MAURICE GRIFFIN v. SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO, et al.
Case No.: 23-cv-01205-LL-JLB
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
September 30, 2024
Hon. Jill L. Burkhardt, United States Magistrate Judge
ECF NOS. 22, 33
(1) RESPONDENT‘S MOTION TO DISMISS THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS; AND
(2) PETITIONER‘S MOTION TO EXPAND THE RECORD
[ECF NOS. 22, 33]
This Report and Recommendation is submitted to the Honorable Linda Lopez, United States District Judge, pursuant to
On June 24, 2023,1 Petitioner Maurice Griffin, (“Petitioner“), currently incarcerated at Sugar Pine Conservation Camp #9 in Bella Vista, California, filed a Petition for Writ of
Habeas Corpus, pro se, before this Court pursuant to
Having reviewed the Petition, Respondent‘s Motion, Petitioner‘s Opposition, and the entire record, the Court RECOMMENDS that Respondent‘s Motion to Dismiss be GRANTED, and the case be DISMISSED.
Also pending is Petitioner‘s Motion to Expand the Record (“Motion to Expand the Record“). (ECF No. 33). Having reviewed the filings and the record, the Court RECOMMENDS the Motion to Expand the Record be DENIED.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Underlying Facts
On August 16, 2019, a jury in the Superior Court of the State of California, San Diego County, found Petitioner guilty on one count of burglary3 and one count of petty theft.4 (See ECF No. 20-1 at 2; ECF No. 20-5 at 1.) The Court sentenced Petitioner to 10 years in prison, following a finding that he had a prior strike for sentencing purposes and that he was out on bail at the time of the offenses in question pursuant to California Penal
Code §§ 667-68, 12022.1. (ECF No. 20-1 at 2; see generally ECF No. 9-1 at 17-40.) The
Petitioner filed a direct appeal to the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District. (See ECF No. 20-1.) On appeаl, Petitioner argued that there was “insufficient evidence in the record to support the jury‘s true finding that the burglary he committed was of an inhabited dwelling house ... [and] that the trial court abused its discretion in declining to dismiss his strike prior and in sentencing him ... on the burglary count.” (Id. at 2.) The Court of Appeal affirmed the conviction, and Petitioner subsequently appealed to the California Supreme Court on the same grounds. (Id.; ECF No 20-2.)5 The California Supreme Court summarily denied his petition on July 21, 2021. (ECF No. 20-3.)6
B. State Court Habeas Petitions
Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus pro se in the Superior Court for
Petitioner filed a second habeas petition in the Superior Court on December 22, 2022—this time represented by counsel—alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel as grounds for relief.8 (ECF No. 20-6; 20-7 at 2.) The Superior Court denied this petition as untimely on January 5, 2023, and made an alternative finding that,
regardless, his trial counsel was not ineffective. (ECF No. 20-7 at 6-9; see also ECF No.
Petitioner—now pro se—applied for habeas relief in the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, on or about April 21, 2023, challenging the Superior Court‘s denial.9 (ECF No. 20-8.) The Court of Appeal denied this petition on May 16, 2023, holding that “[Petitioner‘s] claims of ineffective assistance of counsel do not state a prima facie case for habeas corpus relief[]” because he “fail[ed] to show he was prejudiced by any of the alleged deficiencies in counsel‘s performance” and that, therefore, even had the prior petition been timely the Superior Court would have dismissed it. (ECF No. 20-9 at 2-4.)10 Petitioner did not file a habeas petition in the California Supreme Court.11
C. Federal Habeas Petition
Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus in the District Court for the Southern
While Petitioner disputes Respondent‘s argument that the federal Petition is untimely, Petitioner does not meaningfully contest the assertion that he did not appeal his state habeas petition to the California Supreme Court, stating instead “I deny the allegation that I[‘]m responsible for never filing with the Supreme Court.” (ECF No. 34 at 4.) The Court takes judicial notice that the California Supreme Court‘s and Court of Appeal‘s electronic case access systems contain no records of any such habeas petition filed in the California Supreme Court. Reyn‘s Pasta Bella, LLC., 442 F.3d at 746 n.6; Appeals Court Case Information—Supreme Court, Cаlifornia Courts, Judicial Council of California, https://appellatecases.courtinfo.ca.gov/search/case/mainCaseScreen.cfm?dist=0&doc_id=2351220&doc_no=S269275&request_token=NiIwLSEnXkw4W1BVSCJNWEpIIEA0UDxTJSBOTz1SICAgCg%3D%3D (last accessed Sept. 30, 2024) [https://perma.cc/XJ2M-XJ9V] (search results for Petitioner in California Supreme Court records). Thus, the Court finds that Petitioner did not file a state habeas case in the California Supreme Court.
Respondent filed the instant Motion to Dismiss on April 3, 2024, arguing that the
II. LEGAL STANDARD
A federal habeas corpus petition challenges the legality or duration of confinement. See Hill v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 573, 579 (2006). Under
A motion to dismiss a petition for writ of habeas corpus is viewed as a request to dismiss under Rule 4 of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts (“Rules Governing § 2254“). See O‘Bremski v. Maass, 915 F.2d 418, 420 (9th Cir. 1990); White v. Lewis, 874 F.2d 599 (9th Cir. 1989). Under Rule 4 of the Rules Governing § 2254, “[i]f it plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court, the judge must dismiss the petition . . .”
III. DISCUSSION
Respondent argues that the Petition should be dismissed for failure to exhaust state-level remedies, and because it is barred by the statute of limitations, with no relief from the limitation available through statutory or equitable tolling. (See ECF No 22-1 at 6-7.) Petitioner disputes each argument. (See generally ECF No. 34.) Upon reviewing the Motion to Dismiss, the Opposition, and the record, the Court recommends that Judge Lopez find that: (A) Petitioner failed to exhaust his state-level remedies; and (B) the Petition is barred by the statute of limitations. Therefore, the Court recommends that the Petition be dismissed.
A. Exhaustion
In its Motion to Dismiss, Respondent argues Petitioner did not exhaust his ability to seek remedies through state processes prior to filing a federal petition, as required. (ECF No. 22-1 at 16.) Specifically, Respondent argues that because Petitioner did not raise the claim he now presents for habeas relief to the California Supreme Court in a state habeas petition, he failed to properly exhaust state remedies. (ECF No. 22-1 at 16-19.) The Court, while not fully agreeing with Respondent‘s articulation of the exhaustion requirement, finds Petitioner did fail to adequately exhaust state remedies as required before seeking federal relief. Petitioner‘s direct appeal did not present the same issues or allegations he presents in his federal Petition, and he did not appeal either state habeas claim to the California Supreme Court. Therefore, the Petition should be dismissed.
i. Legal Standard
However, a petitioner need not file repetitive petitions for relief in the state courts, bringing the same claims under different procedural devices—such as both a direct appeal and subsequent collateral review. O‘Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 844 (citing Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 447 (1953) (overturned on other grounds)). Thus, a petitioner convicted of a felony in California need not file a habeas claim restating the grounds for relief contained in a previous direct appeal, provided that direct appeal was presented to the California Supreme Court. Turner v. Compoy, 827 F.2d 526, 528 (9th Cir. 1987); see Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 219-25 (discussing California‘s unique collateral review scheme); Nilsen v. Lake Cnty, Super. Ct., No. 19-cv-02917-PJH, 2020 WL 4701094 at *1 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 13, 2020) (state remedies must be exhausted, “either by way of a direct appeal
ii. Analysis
a. Petitioner‘s Direct Appeal Does Not Exhaust His State Remedies
Petitioner‘s direct appeal does not reflect the substance of the issues raised in his federal claim for habeas relief, and thus cannot exhaust his claim. Rose, 455 U.S. at 516-22. In his Petition for Review to the California Supreme Court on direct appeal, Petitioner argued two grounds for relief: 1) that an employee maintenance room in a garage beneath a senior living facility does not qualify as an inhabited dwelling house within the meaning of first-degree burglary under California law; and 2) that the Court abused discretion by refusing to dismiss Petitioner‘s prior strike in sentencing and sentencing him to a “middle term” under California law. (ECF No. 20-2.)
Regarding his claim based upon the failure to dismiss the prior strike, nowhere in his argument to the California Supreme Court did Petitioner put the Court on notice that he was bringing a claim for violation of his Constitutional rights.14 (Id. at 24-36). With respect to this argument, then, Petitioner did not sufficiently put the California Supreme Court on notice that his federal rights were allegedly violated, and that claim cannot be considered exhausted. Peterson v. Lampert, 319 F.3d 1153, 1156-57 (9th Cir. 2003); Rose, 455 U.S. at 516-22.
Moreover, the claims in the instant Petition do not align with those brought in state court. In his state appeal, Petitioner argued that a prior strike should have been discounted due to mitigating factors and a lack of aggravating factors and that the trial judge abused its discretion by acting otherwise. (ECF No 20-2. at 32-35.) Nowhere does he argue that the underlying previous offense never occurred, or that it was entered into the record in
violation of the rules of evidence or procedure. (Id.) In his federal Petition, however,
b. The State Habeas Petitions Do Not Exhaust Petitioner‘s State Remedies
Petitioner filed, in addition to his direct appeal, two state habeas petitions in the Superior Court and one in the California Court of Appeal, as discussed above. However, Petitioner did not file any habeas petitions in the California Supreme Court. Instead, Petitioner abandoned his first habeas claim after the Superior Court denied it and filed his second only in the Superior Court and in the Court of Appeal for review. To meet exhaustion requirements with these petitions, Petitioner must have presented them to the highest state court for review before filing a federal petition. Baldwin, 541 U.S. at 29; Peterson, 319 F.3d at 1156; Rose, 455 U.S. at 516-22. Because Petitioner did not file any habeas petition in the California Supreme Court, none of his state habeas petitions can exhaust his claims.
B. Statute of Limitations
Respondent argues that Petitioner‘s federal Petition is untimely, and thus the Court should dismiss it. (ECF No. 22-1 at 11-16.) Specifically, Respondent argues that the one-year statute of limitations imposed by
i. Legal Standard
“State prisoners have one year from the date on which their convictions became final to commence federal habeas corpus proceedings.” Wixom v. Washington, 264 F.3d 894, 895 (9th Cir. 2001);
- the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;
- the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;
- the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or
- the date on which
the factual predicate оf the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.
For purposes of
To instead rely on a starting date under
“Section 2244(d)(1)(D)18 provides a petitioner with a later accrual date than section 2244(d)(1)(A) only if vital facts could not have been known by the datе the appellate process ended.” Ford v. Gonzalez, 683 F. 3d 1230, 1235 (9th Cir. 2012) (internal quotations omitted). In such circumstance, “[t]he statute of limitations begins to run . . . when the factual predicate of a claim could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence, not when it actually was discovered.” Id. “Due diligence does not require the maximum feasible diligence, but it does require reasonable diligence in the circumstances.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). A petitioner, however, need not know the legal significance of the missing facts before the statute of limitations begins to run—the petitioner need only have known (or been able to discover) the facts. See Davis v. Madden, No. 22-cv-0951-LL-MDD, 2023 WL 2087969, at *7 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 17, 2023), R. & R. adopted, No. 22-cv-51-LL-DDL, 2023 WL 3818358 (S.D. Cal. Jun. 5, 2023) (citing Hasan v. Galaza, 254 F.3d 1150, 1154 n.3 (9th Cir. 2001)).
ii. Analysis
Respondent asks the Court to find that the statute of limitations in the instant case is
First, Respondent argues that no state action impeded Petitioner‘s ability to file a Petition such that
Second, Respondent argues that Petitioner does not raise claims based on discovery of new facts so as to trigger
Having determined that neither
C. Tolling
i. Statutory Tolling
As discussed above, absent tolling, the statute of limitations began to run on
expired before he filed his second state habeas petition, and the second petition‘s filing cannot “resurrect” the statute of limitations. (Id. at 14-15.)
ii. Legal Standard
The one-year statute of limitations is tolled for “[t]he time during which a properly filed application for [s]tate post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending.”
An application is “properly filed” and tolls the limitation рeriod when it complies with the applicable “laws and rules governing filings” including those regarding “the court and office in which it must be lodged.” Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4, 8 (2000). An application accepted by “the clerk of a court lacking jurisdiction . . . will be pending, but not properly filed.” Id. at 9; see also Larry v. Dretke, 361 F.3d 890, 893 (5th Cir. 2004) (“a habeas petition filed in a court lacking jurisdiction to consider the application is not ‘properly filed[.]‘“); Satterfield v. Johnson, 434 F.3d 185, 191-92 (3rd Cir. 2006);
A petition is still “properly filed,” however, if it meets the applicable laws and rules which allow the Court to hear the case, even if the relief sought is unavailable. See Artuz, 531 U.S. at 10-11; Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 417 (2005) (“[f]or purposes of determining what are ‘filing’ conditions, there is an obvious distinction between time limits, which go to the very initiation of a petition and a court‘s ability to consider that petition, and the type of ‘rule of decision’ procedural bars at issue in Artuz, which go to the ability to obtain relief.“) (partially superseded on other grounds); Ramirez, v. Yates, 571 F.3d 993, 999 (9th Cir. 2009); Dictado v. Ducharme, 244 F.3d 724, 726-27 (9th Cir. 2001) (bar to successive state personal restraint petitions was a “condition to obtaining relief” and
a. Analysis
1) Petitioner‘s First State Habeas Petition
Respondent argues that, because Petitioner‘s first state habeas petition was denied, in part, based upon “lack of jurisdiction” to resentence him (ECF No. 20-5 at 3), his petition was not properly filed per Artuz and Pace and therefore ineligible to toll the statute of limitations. (ECF No. 22-1 at 14.) The Court disagrees. As discussed above, a petition is properly filed if it meets all the requirements—including jurisdictional requirements for the Court to hear the case and does not fail to toll the statute of limitations merely because the relief sought is procedurally barred. See Artuz, 531 U.S. at 10-11; Pace, 544 U.S. at 417; Dictado v. Ducharme, 244 F.3d 724, 726-27 (9th Cir. 2001) (bar to successive state personal restraint petitions was a “condition to obtaining relief” and not a “condition to filing“) (abrogated on other grounds by Pace, 544 U.S. at 417); Harris, 282 Fed. Appx. at 241-42; Thibodeaux, 2011 WL 3860460 at *2; see also Ramirez, 571 F.3d at 999.
For example, in Dictado, the Court held that though the Washington Supreme Court dismissed Petitioner‘s petition, in part, because it was successive and thus procedurally barred, that petition was still “properly filed.” Dictado, 244 F.3d at 726-27. While the state statute “disfavored” successive petitions, the Court was still permitted to hear them on the merits. Id. Therefore, petitions in violation “will not be successful, but they have been properly delivered and accepted so long as the filing conditions have been met.” Id. (quoting Artuz, 531 U.S. at 10-11.)
Likewise, in Thibodeaux, the Court held that a mandamus petition filed in state court was properly filed for the purposes of statutory tolling, despite the state court‘s having dismissed it due to the court‘s lack of jurisdiction to grant the specific relief requested. Thibodeaux, 2011 WL 3860460 at *1-2. Though the Court was not permitted to grant the
Here, the dismissal due to the court‘s inability to grant Petitioner‘s sentencing relief in his initial state court habeas petition is analogous to the petitioners’ situations in Dictado and Thibodeaux. As with those petitions, it was the relief Petitioner sought—resentencing—that was barred and led to denial, not Petitioner‘s failure to meet the requirements for filing. The same is true as to the Superior Court‘s denying Petitioner‘s state habeas claim based on the “general rule . . . that habeas corpus cannot serve as a substitute for an appeal, and that matters that could have been, but were not, raised on a timely appeal from a judgment . . . are not cognizable on habeas corpus in the absence of special circumstances . . .” (ECF No. 20-5 at 3 (quoting In re Clark, 855 P.2d 729 (Cal. 1993) (superseded by statute on other grounds).) Here, as with the rule against successive petitions addressed in Dictado, the rule is not a filing condition but instead a rule of decision creating a procedural bar to relief. See Dictado, 244 F.3d at 726-27; In re Clark, 855 P.2d at 737-41 (discussing bars to habeas claims in California State Court) (superseded on other grounds).
Petitioner‘s state court petition met all laws and rules for filing, “in that it was timely, formatted in an acceptable manner, and filed in a court with jurisdiction to consider the petition (even if it lacked jurisdiction to grant the relief requested),” and thus “properly filed” to toll the statute of limitations. Harris, 282 Fed. Appx. at 241-42 (citing Artuz, 531 U.S. at 8.) Accordingly, Petitioner‘s first state petition was properly filed and tolled the statute of limitations while pending.
The decision in Petitioner‘s habeas case was final—and therefore stopped tolling the statute of limitations—on the date the decision was filed: December 28, 2021. See
2. Petitioner‘s Later State Habeas Petitions
After the Superior Court denied Petitioner‘s first state habeas petition, 358 days expired un-tolled before he filed his second, consuming all but 7 days of the one-year limitation period. (See ECF No. 20-6 at 1.) The Superior Court then denied his second state petition as untimely.20 (ECF No. 20-7 at 6-7.) Because it was found untimely, this second Superior Court petition could not toll the statute of limitations between the first petition‘s denial and the second petition‘s filing, nor the time during which the second petition was pending—despite the Superior Court‘s alternative merits finding. Banjo v. Ayers, 614 F.3d 964, 968-69 (9th Cir. 2010); Pace, 544 U.S. at 412-417 (holding explicitly that timeliness is a filing condition, not merely a bar to relief sought); Carey, 536 U.S. at 226; Kistler, 2023 WL 2394639 at *3.
Because the clock began to run again on December 29, 2021, after the first petition was denied, and because the second petition had no tolling effect, the last day for Petitioner to file this federal habeas petition was December 20, 2022, absent equitable tolling. The
iii. Equitable Tolling
a. Legal Standard
“Equitable tolling is available . . . only when extraordinary circumstances beyond a prisoner‘s control make it impossible to file a petition on time and the extraordinary circumstances were the cause of [the] untimeliness.” Ford, 683 F.3d at 1237 (emphasis original). “To equitably toll AEDPA‘s one-year statute of limitations, [t]he petitioner must establish two elements: (1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstances stood in his way. The prisoner must show that the extraordinary circumstances were the cause of his untimeliness.” Bryant, 499 F.3d at 1061 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted); Ford, 683 F.3d at 1237; see Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 649 (2010). “The diligence required for equitable tolling purposes is reasonable diligence, not maximum feasible diligence.” Ford, 683 F.3d at 1237. A petitioner bears the burden of demonstrating that equitable tolling is appropriate. Gaston, 417 F.3d at 1034 (opinion modified on other grounds).
b. Analysis
Further, even if Petitioner had at times been diligent in pursuing his rights, the unexplained and nearly year-long period between his first state habeas petition‘s denial and the filing of his second petition undermines any claim of diligence. Having presented neither an argument that extraordinary circumstances affected his filing nor a convincing presentation of diligence in pursuing his rights, Petition has not established that he qualifiеs for equitable tolling.
With no equitable tolling available, and insufficient statutory tolling to render his federal petition timely, the Court recommends that Judge Lopez find that the statute of limitations bars Petitioner‘s Petition and GRANT Respondent‘s Motion to Dismiss.
IV. PETITIONER‘S MOTION TO EXPAND THE RECORD
Also before the Court is Petitioner‘s Motion to Expand the Record. (ECF No. 33.)
a. Legal Standard
Under Rule 5(c) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts, within an Answer, the respondent must “. . . indicate what transcripts (of pretrial, trial, sentencing, or post-conviction proceedings) are available, when they can be furnished, and what proceedings have been recorded but not transcribed. The respondent must attach to the answer parts of the transcript that the respondent considers relevant.” R. Governing § 2254, R. 5(c). The Court, upon its own motion or Petitioner‘s request, has discretionary power to order that Respondent “furnish other parts of existing transcripts or that parts of untranscribed recordings be transcribed and furnished. If a transcript cannot be obtained, the respondent may submit a narrative summary of the evidence.” Id. Additionally, under Rule 7 of the Rules Governing § 2254 cases, “[i]f the petition is not dismissed, the judge may direct the parties to expand the record by submitting additional materials relating to the petition.” R. Governing § 2254, R. 7(a).
b. Analysis
Additionally, Respondent has lodged all documents it deems relevant to the Court with its Motion to Dismiss, pursuant to the Court‘s order. (ECF No. 10 at 2; ECF No. 20.) Petitioner has not presented any argument or assertion that the lodged documents are incomplete or insufficient to address the Motion to Dismiss. Therefore, the Court recommends the Motion to Expand the Record be denied—as moot if Judge Lopez adopts the recommendations herein and as premature if Judge Lopez allows the Petition to proceed to the answer stage.
VI. CONCLUSION
IT IS ORDERED that no later than October 21, 2024, any party to this action may file written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document should be captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.”
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to any objections shall be filed with the district court and served on all parties no later than November 4, 2024. The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise those objections on appeal of the Court‘s order. See Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 1991).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: September 30, 2024
Hon. Jill L. Burkhardt
United States Magistrate Judge