GRISELDA JAUREGUI, individually, and on behalf of other members of the general public similarly situated v. ROADRUNNER TRANSPORTATION SERVICES, INC., an unknown business entity
No. 22-55058
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
March 17, 2022
D.C. No. 2:21-cv-04657-RGK-PD. Argued and Submitted February 7, 2022, San Francisco, California.
Before: Andrew D. Hurwitz and Lawrence VanDyke, Circuit Judges, and Joan N. Ericksen, District Judge.
OPINION
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California R. Gary Klausner, District Judge, Presiding
Opinion by Judge VanDyke
* The Honorable Joan N. Ericksen, United States District Judge for the District of Minnesota, sitting by designation.
Amount in Controversy / Class Action Fairness Act
The panel reversed the district court‘s order that remanded a class action to California state court after it determined that the $5 million amount in controversy requirement of the Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA“) was not met.
The plaintiff filed a putative class action against Roadrunner Transportation Services on behalf of all Roadrunner and former California hourly workers, alleging violations of California labor law, primarily wage and hour violations. Roadrunner removed the case to federal court, invoking jurisdiction under CAFA. Plaintiff responded with a motion to remand for lack of jurisdiction. The district court found that Roadrunner failed to meet its burden to establish the requisite $5 million minimum for the amount in controversy, and remanded to state court.
The panel held that the district court erred in imposing — both explicitly and in its analysis — a presumption against CAFA jurisdiction. Presumably because of this, latent throughout the order was an inappropriate demand of certitude from Roadrunner over its assumptions used in calculating the amount in controversy.
The panel also held that the district court erred in how it approached the amount in controversy analysis. Because plaintiff contested removal, Roadrunner was required to
The panel held that the CAFA amount in controversy requirement was met. Using the lowest hourly wage rate identified by the district court, the minimum wage claim was reasonably valued at $4.5 million. Added to the $2.1 million for the two other claims accepted by the district court, that would be more than enough to establish jurisdiction under CAFA, without even considering any of the other four claims that the district court also zeroed-out. The panel remanded to the district court for further proceedings.
** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
COUNSEL
Jules S. Zeman (argued), Frederic W. Norris, and Jennifer N. Hinds, Husch Blackwell LLP, Los Angeles, California, for Defendant-Appellant.
Eileen B. Goldsmith (argued) and Michael Rubin, Altshuler Berzon LLP, San Francisco, California; Arby Aiwazian, Edwin Aiwazian, and Joanna Ghosh, Lawyers for Justice, PC, Glendale, California; for Plaintiff-Appellee.
OPINION
VANDYKE, Circuit Judge:
I. INTRODUCTION
We are asked in this case to review the district court‘s order remanding a class action to California state court after it determined that the $5 million amount in controversy requirement of the Class Action Fairness Act was not met. Because the district court erred in its amount in controversy analysis by assigning a $0 valuation to several claims, we reverse and remand.
II. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Griselda Jauregui filed a putative class action in California Superior Court against Defendant Roadrunner Transportation Services (Roadrunner) on behalf of all Roadrunner current and former California hourly workers. The complaint alleged numerous violations of California labor law focused primarily on wage and hour violations.1
Roadrunner removed the case to federal court, invoking Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA) jurisdiction. Plaintiff responded with a motion to remand, arguing that the district court lacked jurisdiction under CAFA because the requisite $5 million minimum for the amount in controversy had not been met.2 As authorized under CAFA, Roadrunner responded with “summary judgment style evidence” to establish the amount in controversy. Roadrunner relied primarily on the declaration of its senior payroll lead who concluded that, based on the company‘s payroll data and Plaintiff‘s allegations, the amount in controversy was $14,780,377.06.3
The district court found that Roadrunner failed to meet its burden and remanded the case to the state court. The court reached this conclusion after independently evaluating
III. ANALYSIS
Remand orders in cases involving CAFA are reviewed de novo. Fritsch v. Swift Transp. Co. of Ariz., 899 F.3d 785, 792 (9th Cir. 2018). A defendant‘s amount in controversy allegation is normally accepted when invoking CAFA jurisdiction, unless it is “contested by the plaintiff or questioned by the court.” See Dart Cherokee, 574 U.S. at 87. When a plaintiff contests the amount in controversy allegation, “both sides submit proof and the court decides, by a preponderance of the evidence, whether the amount-in-controversy requirement has been satisfied.” Id. at 88.
A.
Much of the district court‘s analysis underlying the order granting the remand consists of granular evaluations of Defendant‘s evidence, assumptions, and arguments. That evaluation was appropriate, but in the end the district court lost sight of the ultimate question: whether Roadrunner met its burden of showing the amount in controversy exceeded $5 million. The two primary errors affecting the remand order were putting a thumb on the scale against removal and assigning a $0 amount to most of the claims simply because the court disagreed with one or more of the assumptions underlying Roadrunner‘s amount in controversy estimates.
In both its “Judicial Standard” section and subsequent analysis, the district court imposed a heavy burden on Defendant to prove that the case belongs in federal court. This threshold posture contravenes the text and understanding of CAFA and ignores precedent.
CAFA “significantly expanded federal jurisdiction in diversity class actions.” Lewis v. Verizon Commc‘ns, Inc., 627 F.3d 395, 398 (9th Cir. 2010); see also Dart Cherokee, 574 U.S. at 89 (“Congress enacted [CAFA] to facilitate adjudication of certain class actions in federal court.“). Congress expressly noted in CAFA‘s “Findings and Purposes” that the statute was designed to “restore the intent of the framers of the United States Constitution by providing for Federal court consideration of interstate cases of national importance under diversity jurisdiction.” Class Action Fairness Act of 2005,
Given this statutory background, the Supreme Court has advised “that no antiremoval presumption attends cases invoking CAFA,” in part because the statute was enacted “to facilitate adjudication of certain class actions in federal
Here, the district court imposed — both explicitly and in its analysis — a presumption against CAFA‘s jurisdiction. The district court‘s “Judicial Standard” section, which explained the legal framework for the case, states that
courts “strictly construe the removal statute against removal jurisdiction” and “[f]ederal jurisdiction must be rejected if there is any doubt as to the right of removal in the first instance.” Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992). The defendant always bears the burden of establishing that removal is proper. Id. The enactment of CAFA does not alter this rule. Serrano v. 180 Connect, Inc., 478 F.3d 1018, 1021 (9th Cir. 2007) (“[When enacting CAFA] Congress intended to maintain the historical rule that it is the proponent‘s burden to establish a prima facie case of removal jurisdiction.“).
This threshold explanation does not square with the numerous statements quoted above insisting on an expansive understanding of CAFA. While the district court went on to cite Dart Cherokee for the proposition that “no antiremoval presumption attends cases invoking CAFA,” it is difficult to reconcile that citation with the court‘s earlier statements in the “Judicial Standard” section. Regardless of how one
Presumably because of this, latent throughout the order was an inappropriate demand of certitude from Roadrunner over its assumptions used in calculating the amount in controversy. The problem with that approach is that a CAFA defendant‘s amount in controversy assumptions in support of removal will always be just that: assumptions. At that stage of the litigation, the defendant is being asked to use the plaintiff‘s complaint — much of which it presumably disagrees with — to estimate an amount in controversy. This is also at a stage of the litigation before any of the disputes over key facts have been resolved. We have therefore made it clear that when calculating the amount in controversy, “the parties need not predict the trier of fact‘s eventual award with one hundred percent accuracy.” Valdez v. Allstate Ins. Co., 372 F.3d 1115, 1117 (9th Cir. 2004). As is inescapable at this early stage of the litigation, the removing party must be able to rely “on a chain of reasoning that includes assumptions to satisfy its burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the amount in controversy exceeds $5 million,” as long as the reasoning and underlying assumptions are reasonable.5 LaCross v. Knight Transp. Inc., 775 F.3d 1200, 1201 (9th Cir. 2015).
The district court did not afford Roadrunner this latitude when analyzing the amount in controversy. As one example, the court rejected Roadrunner‘s assumption that each
B.
The district court also erred in how it approached the amount in controversy analysis. Because Plaintiff contested removal, Roadrunner was required to show the amount in controversy by a preponderance of the evidence. Dart Cherokee, 574 U.S. at 88.
Our court has defined the amount in controversy as simply “the amount at stake in the underlying litigation ....” Theis Rsch., Inc. v. Brown & Bain, 400 F.3d 659, 662 (9th Cir. 2005). Importantly, that “‘[a]mount at stake’ does not mean likely or probable liability; rather, it refers to possible liability.” Greene v. Harley-Davidson, Inc., 965 F.3d 767, 772 (9th Cir. 2020) (emphasis added); see also Lewis, 627 F.3d at 400 (noting that the amount in controversy is “an estimate of the amount that will be put at issue in the course of the litigation” (citing McPhail v. Deere & Co., 529 F.3d 947, 956 (10th Cir. 2008))).6
Recognizing that the amount in controversy is supposed to be an estimate of the entire potential amount at stake in the litigation demonstrates the unrealistic nature of assigning $0 to five out of seven of Plaintiff‘s claims. Of course, if a defendant provided no evidence or clearly inadequate evidence supporting its valuation for a claim, then it might be appropriate for a district court to assign that claim a $0 value. But that is not what happened here. Roadrunner offered substantial evidence and identified assumptions to support its valuation of each of the various claims in this case. In analyzing each of the claims, the court disagreed with some of Roadrunner‘s assumptions, identifying other assumptions that it concluded were better. In a circumstance like this, merely preferring an alternative assumption is not an appropriate basis to zero-out a claim; at most, it only justifies reducing the claim to the amount resulting from the alternative assumption. The approach used by the district court turns the CAFA removal process into an unrealistic all-or-nothing exercise of guess-the-precise-assumption-the-court-will-pick — even where, as here, the defendant provided substantial evidence and analysis supporting its amount in controversy estimate.
Plaintiff‘s minimum wage claim — one of her higher value claims in this case — illustrates our point. In its opposition to the remand motion, Roadrunner calculated the amount in controversy for the minimum wage claim by assuming that one hour of work a week went unpaid. Roadrunner then took the 63,431 workweeks in question and
The district court did not disagree with most of Roadrunner‘s assumptions for the minimum wage claim estimate. But it noted that Roadrunner erred in using a $16.22 hourly wage figure for these calculations, because California‘s minimum wage for the time in question ranged from $10.50 in 2017 to $14.00 in 2021 — all lower than the $16.22 amount used. Because this resulted in Defendant‘s calculations being a “gross over-calculation,” the district court assigned a $0 valuation for the minimum wage claim.
Assigning a $0 value was improper. Neither party, nor the district court, believed the amount in controversy for this claim to be anywhere near $0. Even using the lowest hourly wage rate offered by the district court ($10.50), the amount in controversy for this claim alone would still come out to over $4.5 million.7
So too here. Using the lowest hourly wage rate identified by the district court, the minimum wage claim is reasonably valued at $4.5 million. Added to the $2.1 million for the two other claims accepted by the district court, that would be more than enough to establish jurisdiction under CAFA, without even considering any of the other four claims that the district court also zeroed-out.8
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, the district court‘s order to remand the case is reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
