GOLDSTEIN et al. v. GENERAL MOTORS LLC
Case No.: 3:19-cv-1778-JLS-AHG
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
February 3, 2021
ECF No. 55
(ECF No. 55)
Prеsently before the Court is Defendant General Motors LLC‘s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Class Complaint. (“Mot.,” ECF No. 55.) Plaintiffs filed a Response in Opposition to Defendant‘s Motion (“Opp‘n,” ECF No. 56), and Defendant filed a Reply (“Reply,” ECF No. 58). The Court took this matter under submission without oral argument pursuant to
BACKGROUND
On May 13, 2020, Plaintiffs filed a Second Amended Complaint in this putative class action against Defendant General Motors LLC. See generally Second Amended Complaint
Plaintiffs seek to represent all persons and entities who purchased or leased a Class Vehicle equipped with Defendant‘s CUE touch screen display in the state of California. Id. ¶ 165. Additionally, Plaintiffs seek to represent a Consumers Legal Remedies Act (“CLRA“) Sub-Class of “all members of the Class who are ‘consumers’ within the meaning of
The CUE “infotainment” system is an audio/visual interface comprised of a touch screen module that provides “entertainment and information delivery to drivers.” Id. ¶ 39. The CUE controls the audio, phone, and climate inputs for the car and displays the rear-view camera when the vehicle is in reverse. Id. ¶¶ 40–51. The CUE is made of two major components: a projected capacitance touch screen and a plastic cover. Id. ¶¶ 56–58.
Plaintiffs allege that the CUE is defective. Id. ¶ 60. Plaintiffs allege that the “plastic cover is prone to delaminating or separating from the touch screen glass” due to either mechanical or thermal stress. Id. ¶¶ 60, 62. When the plastic cover separates, Plaintiffs allege it causes a “spider-web-like pattern on the display” to form, which in turn prevents the CUE from recognizing any touch input from a user (the “Defect“). Id. ¶ 60.
Plaintiffs allege that the CUE is “defectively designed” beсause of the placement of the screws and rubberized gasket that hold the plastic cover to the frame of the CUE. Id. ¶ 63. The plastic cover is anchored to the touch screen by eight screws. Id. ¶ 64. Plaintiffs allege that only two screws are placed on “the bottom portion of the plastic cover, which causes it to flex and move when pressure is applied.” Id. According to Plaintiffs, this makes the plastic cover prone to separating from the touch screen glass. Id. ¶ 66. Plaintiffs
Plaintiffs allege that Defendant “knew, or should have known, about the Defect . . . .” Id. ¶ 79. In support of this allegation, Plaintiffs cite to four service bulletins and service bulletin updates (“Technical Service Bulletins” or “TSBs“) that Defendant allegedly issued to its dealers in the United States between December 2014 and August 2017. Id. ¶¶ 82–89. Plaintiffs claim that these Technical Service Bulletins demonstrated that Defendant “was aware of the Defect and recognized it was covered under its Warranty.” Id. ¶ 89. These TSBs stated that “[s]ome customers may report that their radio screen appears bubbled, cracked, or is delaminating” and directed dealers to “replace the ICS (Integrated Center Stack) by following the SI replacement procedure.” Id. ¶ 83. Plaintiffs also point to various consumer complaints filed with the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (“NHTSA“) as evidence that Defendant was aware of the Defect. Id. ¶ 93. Similarly, Plaintiffs allege that Defendant was aware of the Defect because of complaints made “by consumers on internet forums” that Defendant allegedly monitored. Id. ¶¶ 94–99. Plaintiffs argue that Defendant was aware of these complaints because Defendant responded to complaints through its agents by making online postings in the various internet forums. Id. Lastly, Plaintiffs allege that Defendant was aware of the Defect “based on the large number of repairs performed to the CUE System‘s exhibiting delamination and spiderwebbing at its network of dealerships.” Id. ¶¶ 100–02.
Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiffs’ SAC for failure to state a claim under
“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, tо ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.‘” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570); see also
Additionally, claims sounding in fraud are subject to the heightened pleading requirements of
Where a motion to dismiss is granted, “leave to amend should be granted ‘unless the court determines that the allegation of other facts consistent with the challenged pleading could not possibly cure the deficiency.‘” DeSoto v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 957 F.2d 655, 658 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting Schreiber Distrib. Co. v. Serv-Well Furniture Co., 806 F.2d 1393, 1401 (9th Cir. 1986)). In other words, where leave to amend would be futile, the Court may deny leave to amend. See Desoto, 957 F.2d at 658; Schreiber, 806 F.2d at 1401.
ANALYSIS
I. Plaintiffs’ Fraud Claims
Defendant argues that Plaintiffs’ CLRA, unfair competition law (“UCL“), and fraudulent concealment claims should be dismissed based on multiple grounds. Specifically, Defendant argues that (1) the CLRA, UCL, and fraudulent concealment claims sound in fraud and fail to meet
A. Rule 9(b)‘s Specificity Requirement
Generally, fraud claims are subject to a heightened pleading standard that requires claims to be pleaded with particularity. Boschma v. Home Loan Ctr., Inc., 198 Cal. App. 4th 230, 248 (2011) (“Fraud must be pleaded with specificity rather than with general and conclusory allegations.” (internal quotations and citation omitted)). However, because fraudulent omission alleges “a failure to act instead of an affirmative act,” various district courts in the Ninth Circuit have found that fraudulent omission claims “can succeed without the same level of specificity required by a normal fraud claim.” Baggett v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 582 F. Supp. 2d 1261, 1267 (C.D. Cal. 2007) (internal quotations omitted).
“Despite this distinction, claims sounding in fraud, even concealment or omission claims, still must be pled with particularity.” Stewart v. Electrolux Home Prod., Inc., 304 F. Supp. 3d 894, 906 (E.D. Cal. 2018) (citing Kearns, 567 F.3d at 1127 (“[T]he contention that . . . nondisclosure claims need not be pleaded with particularity is unavailing.“)). Here, Plaintiffs must describe “the content of the omission аnd where the omitted information should or could have been revealed, as well as provide representative samples of advertisements, offers, or other representations that plaintiff relied on to make her purchase and that failed to include the allegedly omitted information.” Marolda v. Symantec Corp., 672 F. Supp. 2d 992, 1002 (N.D. Cal. 2009).
With these standards in mind, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have met the specificity requirements of
Defendant аrgues that Plaintiffs’ descriptions of specific materials and interactions Plaintiffs claim they relied upon in purchasing their vehicle are generic and “[P]laintiffs do not allege any details about the information they reviewed.” Mot. at 8. Because this is a fraud in the omission case, the Court examines whether Plaintiffs describe “where the omitted information should or could have been revealed, as well as provide representative samples of advertisements, offers, or other representations . . . .” Marolda, 672 F. Supp. 2d at 1002.
The Court finds that Plaintiffs have sufficiently pled specific information channels where Defendant could have disclosed the Defect but instead omitted the information. Among these channels are: Defendant‘s press relеases, SAC ¶¶ 80–81; promotional statements in news articles, id. ¶¶ 51–52; advertisements in automotive magazines, ¶ 139; window Monroney Stickers, id. ¶¶ 38, 114, 122, 139, 151, 163; interactions with authorized dealerships’ salespeople, id. ¶¶ 38, 105, 114, 122, 139, 151, 163; and Defendant‘s own website, id. ¶¶ 36, 122. See Daniel v. Ford Motor Co., 806 F.3d 1217, 1226 (9th Cir. 2015) (“Plaintiffs presented evidence that they interacted with and received information from sales representatives at authorized Ford dealerships prior to purchasing their Focuses. This is sufficient to sustain a factual finding that Plaintiffs would have been aware of the disclosure if it had been made through Ford‘s authorized dealerships.“). Plaintiffs further allege they relied on emails and conversations with dealership salespeople, but Defendant argues that Plaintiffs do not “allege the substance of these communicаtions or identify any actual misrepresentations by [Defendant] that they relied on.” Mot. at 8 (citation omitted); see, e.g., SAC ¶ 105 (“Mr. Goldstein also exchanged emails with a Fairfield Cadillac
Accordingly, the Court DENIES Defendant‘s motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ CLRA, UCL, and fraudulent concealment claims to the extent the motion is based on Plaintiffs’ failure to adequately plead fraud with specificity.
B. UCL
Defendant argues that Plaintiffs cannot pursue equitable remedies for their UCL claim because they have adequate legal remedies for damages in their CLRA and implied warranty claims, and Plaintiffs’ UCL, CLRA, and implied warranty claims are based on the same underlying conduct. Mot at 15. In response, Plaintiffs argue that courts in this
Within the Ninth Circuit, “[d]istrict courts are split on whether a plaintiff‘s claims for equitable relief should be dismissed at the pleading stage.” Safransky v. Fossil Grp., Inc., No. 17CV1865-MMA (NLS), 2018 WL 1726620, at *14 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 9, 2018) (citing Covell v. Nine W. Holdings, Inc., No. 3:17-cv-01371-H-JLB, 2018 WL 558976, at *8 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 15, 2018)); Munning v. Gap, Inc., 238 F. Supp. 3d 1195, 1204 (N.D. Cal. 2017)). In the absence of controlling Ninth Circuit authority, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs’ line of cases reflects the prevailing view within this District and better comports with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See
Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendant‘s Motion and DISMISSES Plaintiffs’ UCL claim for failure to adequately plead that they have no adequate remedy at law.
C. CLRA
The CLRA prohibits “unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices.”
Defendant contends that Plaintiffs do not allege plausible facts establishing that Defendant had exclusive knowledge of the Defect at the time of sale. Mot. at 9. Plaintiffs allege Defendant had knowledge of the Defect basеd on (1) Technical Service Bulletins Defendant issued to its dealers, and/or (2) consumer complaints made to Defendant, the NHTSA, and on third-party websites. See generally SAC ¶¶ 90–99.
“[U]nder the CLRA, plaintiffs must sufficiently allege that a defendant was aware of a defect at the time of sale to survive a motion to dismiss.” Wilson v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 668 F.3d 1136, 1145 (9th Cir. 2012). For fraud-based claims, heightened pleading does not apply to allegations regarding a defendant‘s knowledge or state of mind.
a. Technical Service Bulletins
Defendant argues that the four TSBs that Defendant issued tо its dealers between December 2014 and August 2017 do not plausibly support that Defendant had pre-sale knowledge of the Defect because the TSBs do not mention “safety hazards.” Mot. at 10. Defendant contends that because the TSBs do not mention the responsiveness or functionality of the CUE system, the TSBs “did not reference the symptom plaintiffs complain about in their vehicles,” and therefore do not support finding that Defendant had pre-sale knowledge of the Defect. Id. at 10–11.
Viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, it is plausible that Defendant was aware of the Defect in the CUE system based on the TSBs. See MacDonald v. Ford Motor Co., 37 F. Supp. 3d 1087, 1093 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (“One plausible inference that can be drawn from the three TSBs is that Ford was generally aware of problems with the cоolant pump, and that despite this awareness it continued to sell vehicles containing the defective part.“).
Defendant argues that the TSBs were issued after Plaintiffs Uyenoyama and Wilder purchased their vehicles; therefore, there is no evidence Defendant knew of the Defect at the time of their purchases. Mot. at 11. Plaintiff Uyenoyama purchased a Class Vehicle in September 2012, and Plaintiff Wilder purchased a Class Vehicle in 2014 without identifying a purchase month. SAC ¶¶ 118, 129. The first TSB was issued in December 2014. Id. ¶ 83. Some courts have found TSBs issued after a plaintiff‘s purchase can support an inference of pre-sale knowledge. See MacDonald, 37 F. Supp. 3d at 1094 (finding TSBs issued five and nine mоnths after the plaintiffs’ purchases “plausibly give rise to the inference that Ford knew of the issue prior to their issuance“); Parrish v. Volkswagen Grp. of Am., Inc., 463 F. Supp. 3d 1043, 1058 (C.D. Cal. 2020) (“Because a manufacturer must receive complaints or data raising an issue and then must investigate the issue before issuing a [technical tip (“]TT[“)] or TSB, it is reasonable to infer that manufacturers know of the issue prior to the release of the TT or TSB. The Court finds a five-month period between knowledge of the Defect and release of the TT to be plausible at this stage.“).
In this case, however, the Court finds Plaintiffs have not plead sufficient facts to infer that Defendant knew of the Defect at the time of Plaintiffs Uyenoyama and Wilder‘s
b. Consumer Complaints
Defendant argues that the consumer complaints made to Defendant, NHTSA, and on a third-party website are inadequate to establish Defendant‘s knowledge of the Defect. Mot. at 11–12 (citing SAC ¶¶ 8, 93, 95).
The earliest complaints Plaintiffs allege werе filed with the NHTSA, CM “Cadillac Customer Care” representatives, and general complaints on the Cadillac Owner/Enthusiast Website and Forum were all from 2016. See SAC ¶¶ 93(a), 96(a), 98(a). Therefore, these complaints cannot plausibly support a finding of pre-sale knowledge for Plaintiffs Uyenoyama and Wilder‘s purchases in September 2012 and 2014, respectively. See id. ¶¶ 118, 129.
Plaintiffs have identified several complaints on Cadillacfourms.com from 2014. See id. ¶ 95(a)–(f). Without a month of purchase for Plaintiff Wilder, it is impossible to evaluate whether these complaints give rise to a reasonable inference of pre-sale knowledge for Plaintiff Wilder‘s claims. Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiffs Uyenoyama and Wilder have not identified with specificity any complaints that predate their purchases.
Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendant‘s motion to dismiss as to Plaintiffs Uyenoyama and Wilder‘s CLRA claims based on an inadequate showing of pre-sale knowledge and otherwise DENIES Defendant‘s motion to dismiss as to the other Plaintiffs on this ground, as the TSBs and consumer complaints are adequate to establish Defendant‘s knowledge of the Defect as to them.
Defendant argues that Plaintiffs do not allege facts establishing that Defendant had a duty to disclose the Defect based on its “superior knowledge” or active concealment of the Defect. Mot. at 14 (citing SAC ¶¶ 79, 222).
Under the CLRA, a manufacturer cannot be found liable for failure to disclose a defect “unless such omission (1) is ‘contrary to a representation actually made by the defendant’ or (2) pertains to a ‘fact the defendant was obligated to disclose.‘” Smith v. Ford Motor Co., 462 F. App‘x 660, 662 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Daugherty v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc., 144 Cal. App. 4th 824, 835 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006)). A duty to disclose may arise if a plaintiff alleges “physical injury or . . . safety concerns posed by the defect.” Daugherty, 144 Cal. App. 4th at 836 (citing Bardin v. Daimlerchrysler Corp., 136 Cal. App. 4th 1255, 1261–62 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006)). “[A] fact can give rise to a duty to disclose and an actionable omission if it implicates safety concerns that a reasonable consumer would find material.” Mui Ho v. Toyota Motor Corp., 931 F. Supp. 2d 987, 997 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (citing Falk v. General Motors Corp., 496 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1096–97 (N.D. Cal. 2007); Daugherty, 144 Cal. App. 4th at 836).
Defendant argues that “[P]laintiffs’ thread-bare allegations of superior knowledge are unsupported,” Mot. at 14, which is an argument that the Court has already addressed and disposed of in Section I.C.1. Defendant goes on to argue that Plaintiffs “have not alleged any facts to support an affirmative act of concealment by [Defеndant]; they do not identify who specifically at [Defendant] was purportedly aware of any concealed facts, the source of that knowledge, or any actions [Defendant] took to conceal any facts.” Id. Plaintiffs argue that Defendant actively concealed the Defect by implementing a practice of “replacing a defective part with an equally defective part.” Opp‘n at 14. Plaintiffs give examples of Defendant replacing the CUE with an equally defective part. See, e.g., SAC ¶ 94c (“[The CUE screen] was replaced once before when I was still under warranty and now it‘s happened again.“). This is sufficient to plead active concealment. See Falk, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 1097 (finding active conсealment adequately pled when the defendant
Additionally, Plaintiffs allege that the Defect “poses a serious safety risk to drivers, who can become dangerously distracted.” SAC ¶ 4. Plaintiffs claim the CUE display is the only method “for a driver to access and use the vehicle‘s safety, navigation, communications, and entertainment features.” Id. ¶ 42. Additionally, the CUE is how a driver uses the “rear Vision Camera” when the vehicle is in reverse. Id. ¶ 50. The Court finds that Plaintiffs successfully showed that the Defect posed a genuine safety risk because the CUE‘s malfunctioning or failure while driving could distract the car‘s driver, and therefore put the car‘s occupants in danger.
Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have adequately alleged that Defendant had a duty to disclose the Defect.
3. Timeliness
Defendant argues that Plaintiffs Goldstein, Sutton, Wilder, Uyenoyama, and Guzman‘s CLRA claims, and Plaintiffs Wilder and Uyenoyama‘s UCL claims, are time-barred because they did not bring their claims within the required three- and four-year period after purchase. Mot. at 16; see
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Defendant argues that “Plaintiffs do not plead sufficient facts to invoke the discovery rule.” Mot. at 16; see Garcia v. Gen. Motors LLC, No. 118CV01313LJOBAM, 2018 WL 6460196, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 10, 2018) (“The discovery related facts should be pleaded in detail to allow the court to determine whether the fraud should have been discovered sooner.” (quoting Cansino v. Bank of Am., 224 Cal. App. 4th 1462, 1472 (2014))).
Plaintiff Guzman alleges that “[a]t the time of purchase, [his] vehicle‘s CUE touchscreen did not exhibit any cracks or spider-webbing.” SAC ¶ 155. He alleges that “[i]n or around January 2018, [he] first noticed spiderwebbing on the lower-right side of the CUE touchscreen.” Id. ¶ 156. Similarly, Plaintiff Goldstein alleges that “[s]ince mid-2018,” his CUE System was “unresponsive and . . . entirely inoperative from the screen.” SAC ¶ 106. These facts are sufficiently detailed to provide Defendants notice of the time at and manner in which Plaintiffs Guzman and Goldstein discovered the Defect. See In re Gen. Motors LLC CP4 Fuel Pump Litig., 393 F. Supp. 3d 871, 884 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (discovery rule tolled CLRA claims where “[p]laintiffs did not have reason to discover the defects in their vehicles until they experienced adverse effects resulting from those defects“).
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Based on the foregoing, the Court GRANTS Defendant‘s motion to dismiss Plaintiff Sutton‘s CLRA claim and DENIES Defendant‘s motion to dismiss Plaintiffs Guzman and Goldstein‘s CLRA claim.
D. Fraudulent Concealment
The elements of a claim for fraudulent concealment are:
(1) the defendant must have concealed or suppressed a material fact; (2) the defendant must have been under a duty to disclose the fact to the plaintiff; (3) the defendant must have intentionally concealed or suppressed the fact with intent to defraud the plaintiff; (4) the plaintiff must have been unaware of the fact and would have acted otherwise if he had known of the concealed or suppressed fact; and (5) as a result of the concealment or suppression of the fact, the plaintiff sustained damage.
In re Ford Motor Co. DPS6 Powershift Transmission Prod. Liab. Lit., No. 17-cv-06656, 2019 WL 3000646, at *5 (C.D. Cal. May 22, 2019). Actual reliance is an essential element for a fraudulent omission claim. Daniel, 806 F.3d at 1225 (citations omitted). Plaintiffs may prove that the omission was a substantial factor in their decision by proving “that, had the omitted information been disclosed, one would have been aware of it and behaved differently.” Id. (citing Mirkin v. Wasserman, 858 P.2d 568, 574 (Cal. 1993)).
Defendant argues that the economic loss doctrine prohibits Plaintiffs from asserting a claim for fraudulent concealment to recover purely economic losses for the purchase of an allegedly defective product. Mot. at 17–18. Plaintiffs claim that their allegations are
Under the economic loss doctrine, “plaintiffs may recover in tort for physical injury to person or property, but not for ‘purely economic losses that may be recovered in a contract action.‘” Lusinyan v. Bank of Am., N.A., No. CV-14-9586 DMG (JCX), 2015 WL 12777225, at *4 (C.D. Cal. May 26, 2015) (quoting S.F. Unified Sch. Dist. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 37 Cal. App. 4th 1318, 1327 (1995)). “California courts recognize several exceptions to the economic loss rule, including violations of certain duties independent of the parties’ contractual duties.” Arechiga v. Ford Motor Co., No. SACV1701915AGDFMX, 2018 WL 5904283, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 23, 2018) (citing United Guar. Mortg. Indem. Co. v. Countrywide Fin. Grp., 660 F. Supp. 2d 1123, 1180 (C.D. Cal. 2009)). Fraud claims based on affirmative misrepresentations may not be subject to the economic loss rule. Robinson Helicopter, 34 Cal. 4th at 989–93.
The narrowly tailored exception to the economic loss rule articulated in Robinson Helicopter does not extend to fraudulent omission claims. Id. at 993 (holding the “narrow” еxception to the economic loss rule is “limited to a defendant‘s affirmative misrepresentations on which a plaintiff relies and which expose a plaintiff to liability for personal damages.” (emphasis added)). Plaintiffs have stated that this is a fraud in the omission case, and therefore the exception based on intentional misrepresentations does not apply. See Opp‘n at 5 (“[S]ince this is an omissions case, there is no specific misrepresentation to allege.“); In re Ford Motor Co. DPS6 Powershift Transmission Prod. Liab. Litig., 2020 WL 5267567, at *8 n.5 (collecting cases that applied the economic loss rule to fraudulent omission claims, all of which found the narrow Robinson Helicopter exception inapplicаble).
Here, Plaintiffs have not alleged affirmative misrepresentations. The economic loss doctrine therefore bars Plaintiffs’ fraudulent concealment claim. Defendant‘s motion is GRANTED as to this claim.
A. Lack of Privity
Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiffs’ implied warranty claims under
“Under
The Court previously dismissed Plaintiffs’ UCC claim for failure to properly allege privity, holding that “the Ninth Circuit has made it clear that under
Accordingly, the Court DENIES Defendant‘s motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ implied warranty claims based on failure to properly allege vertical privity between Defendant and Plaintiffs.
B. Plaintiffs Uyenoyama and Wilder
Next, Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiffs Uyenoyama and Wilder‘s implied warranty claims under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act and
Song-Beverly‘s statute of limitations is four years, and the discovery rule does not apply to toll the statute of limitations. Mexia v. Rinker Boat Co., 95 Cal. Rptr. 3d 285, 291–92 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009).
Plaintiffs argue that these limitations should be tolled because Plaintiffs have adequately pled fraudulent concealment. Opp‘n at 24. Under the doctrine of fraudulent concealment, “the defendant‘s fraud in concealing a cause of action against him tolls the applicable statute of limitations, but only for that period during which the claim is undiscovered by plаintiff or until such time as plaintiff, by the exercise of reasonable diligence, should have discovered it.” Sanchez v. South Hoover Hospital, 18 Cal. 3d 93, 99 (1976). The purpose of this doctrine is “to disarm a defendant who, by his own deception, has caused a claim to become stale and a plaintiff dilatory.” Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 4th 509, 533 (1999). Where a plaintiff relies on fraudulent concealment to toll the statute of limitations, “the plaintiff must show (a) the substantive elements of fraud, and (b) an excuse for late discovery of the facts.” Investors Equity Life Holding Co. v. Schmidt, 195 Cal. App. 4th 1519, 1533 (2011). Courts have
Here, the Court has already determined that Plaintiffs have not adequately pled the substantive еlements of fraudulent concealment for Plaintiffs Uyenoyama and Wilder. See supra Section I.C.1; see also Mui Ho, 931 F. Supp. 2d at 999 (stating the elements of fraud by omission and violation of the CLRA are the same). Accordingly, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs have not pled sufficient facts to toll the statute of limitations and GRANTS Defendant‘s motion to dismiss Plaintiffs Uyenoyama and Wilder‘s implied warranty claims under Song-Beverly and
III. Plaintiffs’ Unjust Enrichment Claim
Defendant argues that Plaintiff‘s unjust enrichment claim is not available because there is an adequate legal remedy. Mot. at 20–21. Plaintiffs counter that they “may plead, at this early stage, alternative avenues of relief.” Opp‘n at 25.
The elements of an unjust enrichment claim are: (1) receipt of a benefit, and (2) unjust retention of the benefit аt the expense of another. Lectrodryer v. SeoulBank, 77 Cal. App. 4th 723, 726 (2000). However, “[u]njust enrichment is an equitable rather than a legal claim,” and “[i]t is a basic doctrine of equity jurisprudence that courts of equity should not act . . . when the moving party has an adequate remedy at law[.]” McKesson HBOC, Inc. v. N.Y. State Common Retirement Fund, 339 F.3d 1087, 1091 (9th Cir. 2003); Mort v. United States, 86 F.3d 890, 892 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 381 (1992)) (alterations in original).
At this early stage, the Court is inclined to allow Plaintiffs to plead alternative avenues for relief. See
Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendant‘s motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ unjust enrichment claim.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART Defendant‘s Motion to Dismiss. Specifically, the Court rules as follows:
- Defendant‘s motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ UCL claim (Count 4) is GRANTED.
- Defendant‘s motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ CLRA claim (Count 1) is GRANTED as to Plaintiffs Uyenoyama, Wilder, and Sutton, and DENIED as to Plaintiffs Goldstein, Rodriguez, and Guzman.
- Defendant‘s motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ fraudulent concealment claim (Count 5) is GRANTED.
- Defendant‘s motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ implied warranty claims (Counts 2 and 3) is DENIED as to Plaintiffs Goldstein, Sutton, Rodriguez, and Guzman and GRANTED as to Plaintiffs Uyenoyama and Wilder.
- Defendant‘s motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ unjust enrichment claim (Count 6) is GRANTED.
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IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: February 3, 2021
Hon. Janis L. Sammartino
United States District Judge