GRAY v. THE STATE
S18A1583
Supreme Court of Georgia
December 10, 2018
304 Ga. 799
MELTON, Chief Justice
MELTON, Chief Justice.
Following a jury trial, Bobby Eugene Gray appeals his convictions for murder and related crimes, contending that the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict, the verdict was contrary to and against the weight of the evidence, and that the trial court and defense counsel made certain evidentiary errоrs.1 For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.
[Grаy] may file another request for an out-of-time appeal in the trial court. If the trial court grants an out-of-time appeal, [Gray] will have 30 days from the entry of the trial court’s order within which to file a notice of appeal.
On June 14, 2018, Gray filed a request for an out-of-time appeal with the trial court, and the triаl court granted the appeal on the same day. Gray then filed this timely notice of appeal on July 6, 2018. See Rowland v. State, 264 Ga. 872, 875 (2) (452 SE2d 756) (1995). The appeal was docketed in this Court for the August 2018 term and submitted for decision on the briefs.
1. In the light most favorable to the verdict, the record shows that, on November 9, 2001, James Stewart Odom picked Gray uр from a friend’s house, and the two men drove around drinking and smoking crack cocaine. Over the course of the night, Odom and Gray made several drug purchases, which Odom paid for because Gray did not have any money at the time. At one point, Odom and Gray went to a body shop where Gray worked so that Gray could get money for another drug transaction. Gray spoke with someone inside the shop and then
On November 14, 2001, Gray was placed under arrest at the Clayton County Police Department. Gray signed a waiver of rights form two separate times and engaged in two interviews with Detective Michael Harris that took place less than an hour apart. During the second interview, Gray confessed that he was with Odom on the night of the murder, that he and Odom had discussed wanting money from Evans at some point during the night, and that he went into Evans’s house and picked up the trophy while inside.
Gray contends that there was insufficient evidence to convict him of the crimes for which he was found guilty. We disagree. The evidence presented at trial was sufficient to enable the jury to find Gray guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimes for which he was convicted.5 Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979). See also
As this Court has previously explained,
[a] motion for new trial based on
OCGA § 5-5-20 , i.e., that the verdict is contrary to the evidence, addresses itself only to the discretion of the trial judge. Whether to grant a new trial based onOCGA § 5-5-21 , i.e., that the verdict is strongly against the evidence, is one that is solely in the discretion of the trial court, and the appellate courts do not have the same discretion to order new trials.
(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Dent v. State, 303 Ga. 110, 114 (2) (810 SE2d 527) (2018). Consequently, when this Court reviews a trial court’s denial of a new trial based upon the general grounds, “this Court must review the case under the standard set forth in Jackson v. Virginia, supra.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Id. As this Court determined in Division 1, supra, that standard has been met.
3. Gray contends that the trial court erred in failing to suppress his in-custody statements to law enforcement on November 14, 2001. Specifically, Gray argues that, because Detective James Walker violated his rights by having a conversation with him after he told Detective Harris that he did not wish to
The United States Supreme Court has held that when an individual in custody “indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease,” and “any statement taken after the person invokes his privilege cannot be other than the product of compulsion.” Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 473-474 (III) (86 SCt 1602, 16 LE2d 694) (1966). However, “[i]f, after invoking his Fifth Amendment rights, a defendant is found to have initiated contact with authorities and then knowingly and intelligently waived his rights, his ensuing statements will be considered properly obtained.” Mack v. State, 296 Ga. 239, 244 (2) (765 SE2d 896) (2014), citing Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 1045 (103 SCt 2830, 77 LE2d 405) (1983) (plurality opinion).
Testimony at the Jackson-Denno hearing showed that, when Gray was brought into thе station, Detective Walker sat with him until Detective Harris was available. At that point, Detective Harris began the interview with Gray without Detective Walker in the room.6 Detective Harris first asked Gray about
“On appeal, the reviewing court must accept the trial court’s findings of disputed fact regarding ‘initiation’ unless clearly erroneous.” Mack, supra, 296 Ga. at 248 (2) (b). However, we must also independently review “whether any actual renewal of contact by the suspect, in the context of the entire interaction
Here, Gray’s right to remain silent was not violated. First, it is not in dispute that Detective Harris “scrupulously honored [Gray’s] . . . invocation of his right to remain silent by immediately stopping his interview and physically exiting the interview room.” Griffin v. State, 280 Ga. 683, 686 (2) (631 SE2d 671) (2006). See also Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 104 (96 SCt 321, 46 LE2d 313) (1975) (confessions are unconstitutionally coerced from a defendant when the accused’s right to cut off questioning was not scrupulously honored after he or she decided to remain silent). See generally Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at 457-458 (I). Dеtective Walker’s subsequent initial conversation with Gray about non-case-related matters did not constitute “express questioning by law enforcement officers or its functional equivalent,” and thus was not an improper interrogation. (Citation and punctuation omitted.) State v. Brown, 287 Ga. 473, 476 (2) (697 SE2d 192) (2010). See also Taylor v. State, 303 Ga. 225, 231 (5) (811 SE2d 286) (2018) (there was no interrogation where the officеr told a defendant, who had invoked her right to remain silent, that if she ate something she could smoke a cigarette outside, and she subsequently made spontaneous confessions about the case while outside with the officer, because the officer’s
Further, to the extent that Detective Walker’s later responses to Gray’s comments about being framed and his fingerprint being on the trophy could be characterized as an interrogation, Gray initiated the renewed contact by “speak[ing] up first” and thereby “reflect[ing] a desire to discuss the investigation at hand.” Mack, supra, 296 Ga. at 246 (2) (b). See also Brown, supra, 287 Ga. at 477 (2) (defendant repeatedly initiated conversation, unprompted by an interrogation posture, when he continually interrupted detectives to discuss case-related topics, including his concern for the victim). See also Bradshaw, supra, 462 U.S. at 1045 (plurality opinion) (distinguishing between inquiries “relating to routine incidents of the custodiаl relationship” that did not meet the standard for initiation, and those “represent[ing] a desire on the part of an accused to open up a more generalized discussion relating directly or indirectly to the investigation”). Here, Gray made three unsolicited comments to Detective Walker about being framеd. And Detective Walker responded by asking Gray if that is why he was there only after Gray brought up the case first. Walton v. State, 267 Ga. 713, 718 (4) (482 SE2d 330) (1997) (“[A]n accused’s response to an officer’s answer to a question posed by the accused is not the product of custodial interrogation.”), disapproved on other
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.
Murder. Clayton Superior Court. Before Judge Carter.
Darrell B. Reynolds, Sr., for appellant.
Tracy Graham Lawson, District Attorney, Elizabeth A. Baker, Todd E. Naugle, Assistant District Attorneys; Christopher M. Carr, Attorney General, Patricia B. Attaway Burton, Deputy Attorney General, Paula K. Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Matthew B. Crowder, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
