285 F. Supp. 3d 1047
M.D. Tenn.2018Background
- Titus Gulley, a GM employee and UAW member at Spring Hill, Tennessee, was discharged after GM security discovered a handgun in his locked vehicle in the employee parking lot.
- GM discharged Gulley under the CBA’s Standard of Conduct #14 (possession of weapons on company premises) and cited its Global Security Policy banning weapons on company property, including parking lots.
- The Union emailed GM asserting Gulley’s conduct was protected by Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-1-312(b) (which protects employees who transport/store firearms in vehicles consistent with Tenn. Code § 39-17-1313).
- GM, Gulley, and the Union executed a Grievance Settlement reinstating Gulley contingent on a “fit for work” medical evaluation; GM ultimately did not return him to active work and paid a settlement amount Gulley alleges was short.
- Gulley sued in state court seeking (1) injunctive relief under Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-1-312(b)(1)(B) to enjoin enforcement of GM policies that violate the statute and to prohibit further adverse actions or medical evaluations based on his vehicle-locked handgun, and (2) economic damages; GM removed and moved to dismiss.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Gulley’s state-law claims are preempted by § 301 of the LMRA | Gulley's rights arise from Tennessee statute § 50-1-312, not the CBA; resolution does not require interpreting CBA terms | GM contends § 301 preempts the claims because the dispute implicates the CBA and grievance process | Court: Not preempted — statute creates independent rights and resolution does not require interpretation of CBA terms |
| Whether the Grievance Settlement bars Gulley’s suit (accord and satisfaction) | Settlement was without prejudice and non-precedent; complaint alleges continued unlawful company policies and harms beyond the grievance | GM contends Gulley voluntarily settled the grievance and cannot relitigate the same claims | Court: Denied — at pleading stage GM has not met burden to show accord and satisfaction; factual issues remain |
| Whether Gulley failed to exhaust contractual remedies or name the Union | Gulley followed grievance and settlement process; suit challenges independent statutory rights | GM argues contractual remedies govern and union should be joined; failure to exhaust or join bars suit | Court: Declined to decide exhaustion/joinder because preemption resolved in Gulley’s favor; not dismissed on that ground |
| Whether the Complaint plausibly pleads that the sole reason for adverse action was protected conduct under Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-1-312 | Gulley alleges he had a valid handgun permit, kept the gun locked/hidden in his vehicle in the employer parking area, and was discharged solely for that reason | GM points to discharge under CBA Standard #14 and the Grievance Settlement/medical evaluations as non-statutory bases | Court: Complaint is plausible enough to survive Rule 12(b)(6); factual proof and burden-shifting at later stages may be difficult for Gulley but dismissal is inappropriate now |
Key Cases Cited
- Philadelphia Indem. Ins. Co. v. Youth Alive, 732 F.3d 645 (6th Cir. 2013) (Rule 12(b)(6) standard and treating complaint facts as true)
- Ouwinga v. Benistar 419 Plan Servs., Inc., 694 F.3d 783 (6th Cir. 2012) (documents integral to the complaint may be considered on dismissal)
- Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (plausibility standard for pleadings)
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (plausibility and pleading requirements)
- Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386 (1987) (§ 301 preemption framework; state-law claims preempted if they require interpreting CBA)
- Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, 486 U.S. 399 (1988) (state-law claim survives § 301 preemption where it can be resolved without interpreting CBA)
- Paul v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan of Ohio, 701 F.3d 514 (6th Cir.) (reliance on the CBA as a defense alone does not trigger § 301 preemption)
- DeCoe v. Gen. Motors Corp., 32 F.3d 212 (6th Cir.) (preemption reaches state-law rules that substantially implicate CBA terms)
- Smolarek v. Chrysler Corp., 879 F.2d 1326 (6th Cir.) (retaliatory discharge under state law not preempted by § 301 when rights are independent of CBA)
- Courie v. Alcoa Wheel & Forged Prod., 577 F.3d 625 (6th Cir.) (plaintiff's complaint need only be plausible to survive dismissal)