Grayton Koenig v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.
740 F.3d 1035
5th Cir.
2014
Check Treatment
Docket

Pamela RICHARDSON, Plaintiff-Appellee v. WELLS FARGO BANK, NA.; Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation, Defendants-Appellants.

No. 13-10002.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Jan. 24, 2014.

740 F.3d 1035

EDITH H. JONES, Circuit Judge

disclosure of information on an IRS form was unlawful compelled speech: “There is no right to refrain from speaking when ‘essential operations of government require it for the preservation of an orderly society—as in the case of compulsion to give evidence in court.‘” (quoting ).

And in , a sex offender challenged Tennessee‘s Sex Offender Registration and Monitoring Act. Although not bringing the compelled speech argument Arnold presses, argued that the registration requirements violated his constitutional “right to privacy.” . The court rejected that theory, holding that “the Constitution does not provide Cutshall with a right to keep his registry information private.” .

Arnold has not urged that SORNA either requires him (a) to affirm a religious, political, or ideological belief he disagrees with or (b) to be a moving billboard for a governmental ideological message. In fact, it appears that Congress enacted SORNA as a means to protect the public from sex offenders by providing a uniform mechanism to identify those convicted of certain crimes.10 and do not therefore require us to conclude that the government has unlawfully compelled Arnold‘s speech.

Our limited sister-court precedent further supports this view. The logic of Sindel extends to the present case: When the government, to protect the public, requires sex offenders to register their residence, it conducts an “essential operation[] of [the] government,” just as it does when it requires individuals to disclose information for tax collection. And as notes, the Constitution does not provide Arnold “with a right to keep his registry information private.”

The judgment based on the order denying Arnold‘s § 2255 motion is AFFIRMED. Arnold‘s motion for appointment of counsel is DENIED.

Jack B. Peacock, Jr., Tracy M. Turner, Gagnon, Peacock & Shanklin, P.C., Dallas, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Robert Thompson Mowrey, William Scott Hastings, Esq., Jennifer Lynette Kinney, Jason Levi Sanders, Esq., Locke Lord, L.L.P., Dallas, TX, for Defendants-Appellants.

Before JONES, WIENER, and GRAVES, Circuit Judges.

EDITH H. JONES, Circuit Judge:

The sole question presented here is whether Appellants Wells Fargo, N.A., et al. (“Wells Fargo“) can move for attorney‘s fees under Rule 54(d)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Appellee Pamela Richardson (“Richardson“) sued Wells Fargo in Texas state court. After Wells Fargo removed the case to federal court, the district court dismissed all of Richardson‘s claims. Wells Fargo then filed a motion for attorney‘s fees, which the district court denied as being unauthorized by Rule 54(d)(2). We conclude that the bank may utilize this Rule and therefore reverse and remand the case for further proceedings.

I.

In 2006, Richardson borrowed $240,950.00 from Wells Fargo to refinance the mortgage on her property in Grapevine, Texas. The debt was secured by a deed of trust. In 2009, Richardson defaulted on her mortgage payments. The following year, Wells Fargo offered Richardson a “Special Forbearance Plan.” After Richardson failed to comply with the terms of this plan, Wells Fargo sold the property at a foreclosure sale to Freddie Mac for $247,763.62. Richardson then brought suit, asserting claims related to Wells Fargo‘s foreclosure and Freddie Mac‘s attempts to evict her. On June 29, 2012, the district court dismissed all of Richardson‘s claims on summary judgment.

The district court first raised the procedural question at issue here. Following the entry of final judgment, Wells Fargo moved for attorney‘s fees under Rule 54(d)(2), which provides that claims for attorney‘s fees “must be made by motion unless the substantive law requires those fees to be proved at trial as an element of damages.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(d)(2)(A). Wells Fargo relied on a standard provision from Richardson‘s deed of trust that supports recovery of the legal fees it incurred in defending against her claims. Richardson disputed that the deed of trust allowed Wells Fargo to recover attorney‘s fees, but did not object to using Rule 54(d)(2) as a vehicle for resolving the matter. After Richardson responded to the motion, the district court sua sponte requested additional briefing on whether Rule 54(d)(2) was available to Wells Fargo in light of the Rule‘s exception for claims that “must be proved at trial as an element of damages.” Ultimately, the district court held that Wells Fargo had a substantive right to attorney‘s fees under the deed of trust, but the bank could not recover these fees under Rule 54(d)(2) because they were an element of damages. The district court explained that Wells Fargo could have recovered attorney‘s fees by pursuing a counterclaim, but it refused to reopen the pleadings for this purpose. Wells Fargo then appealed.

II.

This Court reviews legal questions regarding the application of Rule 54(d)(2) de novo. . As noted, the Rule generally prescribes that claims for attorney‘s fees must be made by motion, but carves an exception where “the substantive law requires those fees to be proved at trial as an element of damages.” Because federal jurisdiction is premised on diversity, we apply the substantive law of Texas. . Under Texas law, attorney‘s fees are recoverable as a cost of collection only if authorized by statute or contract. . Wells Fargo‘s claim for attorney‘s fees arises under the deed of trust. Accordingly, we consider whether the attorney‘s fees claimed under this agreement are damages under Texas law.

III.

Texas courts “have long distinguished attorney‘s fees from damages.” . To differentiate the two, Texas courts draw a distinction between “compensation owed for an underlying harm and fees that may be awarded for counsel‘s services.” . Thus, attorney‘s fees for the prosecution or defense of a claim are not damages under Texas law. Texas courts also recognize, however, that in some cases attorney‘s fees are compensation for an underlying harm and therefore recoverable as damages. For example, attorney‘s fees are considered damages if the fees are incurred in litigation with a third party, or if the fees are unpaid legal bills sought in a breach of contract action against a client, or if the fees are expended before litigation to obtain title from a third party to whom defendants had wrongfully transferred title.1 In these cases, the legal fees constitute “an independent ground of recovery,” (quoting ), and are therefore distinguishable from the collateral legal costs associated with collecting a debt or prosecuting or defending against a pending lawsuit.

Here, the deed of trust provided for attorney‘s fees to compensate Wells Fargo, inter alia, for the prosecution or defense of a claim. The agreement stated, in pertinent part:

Protection of Lender‘s Interest in the Property and Rights: Under this Security Instrument. If (a) Borrower fails to perform the covenants and agreements contained in this Security Instrument, (b) there is a legal proceeding that might significantly affect Lender‘s interest in the Property and/or rights under this Security Instrument ..., or (c) Borrower has abandoned the Property, then Lender may do and pay for whatever is reasonable or appropriate to protect Lender‘s interest in the Property and rights under this Security Instrument,.... Lender‘s actions can include, but are not limited to: (a) paying any sums secured by a lien which has priority over this Security Instrument; (b) appearing in court; and (c) paying reasonable attorneys’ fees to protect its interest in the Property and/or rights under this Security Instrument. (emphasis added).

Attorney‘s fees sought under this provision are expressly distinguished from the damages that Wells Fargo incurs whenever the bank‘s substantive interest in Richardson‘s property is harmed by the borrower‘s failure to perform. The fees are not an “independent ground of recovery.” They are the costs of collection or costs incurred to protect the bank‘s interest in the mortgaged property and its rights under the security agreement.

Richardson, echoing the district court, asserts that the following language from another provision of the deed of trust demonstrates that the attorney‘s fees are damages: “Any amounts disbursed by Lender under this Section 9 shall become additional debt of Borrower secured by this Security Instrument.” Richardson contends that, under this provision, Wells Fargo‘s attorney‘s fees are part of her contractual debt. True enough, but how this makes any difference under Texas law is a mystery that Richardson does not attempt to solve. The additional debt provision speaks only to the manner in which Wells Fargo‘s attorney‘s fees will be collected. It authorizes the bank to collect its attorney‘s fees from the proceeds of a foreclosure sale or through a separate judgment in the event that the foreclosure proceeds are insufficient to reimburse fees. The mechanism of collecting attorney‘s fees, however, has no relevance under Texas law to determining whether those fees are in the nature of damages or collateral costs.

According to the district court, “No reasonable argument can be made that facts establishing the existence and amount of [Richardson‘s] indebtedness do not have to be proved at trial as elements of damages.” . Yet this assertion is contrary to numerous decisions of other district courts that have granted Rule 54(d)(2) motions to recover attorney‘s fees provided by contracts that included the same additional debt term.2 See, e.g., ; ; . Although some lenders have counterclaimed for attorney‘s fees, as opposed to moving under Rule 54(d)(2), none of the courts reviewing these counterclaims characterized the attorney‘s fees as damages on account of the additional debt language. See, e.g., ; . The consensus among these district courts exists for good reason. Holding otherwise would invite needless satellite litigation over the possible procedural ramifications of contractual attorney‘s fee language, which is contrary to the aim of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (declining to restrict a court‘s authority to sanction litigants where restriction “would serve only to foster extensive and needless satellite litigation, which is contrary to the aim of the Rules themselves“); see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(d)(1) (providing that no “technical form” is required in pleading a claim).

Richardson contends that Wells Fargo must prove its attorney‘s fees as damages because they are authorized by contract. In support, Richardson relies on the Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 54(d)(2) and two district court cases, and . None of these authorities, however, proves that Rule 54(d)(2) is always off-limits to attorney‘s fees provided by contract. The Advisory Committee Notes indicate that Rule 54(d)(2) is inapplicable “to fees recoverable as an element of damages, as when sought under the terms of a contract.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(d)(2) (1993 Advisory Committee Notes). The Notes set no bright-line rule that fees sought under the terms of “any contract” or “all contracts” must be considered damages. Instead, attorney‘s fees provided by contract are an example of fees that might be recoverable as an element of damages. The language of the contract and the nature of the claim are the dispositive factors concerning whether the fees are an element of damages or collateral litigation costs. Moreover, the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits have rejected Caremark‘s and Allgood‘s blanket prohibition against Rule 54(d)(2) motions to recover fees provided by contract. Those circuit courts considered the text of Rule 54(d)(2) and the Advisory Committee Notes and concluded that, in appropriate situations, contractual attorney‘s fees may be pursued under Rule 54(d)(2). (holding that the party seeking contractual attorney‘s fees is entitled to a decision on the merits); (per curiam) (same). For the reasons stated immediately above, we agree that motions for attorney‘s fees provided by contract are permissible under Rule 54(d)(2).

Accordingly, the district court‘s order denying Wells Fargo‘s motion for attorney‘s fees is REVERSED and the case is REMANDED for resolution of the motion on its merits.

EDITH H. JONES

UNITED STATES CIRCUIT JUDGE

Notes

2
The attorney‘s fee provision in the deed of trust is a standard term used by Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac when originating single-family residential mortgage loans. See Form 3044: Texas Deed of Trust, http://www.freddiemac.com/uniform/unifsecurity.html (last visited Jan. 13, 2014).
10
See Applicability of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act, 28 C.F.R. § 72 (2007) (“The SORNA reforms are generally designed to strengthen and increase the effectiveness of sex offender registration and notification for the protection of the public, and to eliminate potential gaps and loopholes under the pre-existing standards by means of which sex offenders could attempt to evade registration requirements or the consequences of registration violations.“).
Read the detailed case summary