Bennie Whitehead v. Food Max of Mississippi, Inc., Kmart Corporation v. Paul S. Minor

bearing apportionment on nation has However,

liability. liability no CANE RIVER

placed today, that decision affirm we

issue is moot.

CONCLUSION carefully reviewed the record of

Having parties’ respective brief-

this case and above, set forth the reasons

ing, and for court’s that the district orders

we conclude parts except all

should AFFIRMED be dealing with the claimants’ portion

for that wages. part As to that

past lost

order, and REMAND so we REVERSE may enter a dam-

that the district court

ages reflecting stipulated amount Texaco, previ- which were paid

amounts

ously excluded. part

AFFIRMED in REVERSED part. REMANDED in WHITEHEAD;

Bennie Plaintiffs, al.,

et

v. MISSISSIPPI, MAX OF

FOOD

INC.; al., Defendants, et Corporation, Defendant-

Appellee,

v. Minor, Appellant.

Paul S.

No. 00-60153. Appeals, States Court of

United

Fifth Circuit.

May 2003.

Rehearing July Denied

ble discretion imposing sanctions for Minor’s violation of Rule (“improp- execution). purpose” er in obtaining writ of The district court acted within its discre- tion. AFFIRMED.

I. In May the district court entered approximate million judgment for $3.4 against Minor’s clients Corporation Kmart in an arising action out of heinous acts two individuals associated with Kmart: their abduction of a mother and her daughter from a parking Kmart lot in Jackson, Mississippi, subsequent and the rape of jury the mother. A found Kmart Luther T. (argued), Munford Ross F. negligent failing provide adequate Bass, Jr., Dunbar, Jackson, MS, Phelps for parking security. lot See Whitehead v. Appellant. Miss., Inc., Food Max 163 F.3d 265 of Cir.1998). Haycraft (argued),

Don Keller Khristina Miller, Lewis, DeLuna Liskow & New Or- trial, $1,000 At Minor was sanctioned leans, LA, Defendant-Appellee. violating, during closing argument, his an warning by

earlier the district court. Id. at 277 n. 3. This followed Minor’s refusals during trial to follow other court instruc- tions. See id. at 276-77. KING, JOLLY, Before Judge, Chief In June shortly entry after HIGGINBOTHAM, DAVIS, JONES, judgment, Kmart moved for a remittitur SMITH, WIENER, BARKSDALE, or, alternatively, new trial. See Fed. R. GARZA, DeMOSS, EMILIO M. addition, In pursuant Civ. P. 59. to Feder-

BENAVIDES, STEWART, DENNIS, and 62(b), al Rule of Civil Procedure it request- CLEMENT, Judges.1 Circuit stay judgment ed a of execution of pending BARKSDALE, RHESA HAWKINS post-trial resolution of those motions. Judge: Circuit decided, stay That motion was not howev- er, August, until 18 when the Rule 59 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Proce- accompanying motions were denied. The dure sanctioned Paul stay Minor, motion was then dismissed as moot. attorney, S. an obtaining writ day, That same the district court judgment. primary execute The denied reason $1,000 request for our en banc review is to decide wheth- reconsider the er the district court abused imposed its considera- sanctions at trial. Prado, Judge joined ticipate who our court subse- this decision. quent argument, par- to en banc oral did not later, charged Kmart Minor had violated using a handwritten days

Three ten-day stay execution of automatic signed, Minor obtained request he had judgment, pursuant claimed to be effect court clerk a writ from the district 62(f), Procedure (the writ). to Federal Rule Civil In judgment execution for the Rule of incorporated Mississippi which addition, the media about notified Minor 62(f) 62(a). Procedure Federal Civil repre- With media pending execution. provides: Mar- and two United States sentatives (the Stay According to State Law. ab- shals, entered lot) upon is a lien judgment state which a parking in its duction had occurred judgment debtor and property judgment by attempted to execute judgment in which the debtor is entitled registers in the cash seizing currency execution, stay judgment to a debt- delayed to allow The seizure was vault. entitled, or is in the district court held a chance to consult employees Kmart’s therein, stay to such as would be accord- attorneys; management their had the action ed the debtor thereafter, stayed by it was shortly been maintained in the courts No cash was seized. district court. state. Kmart, inter- at the Minor was While added). 62(f) (emphasis Fed R. P. Civ. media; by reports news about viewed 62(a) Mississippi provides part: Rule writ-execution, including Minor’s ex- Stay; Exceptions. Except Automatic tremely hyperbolic, intemperate, and mis- provid- as stated herein or as otherwise comments), (improper leading comments by by ed statute or order of the court media, were, in at among other broadcast shown, good for cause no execution shall reports. Minor char- least three television upon judgment a nor shall be issued “arrogan[tj” Kmart’s actions as acterized proceedings be taken for its enforce- Kmart “outrageous” and asserted and expiration days ment until ten nojt pay” judgment; claimed “wo[uld entry disposition its or the a after Kmart had been “warned” before the ab- trial, motion a new whichever last going like was duction that “an event [that] occurs. care”; happen” charged to but “didn’t his 62(a) added). P. Miss. R. Civ. by clients had been twice “victimized” pursuant Kmart maintained: to Missis- Kmart, by being once abducted there and 62(a), ten-day stay a sippi Rule is automat- paying just “not ... a once Kmart’s disposition ic in state court after of a new debt”; proclaimed and he was there to motion; therefore, application trial of that supposed ensure Kmart did what it to was rule, 62(f), through Federal Rule resulted do.2 stay August in a from the 18 denial of day, That court same the district held Kmart Kmart’s new trial motion. also as- Minor, with the Kmart parties: newspaper teleconference serted: with “numerous teams”, supersedeas was directed to submit a bond reporters and television interview (it so); justification, “paraded through later did and Kmart advised it and without in full against would seek sanctions Minor. view of customers and em- [Kmart] sanctions, ployees orchestrating] damage Kmart ... pursuant, soon moved alia, Kmart, goodwill”; to Rule 11. its and and his inter business least”, that, extremely regrettable light nique say 2. It is in the ... colorful to Dis [as] taste”, conduct, "perhaps poor especially at id. Minor's his sent comments, the dissent views "Minor’s tech at 815. by Rule court ruled on the sanctions mo- (proscribed purpose” “improper tion. 11(b)(1)) actions. obvious from these was copies were with the motion

Provided In a the court opinion, well-reasoned - newspapers from Jackson two articles prerequisite a motion concluded: is not a vid- city Mississippi another 62(f); stay to a under Federal Rule about of television broadcasts eotape Kmart protected by stay against includ- items attempted execution. These v. attempted execution. Whitehead improper comments. ed Minor’s Corp., 202 529-32 F.Supp.2d Kmart (S.D.Miss.1999). Concomitantly, the court responded: following denial Minor make concluded that Minor had “failed to motion, Kmart had new trial inquiry govern- a reasonable into the law 62(f), Rule Federal pursuant moved> ” ing judgments.... execution of Id. 62(a) stay; Mississippi Rule automatic The court also ruled Minor “was 532. therefore, stay effect. no had been and call at- seeking to embarrass [Kmart] Minor in the record indicates (Nothing tention to himself a tireless laborer judg- in district that the contended justice for his attempting the bar obtain against not constitute a lien ment did fact, when, in there was no basis client (one prerequisites of the property Kmart’s in fact or in law for the actions whatsoever 62(f) stay).) for a Federal ” Id. at taken.... seeking to obtain also contended: ap- pay Minor was ordered to not an portion $8,000 attorney’s fees proximately —its proscribed by improper purpose Although the execution. Id. opposing 11(b)(1); and, has “where action counsel’s requested public apology Kmart had law, a court a reasonable basis under determined, Minor, the district ” improper purpose.... will find an not publication of the sanc- agreed, exe- attempted Minor’s affidavit stated he (The opin- opinion tions would suffice. Id. portion cution in order obtain a 2002, published after rendition ion was (1) Kmart had not re- because: judgment for this panel opinion the of now-vacated concerning po- telephone calls turned his appeal.) (2) settlement; he was con- tential damages, the Following remand-trial Kmart, to be which he believed cerned the 11 sanctions. appealed Rule self-insured, posted supersedeas had not a 2002, reversed January panel a divided bond. Miss., v. Max them. Whitehead Food of (5th Cir.), Inc., by 277 F.3d 791 vacated delayed court apparently The district (en banc). (5th Cir.2002) F.3d 472 308 pending ruling on the sanctions motion (The majority included a district panel judgment from the appeal Kmart’s Politz, Judge Henry A. who judge and our underlying appeal, action. For that opinion. Politz died Judge authored the jury had influenced court held been deciding appeal to our to review this prior passion prejudice resulting from Mi- banc.) en closing argument; the action was nor’s early for a new trial on (objective remanded 1999 Rule rea- Regarding Whitehead, existing F.3d at damages. inquiry concerning See of sonableness 276-78, March, light law), matter majority That in the held: as a panel 62(f) (January law, oral Rule not afford briefing, argument extensive Federal does unless the 1998), analysis stay provided the au- state law painstaking 62(f), claiming motion construing debtor files a thority Federal Rule motion, stay cating) pleading, in ef- written or accordingly, no stay; certify- ... paper, attorney other an is fect; did not the record person’s writ, ing that to the best of the that, requesting the conclusion before information, belief, knowledge, inquiry make a reasonable Minor failed to inquiry an reasonable un- law. Id. at 794-96. governing into formed after circumstances,— der the 11(b)(1) (improper pur- Rule Concerning (1) being presented it is not majority held: Minor’s pose), panel as to harass improper purpose, such publicity pur- for the “intentional use unnecessary or delay or to cause embarrassing adversary” pose of litiga- increase in the cost of needless but, ex- inappropriate”', absent “patently tion; [and] circumstances, an ulterior motive ceptional (2) claims, defenses, le- and other not read into a document filed should be gal contentions are warranted therein “any purpose; and conse- legitimate for a by a by existing law or nonfrivolous ... from such be- quences that flow[ed] extension, argument modifica- havior” was a decision for state bar. tion, existing or reversal of law or the added). Id. at 796-97 of new law.... establishment urged that the district court The dissent added). 11(b) (emphasis R. P. Fed. Civ. concluding did not abuse its discretion satisfied; obligation Each must be viola- (2) (b)(1) and were independent subparts justifies tion of either sanctions. (Barksdale, at 797-802 each violated. Id. City Bogalusa, v. 168 F.3d Walker J., (b)(2), Regarding subpart dissenting). (5th Cir.1999). And, in determining the dissent stated: was compliance obligation, vel non with each had, decide, majority as the whether attorney “the standard under which an is trigger motion a Federal required objective, subjective, measured is an 62(f) stay; at issue was whether Mi- cir- standard reasonableness under the objectively nor’s were reasonable actions cumstances”. Childs v. State Farm Mut. existing legal authority; light of then Co., Auto. Ins. 29 F.3d and, As they were not. Id. at 800-802. Cir.1994). (b)(1), subpart the dissent stated: Mi- sanctions are reviewed “improper purpose” provided sepa- nor’s discretion, only e.g., for an abuse of Luli sanctions; they rate basis for the were Ltd., Servs., rama Inc. v. Axcess Broad. appropriate light in the of Minor’s media- Inc., (5th 872, Cir.1997), in 128 F.3d 884 actions, precisely type of conduct Rule cluding reviewing findings only factual designed remedy. 11 Id. at 802. is error, Smith, e.g., clear Crowe v. 261 F.3d panel rehearing. petitioned Cir.2001). (5th 558, 564 This abuse 2002, our court decided sua September necessarily very discretion standard is def banc, sponte thereby vacating to review en erential, for two reasons. (5th F.3d 472 panel opinion. 308 Cir. First, ‘[f]amiliar[ity] “based on its 2002) (en banc). litigants, with issues the district court is better situated than the court of II. appeals pertinent to marshal the facts and 11(b) pertinent provides apply fact-dependent legal standard part: Lulirama, Ltd., by mandated Rule 11’”. (whether

By by to the court at v. presenting (quoting 128 F.3d 884 Cooter & Gell 384, 402, Corp., 496 110 signing, filing, submitting, or later advo- Hartmarx U.S.

803 (1990); 2447, reconsidering already 110 L.Ed.2d 359 em- evidence and facts S.Ct. added). Mercury weighed also Air phasis See considered the district Mansour, 542, court; Inc. v. 237 F.3d 548 Group, it will also discourage litigants Cir.2001) (“the (5th imposition of sanctions marginal from pursuing appeals, thus inquiry, often a which is reducing the amount of satellite litiga- fact-intensive given the trial court is wide discretion” tion. added)). 404, 496 U.S. at 110 2447 (emphasis S.Ct. added).

Second, judge the district is inde maintaining pendently responsible review, For this deferential integrity judicial proceedings his necessarily “district court would abuse its and, concomitantly, must be accord if it ruling discretion based its on an erro authority. ed the clearly neous view of the law or on a Gell, 404, 496 at 110 Cooter & U.S. S.Ct. erroneous assessment of the evidence”. NASCO, 2447; Inc. v. Calcasieu Televi 405, “Generally, Id. 110 S.Ct. 2447. an Radio, Inc., 696, sion and 894 F.2d 702-03 only abuse of discretion occurs where no (5th Cir.1990) power inherent (discussing person reasonable could take the view court), sub nom. Chambers v. aff'd adopted by the trial court.” Friends for NASCO, Inc., 32, 2123, 501 111 U.S. S.Ct. Am. Free Enter. Ass’n v. Wal-Mart (1991). 115 27 L.Ed.2d Stores, Inc., 284 F.3d Cir. It was for these reasons that our 2002) (internal omitted; quotation empha Servs., Inc., Capital Security in Thomas v. added)3. sis (5th Cir.1988) (en banc), F.2d discretion, established abuse of rather than A. novo, our of review part de standard (b)(1) (2) Subparts of Rule 11 for Rule 11 sanctions. This was confirmed provide independent for sanctions. bases Gell, Supreme Court Cooter & The district court concluded Minor violat reasoning rings with partly true here: therefore, subpart; each ed nec policy goals also Rule ll’s essary to decide he violated one. whether adopting abuse-of-discretion stan- acquain- dard. The district court is best prac- litigation ted the local bar’s (b)(2) (objective Regarding subpart

tices and thus best situated to determine rea existing inquiry concerning when a sanction is warranted to serve sonableness of law), goal opposition affidavit specific general Rule ll’s (1) upon: deterrence. to the determi- sanctions stated he relied Van Deference Landsberg, F.Supp. nation courts on the lines Huss v. front (W.D.Mo.1967) (dictum; had cited litigation will enhance these courts’ in ability litigants opinion opposing to control this earlier Kmart’s before t 62(b) stay pend them. motion for Federal Rule Such will streamline deference (2) motions); litigation process by freeing appel- ing post-trial resolution of its duty reweighing late courts from the of Wright, Kane, Miller & Federal Practice court, court, decided 3. The dissent does not even mention the def- trict not this that Mi- and, (important erential to our standard review was violative of Rule 11 nor’s conduct ruling); appear discretion, nor does it to review the pursuant to its considerable im- sanctions under that deferential standard. In posed those sanctions. fact, forget appears it that it was the dis- (1995) (motion Minor, 532-33, § did not shelter id. at & Procedure stated; 62(f) should, must, stay Federal district court (3) filed); district court’s earlier be Additionally, has submitted [Kmart] (as moot) post-trial Kmart’s denial re- to this court several of the articles 62(b) stay. quest for the Federal in reports generated news which were authority, The district court ruled this the local press improper execu- against plain lan- juxtaposed when tion of in the instant case. It rules, did not guage clear unchallenged these sub- from objectively stay reasonable belief no missions that was seeking [Minor] Whitehead, in See effect. embarrass [Kmart] and call attention to F.Supp.2d at 528-32. aas tireless laborer the bar himself line, Along panel majority this attempting justice to obtain for his client whether, law, on as a matter of focused when, fact, there was no basis what- required stay; to invoke the motion is or in soever law the actions fact that, result, held that it was and no Thus, taken August 1997. this stay place protect Kmart from persuaded imposition court is that the Instead, panel execution. should have appropriate jus- sanctions in this case is belief addressed whether Minor’s was ob proper. tified and jectively reasonable time he re added). Id. at 533 As discussed Thomas, quested writ. (b)(1) infra, subpart “improper pur- (proper “snapshot” F.2d at 874 focus is pose” ruling is sufficient to sustain the signed). In instant when document sanctions. (b)(1) (2) event, subparts pro because sanctions, independent vide bases for it is Minor insists we must decide the sub- (b)(2) issue, part to decide whether asserting subpart the dis that the (b)(1) concerning ruling trict court abused its discretion is inextrica- (b)(2). whether, For subpart purposes deciding bly intertwined with sub- under (b)(2), whether sanctions could be based on sub- part objectively he had an reason- (b)(1), part we will assume Minor did not stay able belief that a did not exist. He (b)(2). subpart violate authority claims: there was even “[I]f did,

arguably supported what there [he] 2. was no basis for the sanctions motion”. determining After Minor failed to make support, Minor notes that the district inquiry (violating subpart reasonable improper purpose ruling court’s states Whitehead, (b)(2)), F.Supp.2d at 529- “there was no basis whatsoever fact or ” addressing why and then Rule ll’s law for [Minor’s] actions.... Id. at (c)(1)(A)) provision (subpart harbor” “safe 533.4 Likewise, correctly previ- dissent insists that these bases law states the test under that intertwined; rigid, paper grounded insists on several ous rule: where a was "well law”, step evaluation-process; erroneously by existing in fact and warranted sanc- "legitimate purpose” imposed only claims we attribute find- tions were under unusual cir- (Unlike ings appears to the district court. This view cumstances. the district pre-1993 ignores grounded por- to be based on a version of Rule 11. dissent the well in fact (now (b)(3) example, upon subparts For the dissent relies case law tion of the test version, (b)(4)) (b)(1) previous contending subparts that was decided under the (b)(2) intertwined.) separated suggest under which these bases were not We do not fact, specific, subparts. into enumerated That case that this case law is not instructive. In

805 [(a)] that, request] certifying tion to the generally, district It is true information, make attorneys knowledge, who not sanction best of his courts do A belief, district representations. a inquiry nonfrivolous formed after [reasonable] however, so, it is where may do [request] proper; ... attorney that an objectively ascertainable [(b)] requesting that the letter the lorit of an to the court for paper a submitted being presented any execution was not for 11(b)(1). improper purpose. Fed.R.Civ.P. as harass improper purpose, such Corp., Motor Sheets v. Yamaha (4) ....”; added); emphasis its then con- (5th Cir.1990); 533, Nat’l F.2d 537-38 891 cluding subpart Minor failed to make a Inc. v. Nat’l Employees, Ass’n Gov’t (b)(2) law, inquiry reasonable into the id. 216, Employees, Fed. 844 F.2d Fed’n of (5) 532; discussing at its then Cir.1988). (5th 224 532-33, provision, ll’s “safe harbor” id. (b)(1) making subpart improper before its instance,

Sheets, filing for held purpose ruling, id. at 533. To conclude harass motions could constitute excessive improper pur- otherwise would render the 11, if the by Rule even proscribed ment pose portion opinion superfluous. fact. law or motions were well-founded Moreover, subparts quite concern two legiti otherwise Filing F.2d at 538. 891 And, again, the different considerations. language mate that use abusive documents can improper purpose ruling fact-driven counsel could also violate opposing toward (as 728, if for our rule, Pierre, be sustained even we assume F.2d Coats v. (5th denied, Cir.), analysis) there were basis law cert. 498 U.S. (1990), obtaining 112 L.Ed.2d 44 as could Minor’s the writ. The two bases S.Ct. filing pleading a valid or motion without were not intertwined. it, Virgi pursue Cohen v.

sincere intent Co., 788 F.2d 247

nia Elec. & Power Cir.1986). may A district court sanction district court’s conclude that We attorney presenting paper to the ruling indepen- “improper purpose” “any improper purpose, court for such as concerning existing “inquiry dent from its 11(b)(1) (em to harass....” Fed.R.CivP. upon this the fol- ruling. law” We base added). Although a court is phasis (1) parties’ having lowing factors: motive into a docu not to read an ulterior purpose is- squarely placed improper law”, in fact and it grounded ment “well (2) court; its earlier sue before the district cases, may exceptional so in such as do (b)(1) in subpart quoting citation to all of this, objec where the 11(b) order, Whitehead, 202 in its Sheets, F.2d tively ascertainable. See (3) 1; F.Supp.2d subsequent at 526 n. its at 537-38. bases, in- specific enumeration of Rule (“Mi- The district cluding improper purpose, id. at 532 found improper purposes requesting had two presented nor to this court writ-execu- [a reason, might compel present form we cite of the same case Rule 11 in its for that some hand, revising improper purpose, this law does law. On the other case the test for subparts the dissent's view of adopted of the Rule. for the former version (b)(1) (b)(2) The as intertwined. struc- presented to our court. The issue was not (as 1993) ture of the current rule amended in Moreover, improper pur- the district court’s belies such notion. easily ruling, infra, pass pose discussed would event, employed dis- under the test purposes deciding muster appeal, is not to determine how sent. 806 (N.D.Ga.1988) Kmart;

the writ: to embarrass and to (attempt to coerce settle- Whitehead, promote himself. 202 proper), ment not Minor offered the fol- F.Supp.2d at 533. Part of our abuse of lowing explanation to the district court: he is to determine discretion review whether attempted Kmart, had to contact but it had ruling was ... the district court’s “based refused to return his telephone calls or clearly on a erroneous assessment of the case; therefore, speak to him about the he Gell, 405, 496 evidence”. Cooter & U.S. at was forced to take this drastic measure to 2447. Pursuant to the well- S.Ct. open lines of communication. known of review for clear error standard record, however, only The contains one non, may findings, vel disturb factual we requesting letter from Minor settlement choices, credibility only which often involve (3 1997, shortly discussions June before if a of all the review evidence leaves us motions). Kmart post-trial filed its That and firm with “the definite conviction that many letter does not reflect how calls were Feedlot, made”. mistake has been Tulia any event, made In Minor. his claim States, 800, Inc. v. United F.2d that Kmart all refused communication is denied, Cir.), 947, cert. 423 U.S. belied his letter: “I am sorry we have (1975). S.Ct. 46 L.Ed.2d 281 missing been each other I appreciate maintaining In legiti he had you returning my phone (Empha- calls ”. mate, improper, purposes, Minor of added.) sis fered two reasons to the district court for Minor’s letter states he attempting obtaining obtaining the writ: part of the to ascertain whether Kmart wished to en- clients; judgment trying for his gage in settlement post- discussions before force settlement. The factual findings re ing appeal At bond. the time of the lated to these two reasons were clearly letter, through mid-August, post- Kmart’s erroneous. trial) (e.g. trial motions for a new were Obviously, there would not have been pending. After the court ruled on the enough cash at local Kmart satisfy one motions, gave only Minor three judgment. addition, million In $3.4 days before attempting to execute. There execution unnecessary to secure the is no evidence that Minor attempted to judgment; constituted a lien contact Kmart during this three-day peri- against property Kmart’s Mississippi. Accordingly, od. it was not clearly errone- Again, nothing in the record indicates Mi reject ous for the district court to Minor’s nor disputed judg district court that the claim that he was forced to obtain the writ ment constituted such e.g., a lien. in order to initiate settlement discussion. 11-7-191; § see also Fed. Ann. Miss.Code 62(f). R.Civ.P. Minor notes that Kmart is addition, In clearly it was not erroneous this, course, currently bankruptcy; is for the by implication, irrelevant to purpose at the time find that neither of these claimed purposes 1997). question event, (August explained presence either Minor’s at the if even Minor’s were to ob execution or his collateral play. media tain portion judgment, the district The execution require did not Minor to clearly finding did not err accompany the two United Mar States separate, also had improper purposes. where, shals to (especially the Kmart Assuming arguendo here, that attempting to property the involved was well- see, obvious). force proper, known, settlement but open, and Fed. R. See Alexander, Elster v. 122 F.R.D. P. Civ. 69. See also FedeRal MooRe’s

807 (2002). And, in improper purpose obtaining § of his 69.02 PRACTICE—Civil Ivy certainly require Kimbrough, did not the me- writ. v. 115 execution (8th Cir.1997) (no improp- 550, the Kmart or the at presence dia’s F.3d 553 abuse of to the sanctions, Minor made there in imposing er comments discretion Rule 11 alia, where, media. inter “aimed conduct was “primarily the media” and for local media fact, dispute that does not he In Minor Tribe, consumption”); Kramer v. 156 that to Kmart or he intended embarrass (D.N.J.1994), opin F.R.D. 96 mthout recognition. aff'd seeking Most personal was ion, (3rd Cir.), denied, 52 F.3d 315 cert. are far regrettably, contends that these he 907, 274, 516 116 L.Ed.2d U.S. S.Ct. 133 pur- being improper from of an evidence (1995) Rule 11 (imposing sanctions be “[ajlmost (e.g., pose obtaining in writ cause, among things, giving other mislead attorney litigation in does everything an ing reports to media demonstrated im designed opponent ... to is embarrass purpose (including intent proper motives another”; “establishing a way in one or embarrass)). Again, to district representa- in the reputation success of, unchallenged videotape had an inter professional way tion is the most of clients alia, improper Minor’s comments. The It lawyer practice”). for a to build finding ... district court’s clear from “[i]t clearly for the district court erroneous unchallenged” newspaper articles and [the] goals to that of Minor’s intended find each videotape pur Minor had an improper purpose. improper of an evidence Whitehead, pose, F.Supp.2d at 533 is dif Claiming purpose to embarrass added), example is a classic (emphasis harass, to Minor seems to ferent than one own being pe “[h]oist Minor’s his that, explicitly Rule 11 contend because tard”. William act ShaKespeare, Hamlet harassment, to and because refers comments, pre improper sc. 4. Minor’s intent purpose, was not his his admitted to very he by entity served enlisted to improper purpose be an embarrass cannot promote embarrass Kmart and himself record, there is no under the rule. On this were, instead, arguably the evidence best these meaningful distinction between two obtaining in improper purpose of his light in the our purposes, especially writ. See, e.g., of review. deferential standard Flaherty Torquato, F.Supp. v. 59- court, raises, banc Before our en (W.D.Pa.1985) harass and (using embar time, for the first First Amendment con- in of Rule 11 interchangeably context rass regard improper to his siderations with discussion), by 800 improper purpose aff'd cited authority comments. No need be (3rd Cir.1986). Regardless, Mi F.2d 1133 that, does not the rule because the record nor Rule 11. misreads points that Minor raised these reflect assuming purpose Minor’s Even them we will not consider on not, essence, Kmart was embarrass event, pur- appeal. improper harass, ll’s improp- list of writ, not pose obtaining the vehicle illustrative; “to er ha- purposes is media) (such implement that as the used to possible improper is but rass” one purpose, by is what is decided 11(b)(1) (“any R. P. purposes. Fed. Civ. ap- sanctioning and reviewed ...” improper purpose, such as harass words, subpart peal. In other under added)). (b)(1), execution attempted issue; pur- Minor, underlying “improper his The media event orchestrated obtaining writ is. The collat- particular, objective pose” evidence constitutes play simply objec- eral media constitutes comparable conduct similarly others sit- improper purpose. tive evidence of that uated”. Fed.R.Civ.P. In addition 11(c)(2). to publishing opinion, its sanctions the dis- that, Finally, although Minor asserts his trict court limited the sanctions “the “civil”, may not have been is not conduct attorneys’ reasonable fees and other ex- civility maintains: sanctionable. He is penses incurred as a direct result of the “aspirational” beyond the of power and violation”, challenge id. Minor does not law; if to impose and our court wants aspect of the order. rules, civility adopt should we them. line, Along this Minor takes with any issue 4. suggestion opinion in the vacated panel sum, there was abuse no of conduct was unethical. See his White- discretion. The district court spoke with head, 277 F.3d at 796-97. He further counsel, Minor, including day on the contends: even if his conduct unethi- were quite incident and was with familiar cal, remedy appropriate would be re- parties and litigants. Minor’s execution ferral possible to the state bar for disci- attempt improper followed his conduct at pline, imposition of Rule 11 sanctions. Whitehead, trial. See 163 F.3d at 276-77 This issue is also raised for the first time 3;n. see also Fed. R. Civ. P. advisory on appeal. panel Because the vacated (“whether committee’s note [sanctionable opinion id., in part, addressed the issue see part pattern was activity, conduct] we it. will consider or an isolated event” is proper “[a] consid Minor again understates the se eration”). verity of his conduct and overlooks both Generally, writ-execution the pur- authority broad district court’s to im pose of satisfying judgment proper. is pose Rule 11 and sanctions our deferential conduct, however, exceptional. was standard of review. Whether Minor’s con Although it days three after dis- duct civility violated and ethics rules is for position post-trial motions, signifi- with event, act upon; others to his con cant remaining appeal time for Kmart to duct 11. violated Rule judgment post supersedeas and These categories mutually are not bond, Minor, obtaining after the execution example, advisory exclusive. For the rules writ: invited the media to one of Kmart’s committee has recognized that some over places of business to execute judgment in lap discipline exists between bar state and plain view Kmart’s customers em- sanctions; its to Rule 11 In against Kmart. their effort to declare

B. kind of behavior will not be ac- the and summary moves for reversal Minor by this short-cir- cepted they have Kmart, or against of sanctions imposition inquiry by cuited the mandated Rule and such sanc- fact-finding for remand for law, potentially and our own case far- with tions, contending: caused the at- Kmart reaching consequences. respectfully I dis- earlier, false re- execution tempted sent. it was self- during discovery that sponses evaluating imposi- a district court’s and, insured; of insur- had Minor known 11(b)(1), sanctions this tion of under Rule covering judgment, the he would ance generally circuits to and other look first (It appears to attempted have execute. court’s findings the district on whether self-insured, um- partly was with by existing was filing at issue warranted coverage.) brella for a argument or a nonfrivolous law was sought relief Minor’s motion The (as Rule change required by the law time, this for the first while requested, 11(b)(2)); on findings look next to motion, pending. In his appeal was an filing presented whether known, claim was nor this neither stated 11(b)(1); Rule improper purpose under confirmed, appeal until well after his findings look next to the on whether majority did not address panel filed. The presented legitimate also for a filing was motion, light reversing in the of its finally to the district purpose; look Whitehead, at 791. 277 F.3d sanctions. any improper court’s evaluation whether under the circum- purpose sufficient his under- Minor fails connect how Rule sanctions under stances standing of Kmart’s self-insured status 11(b)(1). correctly If the court has district conduct. justified improper-purpose his filing, legitimate purpose found discovery do not affect responses Kmart’s reluctant this and other circuits have been whether Mi- underlying the considerations imposition of sanctions approve writ was purpose obtaining nor’s 11(b)(1). Rule under (We express on wheth- proper. opinion no contrast, Here, by majority presents court er Minor can seek relief district subparts of Rule as not the two relevant challenged discovery respons- on the based assessing Rule purposes intertwined es.) 11(b)(1) goes majority sanctions. then The making on to credit district court III. im- findings legitimate crucial both reasons, foregoing purposes the sanctions the district proper For the AFFIRMED; majority winds plainly motion for sum- did make. The conclu- affirming the court’s mary up by reversal or remand is DENIED. sion that sanctions are warranted under circuit has extended logic this in conclud- 11(b)(1) ing that “[a]lthough filing where is not at all clear of a paper for an improper purpose is not immunized the district concluded as much. from rule 11 sanctions simply because it is evaluating This method of entire sanctions grounded law, well in fact only under Rule 11 effectively assessed under eviscer- unusual filing circumstances —such as the were, until up point, ates what critical of excessive filing motions—should the [ ] aspects of the Rule framework. Sheets, constitute sanctionable conduct.” added). 891 F.2d at I. (1) precedent What this says is that THE OF ANALYSIS FRAMEWORK 11(b)(2) finding favorable regarding Rule FOR SANCTIONS UNDER should influence a district court’s conclu- 11(b)(1) RULE sion regarding the existence of an “im- proper purpose” sanction under Rule 11(b)(1) A. The Interrelation (2) 11(b)(1), excep- the most tional circumstances will uphold this court 11(b)(2) explicitly requires Rule that an 11(b)(1) sanctions under Rule when a pa- attorney to paper submit a the court 11(b)(2) per satisfies the Rule require- forming after a reasonable belief that it is ments. (or by existing warranted law a non-frivo- Here, majority concludes, the first cor- law) argument change lous for a in the and rectly, that “the two subparts [Rule 11(b)(1) explicitly precludes Rule an attor- 11(b)(1) 11(b)(2)] and Rule quite concern ney submitting paper from a for certain different considerations” but then con- “improper purposes.”1 The subsections cludes, incorrectly, they that need “not” be appear quite thus to be textually. discrete 11(b)(1) “intertwined” inquiry. However, our case law demonstrates that precedent Our does not support that. In actually the subsections are interrelated in the interest of bypassing an evaluation [paper] least one situation: “When a is the district possibly court’s incorrect find- grounded well in fact and by warranted 11(b)(2), ing under Rule the majority has law, existing ‘only under unusual circum- (that 11(b)(1) announced rule the Rule ... filing stances should the paper] [the 11(b)(2) inquiries need not be inter- ” constitute sanctionable conduct.’ 11(b)(1) twined in a situation where Rule Calhoun, 1291, F.D.I.C. v. 34 F.3d 1300 sanctions are to be imposed) that is direct- (5th Cir.1994) added) (quoting ly at precedent. odds with our my In U.S.A., Sheets v. Corp., Yamaha Motors view, mistake, that is a serious now bad (5th Cir.1990)). 891 F.2d This law.2 subparts

1. The two relevant of Rule 11 state unnecessary cause delay or needless in- that: litigation; crease in the cost of (2) claims, defenses, legal and other (b) By (whether presenting by to the court contentions therein are warranted signing, filing, submitting, or later advo- existing argu- law or a nonfrivolous motion, cating) pleading, written or oth- extension, modification, ment for the or paper, attorney unrepresented er or existing reversal of law or the establish- party certifying is that to the best of the ment of new law. information, person’s knowledge, and be- ll(b)(l)-(2). Fed.R.Civ.P. lief, inquiry formed after an reasonable circumstances,— under the majority In footnote states that: "In (1) event, being presented it any is not purposes deciding for im- ap- this proper purpose, peal, such as to harass or to it is not to determine how plaintiff sincerely plaint to in which Impose Predicate Necessary B. The 11(b)(1) injunction the Rule 11 Sanctions under believes. Yet against harassment does not exact of clear that the next case law makes Our pleadings those ivho an undiluted “im- imposing in the framework file step just desire deserts ... court [T]he consider- purpose” sanctions proper objectively must focus on ascertainable legitimate court of by the district ation or that an inference litigant party circumstances improper purposes submitting had for the relevant or may filing have that a harassed the defendant quest uphold the district its paper. unnecessary delay. Judge As caused sanctions, majori- imposition court’s reasonably stated: “If Schwarzer has to the district court ty findings attributes justification clear legal can be shown purpose step regarding legitimate paper no filing question, make, clearly court did not the district can improper purpose be found to the legal attributes conclusion ... A inappropriate” sanctions are regarding whether sanctions plaintiff complaint file a in order ] must [ under Rule independently warranted rights find vindicate his court. We may the district filing no here was indication made. have even unnecessary, for the had [defendants] legit- court finds a Assuming the district [alleged refused to retract the defamato- or for the purposes imate relevant ry] circum- statement. Under weigh legitimate filing, then must stances, in- [plaintiff] proper had a against any illegitimate purposes purposes suing attempt terest in its to vindicate illegitimate pur- the and evaluate whether reputation. are sufficient in themselves to inde- poses (internal at omitted Id. 223-24 footnote support sanctions under Rule pendently added). Thus, emphasis interpret- as 11(b)(1). in As we National Associ- stated court, can ed our district court before Employees, Inc. v. ation Government 11(b)(1), it impose under Rule sanctions Employ- Federal National Federation of Cir.1988): ees, (5th any legitimate proper must or F.2d consider attorney may or have purposes litigant the litigation not instituted We do condone in district presenting paper had to the ulterior rather than to se- purposes for today, to find court. we were loath well-grounded cure on a com- Before might through the correct present compel its court must be funneled Rule 11 in form revising improper purpose, imposition the test for as the of sanctions framework before adopted for the former version of the Rule.” appropriate. taught by our can be deemed As This statement a critical short- underscores (which questioned has not until case law been coming majority’s opinion. with the It an- plainly by major- today the and which is cited (that 11(b)(1) a new the Rule nounces rule ity proposition the for exact for which the 11(b)(2) inquiries are unrelated in a fact law), case if the rele- dissent cites the same 11(b)(1) pattern where are to Rule sanctions 11(b)(2) requirements filing vant Rule satisfies imposed, paper at be even if the issue was presented have for a and is found to been 11(b)(2)), compliance with Rule submitted legitimate purpose, extremely we are reluc- that, not, says it does and then but announces imposition approve tant to of sanctions event, any knowledge applicable 11(b)(1). improper purpose under If an Rule 11(b)(1) necessary not Rule framework is rule, it majority seeks to alter this clear imposed to be here. sanctions has, (and maybe say who’s to should so contrast, I framework as critical. see the say?) apply to the facts then its new rule “improper” The facts related nature of to this case. presenting to the Minor’s the writ district added). attorney’s an or litigant’s illegitimate Id. Kunstler’s independently purpose could sanc- holding with our circuit precedent. accords legitimate purpose filing where a tions an illegitimate If engulf does not paper the relevant also existed. legitimate purpose, individual’s sanc- tions under Here, “improper purpose” sec- lip paying required service inquiry into tion Rule 11 cannot stand. legitimate purposes, the ma- Because the upholds clearly jority as “not erroneous” district court in- important overlooked this findings rejecting proffered factual our quiry, place court has no upholding legitimate purposes seeking writ findings that are not even there. (to satisfy part execution of the judgment attributing In addition to factual find- for his client in order to medical bills pay ings to the district court that it not did settlement). However, to encourage make, majority jumps to the support of I though thoroughly have searched legal conclusion that the district court order, mention, district court’s I find no may not have even majority made. The discussion, possible much less legiti- points single to a paragraph or proper purpose. mate This court’s eighteen-page order refer- predicate is not simply there. ences Minor’s desire to embarrass Kmart The Fourth Circuit case of In Kun re gain publicity for himself indis- as stler, Cir.1990), 914 F.2d 505 discusses putably demonstrating an intention importance of the critical step omitted part of the district court to sanction Minor by the district court: 11(b)(1). independently under Rule How- the term “improper pur- defines ever, clear, it is not “indisputa- much less pose” to include “such factors as to ha- ble,” single from paragraph that the or unnecessary delay rass to cause or district court intended to sanction Minor litiga- needless increase the costs of under Rule independent from tion.” The factors mentioned in the rule 11(b)(2), especially paragraph as this complaint If exclusive. expressly states that “there was basis no rights pur- filed vindicate its whatsoever in or in law for the actions fact However, pose improper. must be aif 21,1997.” on August taken Whether there complaint filed, is to rights vindicate clearly is a basis in law is the relevant court, and also some other purpose, inquiry 11(b)(2), under Rule not Rule a court should not sanction counsel for 11(b)(1). Further, the district court does an intention that the court not does any not use of the descriptive language approve, long so as purpose the added is ll(b)(l)’s list, found Rule non-exclusive not undertaken in bad and is not faith such as “harass.” While this is not re- so excessive as to proper eliminate a I quired, expect would to see some discus- Thus,

purpose. purpose the to vindicate sion a regarding comparison between “ha- rights in court must be central sin- rass” and “embarrass” if the words, ... In district court cere other it is enough not (as assumes) truly injured majority that the intended the party subjectively be- to that a lawsuit use the brought interchangeably lieves ha- terms to and to sanc- rass, or to negative publicity focus on tion Minor independently under Rule injured 11(b)(1).3 party. minimum, At a I expect would Further, majority goes so far as to purposes between these two ['harass' and state, discussion, ‘embarrass’], without that this especially light “[o]n in the our record, meaningful there is no distinction deferential standard of review.” In

813 trict necessary have at least men- court with—the factual court to the district dealing predicate with “im- omitted court and subpart district tioned either may to “improper supply legal or the term conclusion that not purpose” proper particu- have I paragraph, itself this been made district court. purpose” technique. of the discussion cannot to this larly given extent subscribe 11(b)(2). regarding II. an order past, imposing

In the when shortcomings, contained such we sanctions THE OR “EXCEPTION- “UNUSUAL” supply findings to refused AL” RE- CIRCUMSTANCES we, because appeal and conclusions QUIREMENT judges, fact must become appellate precedent clear. assuming Our Even See, Calhoun, e.g., F.D.I.C. v. finders. appropriate the district court had made Cir.1994) (“We (5th 1291, 1297 have F.3d factual findings on whether Minor had a in applying district long held legitimate purpose obtaining the writ sanctions, may have to make detailed here, in of execution situations where an legal reasons .... The explanation its attorney party paper that is or submits a record is sim- creating such well-grounded law under guard against to the applica- In order ple: 11(b)(2) ar- majority assumes —as who hindsight by district courts tion case guendo “improper to be the here — complicated, through long, have sat may by a purpose” imposed sanctions be we proceedings, contentious must not often “excep- district court “unusual” or having position guess in the put be disagree tional” circumstances. I with legal factual or errors what unwarranted majority’s implied finding this sanctions.”); basis of were the United presents case such “unusual” circum- Alexander, 981 F.2d v. U.T. States stances. Cir.1993) (“The did here date, To have not found a case with not cite ‘unusual circumstances’ we merely up such to merit sanctions. The “unusual circumstances” warranted holding “improper finding purpose” the view that the claim was filed an asserted here) (as the case though Even where is assumed be purpose. paper the Rule findings required up- filing satisfies detailed Calhoun, sanctions, requirements. an award there must be hold Sheets, review.”). 1300; 538; Today F.2d record to the ma- F.3d at some F.2d at precedent Emp., this to Nat'l Gov’t jority back-pedals from Assoc. of I indeed, spirit, disagree 224.4 In supply and, even credit the dis- — statement, Empl., Flaherty Nat'l cites to v. Tor sive motions.” Assoc. Gov't of this it of 55, (W.D.Pa.1985), This com quato, F.Supp. 623 59-60 844 F.2d at 224. connotation (3d ports general usage under op., 800 F.2d 1133 the without with aff 'd 1986), "using annoyance as or ex standing Cir. harass embarrass of "harass” — interchangeably of Rule im of in context 11 the characteristic haustion with added However, proper purpose a repetitiveness opposed discussion.” to persistency or —as non-binding cursory read of this district or self-con "embarrass” —mere distress opinion Collegiate that the does court reveals court sciousness. See Webster’s New 370, (1977). interchangeably not use these in its terms 522 Dictionary to award Id. decision decline to sanctions. Pierre, 1989), Moreover, Cir. we 4. v. 890 F.2d 728 have on occasion discussed Coats finding. a is the we have come to such “harass” in the context of Rule to closest There, "filing tenure and a teacher who was denied cover conduct such as the of exces- 814 (2d Israel, Cir.1995)

majority 450, should as that case serve the 56 F.3d 459 of (“The for district courts imposing benchmark filing district court held that the of in “improper purpose” sanctions the fu complaint the a exerting pres- with view to finding by a ture. district With through generation sure on defendants of oppo an intent to embarrass one’s economically adverse and disadvanta- gain publicity intent to nent and an for geous publicity reflected an pur- quite oneself—both common characteris pose. To the extent that a complaint is in judgment tics a or debt collection set fact, not to lack in held foundation law or ting litmus, will as a poor case serve we not disagree. It is the role of Rule 11 —the given particularly that the district court to safeguard public a defendant from criti- did even consider whether Minor had a cism may result from the assertion filing. legitimate purpose for As claims.”); Kunstler, nonfrivolous In re me, things to appear majority employs 505, (4th Cir.1990) F.2d (“Holding a “I it I see it” approach know when to press lawsuit, conference announce a judging technique, substituting Minor’s its taste, perhaps poor while is not grounds findings own where the district court made sanction, subjective a Rule 11 is a nor none. hope by plaintiff a that a em- lawsuit will defendant, upset or barrass a so long majority

The shames for conduct there that a plaintiffs is evidence central befit determines does not an upstanding filing complaint was to vindi- Specifically, officer of the court. it ap- cate rights through judicial process.”). pears perturbed most regarding Minor’s Further, in each cases cited offensive tow media majority its determination collection. I admit that technique that “improper purpose” sanctions are However, here is to say colorful the least. here, spe- warranted the district court had other courts have at similar circum- looked cifically found that the filing relevant stances and have not so been critical of the well-grounded litigants’ law under Rule of litigation choice tactics. 11(b)(2). P.C., Kimbrough, See Ivy v. 115 F.3d Cinque Cinque, Revson v. & (8th Cir.1997) Cir.2000) (2d (sanctioning F.3d (stating air- plaintiff and ing grievances attorney his threatening litigation bringing through action commonplace” against police letters “are frivolous officer and “[sjimilarly, judge the court’s involved in his subsequent concern that arrest [plaintiff] dispute had fact tarnished marital [defen- because “the cause, reputation speaking good gave dant’s] with a plaintiff news at- [the and his reporter not a proper torney] repeated basis sanc- warning that their claims 11); tions” v. appeared frivolous, under Sussman Bank to be that much of brought rights alleg- ported by any not rehired a civil action people called [he] from ing wrongful termination in retaliation for university” filing his was "worse than exercising speech. up- Id. at We free outrageous,” was "unconscionable” and was plaintiff's held Rule 11 sanctions ha- worthy proceedings. "contempt” Id. The rassing filings, opposing which stated that clearly distinguishable case before us is from nasty counsel like "acted a little dumb female Coats. The in Coats found the pig Mexican in heat” that was she "noth- here, unsupportable lawsuit in law whereas ing garbage.” Although but Id. at 734. is, majority opposite assumes it —that specific district failed court there make objectively assumes it was reasonable finding groundless, that the suit was con- existing under fact law for Minor to file cluded that sanctions were warranted because writ execution with the district court. plaintiffs allegations "totally unsup- were media, it did enter —sanctions on a aimed at the based their conduct seemed 11(b)(2). I think pursue this violation of Rule that the properly that failure to sanc district court’s conclusions on that possible dismissal and violation lawsuit risked Tribe, tions”); probably wrong, although I agree v. 156 F.R.D. 96 Kramer (D.N.J.1994) (sanctioning attorney Judge original un Barksdale’s dissent insofar (b)(2), § and its as it stated that neither the district der Rule fines, authority through panel required upon submis nor the was to decide inherent attorney disciplinary trigger au whether a motion is sion of counsel to 62(a) Mississippi stay. of counsel to the Rule automatic thorities and submission said, is, attorney Judge inquiry where the As Barksdale criminal authorities instead, filing whether Minor undertook a legitimate had no rea- (at history inquiry authority regard- instanc sonable into the suit and had a least 86 es) courts), and, did, if ing of unethical conduct before the Fed.R.Civ.P. he 62® (3d objectively op., 52 F.3d 315 Cir. whether his actions were rea- without aff'd Alexander, 1995); My Elster v. 122 F.R.D. sonable. own conclusion is that Minor (N.D.Ga.1988) (imposing inquiry Rule 11 did make a into the reasonable (scarce papers authority good day); as it is to this “pleadings sanctions where I am plaintiff ... were filed less certain about whether his action filed behalf inquiry executing judgment prior which Rule without without reasonable provide objectively court authorization requires”). These cases thus reason- because, able, majority given paucity authority little for the on the cases, subject. circumstances, majority to these here But under the I contrast (in may uphold against the face of well be would not sanctions presumes what findings contrary by to the for what amounts at most to a mistake of problematic court) I judgment that the writ filed Minor on that score. would vacate well-grounded required law as the sanctions order. 11(b)(2). I agree original panel’s with the de- conduct,

termination that Minor’s while taste,

perhaps poor does not merit 11(b)(1). We,

sanctions under at a far re-

appellate judges, operate collecting

move from the business judgments effecting or settlements. We LTD.; TRANS CHEMICAL ought excoriating to refrain from a law- al., Plaintiffs, et yer upon based our own sensibilities Ltd., Trans Chemical Plaintiff- to that when the district closer Appellee, are, provided business than we has not explicit predicate clear and for the ex- Khan; A Daud Duad Sardar Shahwar judgment. ercise of our Khan, Plaintiffs- Intervenor Appellants,

III.

v. DONE WHAT WE SHOULD HAVE IM- CHINA NATIONAL MACHINERY I think that we should take the district AND PORT EXPORT CORPORA- TION; al., Defendants, at its word and review et notes ployees; and improper made comments to possible state that one for a sanction viola case, Kmart, regarding media tion of Rule 11 is referral to a state bar willingness satisfy Kmart’s judg- Kramer, authority. See also F.R.D. ment. 96 (imposing referring sanctions and mat found, The district court in part based bar). ter to state District courts have an on videotape, improper that Minor had independent duty maintain the integrity purposes in obtaining the writ: to embar- judicial may process impose rass personal posi- advance his Rule 11 necessary, sanctions where re course, tion. The district in is gardless of discipline whether state bar far position better than we to balance the concurrent. considerations underlying rulings on Rule sanctions, limits sanctions “to what is suffi- 11 especially most the concomi- cient repetition to deter of such conduct or tant findings (including credibility factual AFFIRMED; choices). review MOTION Obviously, why this is we SANCTIONS abuse DENIED. very under a deferential decision its subpart For the standard. of discretion KING, Judge, whom Chief JERRY (b)(1) the record purpose ruling: BENAVIDES, E. SMITH Circuit being findings these does join, Judges, dissenting: erroneous; nor there “an erro clearly Gell, & of the law”. See Cooter neous view all, majority, appellate judges The 405, 110 496 U.S. S.Ct. lawyer exercised Paul Mi- plainly about to collect nor’s efforts his clients’

Case Details

Case Name: Bennie Whitehead v. Food Max of Mississippi, Inc., Kmart Corporation v. Paul S. Minor

Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Date Published: Jul 17, 2003

Citation: 332 F.3d 796

Docket Number: 00-60153

Court Abbreviation: 5th Cir.