GRAY v. THE STATE
S18A1583
Supreme Court of Georgia
December 10, 2018
304 Ga. 799
FINAL COPY
MELTON, Chief Justice.
Following a jury trial, Bobby Eugene Gray appeals his convictions for murder and related crimes, contending that the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict, the verdict was contrary to and against the weight of the evidence, and that the trial court and defense counsel made certain evidentiary еrrors.1 For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.
Redress,” and the trial court granted an out-of-time appeal on January 26, 2014, directing the appeal to be filed within 30 days. No timely notice of appeal or motion for new trial was filed. On May 22, 2014, the trial court granted Gray an extension until July 31, 2014, even though it was not authorized to do so. See
[Gray] may file another request for an out-of-time appeal in the trial court. If the trial court grants an out-of-time appeal, [Gray] will have 30 days from the entry of the trial court’s order within which to file a notice of appeal.
On June 14, 2018, Gray filed a request for an out-of-time appeal with the trial сourt, and the trial court granted the appeal on the same day. Gray then filed this timely notice of appeal on July 6, 2018. See Rowland v. State, 264 Ga. 872, 875 (2) (452 SE2d 756) (1995). The appeal was docketed in this Court for the August 2018 term and submitted for decision on the briefs.
1. In the light most favorable to the verdict, the record shows that, on November 9, 2001, James Stewart Odоm picked Gray up from a friend’s house, and the two men drove around drinking and smoking crack cocaine. Over the course of the night, Odom and Gray made several drug purchases, which Odom paid for because Gray did not have any money
Evidence collected and observed by law enforcement supported this version of events. On November 13, 2001, Officer Paul Garland was dispatched to Evans’s housе, where he found Evans’s dead body, covered in blood and slumped over on the couch. Evans had lacerations to his head and stab wounds on his chest. The GBI medical examiner confirmed Evans’s cause of death was from one of two stab wounds to the chest, inflicted by a cutting instrument like a knife going at least “two to three inches” into Evans’s heart.3 He also testified that Evans suffered blunt force injuries and abrasions on the top part of his head consistent with being hit or pushed against something about seven to nine times.4 In addition, evidence of the following was found in the house: Evans’s pants on the living room floor with the pockets turned inside out; pooled blood and blood spatter throughout the living room; dried blood and athletic shoe footprints on the kitchen floor and blood on the sink; and two trophies with bloodstains on the hardwood floor near the front door. Gray’s fingerprint was
found on one of the trophies along with Evans’s blood.
On November 14, 2001, Gray was placed under arrest at the Clayton County Police
Gray contends that there was insufficient evidence to convict him of the crimes for which he was found guilty. We disagree. The evidence presented at trial was sufficient to enable the jury to find Gray guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimеs for which he was convicted.5 Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979). See also
2. Gray contends that the evidence was sufficiently close to warrant this Court to exercise discretion pursuant to the general grounds set forth in
As this Court has previously explained,
[a] motion for new trial based on
OCGA § 5-5-20 , i.e., that the verdict is contrary to the evidence, addresses itself only to the discretion of the trial judge. Whether to grant a new trial based onOCGA § 5-5-21 , i.e., that the verdict is strongly against the evidence, is one that is solely in the discretion of the trial court, and the appellate courts do not have the same discretion to order new trials.
(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Dent v. State, 303 Ga. 110, 114 (2) (810 SE2d 527) (2018). Consequently, when this Court reviews a trial court’s denial of a new trial based upon the general grounds, “this Court must review the case under the standard set forth in Jackson v. Virginia, supra.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Id. As this Court determined in Division 1, supra, that standard has been met.
3. Gray contends that the trial court erred in failing to suppress his in-custody statements to law enforcement on November 14, 2001. Specifically, Gray argues that, because Detective James Walker violated his rights by having a conversation with him after he told Detective Harris that he did not wish to speak any longer, his ensuing statements should be suppressed. We disagree.
The United States Supreme Court has held that when an individual in custody “indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease,” and “any statement taken after the person invokes his privilege cannot be other than the product of compulsion.” Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 473-474 (III) (86 SCt 1602, 16 LE2d 694) (1966). However, “[i]f, after invoking his Fifth Amendment rights, a defendant is found to have initiated contact with authorities and then knowingly and intelligently waived his rights, his ensuing statements will be considered proрerly obtained.” Mack v. State, 296 Ga. 239, 244 (2) (765 SE2d 896) (2014), citing Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 1045 (103 SCt 2830, 77 LE2d 405) (1983) (plurality opinion).
Testimony at the Jackson-Denno hearing showed that, when Gray was brought into the station, Detective Walker sat with him until Detective Harris was available. At that point, Detective Harris began the interview with Gray without Detective Walker in the room.6 Detective Harris first asked Gray about
the night of the murder, and Gray denied knowing Evans, hanging out with Odom, or being at Evans’s house. Detective Harris then read Gray his Miranda warnings, and Gray stated that he understood his rights and was still willing to talk.7 Detective Harris asked Gray
Walker, Gray stated that he was being “framed” for murder. Detective Walker then asked Gray if that is why he was there, to which Gray responded, “yes.” Then, after Gray’s third comment about bеing framed for murder, Gray also volunteered to Detective Walker that Detective Harris had previously indicated that his fingerprint was found on a trophy in Evans’s home. At this point, Detective Walker said that if Detective Harris told Gray that information, that it was not a lie, and he suggested that if Gray knew any information that might help him, hе should speak with Detective Harris. Gray then requested to speak with Detective Harris again. Detective Harris re-entered the room and read Gray his Miranda rights for the second time. After waiving his rights again, Gray admitted that he was with Odom on the night of the murder, that he and Odom discussed wanting money from Evans at some point during the night, and that he went into Evans’s house and picked up the trophy while inside. Gray contends that these statements were not admissible because he had invoked his right to silence, and he had not voluntarily initiated renewed questioning.
“On appeal, the reviewing court must accept the trial court’s findings of disputed fact regarding ‘initiation’ unless clearly erroneous.” Mack, supra, 296 Ga. at 248 (2) (b). However, we must also independently review “whether any actual renewal of contact by the suspect, in the context of the entire interaction
between law enforcement authorities and the accused, constitutes a legally effective ‘initiation.’” Id. at 248-249 (2) (b).
Here, Gray’s right to remain silent was not violated. First, it is not in dispute that Detective Harris “scrupulously honored [Gray’s] . . . invocation of his right to remain silent by immediately stopping his interview and physically exiting the interview room.” Griffin v. State, 280 Ga. 683, 686 (2) (631 SE2d 671) (2006). See also Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 104 (96 SCt 321, 46 LE2d 313) (1975) (confessions are unconstitutionally coerced from a defendant when the accused’s right to cut off questioning wаs not scrupulously honored after he or she decided to remain silent). See generally Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at 457-458 (I). Detective Walker’s subsequent initial conversation with Gray about non-case-related matters did not constitute “express questioning by law enforcement officers or its functional equivalent,” and thus was not an improper intеrrogation. (Citation and punctuation omitted.) State v. Brown, 287 Ga. 473, 476 (2) (697 SE2d 192) (2010). See also Taylor v. State, 303 Ga. 225, 231 (5) (811 SE2d 286) (2018) (there was no interrogation where the officer told a defendant, who had invoked her right to remain silent, that if she ate something she could smoke a cigarette outside, and she subsequently made spontaneous confessions about the case while outside with the officer, because the officer’s
actions were “not calculated to elicit an incriminating response”).
Further, to the extent that Detective Walker’s later responses to Gray’s comments about being framed and his fingerprint being on the trophy could be characterized as an interrogation, Gray initiated the renewed
grounds by Toomer v. State, 292 Ga. 49 (734 SE2d 333) (2012). After Gray requested to speak with Detective Harris again, Detective Harris re-read Gray his Miranda rights, and Gray re-signed the Miranda form, validly waiving his rights. Thus, Gray’s subsequent admissions to Detective Harris were properly obtained and admissible in trial. There was no error.
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.
Decided December 10, 2018.
Murder. Clayton Superior Court. Before Judge Carter.
Darrell B. Reynolds, Sr., for appellant.
Tracy Graham Lawson, District Attorney, Elizabeth A. Baker, Todd E. Naugle, Assistant District Attorneys; Christopher M. Carr, Attorney General, Patricia B. Attaway Burton, Deputy Attorney General, Paula K. Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Matthew B. Crowder, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.