Ephraim GREENBERG, individually on behalf of himself, and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. Carolyn W. COLVIN, in her official capacity as Acting Commissioner of the Social Security Administration, and The Social Security Administration, Defendants.
Civil Action No. 13-1837 (RMC)
United States District Court, District of Columbia.
Signed August 8, 2014
ROSEMARY M. COLLYER, United States District Judge
V. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS ALPA‘s motion to transfer. An appropriate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.
Fred Elmore Haynes, U.S. Attorney‘s Office, Washington, DC, for Defendant.
OPINION
ROSEMARY M. COLLYER, United States District Judge
Ephraim Greenberg asks the Court to certify a class of individuals who have had their Old Age, Survivors, and/or Disability Insurance Benefits reduced under the Windfall Elimination Provision of the Social Security Act because they receive Old Age Benefits from the National Insurance Institute of Israel. Defendants do not oppose the motion for class certification and both parties agree that the Social Security Administration should not apply the Windfall Elimination Provision to a beneficiary who receives an Old Age pension from the National Insurance Institute of Israel. However, Plaintiff and Defendants do not agree on the legal bases for attorney fees for counsel to the proposed class. Plaintiff seeks attorney fees under a provision of the Social Security Act or, alternatively, under the common benefit or common fund doctrine. Defendants argue that Plaintiff‘s counsel is entitled only to attorney fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act. Because the terms and implementation of any settlement agreement depend upon the resolution of the fee dispute, the parties seek a ruling on the question now.
I. FACTS
A. The Windfall Elimination Provision and National Insurance Institute of Israel Old Age Benefits
This case involves a statutory provision implemented by the Social Security Administration (SSA), known as the Windfall Elimination Provision (WEP),
SSA applied WEP to reduce OASDI Benefits in cases where recipients also receive Old Age benefits from the National Insurance Institute of Israel (NII Old Age benefits). NII Old Age benefits are guaranteed to all residents of Israel who have reached a certain age, subject to residency requirements and payment into the system for a minimum time period.1 “Neither entitlement to the benefits, nor the amount of benefits to which an individual is entitled, is dependent on the individual‘s work history or prior earnings (if any).” Id. ¶ 12. Thus, even if an otherwise qualified resident of Israel has never been employed or collected earnings, s/he may satisfy the criteria and be entitled to NII Old Age Benefits.
Several years prior to the filing of the Complaint in this case, SSA applied WEP to reduce the retirement benefits of Rabbi Jerome Berger because he received NII Old Age benefits. In 2001, Rabbi Berger appealed SSA‘s determination and then filed suit in this Court. See Berger v. Barnhart, No. 04-0431 (D.D.C. 2004).2 While the Berger suit was pending, SSA sought a remand to the agency. On September 3, 2004, the SSA Appeals Council determined that Rabbi Berger‘s Israeli pension did not trigger WEP because, for qualified individuals, NII Old Age benefits are based solely on residency status and payments into the NII system, but not on earnings. The Appeals Council further directed SSA to recalculate Rabbi Berger‘s social security benefits without regard to his NII benefits.
In 2005, Martin H. Gerry, Deputy Commissioner for Disability and Income Stability Programs for SSA, responded to an inquiry from Mordechai Biser, Associate General Counsel for Agudath Israel of America, concerning the Berger case. Mr. Gerry wrote:
On remand, [SSA] found that we had incorrectly applied the WEP to Mr. Berger‘s benefits because the NII pension is based on residency in Israel, not on employment that was not covered by the U.S. Social Security system....
We agree that other beneficiaries who are also receiving the NII pension may have had the WEP erroneously applied and that we should recalculate the current benefit amounts of all such beneficiaries and pay any back benefits due. We have begun the process of identifying such persons in our files, and we will take appropriate actions to correct any misapplication of the WEP.
Compl. ¶ 36. However, SSA continued to apply WEP to the SSA Benefits of individuals who also receive NII Benefits.
B. Plaintiff‘s Complaint and the Parties’ Settlement Agreement
On November 21, 2013, Plaintiff filed a class action complaint alleging that Defendants repeatedly and unlawfully applied WEP to reduce his and other similarly situated claimants’ SSA Benefits based on their receipt of NII Old Age benefits. Plaintiff alleges that his SSA Benefits should not be subject to WEP reduction.
Soon after Plaintiff filed his Complaint, the parties began settlement discussions. They filed a joint status report on April 2, 2014, stating that they had reached a partial resolution of Plaintiff‘s claims on a class-wide basis and that both parties agreed that SSA should not apply WEP to a beneficiary who receives a NII Old Age pension. They reported that SSA had agreed to take the following actions: (1) rescind the practice of applying WEP to NII Old Age benefits; (2) recalculate all Social Security benefits where WEP had been applied because a beneficiary received NII Old Age benefits; and (3) pay all benefits that would have been paid had WEP not been applied. After the final settlement terms are reviewed and approved by the Department of Justice, the parties have agreed to submit the settlement agreement to the Court for approval.
C. The Proposed Class Definition
Plaintiff seeks class certification under
In this definition:
“Beneficiary” or “beneficiaries” means a person or persons, or his/her Representative Payee(s) as provided under the Act who has received or is receiving OASDI Benefits payment(s), or, if such person(s) or Representative Payee(s) is (are) dead, the estate of such person(s) or Representative Payee(s).
“Representative Payee” means a person who has been selected or appointed to receive payments on behalf of any Beneficiary of OASDI Benefits payment pursuant to the Act and its regulations.
“Reduced” refers to a reduction in an OASDI Benefits payment, as well as any determination that an OASDI Benefits overpayment was made by SSA and that the recipient would have to repay the overage and/or that the overage would be subtracted from OASDI Benefits payment(s) or other benefits.
Id. SSA estimates that the size of the class is no more than 1,666 individuals.
II. CLASS CERTIFICATION
A. Legal Standards
Under
The “party requesting class certification under Rule 23 bears the burden of showing the existence of a class, that all prerequisites of Rule 23(a) are satisfied and the class falls within one of the categories of Rule 23(b).” Bynum v. District of Columbia, 214 F.R.D. 27, 30-31 (D.D.C. 2003) (citations omitted). Rule 23(a) requires a class to satisfy four criteria: 1) numerosity, so that joinder of all persons would be impractical; 2) commonality of questions of law and fact; 3) typicality of the named party‘s claims and defenses to the members of the class; and 4) adequacy of representation of the class by the named party and counsel.
B. Analysis
In this case, the motion for class certification is unopposed. Nonetheless, the Court reviews the standards for certification below and finds that Plaintiff has met his burden under Rule 23. See In re LivingSocial Mktg. & Sales Practice Litig., 298 F.R.D. 1, 8 (D.D.C. 2013) (reviewing requirements of Rule 23 before certifying a class for settlement purposes); Radosti, 717 F. Supp. 2d at 51 (starting with analysis of Rule 23(a) certification factors “since the settlement class must comport with the requirements of Rule 23“).
1. Existence of a Class
“It is axiomatic that for a class action to be certified a ‘class’ must exist.” Barnes v. District of Columbia, 242 F.R.D. 113, 120 (D.D.C. 2007) (citing Simer v. Rios, 661 F.2d 655, 669 (7th Cir. 1981)); see also Lewis v. Nat‘l Football League, 146 F.R.D. 5, 8 (D.D.C. 1992) (clearly defined class is necessary “to ensure that the class is neither amorphous, nor imprecise” (internal citation omitted)). At this juncture, the Court is satisfied that Plaintiff‘s proposed class definition—persons who have had their OASDI Benefits payments reduced since September 3, 2004 through application of WEP because they also receive NII Old Age Benefits—is tailored properly because it allows an individual “to determine, simply by reading the definition, whether he ... is a member of the proposed class.” Bynum, 214 F.R.D. at 32; see also
a. Numerosity
“Courts in this District have generally found that the numerosity requirement is satisfied and that joinder is impracticable where a proposed class has at least forty members.” Hardy v. District of Columbia, 283 F.R.D. 20, 24 (D.D.C. 2012) (quoting Cohen v. Chilcott, 522 F. Supp. 2d 105, 114 (D.D.C. 2007)); see also Lindsay v. Gov‘t Emps. Ins. Co., 251 F.R.D. 51, 55 (D.D.C. 2008) (“Typically, a class in excess of 40 members is sufficiently numerous to satisfy [the numerosity] requirement.“); Vista Healthplan, Inc. v. Warner Holdings Co. III, Ltd., 246 F.R.D. 349, 357 (D.D.C. 2007) (citing cases).
As noted above, the class proposed here would encompass as many as 1,666 persons whose OASDI Benefits payments may have been reduced. This class far exceeds the generally accepted size of 40 people, thereby rendering joinder impracticable and satisfying the numerosity requirement.
b. Commonality
Rule 23(a)(2) requires that there be questions of law or fact common to the class.
As Plaintiff has articulated, there are many questions of fact and law common to the class, including whether: (1) NII Old Age Benefits are based on prior employment earnings; (2) SSA‘s policy of applying WEP to reduce claimants’ OASDI Benefits payments based on their receipt of NII Old Age Benefits is unlawful; (3) the members of the proposed Class are entitled to an injunction prohibiting SSA from continuing this policy; and (4) the members of the proposed Class are entitled to an injunction ordering SSA to recalculate their past OASDI Benefits payments and to pay those amounts. Accordingly, the Court finds that the commonality requirement is met.
c. Typicality
Under Rule 23(a)(3), “the claims or defenses of the representative parties [must be] typical of the claims or defenses of the class.”
d. Adequacy of Representation
Certified classes must have adequate representation. See
Mr. Greenberg‘s interests are neither antagonistic to nor in conflict with the interests of the putative class members. To the contrary, his claims mirror those of the class. Additionally, the Court is satisfied that Kelley Drye can fairly and adequately represent the class. The law firm has ample experience in this area and can represent the interests of the class in a satisfactory manner. See infra II.B.5. Defendants do not argue otherwise.
3. Rule 23(b) Requirements
Plaintiff seeks to certify the class pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3).3 This Rule requires the Court to consider whether “questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.”
a. Predominance
“In order to meet the predominance requirement of Rule 23(b)(3), a plaintiff must establish that the issues in the class action that are subject to generalized proof, thus applicable to the class as a whole, ... predominate over those issues that are subject only to individualized proof.” Amchem, 521 U.S. at 623; see also Alvarez, 303 F.R.D. at 162, 2014 WL 1400846, at *6. “Significantly, the common issues need only be predominant, not dispositive of the litigation.” Vista Healthplan, Inc., 246 F.R.D. at 359 (citing Lorazepam I, 202 F.R.D. at 29). The predominance requirement is linked to the commonality requirement in that “[p]laintiffs must show that the common issues identified by the Court ... as sufficient under Rule 23(a)(2) predominate over any non-common issues.” Chilcott, 522 F. Supp. 2d at 116 (citing Vitamins I, 209 F.R.D. at 262).
Here, common questions predominate over any issues that are not common among the class. Mr. Greenberg‘s central theory of liability—that SSA has a general policy of applying WEP to NII Old Age Benefits, thereby reducing the amount of OASDI Benefits received—is common to every class member. Alvarez, 303 F.R.D. at 162, 2014 WL 1400846, at *7. Moreover, predominance is not negated by the fact that each class member will be entitled to a different damages figure in the amount their OASDI Benefits were improperly reduced. See id. (“[E]ven the minor differences between the class members—such as
b. Superiority
The superiority requirement of Rule 23(b)(3) is satisfied when a court finds that maintaining the present action as a class action will be superior to other available methods of adjudication.
In this case, a class action is clearly the superior method to adjudicate the claim. The central issue is whether SSA erroneously applied WEP to beneficiaries who also receive NII Old Age benefits. SSA has already admitted the error and merely wants to settle the legal issue and pay any SSA benefits owed. Any class member who wishes to prosecute his own claim may opt out of the Class. Because the class is certified only for settlement, the Court “need not inquire whether the case, if tried, would present intractable management problems.” Amchem, 521 U.S. at 620.
4. Notice
In certifying a class under Rule 23(b)(3), “the court must direct to class members the best notice that is practicable under the circumstances, including individual notice to all members who can be identified through reasonable effort. The notice must clearly and concisely state in plain, easily understood language:
- the nature of the action;
- the definition of the class certified;
- the class claims, issues, or defenses;
- that a class member may enter an appearance through an attorney if the member so desires;
- that the court will exclude from the class any member who requests exclusion;
- the time and manner for requesting exclusion; and
- the binding effect of a class judgment on members under Rule 23(c)(3).
Using its records, SSA has already identified the beneficiaries to whom notice should be sent, though not all may ultimately prove to be class members. The parties have requested a brief conference to discuss with the Court the timing for submitting the notice plan and the specific notice provisions. The Court will set a date for this conference in a separate scheduling order. See LCVR 23.1(c) (“In certifying a class action as maintainable under Rule 23(b)(3), the court may include in its order the provisions for notice pursuant to Rule 23(c)(2) or may postpone a determination of the matter.” (emphasis added)).
5. Appointment of Class Counsel
Under Rule 23(g), in appointing class counsel a court must consider: (1) the work counsel has done in identifying or
Here, Kelley Drye has a significant history of investigating the claims in this action and handling similar matters. Indeed, Ira Kasdan of Kelley Drye represented the plaintiff in the Berger litigation, where he challenged the same SSA policy at issue here. Further, there is no dispute as to whether Kelley Drye attorneys are appropriate to serve as class counsel. Therefore, Kelley Drye will be appointed as class counsel.
C. Certification of the Class
Plaintiff has demonstrated the existence of a class and has met the requirements of Rule 23(a) by showing numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy. Moreover, Plaintiff has satisfied the criteria of Rule 23(b)(3): that common questions of law and fact predominate and that a class action is superior method of adjudication. Accordingly, the Court finds that certification is proper under Rule 23 and certifies a class for the purpose of effectuating the settlement agreement between the parties.
III. ATTORNEY FEES
Although the parties agree about the merits of the case, they dispute the appropriate law to be applied in calculating attorney fees. Plaintiff argues that the Court should award attorney fees under Section 406(b) of the Social Security Act,
A. Legal Standards
1. Section 406(b) of the Social Security Act
Section 406(b) provides that “[w]henever a court renders a judgment
2. The Equal Access to Justice Act
“Under EAJA, a party prevailing against the United States in court, including a successful Social Security benefits claimant, may be awarded fees payable by the United States if the Government‘s position in the litigation was not substantially justified.” Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 796 (internal citations omitted). “Unlike § 406(b) awards, EAJA fee awards ‘are determined not by a percent of the amount recovered, but by the time expended and the attorney‘s [hourly] rate,’ subject to a specified cap, and are paid by the government, not the claimant.” Parrish v. Comm‘r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 698 F.3d 1215, 1218 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 796). An attorney who successfully represents a Social Security benefits claimant in court may receive fees under both EAJA and § 406(b), but must “refund to the claimant the amount of the smaller fee.” Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 796 (quoting Act of Aug. 5, 1985, Pub.L. 99-80, § 3, 99 Stat. 186).
B. Analysis
1. Statutory Interpretation
Given the lack of judicial consideration of this issue, the Court turns to general principles of statutory interpretation to discern the boundaries of § 406(b). “Statutory construction must begin with the language employed by Congress and the assumption that the ordinary meaning of that language accurately expresses the legislative purpose.” Engine Mfrs. Ass‘n v. S. Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., 541 U.S. 246, 252 (1984); see also FTC v. Tarriff, 584 F.3d 1088, 1090 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (finding that unless otherwise defined, the words of a statute must be construed according to their common meaning). Here, § 406(b) explicitly states that when the Court renders a favorable judgment awarding a claimant past-due Social Security benefits, it may also determine and allow a reasonable fee for the claimant‘s attorney.
The fact that § 406(b) refers to a singular claimant does not render it inapplicable to class actions. “Statutory interpretation focuses on ‘the language itself, the specific context in which that language is used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole.‘” AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1754 (2011) (quoting Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341 (1997)). Here, the language and context of § 406(b) suggest that attorney fees are allowable in cases with multiple claim-
2. Legislative Purpose
In order to further “determine legislative intent and to clarify the meaning of [the] statute[] so as to avoid ambiguity and absurd or unreasonable results,” a court may also look to legislative history. United Air Lines, Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics Bd. (Holding Co. Reorganizations), 569 F.2d 640, 647 (D.C. Cir. 1977). The legislative history of § 406(b) indicates the provision was motivated by two main concerns: first, that attorneys were collecting “inordinately large fees” in social security cases; and second, that attorneys should be able to collect reasonable fees. Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 805.8
3. Defendant‘s Arguments
Defendants set forth various arguments, all of which are unavailing, in an attempt to persuade the Court that attorney fees in a Social Security class action suit are inappropriate under § 406(b). Presuming that a contingent fee agreement is a necessary predicate for an award under § 406(b), Defendants argue that fees here are improper because absent class members have not entered into explicit contingency arrangements with Kelley Drye. The statute, however, does not demand a contingent agreement; it merely states that the court may award reasonable attorney fees, not in excess of twenty-five percent of total past-due benefits, to a lawyer who has represented a successful claimant in court. See
authority to allow as part of its judgment a reasonable fee, not in excess of 25 percent of accrued benefits, for services rendered in connection with the claim; no other fee would be payable. Any violation would be made subject to the same penalties as are provided in the law for charging more than the maximum fee prescribed in regulations for services rendered in connection with proceedings before the Secretary—up to $500, or a year‘s imprisonment, or both. In order to assure the payment of the fee allowed by the court, the Secretary would be permitted to certify the amount of the fee to the attorney out of the amount of the accrued benefits.
McGraw, 450 F.3d at 500 (quoting 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1943, 2062).
Defendants also maintain that § 406(b) requires an attorney to represent a claimant in his individual capacity and that absent class members have not authorized class counsel to do so. The Court is not persuaded, however, that “the creation of an attorney-client relationship under § 406(b) is predicated upon an express authorization by a claimant to retain an attorney for his or her individual claim.” Defendants’ Opposition to Plaintiff‘s Motion for Determination of Attorney Fees (Def. Mem.) [Dkt. 17] at 8. To start, Defendants provide no legal authority for this proposition. Furthermore, in class actions brought in various other contexts, there is no requirement that absent class members give their express authorization before an attorney can represent them in court. To the contrary, courts routinely find that “class counsel represents all class members as soon as a class is certified.” Kleiner v. First Nat‘l Bank of Atlanta, 751 F.2d 1193, 1207 n. 28 (11th Cir. 1985). See also Palumbo v. Tele-Communications, 157 F.R.D. 129, 133 (D.D.C. 1994) (“[I]n certifying a class action, the Court confers on absent persons the status of litigants and ‘creates an attorney-client relationship between those persons and a lawyer or group of lawyers.‘“) (quoting Kingsepp v. Wesleyan Univ., 142 F.R.D. 597, 599 (S.D.N.Y. 1992)); Harris v. Vector Mktg. Corp., 716 F. Supp. 2d 835, 846 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (“Although not all courts are in agreement, most courts have held that, ‘[o]nce a class has been certified, the rules governing communications [with class members] apply as though each class member is a client of the class counsel.‘“) (quoting Manual of Complex Litig. § 21.33, at 300 (4th ed. 2004))). There is no reason why counsel‘s representation in a class action under § 406(b) should be any different.
Given that class counsel represents absent class members who choose not to opt-out, allowing class counsel to seek a contingent fee without an explicit signed agreement from each absent class member is not “unprecedented and unwarranted,” as Defendants suggest. Def. Mem. at 8. Rather, courts consistently award attorneys’ fees in class actions where the absent class members are not apprised of the proposed fee arrangement until after either a preliminary settlement has been reached or the court has decided in favor of the plaintiffs.10 In such cases, courts have not required individual fee agreements, but have deemed it sufficient to notify absent class members of the proposed arrangement and allow for objections. See, e.g., Kifafi v. Hilton Hotels Ret. Plan, No. 98-1517, 999 F. Supp. 2d 88, 93-95, 101-02, 2013 WL 6053754, at *2-3, *8 (D.D.C. Nov. 18, 2013) (after deciding in favor of class, court ordered parties to notify class members of increase in benefits and request for attorney fees, resulting in reduction of each class member‘s benefit increase, and to provide instructions for class members to object to requested fee award, which were considered when Court determined reasonableness of award); Trombley v. Nat‘l City Bank, 826 F. Supp. 2d 179, 204-05 (D.D.C. 2011) (proposed settlement agreement in class action
The Court also rejects Defendants’ related argument that § 406(b) fees are improper because the Court is unable to review individual contingent agreements for reasonableness. In this case, prior to any final approval of the settlement or award of attorney fees, the Court will hold a hearing to determine the reasonableness of the agreement and the fee award. Any concerns about the reasonableness of the
fee arrangement between counsel and class members can be raised as objections and considered prior to determining a fee award. As set forth in Gisbrecht, the Court will “look[] first to the contingent-fee agreement, ... test[] it for reasonableness,” and may “appropriately reduce[] the attorney‘s recovery based on the character of the representation and the results the representative achieved.” Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 808.
Regarding the Court‘s review of the agreement, Defendants argue that a Fairness Hearing is insufficient because, at that point, absent class members will be unable to object to the application of § 406(b) and “[a]s a result, the propriety of pursuing a fee award under § 406(b) rather than EAJA will not be addressed.” Def. Mem. at 10. However, the Court has considered the propriety of such awards herein and finds that fees under § 406(b) are appropriate. The statute does not require a court to choose between EAJA and § 406(b); rather, it provides that an attorney representing a Social Security claimant may be awarded fees under both EAJA and § 406(b) as long as he “refund[s] to the claimant the amount of the smaller fee.” Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 796. While Defendants argue that there is a conflict of interest in allowing class counsel to be awarded fees from individual class members’ benefits, that conflict is clearly one contemplated by Congress and approved by the Supreme Court.11 There is no greater conflict of interest here than in any other Social Security case where the attorney seeks § 406(b) fees from an individual plaintiff,
While acknowledging that contingent fee agreements may be proper under Gisbrecht, Defendants contend that class counsel here “do not bear a risk of loss that warrants a contingent fee” because both parties “have provisionally agreed to file a stipulation of settlement, subject to approval by the Department of Justice.” Def. Mem. at 5. The Court disagrees that “[t]he settlement of this action removes any litigation risk.” Id. As Plaintiff points out, there are various potential issues “that may prevent a settlement, including the Justice Department‘s failure to approve the settlement terms, or even a change in the law.” Reply in Support of Plaintiff‘s Motion for Determination of Attorneys’ Fees [Dkt. 18] at 4. And, when Plaintiff filed suit, it was not a foregone conclusion that SSA would agree to a settlement. Indeed, SSA previously stated that it had acted erroneously and would recalculate the amount of any past-due benefits accordingly, but did not change its policy, thereby requiring the instant lawsuit.
Moreover, in determining what percentage of past benefits will constitute a reasonable attorney fee, the Court may consider the relative amount of risk faced by Plaintiff‘s counsel. See Buljina, 828 F. Supp. 2d at 113-14 (observing risk of loss as a factor to be considered when determining reasonableness of contingency fee). If the Court is ultimately persuaded that the risk of loss to Plaintiff‘s counsel was not substantial, it may reduce the fee award accordingly. See Damron v. Comm‘r of Soc. Sec., 104 F.3d 853, 856-57 (6th Cir. 1997) (finding it appropriate to reduce requested rate under § 406(b) where fee agreement was not signed until after judgment entered in favor of plaintiff); Porter v. Comm‘r of Soc. Sec., No. 8:06 Civ. 1150, 2009 WL 2045688, at *4-5 (N.D.N.Y. Jul. 10, 2009) (noting that fee was not truly contingent because agreement was signed after plaintiff prevailed and thus requested fees could be reduced for that reason alone); Morrison v. Comm‘r of Soc. Sec., No. 1:04 Civ. 454, 2008 WL 828863, at *3 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 26, 2008) (finding that failure to sign contingency agreement until after court remanded to agency is sufficient reason to decrease fee requested because there was zero risk of loss); cf. Coppett v. Barnhart, 242 F. Supp. 2d 1380, 1383 (S.D. Ga. 2002) (“A contingency fee is more likely to be reasonable the greater the risk that the claimant would not prevail.” (citing McGuire v. Sullivan, 873 F.2d 974, 985 (7th Cir. 1989))).
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Plaintiff‘s unopposed motion to certify the class under
ROSEMARY M. COLLYER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Notes
It has come to the attention of the committee that attorneys have upon occasion charged what appear to be inordinately large fees for representing claimants in Federal district court actions arising under the social security program. Usually, these large fees result from a contingent-fee arrangement under which the attorney is entitled to a percentage (frequently one-third to one-half) of the accrued benefits. Since litigation necessarily involves a considerable lapse of time, in many cases large amounts of accrued benefits, and consequently large legal fees, are payable if the claimant wins his case.
The committee bill would provide that whenever a court renders a judgment favorable to a claimant, it would have express