GLENDA M. YOUNG, Appellant, v. STATE OF MISSOURI, Respondent.
No. SC101253
SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI en banc
July 7, 2026
The Honorable Raymond M. Gross, Judge
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF DOUGLAS COUNTY
Glenda Young’s amended motion to set aside her conviction under
Background
After a bench trial, Young was found guilty of first-degree murder and armed criminal action for the murder of her husband (“Victim”). On July 28, 2020, the circuit court sentenced her to concurrent prison terms of life without parole and 30 years. On Novembеr 30, 2020, while the direct appeal in her criminal case was pending, Young
The motion court entered judgment denying postconviction relief on the two claims raised in the amended motion. Before reaching the merits of those claims, however, the motion court determined both Young’s pro se motion and the amended motion were untimely. The motion court stated the pro se motion was untimely because it was not filed within 90 days after the court of appeals issued its mandate, and the amended motion was untimely because it was filed more than two years after the pro se motion. Then, without holding a hеaring on the matter, the motion court found appointed counsel abandoned Young by failing to timely file the amended motion. Finally, the motion court reached and rejected both ineffective assistance of counsel claims asserted in Young’s amended motion without holding an evidentiary hearing.1
Standard of Review
Appellate review of a motion court’s ruling on a
Analysis
I. Pro Se Motion Was Timely
The motion court’s determination Young’s premature pro se motion was untimely is clearly erroneous. The version of
II. Amended Motion Was Not Timely
Notwithstanding its clearly erroneous conclusion Young’s pro se motion was untimely, the motion court went on to consider whether appointed counsel’s amended motion was timely and concluded it was not. This determination was correct.
III. Appointed Counsel Abandoned Young
When an amended motion is untimely, the motion court ordinarily has no authority to review the claims asserted in that motion. Price v. State, 422 S.W.3d 292, 299-300 (Mo. 2014) (holding an untimely amended motion limits the motion court’s review to claims raised in the pro se motion). There is an exception to this general rule, however, when the motion court finds appointed counsel “abandoned” the defendant by failing to timely file the amended motion, i.e., the tardiness was entirely appointed counsеl’s fault, and the defendant’s actions (or inactions) did not contribute to the tardiness. Luleff v. State, 807 S.W.2d 495, 498 (Mo. 1991). A finding of abandonment normally requires a hearing at which evidence of these facts can be presented. Moore v. State, 458 S.W.3d 822, 826 & n.3 (Mo. 2015). If the motion court determines the defendant was abandoned, the remedy is to treat the untimely amended motion as timely. Nelson, 719 S.W.3d at 735. If the motion court did not conduct an abandonment inquiry, this Court ordinarily will remand for it to do so rather than allow appellate courts to make such determinations in the first instance. Id.
In Nelson, however, this Court held remanding for an abаndonment determination is not required in every instance. Id. When the amended motion shows appointed counsel erred in calculating the due date for the amended motion by using the wrong version of
IV. Ineffective Assistance Claim – Failure to Call Expert Witness
Ineffective assistance of counsel claims require a showing “counsel failed to exercise the customary skill and diligence of a reasonably competent attorney under similar circumstances” and this “deficient performance prejudiced” the defendant. Anderson v. State, 196 S.W.3d 28, 33 (Mo. 2006). For postconviction relief purposes, “prejudice” means “a reasonable probability the outcome of the trial would have been different,” i.e., the probability of a different outcome is sufficient to undermine confidence in the conviction. McNeal v. State, 412 S.W.3d 886, 889 (Mo. 2013).
The motion court’s conclusion Young was not prejudiced by the failure to call an expert regarding psychological shock was based on the facts proved at her underlying criminal trial. Young and Victim were married in 2009. Victim became attracted to another woman and, on January 19, 2017, he told his girlfriend he was going to tell Young he wanted a divorce. At around 4 p.m. the next day, Young called the sheriff’s office saying she had returned to her house to find Victim’s body, it was cold, she was not home when it happened, but it looked as though he had accidentally shot himself.
When an officer arrived, Young had blood on her clothes, and the scene at Young’s house was gruesome. Victim was found dead on the floor of his bedroom. He appeаred to have been trying to reach under the bedside dresser. On the dresser was the base for a cordless phone. The bed and much of the bedroom was covered in Victim’s blood. Lying next to Victim was a television remote saturated in blood as though, in his dazed state, Victim mistakenly had tried to use it as a phone.
Victim’s cell phone, covered in blood, was found so far under the recliner the officers had to tip the chair to retrieve it. Apparently, the phone had been kicked or pushed under the recliner and out of Victim’s reach. Later investigation showed Victim made two calls on January 20 using this phone. The first was at 11:02 а.m. to one of Victim’s friends. Victim left a voice mail, which – though he could barely speak – was something to the effect of “I’ve been shot.” The second call, two minutes later, was to another friend. There was no answer, and Victim left no voicemail. That friend called back at 12:15 p.m., but Victim did not answer. Victim apparently tried to call the sheriff’s office several times but was unable to dial the number correctly, and the call did not go through.
Even though Young claimed Victim was alive and cleaning his gun at 3 p.m. when she left for the store, the coroner examined Viсtim around 5 p.m. and concluded Victim must have died several hours before 3 p.m. because rigor mortis was so advanced. Victim died of a gunshot that entered between his jaw and ear on the left side of his face and lodged against (and broke) his jaw on the right side. The bullet cut Victim’s tongue, causing him to bleed to death. If Victim had gotten first aid quickly, he could have survived. Instead, it took 20 to 30 minutes for Victim to bleed to death. Notably, the gunshot was not Victim’s only injury. He had several bruises, all less than a day old; two bone-deep lacerations on his heаd above the cap line; and two lacerations on his face. The skull injuries appeared to have been caused by the screwdriver found next to the recliner with blood smudged on its handle.
As noted, Young’s first statement on January 20 was that she chased her dog for two hours and returned home at 4 p.m. to find Victim dead. That same day, she told another officer Victim was cleaning his gun for an hour before she left to go to the store around 3 p.m. On February 23, the sheriff spoke with Young. She was unable to provide a concrete timeline as to when she left or why, and she changed her story several times.
A highway patrol officer interviewed Young on February 28. She denied shooting Victim but complained about his infidelity and the fact he had run up сonsiderable debt on her credit cards. She did not say, but investigation revealed Young recently purchased additional life insurance policies on Victim totaling more than $700,000 in accidental death coverage. Added to existing policies, Victim’s life was insured for more than $1.1 million.
After speaking with the patrol officer a while, Young’s story changed again. She said she was there when Victim shot himself. She said she grabbed the gun (though she could not explain why) and, as they were struggling, it went off accidentally, hitting Victim. She said Victim crawled around for аbout five minutes before dying. She said she was in shock and could not help him. She said she did not know if Victim tried to call for help but denied unplugging the cordless phone base in the bedroom. At the conclusion of this interview, Young gave the following written statement:
At 10 a.m., approximately, January 20th, [Victim] went to barn, then out to burn barrel and shot 9 millimeter. Came back in and started to clean gun, clip out, gun unloaded. A little after 11 a.m. he was belittling me, and I grabbed gun, he grabbed me, we wrestled, and gun went off. I panicked and run outside only a few moments. Came back in аnd sat on sofa. He had gotten up and was in bedroom. I was afraid he went after the .38 to turn on
me. He grabbed phone. When he picked it up, it came unplugged from wall. He then fell by bed.
I went upstairs and stripped bed and moved mattress back on bed. Went back downstairs, washed my hair, put dry outfit on, and went to Mom & Pop’s. Came back, chased dog uphill about 30, 45 minutes, brought him back to porch. Came in, plugged the phone back in, and called sheriff’s department.
At trial, Young testified she and her husband were arguing about the gun, she grabbed it, and they were struggling whеn the gun fired. She added she did not believe the gun was loaded and did not intend for it to fire. She testified she did not know her husband had been shot, and she ran out of the house because she was afraid of what he would do.
The circuit court found Young guilty of first-degree murder and armed criminal action. In explaining its decision, the circuit court cited certain evidence as particularly persuasive, including: (1) the calls from Victim’s cell phone putting the time of the shooting around 11:00 a.m.; (2) Victim’s voicemail saying “I’ve been shot,” indicating he had not shot himself; (3) Victim’s phone being kicked or pushed out of reach, causing Victim to have to crawl to the bedroom; (4) Young disconnecting the home phone in the bedroom to stop Victim from calling for help because her statement Victim disconnected it when he grabbed it was contradicted by the lack of blood on or near the phone base; (5) Victim changing clothes both before and after her trip to the store and still having blood on her clothes but not her hands when the officers arrived; (6) Young causing Victim’s “puncture” wounds to the sсalp using the screwdriver near the recliner; (7) the angle of the bullet wound being inconsistent with any of Young’s accounts; and (8) Victim (who
So based on -- you know, like I said, he was alive and he would have been alive today if she really intend -- intended not to have hurt him and it was an accident. Why wouldn’t you -- she said, “Well, I just -- I was in shock. I just didn‘t know what to do.” Well, that’s -- you know, that’s not an excuse. I don‘t think it happened that way. I think she intentionally shot him and then waited for him to die and then waited four hours to cаll -- or five hours to call the sheriff’s department.
(Emphasis added).
The motion court relied on the record from Young’s criminal trial in concluding she suffered no prejudice from counsel’s decision not to call an expert to testify about psychological shock. This was not clearly erroneous. First, the amended motion does not allege an expert would be able to testify, to a reasonable degree of certainty, that Young was suffering such shock on the day of the murder. Moreover, such evidence would have added little of significance because the circuit court heard evidence from several witnesses, including Young, that she was in a state of shock. Defense counsel argued in closing Young’s shock accounted for her conduct and inaccurate statements to the sheriff’s officers on the day of the murder. And, as the motion court noted in rejecting Young’s claim, most of her inconsistent statements came days or weeks later and, therefore, could not be explained by whatever shock she may have suffered. For all these reasons, the very most an expert about psychological shock might have been able to do was to make a relatively tangential argument slightly better. It would not have likely altered the outcome.
Young claims the motion court should have granted an evidentiary hearing regarding her claim, but this argument misunderstands the purpose of evidentiary hearings in postconviction proceedings. If an amended motion alleges facts warranting relief, i.e., facts sufficient to show counsel’s performance was deficient and prejudice resulted, the movant still must prove those facts at an evidentiary hearing. Flaherty v. State, 694 S.W.3d 413, 422-23 (Mo. 2024). But, if the record refutes either of these necessary conclusions, an evidentiary hearing serves no purpose and need not be held. Id. In the present case, no evidentiary hearing was needed because the record of Young’s criminal trial clearly and undoubtedly refuted her allegations of prejudice.
Young’s second claim is that her trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to request a competency evaluation. To merit relief under
The motion court found the record refuted Young’s second claim because the circuit court in Young’s criminal case had no reasonable cause for sustaining such a motion even if it had been made.
Whenever any judge has reasonable cause to believe that the accused lacks mental fitness to proceed, the judge shall, upon his or her own motion or upon motion filed by the state or by or on behalf of the accused … appoint one or more private psychiatrists or psychologists … to examine the accused[.]
Young’s amended motion alleges no facts that, if proven, would show the circuit court would have had “reasonable cause” to believe she was not competent to be tried if defense counsel had requested an evaluation. Instead, the entire record in the underlying criminal proceeding clearly refutes this claim. The motion court specifically noted:
Movant waived her right to a jury trial in open court. Movant appeared many other times, including at bond hearings where she was released on bond pending trial. Movant even gave voluntary testimony at her trial. Sufficient cause for investigation into competency does not exist if an accused has the present ability to consult with her lawyer with rationality and to understand the proceedings against her. While there were discussions in open court about an entry of an Alford plea, Defendant withdrew her plea of guilty after questioning. At no point did the trial court find reasonable cause to order an examination.
The circuit court had numerous opportunities to observe Young before and at trial and asked multiple times about her mental health. Each time, she denied having any mental health problems or concerns, and she repeatedly showed she was aware of what was happening and was assisting in her defense. The circuit court also asked defense counsel about Young’s fitness to proceed, and counsel confirmed she was fit. Neither Young nor her counsel, nor any of their actions before the circuit court prior to or at trial, indicated otherwise. As а result, the record clearly and undoubtedly refutes the allegation counsel should have sought a competency evaluation. See Clayton v. State, 63 S.W.3d 201, 209 (Mo. 2001) (holding “[c]ounsel has no duty to investigate a client’s mental condition where the client appears to have the present ability to consult rationally with the attorney and understand the court proceedings”); State v. Carter, 955 S.W.2d 548, 555 (Mo. 1997) (holding this Court “cannot say as a matter of law that it is ineffective assistance of counsel to fail to obtain a mental examination for a defendant who exhibits no signs of mental illness”). In addition, the record clearly and undoubtedly refutes the allegation counsel’s failure to request an evaluation was prejudicial because the circuit court did not have “reasonable cause” to order an evaluation under
Young’s amended motion under
Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, the motion court’s judgment is affirmed.
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Paul C. Wilson, Judge
All concur.