Green Mountain Fireworks, LLC v. Town of Colchester et al.; Matthew Lavigne v. Town of Colchester et al.
Nos. 2019-131 & 2019-132
Supreme Court of Vermont
2020 VT 64
2020 VT 64
Helen M. Toor, J. (Superior Court); Robinson, J. (Supreme Court)
On Appeal from Superior Court, Chittenden Unit, Civil Division. October Term, 2019.
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions by email at: JUD.Reporter@vermont.gov or by mail at: Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801, of any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.
John L. Franco, Jr., Burlington, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.
Brian P. Monaghan and James F. Conway, III of Monaghan Safar Ducham PLLC, Burlington, for Defendants-Appellees.
¶ 1. ROBINSON, J. This consolidated appeal requires us to determine whether
¶ 2. The record, viewed in the light most favorable to appellants, reveals the following facts. In May 2018, appellants began selling fireworks from a retail store in Colchester, Vermont. As described in their complaint, the “intended purpose” for the store was “to sell retail fireworks to consumers.” In relation to the retail store, appellants obtained a license from the U.S. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) as a “Type 53 - Dealer of Explosives.” They also got a building permit and a certificate of occupancy from the Town Zoning Administrator. These zoning permits were the only two permit applications appellants submitted to the Town.
¶ 3. Shortly after Green Mountain Fireworks opened, the Chief of the Colchester Police Department informed appellants that she believed they were operating illegally because they did not have a municipal permit to sell fireworks under
¶ 4. In response to this information, appellants filed a complaint with the superior court seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. Specifically, they sought a declaration that having received the zoning permits, they have “all possible and applicable permits and that the sales of fireworks by [appellants] as described herein is permissible by
¶ 5. After a hearing on June 26, 2018, the selectboard denied appellants’ application. It concluded that appellants’ zoning permits did not authorize them to sell fireworks under
¶ 6. The superior court then granted the Town‘s motions to dismiss both the Rule 75 appeal and declaratory-judgment action. In interpreting the statute, the superior court noted, “The statute is poorly written.” However, it agreed with the selectboard that the statute requires a distinct municipal permit to sell fireworks and that the zoning permits could not suffice. It also rejected appellants’ arguments that selling fireworks was legal in Colchester because the Town had not established a permitting process, that the selectboard had improperly relied on the standards in subsection (c), and that the selectboard had abused its discretion in its application of that standard.
¶ 7. On appeal to this Court, appellants argue that they are not required to have a distinct permit to sell fireworks because
¶ 8. The Town counters that Vermont law prohibits the sale of fireworks without a valid municipal permit to sell fireworks; that because it is clear from the statute as a whole that the Legislature intended the statute to be applied in the interest of public safety,
¶ 9. We conclude that both parties misconstrue
I. Text of § 3132
¶ 10. Our review of the text of
¶ 11. Our primary goal in interpreting the statute is to carry out the intent of the Legislature. Zlotoff Found., Inc. v. Town of South Hero, 2020 VT 25, ¶ 18, __ Vt. __, __ A.3d __. Our first step in doing so is to examine the statute‘s plain language. Shires Housing, Inc. v. Brown, 2017 VT 60, ¶ 9, 205 Vt. 186, 172 A.3d 1215. If a statute is clear on its face, we will generally accept its plain meaning; if is ambiguous, we look beyond the text of the statute to ascertain the legislative intent. Id. We interpret the statute without deference to the trial court. Severson v. City of Burlington, 2019 VT 41, ¶ 11, __ Vt. __, 215 A.3d 102.
¶ 12. We reproduce the relevant portions of the statute at length because our understanding of
(a) Except as provided in this section, it shall be unlawful for any person, firm, co-partnership, or corporation to do any of the following:
(1) Offer for sale, expose for sale, sell at retail or wholesale, or possess fireworks unless the person has been issued a permit by both the U.S. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms and the municipality in which the person offers for sale and stores the fireworks.
(2) Use, possess, or explode any fireworks unless the person has been issued a permit to display fireworks pursuant to subsection (c) of this section.
. . . .
(b) The state fire marshal shall have power to adopt reasonable rules and regulations for granting permits for supervised public displays of fireworks by municipalities, fair associations, amusement parks, and other organizations or groups of individuals.
(c) Any display for which a permit is issued shall be handled by a competent operator to be approved by the chiefs of police and fire departments of the municipality in which the display is to be held and shall be of a character, and so located, discharged or fired as, in the opinion of the chief of the fire department, or in a municipality with no fire department, the selectboard, after proper inspection, shall not be hazardous to
property or endanger any person or persons. (d) Application for permits shall be made to the chief of the fire department, or in municipalities with no fire department, the selectboard, in writing, at least 15 days in advance of the date of the display. After the permit has been granted, sales, possessions, use and distribution of fireworks for the display shall be lawful for that purpose only. No permit granted under this section shall be transferable.
¶ 13. Based on the plain language of
¶ 14. Second, while we conclude that the statute clearly requires a distinct permit for fireworks sales, little else about the required sales permit is clear. The statute does not plainly set out the scope of the permit or what standards apply in evaluating a permit application.3 Most importantly for this case, it is not clear from the statute whether
¶ 15. This ambiguity stems primarily from the tension between the language of subsection (a)(1) and the conflicting language of subsections (a)(2) and (d). Subsection
¶ 16. The most plausible interpretation of the statute as a whole is that it prohibits the sale of fireworks to purchasers who do not have a permit for a “supervised public display.”
II. Legislative History
¶ 17. Multiple tools of statutory construction strongly reinforce our understanding of the statute. See Shires Housing, Inc., 2017 VT 60, ¶ 9 (explaining that where statute is ambiguous, we must use tools of statutory construction to determine legislative intent, including legislative history, circumstances surrounding statute‘s enactment, evidence of legislative policy at which statute was aimed, and interpretation of agency charged with enforcing statute). The legislative history of the statute reveals that the Legislature intended to allow only the sale of display fireworks, not fireworks generally. Our interpretation promotes the overarching goal of the statute to protect the public from fireworks-related hazards, as well as the goal of the specific amendment authorizing permits to sell display fireworks. And the regulations adopted by the agency charged with enforcing the statute further buttresses our interpretation.
¶ 18. Our analysis of the legislative history focuses primarily on the 2003 amendment to
¶ 20. The Senate then modified the statute to its current language, prohibiting the sale of fireworks in subsection (a)(1), prohibiting the use of fireworks in subsection (a)(2), and adding exceptions in both subsections for individuals with permits to sell or display fireworks, respectively. See H.44 (as proposed by Senate), http://www.leg.state.vt.us/docs/legdoc.cfm?URL=/docs/2004/bills/senate/H-044.HTM&Session=2004 [https://perma.cc/2CNN-QYVT].
¶ 21. After the Senate returned the bill to the House with its proposed amendments, Meredith Sumner, Legislative Counsel, described the rationale for the Senate‘s changes to the House General, Housing and Military Affairs Committee. See An Act to Permit the Sale and Use of Sparklers: Hearing on H.44 Before House Comm. on General, Housing and Military Affairs, 2003-2004 Bien. Sess. (Vt. Apr. 24, 2003). Legislative Counsel explained that the Senate‘s modification to subsection (a)(1) was intended to “clear[] up an ambiguity in the law” with regard to display fireworks, not to allow for new sales of fireworks to consumers without display permits.
The substantive change is in . . . 3132(a), where it lists all those prohibitions. Well in reviewing it, some interested parties noted to me that a technical reading of the law, which I agree with, makes it illegal for those many businesses (one) that store and provide fireworks, not sparklers, but fireworks to people who get permits for—usually municipal or National Life displays—the big permitted displays of fireworks. And that technically, in the years of doing business, in offering for sale, selling, and possessing fireworks they‘ve been in violation of the law. . . . As I looked further, I realized that it also prohibits possessing and exploding, without reference to the permit that allows you to do that. So in those prohibitions, they were re-worded.
¶ 22. The act summary reinforces this intent. See Doncaster v. Hane, 2020 VT 22, ¶ 22, __ Vt. __, __ A.3d __ (noting that while act summary will not override plain language, it may be “helpful in deducing legislative intent where the plain language of the statute is unclear“). The act summary states, “This act retains the prohibition against the sale and use of fireworks, but permits the sale and use of sparklers . . . .” Act Summary, 2003, No. 15, http://www.leg.state.vt.us/docs/legdoc.cfm?URL=/docs/2004/acts/ACT015SUM.HTM [https://perma.cc/P7M9-J8B8] (emphasis added). It goes on to state:
[T]his act remedies an inconsistency in existing law, which allowed public firework displays pursuant to a permit, but technically prohibited a fireworks supplier from storing or selling fireworks. This act amended the law to permit the sale and storage of fireworks provided the fireworks supplier has a permit issued by the U.S. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms and the municipality in which the fireworks are stored.
¶ 23. Contemporaneous press coverage of the bill reinforces our understanding of the Legislature‘s intent by emphasizing that while the bill permitted the use of sparklers, fireworks remained illegal. For instance, shortly before the amendments to the bill passed the Senate, the Rutland Daily Herald credited Lisa Nolen Birmingham—a lobbyist for the U.S. Fireworks Safety Commission who testified numerous times in relation to the bill—as acknowledging that the bill was “not a first step toward seeking legalization of all fireworks” and that “we would come back and fight any attempt to [allow] anything aerial or explosive, because that‘s where the injuries and fires occur.” David Mace, Sparkler Bill Appears Likely to Pass Vt. Senate, Rutland Daily Herald, Apr. 19, 2003, at B5. After the bill‘s passage, the legislative highlights in the Burlington Free Press summarized the bill as “legaliz[ing] the sale and use of sparklers, but not explosive fireworks.” Legislative Highlights, Sparklers, Burlington Free Press, June 1, 2003, at 6A. Other coverage from before and after the bill‘s passage reflected the same understanding. See, e.g., Nancy Remsen, Sparklers Sales Ignite: Fireworks Legal in Time for July 4th, Burlington Free Press, June 28, 2003, at 1A (“The Legislature lifted the ban only on sparklers and another category of devices, including poppers that spew confetti, and balls with fuses that smoke when lighted. The ban remains for other fireworks, such as firecrackers, rockets, cherry bombs and Roman candles.“); Senate Approves Legalizing Sparklers, Bennington Banner, Apr. 21, 2003, at 3 (stating that bill “would make sparklers legal in Vermont” but that it “differentiates sparklers from fireworks, which remain illegal“).
¶ 24. Additionally, our understanding of the Legislature‘s intent is consistent with the statute‘s broader purpose, which is to
¶ 25. The Department of Public Safety‘s interpretation of the statute, as reflected in its implementing regulations, also generally supports our understanding of the statute. See Shires Housing, Inc., 2017 VT 60, ¶ 9. (“[W]here a statute is silent or ambiguous and an agency charged with enforcing the statute has interpreted it, this Court will defer to the agency interpretation of the statute within its area of expertise.“). The Department of Public Safety‘s Division of Fire Safety (DFS) is entrusted with regulating fireworks display permits. See
¶ 26. For all of these reasons, we conclude that it is unlawful in Vermont for any person to offer fireworks for sale except for permitted supervised public displays of fireworks.4
III. Application to This Case
¶ 27. Appellants’ store is intended as a retail store to sell fireworks for use by consumers, without regard to whether the purchasers have permits to possess and display them. In their complaint, appellants refer to Green Mountain Fireworks as a “consumer fireworks retail store (CFRS).” This was true in appellants’ two previous locations in St. Albans and Milton, where they operated out of a tent, and it continued to be true in the brick-and-mortar Green Mountain Fireworks store in Colchester. Appellants expressly sell fireworks “to the public,” rather than—as the Legislature intended—to “people who get permits for . . . the big permitted displays of fireworks.” See
¶ 28. At no time did appellants seek a declaratory judgment or permit that would authorize them to operate as a dealer of display fireworks under the statute. Their complaint sought a declaratory judgment that “the sales of fireworks by [appellants] as described herein is permissible by
¶ 29. For these reasons, we need not address the parties’ other arguments, and we conclude that the trial court did not err in ruling in the Town‘s favor in the Rule 75 appeal and the declaratory-judgment action.
Affirmed.
FOR THE COURT:
Associate Justice
