Gregory D. LAVITT and Debra C. Lavitt, Appellants (Defendants), v. Harry E. STEPHENS, Appellee (Plaintiff).
No. S-14-0190
Supreme Court of Wyoming.
April 15, 2015
2015 WY 57
[¶ 18] The district court‘s observation that the railroad was merely a “mechanism” for Ms. Greenmeyer to receive payments is also consistent with our characterization of a division of retirement benefits under the
[¶ 19] One additional argument made by Mr. Greenmeyer merits attention. The district court ordered him to pay four years’ worth of retirement benefits to Ms. Greenmeyer, with a resulting judgment of more than thirty thousand dollars. He asserts that this decision “raises the specter of [a party] sitting on her rights for an even longer period of time,” resulting in an extremely large judgment and “a vast amount of uncertainty.” We understand these concerns, but also recognize that a party who sits on her rights too long may find her claims barred by laches, estoppel, or other defenses. In the Young case, for example, the applicable statute of limitations barred Ms. Young from recovering royalty payments made to Mr. Young more than four years prior to her filing suit. Id., 709 P.2d at 1260.
[¶ 20] Mr. Greenmeyer‘s district court pleadings contain no mention of these defenses. Laches was mentioned briefly during the hearing, but the district court found “no laches.” Mr. Greenmeyer has not challenged this aspect of the district court‘s decision. We need not consider the application of these defenses in the present appeal.
[¶ 21] We find no abuse of discretion and affirm the district court‘s order.
Representing Appellee: Frank J. Jones, Wheatland, Wyoming.
Before BURKE, C.J., and HILL, KITE, DAVIS, and FOX, JJ.
FOX, Justice.
[¶ 1] In an earlier proceeding which we affirmed on appeal, the district court determined that the appellee, Harry E. Stephens, forfeited a legally enforceable easement across the property of the appellants, Gregory D. Lavitt and Debra C. Lavitt (Lavitts). Thereafter, Mr. Stephens petitioned the district court to condemn a private road to his landlocked property, proposing a route crossing the Lavitts’ property identical to the easement that had been terminated. The district court dismissed the Lavitts from the private road action, finding that Mr. Stephens had created his own lack of access. The Lavitts requested that the district court impose sanctions against Mr. Stephens and his attorney and award them costs and attorney‘s fees for bringing a second private road
ISSUES
[¶ 2] 1. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it declined to award costs and attorney‘s fees to the Lavitts pursuant to
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it declined to impose sanctions against Mr. Stephens and his attorney pursuant to
FACTS
[¶ 3] We considered the first chapter of this road easement dispute in Stephens v. Lavitt, 2010 WY 129, 239 P.3d 634 (Wyo. 2010). The Lavitts and Mr. Stephens own mountain property near one another in Albany County, Wyoming. Id. at ¶ 3, 239 P.3d at 636. In 2007, Mr. Stephens filed a petition with the Board of County Commissioners of Albany County (Board) requesting that the Board condemn a private road to provide Mr. Stephens access to his land-locked property. In his petition, Mr. Stephens named the Lavitts as affected parties, and proposed a route traversing their property.
[¶ 4] Thereafter, Mr. Stephens commenced a declaratory judgment action in district court seeking a ruling that he held a valid easement across the Lavitts’ property.1 Stephens, 2010 WY 129, ¶ 4, 239 P.3d at 636. The district court determined that Mr. Stephens did hold a valid easement, but imposed conditions on Mr. Stephens’ use of the easement. Id. at ¶¶ 6-7, 239 P.3d at 636. Mr. Stephens repeatedly violated these conditions,2 which resulted in the district court finding that Mr. Stephens had forfeited the easement due to his own bad acts. Id. at ¶ 8, 239 P.3d at 637. In 2009, the district court terminated Mr. Stephens’ easement, and on appeal, we affirmed. Id. at ¶¶ 18, 22, 239 P.3d at 637, 640.
[¶ 5] In the meantime, prior to the district court‘s determination that Mr. Stephens forfeited the easement, the parties stipulated to a dismissal of the Lavitts from the private road action pending in front of the Board. After the district court‘s termination of Mr. Stephens’ easement, the private road action before the Board continued for nearly four years, until July 2013, when Mr. Stephens withdrew his application for a private road and the Board dismissed the proceeding.
[¶ 6] Mr. Stephens then filed a complaint in district court pursuant to
The court recognizes that there has been a prior action before the county commissioners in Albany County and that was dismissed and then the matter is raised in the district court. However, the change of process or procedure that the legislature enacted to the court‘s way of thinking is sufficient to not make this just a repetitive, redundant procedure. The legislature was really concerned about bringing these private road actions in the county commissioners forum instead of with the courts. So, the court doesn‘t find that this is just a redundant, repetitive action. The court also finds and recognizes that the remedy [terminating the easement] the court previously entered is a drastic, unique remedy and the application or non-application of private road availability was unknown.
The Lavitts appealed the district court‘s denial of their Rule 11 and Rule 41(d) motions.3
DISCUSSION
I. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it declined to award costs and attorney‘s fees to the Lavitts pursuant to W.R.C.P. 41(d) ?
[¶ 7] Because the award of costs4 under
[¶ 8] In construing rules of procedure, we apply the same guidelines as those we use when interpreting statutes. Busch v. Horton Automatics, Inc., 2008 WY 140, ¶ 13, 196 P.3d 787, 790 (Wyo. 2008). We first determine whether the statute or procedural rule is ambiguous. Id. If not, we interpret the plain language of the rule according to the “ordinary and obvious meaning of the words employed,” giving due regard to their arrangement and connection. Id.
[¶ 9]
If a plaintiff who has once dismissed an action in any court commences an action based upon or including the same claim against the same defendant, the court may make such order for the payment of costs of the action previously dismissed as it may deem proper and may stay the proceedings in the action until the plaintiff has complied with the order.
[¶ 10] Both parties agree that the Board is an “agency” as defined by the Wyoming Legislature. “‘Agency’ means any authority, bureau, board, commission, department, division, officer or employee of the state, a county, city or town or other political subdivision of the state, except the governing body of a city or town, the state legislature, the University of Wyoming and the judiciary [.]”
[¶ 11] The nature of the judicial branch when compared with administrative agencies further solidifies our conclusion that the term “court” and “agency” cannot be considered coextensive. The courts of our state are created and maintained as a separate, independent branch of government in accordance with the mandates of the Wyoming Constitution.
[¶ 12] The district court did not err in denying the Lavitts’ motion for costs and attorney‘s fees pursuant to
II. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it declined to impose sanctions against Mr. Stephens and his attorney pursuant to W.R.C.P. 11 ?
[¶ 13] We review a district court‘s decision on whether to impose Rule 11 sanctions under an abuse of discretion standard. Davis v. Big Horn Basin Newspapers, Inc., 884 P.2d 979, 983 (Wyo. 1994) (citing LC v. TL, 870 P.2d 374, 381 (Wyo. 1994)). Our touchstone inquiry in determining whether a court abused its discretion is whether the trial court could have reasonably concluded as it did. Dewey v. Dewey, 2001 WY 107, ¶ 18, 33 P.3d 1143, 1148 (Wyo. 2001); Vaughn v. State, 962 P.2d 149, 151 (Wyo. 1998).
[¶ 14] A Rule 11 analysis requires a two-step inquiry. First a court must determine whether there has been a violation of
[¶ 15]
By presenting to the court (whether by signing, filing, submitting, or later advocating) a pleading, written motion, or other paper, an attorney or unrepresented party is certifying that to the best of the person‘s knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances:
(1) It is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation;
(2) The claims, defenses, and other legal contentions therein are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law;
(3) The allegations and other factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified, are likely to have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery; and
(4) The denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence or, if specifically so identified, are reasonably based on a lack of information or belief.
The Lavitts contend that Mr. Stephens and his attorney violated
[¶ 16] We analyze each of the Rule 11(b) elements independently as “violation of any of them triggers the sanctions provisions of the rule.” 5A Charles A. Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 1335 (3d ed. 2004); see also Whitehead v. Food Max of Miss., Inc., 332 F.3d 796, 802 (5th Cir. 2003). We begin with the Lavitts’ contention that Mr. Stephens and his attorney violated
[¶ 17] The private road statutes,
[¶ 18] One such substantive requirement, which remained unchanged with the 2013 amendments, is that a private road action be commenced in good faith. In Mayland v. Flitner, 2001 WY 69, 28 P.3d 838 (Wyo. 2001), we found that good faith in bringing a private road action is an “essential prerequisite.” Id. at ¶ 13, 28 P.3d at 843. The logical reverse of this requirement is that an applicant who acts in bad faith is precluded from5 bringing a private road action. In Mayland, a respondent to a petition for a private road argued that the applicant had not brought the private road action in good faith because he had blocked a road to his land-locked property, thus causing his own lack of access. Id. at ¶¶ 17-18, 28 P.3d at 845. We found that the county commissioners in that case implicitly determined that the applicant acted in good faith in bringing the private road action because the commissioners found that a private road was necessary. Id. at ¶ 19, 28 P.3d at 846.
Although the County Commissioners did not specifically find “good faith,” they likewise did not find “bad faith.” The requisite “good faith” is apparent and incorporated in the statutory language referenced in Finding No. 12, “[the applicant] has demonstrated that the private road for which this application is filed is necessary.” Had [the respondent] sufficiently established his claim of bad faith [based on the applicant causing his own lack of access], this finding could not have been made because it would not have been supported by the record. We conclude the record sufficiently demonstrates the “good faith” of the applicant as anticipated in Dunning [v. Ankney, 936 P.2d 61, 65 (Wyo. 1997)].
Id. We also recognized that an applicant acts in bad faith when he causes his own lack of access, and that bad faith precludes a person from petitioning for a private road. Id. at ¶ 13. We have steadfastly adhered to our ruling that a private road action be commenced in good faith, despite numerous amendments to the private road statutes. Voss v. Albany Cnty. Comm‘rs, 2003 WY 94, ¶ 25, 74 P.3d 714, 722 (Wyo. 2003); Wagstaff v. Sublette Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Comm‘rs, 2002 WY 123, ¶ 12, 53 P.3d 79, 82-83 (Wyo. 2002); Mayland, 2001 WY 69, ¶ 13, 28 P.3d at 843; Martens v. Johnson Cnty. Bd. of Comm‘rs, 954 P.2d 375, 380 (Wyo. 1998); Dunning v. Ankney, 936 P.2d 61, 65 (Wyo. 1997); McGuire v. McGuire, 608 P.2d 1278, 1286 (Wyo. 1980). While we have not yet had the opportunity to address our good faith requirement in light of the 2013 amendments,
[¶ 19] We turn to the question of whether Mr. Stephens or his attorney violated the provisions of Rule 11(b)(2) in commencing a second private road action in district court. According to Rule 11(b)(2), Mr. Stephens’ complaint in district court must be warranted by: (1) the existing substantive law; or (2) a nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification or reversal of the existing substantive law; or (3) a nonfrivolous argument for the establishment of new substantive law.
[¶ 20] There is no question that Mr. Stephens caused his own lack of access in this case. Mr. Stephens admitted to as much in his complaint for a private road filed in district court. In Mayland we determined that good faith is an “essential prerequisite” to bringing a private road action, and a party acts in bad faith when he causes his own lack of access. Mayland, 2001 WY 69, ¶¶ 13, 19, 28 P.3d at 843, 845-46. Thus, Mr. Stephens’ claims are not supported by existing law because he was precluded from bringing a private road action by his own bad faith. See
[¶ 21] The district court determined that the drastic remedy imposed in terminating Mr. Stephens’ easement created uncertainty in whether Mr. Stephens could petition for a private road, and that Mr. Stephens and his attorney acted reasonably and in a nonfrivolous manner in filing the complaint in district court. We cannot say that the district court acted unreasonably in coming to this conclusion. Vaughn, 962 P.2d at 151. Forfeiture of an easement based on misuse is a drastic remedy, and this case presents the Court with a unique circumstance. See Stephens, 2010 WY 129, ¶¶ 20, 21, 239 P.3d at 640 (recognizing that forfeitures are generally abhorred, and that termination of the easement was an “onerous” remedy). We have a “long established public policy against landlocking property and rendering it useless.” In re Private Road ex rel. Cross, 2013 WY 79, ¶ 24, 304 P.3d 932, 938 (Wyo. 2013). In Mr. Stephens’ appeal challenging the district court‘s decision to terminate the easement, we recognized, in dicta, that Mr. Stephens’ property would not be land-locked, stating, “Mr. Stephens can still access his property by using the Mart Miller Road.” Stephens, 2010 WY 129, ¶¶ 21, 22, 239 P.3d at 640. Additional proceedings following that appeal have revealed that Mr. Stephens does not, in fact, have another legally enforceable route to access his property. Thus, once the district court terminated Mr. Stephens’ easement, his property became land-locked. It was therefore, arguably, unclear which policy consideration—the reluctance to land-lock property or the requirement that applications be brought in good faith—would prevail in a situation such as this. The district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that there was uncertainty in the law under these circumstances.
[¶ 22] The Lavitts also argued that Mr. Stephens and his attorney violated
[¶ 23] The district court determined that Mr. Stephens’ voluntary dismissal of his first private road action and commencement of a second in district court was not frivolous because “the change of process or procedure that the legislature enacted to the court‘s way of thinking is sufficient to not make this just a repetitive, redundant procedure.” Again, we cannot find that the district court acted unreasonably in concluding as it did. The legislature did, indeed, change the forum in which a private road action could be commenced with its 2013 amendments to the private road statutes.
[¶ 24] The district court‘s decision to not impose sanctions was based on its finding that the complaint filed by Mr. Stephens in district court was not frivolous, and as a result, there was no violation of
CONCLUSION
[¶ 25] We find that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied the Lavitts’ motion for costs and attorney‘s fees pursuant to