GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES RETIREMENT SYSTEM OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES VIRGIN ISLANDS Appellant, v. Charles TURNBULL, Ph.D., as Governor of the Virgin Islands; Government of the Virgin Islands; Legislature of the United States Virgin Islands.
No. 04-2342.
United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.
Decided May 16, 2005.
Argued April 20, 2005.
I.
Because we write only for the parties, who are familiar with the facts, procedural history and contentions presented, we will not recite them except as necessary to the discussion.
II.
We decide that the District Court did not err in concluding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to review the Planning Board‘s decision. An adjudication of municipal actions or zoning board and planning board decisions are accomplished by actions in lieu of prerogative writs. See
III.
We must decide also whether the relief Hott sought was within the scope of the settlement agreement between the parties. The District Court correctly held that “[n]either the settlement agreement with the City nor the Constitution gives Plaintiff the blanket right to open its business without complying with applicable land use regulations and obtaining the appropriate site plan approvals.” (Dist. Ct. Op. at 24.) Even if the relief was within the scope of the settlement agreement, the District Court could not enforce the settlement against the Planning Board because the Board was never a party to the underlying litigation or the settlement agreement.
IV.
The final issue is whether the District Court should have appointed a Special Master to ensure that the settlement was implemented going forward. Appointment of a Special Master is warranted to: (1) perform duties consented to by the parties; (2) hold trial proceedings and make findings of facts if there is an “exceptional condition” or the issues involve a “difficult computation of damages;” or (3) address pre-trial and post-trial motions that cannot be addressed effectively by a judge.
* * * * * *
We have considered all contentions of the parties and conclude that no further discussion is necessary. The judgment of the District Court will be affirmed.
Vincent F. Frazer, (Argued), Law Office of Frazer & Williams, Charlotte Amalie, St. Thomas, USVI, for Appellant.
Yvonne L. Tharpes, (Argued), Office of the Legislative Legal Counsel, Charlotte Amalie, St. Thomas, USVI, for Appellee Legislature of the United States Virgin Islands.
Before NYGAARD, RENDELL, and SMITH, Circuit Judges.
OPINION OF THE COURT
NYGAARD, Circuit Judge.
Appellant, Government Employees Retirement System of the Government of the United States Virgin Islands (“GERS“), filed this action against Charles Turnbull, in his capacity as Governor of the Virgin Islands; the Legislature of the Virgin Islands; and the Government of the Virgin Islands (“Appellees“). GERS appeals the District Court‘s order granting Appellees’ Motion to Dismiss. For reasons different from those given by the District Court, we will affirm.
I.
On June 24, 1959, the Legislature passed legislation enacting GERS. GERS was established as an employee benefit and pension plan for employees of the Government of the Virgin Islands. The legislation provided that GERS would be financed by contributions from the employees, the Government as employer, and investments and interest income. Although the legislature granted management authority to a Board of Trustees to operate and manage GERS, it reserved for itself the power and responsibility to determine and adjust the contribution rates. See
This is not the first time the District Court has considered complaints about the unfunded liability of the system and the Government‘s refusal to make contributions.1 In the case now on appeal, GERS filed suit for an injunction, damages to recover monies that are owed to it, and to force the Government to comply with its contractual obligations. The Legislature filed a motion to dismiss the complaint. The District Court heard argument on the motion. After a hiatus of nearly two years, the Court granted the motion to dismiss without an opinion, concluding GERS failed to show the existence of a contractual obligation arising from the local statute establishing GERS, and therefore it lacked standing. Additionally, because no federal claims were properly before the Court, it held that it lacked pendent jurisdiction over the local claims. GERS filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which the District Court denied, also without an opinion. This appeal followed.
II.
Although neither party raises the question of our jurisdiction, federal courts are bound by the justiciability doctrines of Article III of the United States Constitution. Here, the ripeness doctrine is dispositive.
Ripeness, like other justiciability doctrines, ultimately derives from Article III‘s requirement that federal courts may decide only cases and controversies. Felmeister v. Office of Attorney Ethics, 856 F.2d 529, 535 (3d Cir. 1988); see also Nextel Communications of the Mid-Atlantic, Inc. v. City of Margate, 305 F.3d 188, 192 (3d Cir. 2002). Considerations of ripeness are sufficiently important that we are required to raise the issue sua sponte, even when the parties do not question our jurisdiction. Id. (citing Suburban Trails, Inc. v. New Jersey Trans. Corp., 800 F.2d 361, 365 (3d Cir. 1986)).
The Supreme Court has stated that to meet the ripeness standard, plaintiffs must show either a specific present objective harm or the threat of specific future harm. Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 14, 92 S.Ct. 2318, 33 L.Ed.2d 154 (1972). Furthermore, “[a] claim is not ripe for adjudication if it rests upon contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all.” Texas v. United States, 523 U.S. 296, 300, 118 S.Ct. 1257, 140 L.Ed.2d 406 (1998) (internal citations omitted).
In 1994, Claude Malloy and three other retirees brought suit against GERS and the Government alleging claims under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, along with claims for waste, mismanagement, and breach of fiduciary duty. The District Court dismissed the bulk of the plaintiffs’ claims for lack of standing, and then dismissed the territorial and common law claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Malloy v. Monsato, 30 V.I. 164, 187-89 (D.V.I. 1994).
Because this case is not ripe for judicial review, it does not present a justiciable “case or controversy.” Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court‘s order dismissing the complaint.