearms prohibition violates
Finally, GM briefly argues that, in light of the Grievance Settlement, the Complaint fails to state a claim on which relief
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, GM's Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 8) will be denied. An appropriate Order will be entered.
Notes
In this regard, the statute provides:
If the employee satisfies th[e] burden [of establishing a prima facie case], the burden shall then be on the employer to produce evidence that one (1) or more legitimate reasons existed for the employee's discharge or adverse employment action. The burden on the employer is one of production and not persuasion. If the employer produces such evidence, the presumption of discharge, or adverse employment action, raised by the employee's prima facie case is rebutted, and the burden shifts to the employee to demonstrate that the reason given by the employer was not the true reason for the employee's discharge, or adverse employment action, and that the stated reason was a pretext for discharge or adverse employment action. The allocations of burdens of proof set out in this subdivision (b)(2) shall apply at all stages of the proceedings, including motions for summary judgment.
Because the Court finds that Gulley's claims under state law are not preempted, the Court need not reach yet the question of exhaustion of remedies, or the failure to name the Union as a party.