*1 SECRETARY OF COHEN, v. ACTING HOPKINS EDUCATION, WELFARE. HEALTH, AND April 2, Argued 11-12, 1968. March 1968. Decided No. 276. Gearinger argued Sharp Allen and Harold H. Israel petitioner. With them on the briefs was cause Steingold. argued respondent. Weinstein the cause for
Harris Griswold, Solicitor General him on the brief were With Attorney Assistant General Weisl and Morton Hollander. opinion Douglas Mr. delivered the Justice Court. ceiling is whether the on an question
fee under of the Social Act, (1964 79 Stat. C. amended,1 U. S. (1) presently provides: 1 42 U. S. C. 466§ judgment “Whenever a court renders a favorable to a claimant subchapter by under this who was before the court an' may attorney, part the court determine and allow as of its representation, a reasonable fee for such not in excess of past-due of the total of the benefits to which the claimant is entitled Secretary judgment, may, reason of and the notwith- standing provisions (i) title, certify section of this payment of, the amount of such fee for to such out to, the amount of such In addition benefits. case ed., Supp. II), is based on the benefits received may claimant alone or be based also on the benefits that *2 family virtue dependent other members of the claimant’s
Respondent petitioner2 totally ruled that was not and permanently disabled within the of the Act. The District Court reversed and awarded claimant’s a fee equal the benefits 25% Appeals the claimant alone. The Court of for the Sev- ruling affirmed. 374 726. enth Circuit P. 2d Because its attorney fees conflicted with decisions of the Fourth as to Celebrezze, (see 815; Circuit Redden v. 361 F. 2d Lam- Celebrezze, 677), granted bert v. 361 F. 2d we 389 petition for certiorari. U. S. 811. claimant under 223 of the Act qualifies §
The disabled II)) figures his (42 (1964 ed., Supp. C. 423 § U. S. primary (42 under 215 of the Act S. § U. C. (1964 ed., Supp. II)).
The claimants who receive benefits relatives of as figure disabled person qualifies § their eligibility § and amount of benefits under 202 of the (1964 Supp. II); S. (42 ed., U. C. (b); child, (d); widow, (e); widower, § § 202 202 202 § 202(g); (h)). 202 202 (f); mother, parent, § § 202 of the Act describes in Section disability wife (d) (1) (d) (2) disability and in husband, bene- The fits of the child of the disabled claimant. wife (§ (§ (b)(1)(A)) (d)(1)(A)) may 202 the child 202 may _ any judgment, such no other fee or certified payment representation except provided as this paragraph.” 2 Raymond Hopkins, “Petitioner,” opinion, used in this refers case, the Social claimant. The interest involved in the proper on the issue of the amount of the it reaches Hopkins’ Sharp. fee, is, however, attorney, that of Allen always do But need so file for these benefits. right makes the to such benefits themselves,3 the Act primarily on the status and condition those dependent persons. dependent on the compute
The wife and child each their benefits percentage share of disabled claimant’s basis §§ benefits determined under 223. See primary family benefit (d)(2). maximum (b)(2)4 to which amount of the benefit depends upon (a) is entitled. See §§ disabled claimant from proceeds The scheme of the Act thus (a). between the recognition relationship of an intimate due varying amounts of benefits the disabled dependents. and his *3 receiving disability payments was 223
Hopkins wife and 1962; March 1961 and December between during receiving also two children were of period recipient disability as of same 202). In December 1962 these benefits payments (§ terminated, ground was no on were Act. longer “disabled” within the of Peti- remedies, his administrative then exhausted tioner sought review the District Court. The District Court’s reversed administrative decision to order 3 Nor 20 CFB 404.603-404.604. are the wife children See §§ parties proceedings of an admin required to become to on review (b) (g); 42 U. S. C. 405 determination. See istrative §§ ; 404.945; §§404.909-404.910; 404.916-404.919 404.951. 20 CFR 4 changed Security Amendments former The Social 1967 to read: 202§
“Except provided (q), in subsection insurance bene- wife's following equal month be fit for each shall whichever (A) amount of smaller: one-half insurance her (or, husband) in the divorced case of a her former husband (Jan. month, (B) 90-248, $105.” or Pub. L. No. for such 1968). pursuant
And this order the Director the Bureau Disability Insurance wrote as follows:
“Based the recent amendments to the Social you Security Act, $123.10. are entitled to receive Your wife two children are each entitled to monthly $51.50. These new rates are effec- tive beginning January 1965.
“Section 206 of the Social provides [y]our attornéy may ask the court to approve a fee not percent exceed 25 past- you. benefits due We are, withholding therefore, $936.20, amount of which represents your past-due benefits of $3,744.00 pending action by the court on the amount of the fee. The amount withheld will applied against the fee set the court and will be directly your mailed attorney; any remaining will you. amount be sent to
“Benefit payments you your wife will con- tinue to be combined. The next husband-wife check will be for $5,032.60. represents This payment for January through December 1965. You will receive this check within a days. few After that, regular monthly check for $174.60 will be sent which, shortly after the month for it is payable. “The children’s check for period of January through December 1963, [sic], the amount *4 of $3,463.50, will you to shortly. sent After that, regular their monthly, check $103.00 for will be sent you to as usual.”
Section 206 (b)(1), restricting the amount of an at- torney’s fee, speaks of “the past-due benefits to which the entitled.” Respondent argues only a plaintiff can satisfy such a not a description, non- party. urged It is also that dependents who are not
joined parties have not received a judgment and that to the wife and the children are only not benefits which the husband, claimant, the is “entitled” within the of 206 (b)(1).
That seems us to be too technical a construction of adopt. which we need not In this instance, proof of the husband’s “claim” in a package results of family; benefits to his immediate benefits inure those to the benefit of the family head of the files “claim.” legislative history of speaks Congress
desire of “contingent reduce fee” arrange- ments to restrict an fee to an amount “not in excess of 25 accrued benefits.” We find The record applied reveals that for benefits for his application two children in his disability payments. initial Al though application encompass did not a claim for on benefits application behalf of his it is made clear in the that his wife applying was also It appear, however, benefits. does not whether separate application by by wife’s benefits was filed her or 3, supra. question her behalf. See n. No is raised concerning propriety of the claims that were filed. Nor is this any question a case where concerning right has been raised the wife or children to Rather, benefits. the wife and children had receiving been them as person of a disabled until by respondent’s were terminated erroneous decision that the hus longer band was no disabled. When that decision was reversed Court, only impediment the District standing way in the receipt the wife and children was removed. attorney In sense, then, a realistic representing fully was- interests of the wife and litigated question children when he the husband’s Rep. I, Cong.,
6 S. No. Pt. 1st Sess., 122. 89th “It has come the attention of the attorneys committee that upon charged appear have occasion inordinately large what to be representing fees for claimants in Federal district court actions arising security program. under the social Usually, large these fees contingent-fee arrangement result from a under which the percentage (frequently is entitled to a one-half) one-third to *5 in nothing history (b)(1) §of 206 that would like- wise restrict those “accrued benefits” to owed amounts viz., the claimant, distinguished from his dependents, the wife and the children.
Reversed. Mr. Justice Marshall took no in part the considera- tion or decision of this case. White,
Mr. Justice with whom The Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Brennan join, dissenting.
As the Court recognizes, entitles a attorney of Social Security benefits claimant to a fee “not in percent excess of 25 of the total of the past-due to which is entitled reason of judgment . . . .” (Emphasis added.) The Court the normal reading characterizes and natural of this language “too a technical construction . . . which we adopt.” need not From undisputed fact that bene- fits of a claimant inure to the benefit of the claimant as head of the family, the may seems conclude that it read “claimant” to mean “claimant and his dependents.” Because I see no justification result, for this either the language of the I history, statute or its dissent.
Section 206 deals with the fees respect with to “a claimant under this title who was before the an court attor- litigation necessarily the accrued benefits. Since involves a con- lapse time, many large siderable cases amounts of accrued large benefits, consequently legal fees, are if the claimant his case. wins provide bill
“The committee would that whenever court renders judgment claimant, express authority favorable to a it would have part fee, of its to allow as a reasonable not in excess of benefits, accrued services rendered in connection payable. claim; fee with the no other would . . *6 more than attorney may The no
ney . . . “by rea- payable such a claimant benefits 25% Only .” can meet plaintiffs . . . son such Therefore, aof “claimant.” (b)(1) definition the for parties in a joined not suit dependents are not “claimants,” for are benefits are not past-due do not court, in court, the are not before only petitioner, In this case judgment. receive a plaintiff the in the court was children, not wife his wife petitioner’s As is true in most such cases, below. in separate were administrative children determined eligible secondary bene- dependents to be proceedings benefits § § 202. Their entitlement fits under found entitled to benefits should not and was an issue before disputed 223 was not below. was the sole the court Since only for whom his party the and the court, before I can- representation court, that lawyer provided only lawyer was en- the conclusion that escape a titled to maximum of 25% be dif- petitioner. might The situation well plain- ferent in a case where the were active claimant’s before the court where tiffs sec- attorney provided representation effective ondary claimants as well. purpose (1) clear, the Court makes
As arrangements limiting contingent fee to reduce was attorneys. maximum fees recoverable The clear legislative purpose that this somehow concludes against construction statute which militates wording again which has the of once clear result its attorneys very high percentage to obtain permitting to Social claimants. however, supports plain legislative history, men- Indeed, of the statute. Court fails to language very generated initially by a claim was case tion by petitioner’s made lawyer a contingent fee con- signed by tract petitioner, given which would have lawyer of the award, given should be effect because 40% prior passage entered into to the (b)(1). It just contingent Congress was fees that meant prohibit. By present ruling gives its the Court mere lip legislative service to the effectively mandate while undoing it For practice. foregoing I reasons respectfully dissent.