LAMARIS GRIER v. THE STATE
S19A0634
Supreme Court of Georgia
May 20, 2019
305 Ga. 882
MELTON, Chief Justice.
FINAL COPY
below, we affirm.
1.
In the light most favorable to the verdict, the record show that, on October 4, 2013, Grier shot and killed Jerry Grier (Jerry)2 and Jamanius Mills at Jerry’s DeKalb County residence. Around 8:30 that morning, Jerry’s girlfriend, Shaquila Bryant, stopped by Jerry’s house and saw Grier sitting on the couch inside Jerry’s room. About two hours later, Jerry’s friend, Ty Tukes, stopped by to purchase some marijuana from Jerry at the same time that Mills was walking up to the house. When Tukes and Mills entered the house, Grier and Jerry were on the couch in Jerry’s room playing a video game, and there was a bundle of cash on the TV stand. Tukes asked if the men were betting, and Grier said they were and that he was losing. Jerry was known to be very good at video games and would often bet with others on the outcome of the games. After talking to the men briefly about the game, Tukes purchased marijuana from Jerry, and left the house around 10:45 a.m. Some time shortly after Tukes left, Grier
Police were called to the scene around 6:30. that evening when Jerry’s younger sister discovered Jerry’s and Mills’s dead bodies. Both men were shot twice and died of gunshot wounds to the head. The police recovered four cartridge casings and two bullet fragments consistent with being fired from a Glock .40-caliber handgun.3 The police also observed that Jerry’s and Mills’s pants pockets were turned inside out, and there were no signs of forced entry into the house.
Both Tukes and Bryant testified that, when they saw Grier’s
Grier contends that there was insufficient evidence to convict him of the crimes for which he was found guilty. We disagree and find the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to enable the jury to find Grier guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimes given Grier’s admission that he “offed” the victims, cell phone location evidence corroborating his admission, Grier’s presence alone with the victims shortly before they were killed, and evidence that Grier
2.
Grier contends that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to object to certain testimony by witnesses regarding the ultimate issue of guilt and failing to object to a comment referring to evidence admitted under
[t]hat the performance of his lawyer was professionally deficient and that he was prejudiced as a result. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668, 687 (104 SCt 2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984). To prove deficient performance, [Grier] must show that his trial counsel
acted or failed to act in an objectively unreasonable way, considering all of the circumstances and in light of prevailing professional norms. See Lupoe v. State, 300 Ga. 233, 239-240 (794 SE2d 67) (2016). To prove resulting prejudice, [Grier] must show a reasonable probability that, but for [trial] counsel’s deficiency, the result of the trial would have been different. Id. at 240. In examining an ineffectiveness claim, a court need not address both components of the inquiry if the defendant makes an insufficient showing on one. Id., citing Strickland, 466 U. S. at 697.
(Punctuation omitted.) Stuckey v. State, 301 Ga. 767, 771 (2) (804 SE2d 76) (2017). We conclude that Grier cannot meet this burden with regard to either of his claims.
(a) First, Grier argues that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to object to McDowell’s, Tukes’s, and Gibson’s “opinions” that Grier killed Jerry and Mills because this testimony invaded the jury’s province and commented upon the ultimate issue. During trial, Tukes testified that when Grier’s picture was shown during news coverage of the shooting, he thought to himself that “this must be the guy that killed [Jerry].” Gibson then testified that when he and McDowell went to Jerry’s house later that night after learning of his death, Gibson said to himself “[Grier] killed [Jerry],” based on
We find that the ineffective assistance claim relating to Gibson’s testimony is waived because Grier failed to allege the error, as it relates to Gibson’s testimony, during his motion for new trial.4 Williams v. Moody, 287 Ga. 665, 666 (1) (697 SE2d 199) (2010) (“In order to avoid a waiver of a claim of ineffective assistance against trial counsel, the claim must be raised at the earliest practicable moment, and that moment is before appeal if the opportunity to do so is available.”) (Citation and punctuation omitted.). Where, as here, appellate counsel raised other ineffective assistance claims during the motion for new trial, he had the opportunity to raise a claim against trial counsel for failing to object to Gibson’s testimony as well. Hayes v. State, 262 Ga. 881, 882 (2) (426 SE2d 886) (1993)
As to the remaining claims, trial counsel’s failure to object was not ineffective assistance of counsel. Both Tukes’s and McDowell’s opinions that Grier must have been the one to kill the victims were “rationally based on [their] perception and helpful to understanding [their] testimony.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) United States v. Campo, 840 F3d 1249, 1266 (11th Cir. 2016). See
(b) Grier also contends that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to object when the prosecutor commented during closing argument on other acts evidence that negatively reflected upon Grier’s character. During a pre-trial hearing, the State sought to introduce evidence of Grier’s prior guilty plea convictions for armed robbery and aggravated assault, as well as testimony of the victim
PROSECUTOR: So, what you’re dealing with when you’re saying do I have a man who could, with intent, shoot two individuals? And the answer is yes, you can because Johnny Webb told you I’m coming back from a bar. [Grier] puts me on the ground. He’s robbing me and he shoots me not once, not twice, but three times. That’s not disputed. [Grier] says yes, I did it. He pled to it. So, if you have any doubt that this be the man that could form the intent because you’re robbing someone . . . we have here is that not just tied to [Grier], but how [Grier] would use a gun.
Even assuming that Grier were able to establish that counsel performed deficiently by not objecting, he has not demonstrated prejudice. Stuckey, supra, 301 Ga. at 771 (2). Given the evidence against Grier, as discussed in Division 2 (a), supra, and in light of the fact that the jury had already heard the Rule 404 (b) evidence during trial, the trial court had instructed the jury on the limited
3.
Grier contends that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct requiring reversal of the convictions when he told the jury to consider the other acts evidence for impermissible purposes during closing argument. However, in the absence of any objection during the proceedings regarding the misconduct, this allegation of error is not properly before our Court for review, and is thus waived. Ford v. State, 298 Ga. 560, 562 (2) (783 SE2d 906) (2016) (“The contemporaneous objection rule cannot be avoided by characterizing trial occurrences as examples of prosecutorial misconduct.”) (Citation and punctuation omitted.). See also Duvall v. State, 290 Ga. 475, 476 (2) (a) (722 SE2d 62) (2012) (defendant’s claim of prosecutorial misconduct cannot be raised for the first time on
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.
Decided May 20, 2019.
Murder. DeKalb Superior Court. Before Judge Jackson.
Dell Jackson, for appellant.
Sherry Boston, District Attorney, Harry S. Ruth, Deborah D. Wellborn, Assistant District Attorneys; Christopher M. Carr, Attorney General, Patricia B. Attaway Burton, Deputy Attorney General, Paula K. Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Vanessa T. Sassano, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
