GENESIS PRODUCING COMPANY, L.P., Appellant v. SMITH BIG OIL CORPORATION, Todd M. Smith and James A. Whitson, Jr., Appellees
NO. 14-13-00743-CV
Court of Appeals of Texas, Houston (14th Dist.)
December 23, 2014
454 S.W.3d 655
A motion to suppress is a specialized challenge to the admissibility of evidence. Black v. State, 362 S.W.3d 626, 633 (Tex.Crim.App.2012). Appellant is not seeking to exclude any evidence. Accordingly, there is no reason to conclude that the standard of review for a motion to suppress is applicable here. Absent further guidance from the Court of Criminal Appeals about whether preservation can be created in this manner and about the proper standard of review, we decline to adopt the holding of Cuellar.
Appellant also argues that “where the parties agree to stipulate to certain facts and the court accepts that stipulation, where the parties argue the proper application of the law to those facts, and where the parties agree not to argue the preservation issue on appeal, the State is precluded from” arguing that the Court cannot consider the sufficiency of the evidence to support the information. This is, in essence, an estoppel argument. There are at least two forms of estoppel in criminal cases: estoppel by judgment and estoppel by contract. Ex Parte Parrott, 396 S.W.3d 531, 541 (Tex.Crim.App.2013). Estoppel by judgment prevents a party that has accepted the benefits of a judgment from challenging its validity and from rejecting its burdensome consequences. Id. Estoppel by contract has the same effect on contracts. Id. A party who accepts the contract‘s benefits cannot later challenge its validity. Id.
Appellant argues that, by obtaining a guilty plea agreement—and the subsequent judgment—of guilt when the legal sufficiency of the charged offense is questionable, the State is estopped from preventing the consideration of the sufficiency of that evidence when such a review was a condition of Appellant‘s plea of guilt. We reject this argument for the same reasons we reject the argument of waiver. By applying estoppel to this situation, we would be reviewing the trial court‘s ruling on a matter it is not permitted to consider under a standard of review that does not exist.
We are cognizant that the disposition of this opinion frustrates a central condition of Appellant‘s agreement to plead guilty. Appellant has not challenged on appeal the continuing validity of his plea agreement, however. Additionally, our disposition does not leave Appellant without any relief for any harm he may have suffered. See
We overrule Appellant‘s sole issue.
Conclusion
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Jeffrey J. Tompkins, Houston, TX, for Appellant.
Panel consists of Justices Boyce, Busby, and Wise.
OPINION
Ken Wise, Justice
In this dispute over an assignment of an interest in an oil and gas lease, Genesis Producing Company, L.P., appeals the trial court‘s judgment granting Smith Big Oil Corporation and Todd M. Smith‘s summary judgment motion, denying Genesis‘s summary judgment motion, and striking Genesis‘s amended petitions. Concluding that Genesis nonsuited its claims before judgment was rendered on the competing summary judgment motions, we reverse and render.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Genesis is in the business of oil and gas exploration and the purchase and sale of oil, gas, and mineral leases in Texas and other states. J. Morgan Smith (Morgan) owns a majority limited partnership interest in Genesis and his company, J. Morgan Smith, Inc., is its general partner. Todd M. Smith (Todd) is Morgan‘s son and Smith Big Oil is Todd‘s company. Unless otherwise indicated, we will collectively refer to Smith Big Oil and Todd as “SBO.”
According to Genesis‘s petition, Genesis‘s business has declined over time and its assets consist of a few remaining oil, gas, and mineral leases. As business continued to worsen, Genesis owed substantial sums to creditors. Consequently, Genesis entered into several transactions, including a purported assignment to Smith Big Oil of its working interest in an oil and gas lease in Louisiana that is the subject of this lawsuit. The lease contains one producing oil and gas well, which Genesis asserts is Morgan‘s principal source of personal income. Genesis claims that the assignment was made “solely for the purpose of protecting the income and revenues received on the Lease for the benefit of J. Morgan Smith and protecting same from the claims of certain creditors” of Genesis.
Genesis alleges that the assignment of the lease is invalid because (1) no consideration was paid for it, (2) the assignment was made through error, mistake, or fraud, and (3) the assignment was improperly witnessed and notarized. Genesis also alleges that it entered into this transaction unwittingly and on the advice of one of its officers. Although Genesis demanded that SBO reassign the lease to Genesis, SBO refused. Genesis also demanded that James A. Whitson, Jr., the operator of the well, continue making payments of proceeds from the well to Genesis. In response, SBO‘s counsel instructed Whitson to continue making all payments to Smith Big Oil.
In 2012, Genesis sued Smith Big Oil, Todd, and Whitson, asserting causes of action for conversion, breach of contract, and declaratory judgment in connection with Genesis‘s assignment of the lease to Smith Big Oil, and requesting a temporary restraining order and temporary injunction. Shortly after the petition was filed, the trial court signed an order reflecting that SBO agreed to a temporary injunction requiring Whitson to pay certain revenues from the well into the registry of the court during the pendency of the case. EOG Resources, Inc., one of Genesis‘s creditors, later intervened in the lawsuit, seeking to recover damages for fraudulent transfer against SBO.
In January 2013, Genesis moved for summary judgment. SBO responded and also moved for traditional and no-evidence summary judgment against Genesis. The trial court heard the parties’ arguments on
On April 22, at 3:44 p.m., the trial court sent the following email to counsel for both parties:
On Friday the court denied Plaintiff‘s Motion to Strike the Intervention of EOG Resources, Inc.
Today, the court is denying [Genesis‘s] Motion for Summary Judgment and granting [SBO‘s] Motion for Summary Judgment as to Breach of Contract and Conversion of the Lease that is the subject of this lawsuit. The court is denying [SBO‘s] Motion for Summary Judgment as to proceeds of the lease that are deposited into the registry of the court.
Counsel for SBO immediately requested a hearing seeking clarification as to “whether any claims remain for trial” on April 24.
On the morning of April 23, the trial court held a telephonic hearing with the parties which apparently was not recorded. At 12:32 p.m. that same day, Genesis filed a notice of nonsuit of all of its causes of action. Later that afternoon, SBO filed and served a proposed “Final Order on Plaintiff‘s Claims.”
On April 24, the trial court signed the Final Order on Plaintiff‘s Claims. In the two-page order, the trial court expressly dismissed with prejudice Genesis‘s claims for breach of contract and conversion, as well as Genesis‘s “fraud claim, styled as a request for a declaratory judgment.” The trial court also specified that it was dismissing with prejudice Genesis‘s other requests for declaratory judgment concerning failure of consideration, error or mistake, and improper witnessing and notarization, and expressly confirmed that the court was dismissing all of Genesis‘s claims against Smith Big Oil, Todd, and Whitson. Finally, the trial court denied Genesis leave to amend its original petition or file its first or second amended petitions, and struck Genesis‘s first and second amended petitions.
On July 19, 2013, the trial court signed a final judgment based on its dismissal of Genesis‘s claims and a subsequent settlement agreement between EOG and SBO. In the final judgment, the trial court dismissed EOG‘s claims without prejudice, dissolved the temporary injunction, ordered the release of the funds in the court‘s registry to a trust account for the benefit of Smith Big Oil, and ordered Whitson to pay a specified amount of all future oil and gas revenues from the lease to the trust.1 Genesis filed a motion for new trial that was overruled by operation of law, and this appeal followed.
ANALYSIS
In five issues, Genesis complains that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Smith Big Oil and Todd on Genesis‘s claims, denying Genesis‘s summary judgment motion, denying Genesis‘s motion for leave to extend the pleading deadline, and striking Genesis‘s amended petitions. In its second issue, Genesis contends that the trial court erred in rendering judgment after Genesis nonsuited its claims. Because we conclude that this complaint is dispositive, we need not address Genesis‘s other issues.
Rendition of judgment is “the judicial act by which the court settles and declares the decision of the law upon the matters at issue.” Comet Aluminum Co. v. Dibrell, 450 S.W.2d 56, 58 (Tex.1970). Generally, a judgment is rendered when the decision is officially announced orally in open court, by written memorandum filed with the clerk, or otherwise announced publicly. Garza v. Tex. Alcoholic Beverage Comm‘n, 89 S.W.3d 1, 6 (Tex.2002); Dibrell, 450 S.W.2d at 59. Rendition is distinguishable from the entry of judgment, which is a purely ministerial act by which the judgment is made of record and preserved. Ex parte Gnesoulis, 525 S.W.2d 205, 209 (Tex.Civ.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1975, orig. proceeding).
Although neither party has directed us to a case involving a trial judge‘s purported ruling communicated by email to the parties, courts have held that a trial court‘s letter may constitute a rendition of judgment if it is in sufficient detail to state the court‘s decision on all the matters at issue and is filed with the clerk. See, e.g., Greene v. State, 324 S.W.3d 276, 282 (Tex.App.-Austin 2010, no pet.); Mixon v. Moye, 860 S.W.2d 209, 210 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 1993, no writ); Ex parte Gnesoulis, 525 S.W.2d at 209. Because the rendition of judgment is a present act that decides the issues upon which the ruling is made, the words used by the trial court must clearly indicate its intent to render judgment at that time, rather than in the future. See S & A Restaurant Corp. v. Leal, 892 S.W.2d 855, 857-58 (Tex.1995) (per curiam); Greene, 324 S.W.3d at 283. A trial court‘s letter to the parties is not a rendition of judgment if it merely indicates the court‘s intention to render judgment in a certain way and sets out guidelines by which counsel are to prepare a judgment. Mixon, 860 S.W.2d at 210; Ex parte Gnesoulis, 525 S.W.2d at 209.
Genesis argues that because it filed its April 23 nonsuit before the trial court rendered judgment in its April 24 written order, the trial court‘s April 22 email is ineffective as a ruling on the merits of Genesis‘s claims. In response, SBO argues that the trial court‘s email was intended to dismiss all of Genesis‘s claims. In support of its contention, SBO relies on Alvarado and Curry v. Bank of America for the proposition that a party cannot nonsuit claims after they have been adjudicated. See Alvarado, 892 S.W.2d at 855; Curry v. Bank of Am., N.A., 232 S.W.3d 345, 354 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2007, pet. denied) (citing Alvarado and explaining that a party who has had his claims adjudicated unsuccessfully cannot later nonsuit his claims to avoid the judgment). But SBO‘s argument assumes that the trial court‘s email effectively rendered judgment on Genesis‘s claims. Neither Alvarado nor Curry involved a dispute concerning whether the trial court adjudicated the plaintiffs’ claims prior to nonsuit. See Alvarado, 892 S.W.2d at 855; Curry, 232 S.W.3d at 354.
Based on the trial court‘s failure to file the email or otherwise announce its ruling publicly, as well as the differences between the email and the court‘s subsequent written ruling, we conclude that the email was not a rendition of judgment. See Garza, 89 S.W.3d at 6; cf. Mixon, 860 S.W.2d at 210 (letter consisting of one short paragraph that was not filed with the clerk and was followed by a later, far more detailed order was not a rendition of judgment). Because the trial court‘s April 22 email to the parties was insufficient to effectuate a rendition of judgment, Genesis‘s April 23 nonsuit mooted all of its claims. Consequently, the trial court erred when it subsequently rendered judgment dismissing Genesis‘s claims with prejudice. We therefore sustain Genesis‘s issue and reverse and render judgment that Genesis‘s claims are dismissed without prejudice.
CONCLUSION
We reverse the trial court‘s final judgment, signed July 19, 2013, to the extent that the judgment dismisses with prejudice Genesis‘s claims for breach of contract, conversion, and declaratory judgment. In light of Genesis‘s nonsuit, we render judgment that these claims asserted by Genesis are dismissed without prejudice.
Ken Wise
Justice