Garza v. Texas Alcoholic Beverage Commission

Tropicana Luis GARZA Jose d/b/a Petitioner,

Night Club,

TEXAS ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE Respondent.

COMMISSION,

No. 00-1069. Texas.

Supreme Court of 10,

Argued Oct.

Decided July

mеnt following that from an canceling, administrative order suspending, refusing liquor license. Texas Beverage Alcoholic Code section provides 11.67 that an appeal liquor of a license denial must be tried to the district court within ten is filed. 11.67(b)(2). Here, Alco. Bev.Code a hearing conducted required days, but did not judgment until nineteen days peal was filed. The court of dis- missed the appeal, holding that the district court, court’s late decision divested that court, subsequent to decide the case. 83 We hold that section requires judgment be rendered no later than ten days from the date the to the dis- But, trict court is regardless filed. of how occurs, rendition section 11.67 does not prevent a performing district court from memorializing ministerial act of a time- ly in signed rendition judgment after the ten-day period Any passed. has signed after that dif- fers from a rendition of judgment is When, here, void. a district court does days, by operаtion is rendered of law Foster, Land, Logene Sugar L. Stephen against issuance, party seeking Richmond, Doggett, A. for Petitioner. renewal, or reinstatement of a license. At General, Cornyn, Attorney John Andy point, the district court has a ministe- Taylor, General, First Attorney Assistant duty rial sign judgment affirming Dennis, Byron Lockhoof, Seth W. Reed administrative decision. Proceedings Dewey III, Helmcamp, Jeffrey Boyd, E. S. the district court remain un- interlocutory Don Attorney Office of the Gener- til the district signs Texas, Austin, al of for Respondent. case, In this the district court has never judgment affirming the adminis- Justice JEFFERSON delivered the trative decision. Because the matter re- opinion of the Court in which Chief Justice interlocutory, mains we affirm the court of PHILLIPS, HECHT, Justice Justice appeals’ judgment dismissing ENOCH, OWEN, Justice Justice jurisdiction. for want of HANKINSON, O’NEILL, Justice joined. Justice RODRIGUEZ Background I.

This case involves the time period within applied Jose Luis Garza to the Texas (TABC) which a district Beverage court must render Alcoholic Commission re- denying the on-prem- 1997 administrative order renew a beer and wine retailer’s Disagreeing with Tropicana Night Club newal application. ises license for result, leg- that “the Texas. The TABC denied dissent concluded Rosenberg, preclude appeal him to intend] and ordered to islature application [did Garza’s re- everything by party to the constitutional a who has done application submit an Beverage the Texas Alcohol county quired court. See under Tex. Alco. Bev.Code 28, Code, 1997, just county § On the the trial failed 61.49. October because (Lar- judge, sitting capacity, responsibilities.” in an Id. administrative meet its sen, J., of signed judgment denying dissenting). renewal rehearing motion permit. Garza’s petition for review con- Garza filed by of See Tex. operation overruled law. (1) tending appeals the court of erred 2001.146(c). Code Gov’t Code Beverage Alcoholic interpreting and 9, 1998, require hearing both section 11.67 January appealed On Garza days of rendition of county judge’s order to the 268th District (2) filed; Court, the record on the date the is which conducted Janu- 16, entry reflecting a docket-sheet ary 1998. See contains Tex. Aloo. Bev.Code fact, 61.34(a). did, in 11.67(a), District Court §§ the 268th a written ment, ten-day peri- court held that the coun- od; (3) interpre- by appeals’ the court of ty judge committed reversible error and violates five tation section 11.67 Garza’s limiting trial witnesses. The Garza process under United right court vacated administrative of due Texas Constitutions and contra- judgment and remanded the case the States and separation-of- judge open-courts venes the and county proceedings. for further The Texas powers Constitu- provisions district court’s recited 20, petition to de- January granted tion. Garza’s court “rendered its dеcision on We cide issues. actually 1998.” the court these 28, on January On Ten-Day Appeal” on II. “Trial The remand, county judge conducted sec- hearing, again judge ond at which the de- Beverage The Alcoholic Code Texas nied Garza application. Garza’s renewal alcohol is gives permit whose county judge’s second deci- appealed the suspended or denied the sion to the 240th District That Court. decision a district renewal on district court denied license The 11.67. court. Alco. Bev.Code January appealed 1999 and Garza statute reads as portion relevant follows: under the substan- shall be judge one dissenting, With rale com- against tial evidence held that the 268th District Court appeals The rules alone defendant. mission lacked at the time it remanded apply, applicable ordinary civil suits county case to because did judge following exceptiоns, days fol- not render literally: shall be construed January lowing Garza’s (1) perfected shall be court. The court of 83 S.W.3d 161. judgments within 30 date filed subsequent vacated decision, order, ruling of the com- county judge and the district court fi- becomes effectively or administrator appeal, dismissed the leav- mission county appealable; nal and place judge’s October (2) the case shall be tried (Tex.1975); before a S.W.2d Cook v. . judge within from the (Tex.1975). date it Spears, 524 S.W.2d filed;

is In Spears, we legislative discussed the his- (3) tory 666-15e, of article section 7a of the party neither jury; entitled to a Act, Texas Liquor Control which is the predecessor to Texas Alcoholic Beverage (4) order, decision, ruling 11.67(b). Code section the commission or administrator We observed that the earliest version of suspended or modified the court the Act required only that an appeal be merits, a trial on the but the tried within ten days оr at the earliest final judgment of the district court possible time thereafter “in the event the may not be modified suspended Judge is not able try such cause within pending appeal. (10) . such ten day period.” Id. at 291 n. 11.67(b). § Alco. Bev.Code omitted) (emphasis (citing Liquor Texas Generally, appeal on from an adminis- Act, 467, C.S., Control 44th Leg., 2d ch. license, trative denial liquor of a the dis- I, 14, 1795, § art. 1935 Tex. Gen. Laws trict court conducts abbreviated hear- 1803). ing1 and renders a decision within ten days after the appeal is filed. id. Legislature See subsequently amended (b). 11.67(a), § At the district court’s provision dis- by striking language cretion, the decision to withhold the license permitting a judge to extend the trial be- may suspended be pending the yond abbreviat- the ten-day period. May Act of See ' 11.67(b)(4). § ed hearing. However, 22, 1937, Id. R.S., 448, I, Leg., 45th ch. art- judgment, rendered, 15, § once im- 1053, takes 1937 Tex. Gen. Laws 1066. 1961, mediate effect suspended and cannot be Legislature article аdded 666- appeal to the court 15e to Liquor Act and Control declared Id. The statute provision makes no statute, for a that the terms of the including the in disposition the event rule, ten-day-trial “shall considered lit- does not render judgment within days. 25, 1961, ten erally.” Act of May Leg., 57th We address that today. R.S., 262, 7a, issue § We have ch. 1961 Tex. Gen. Laws 11.67(b)(2) held that section requires all 561. Legislature’s sys- Based on the proceedings in the district court to be com- tematic efforts to constrict the timetable pleted within rendered, the date the within must be Walker, is filed. Cook 529 we in Spears concluded Originally, Legislature 1. powers judiciary). envisioned the trative and duties on the hearing at the district court level to be a trial incorpo- The current version of the statute 11.67(b)’s on the predecessor merits. Section rates a standard of re- substantial evidence directed the district court to conduct view to the constitutional infraction avoid peal as a trial de Liquor novo. Texas Control Bradley. identified in See Tex. Alco. Bev.Code Act, C.S., I, Leg., 44th 2d ch. art. court, § 11.67 .note. revisor’s In the district 1935 Tex. Following Gen. Laws 1803. testimony there is no live witness nor intro- enactment, provision the statute’s grant- duction of evidence outside the record ing the district court de novo review of a proceeding, as word "tri- Liquor Control Board order was un- declared However, might imply. al” otherwise refer- Bradley Liquor constitutional. See v. Texas ences to a district court "trial” on Bd., (Tex.Civ. Control "trial on the merits” have not been stricken 1937, writ) App.-Austin (determining statutory language. from the current See id. a trial de novo would be an unconstitutional 11.67(b)(2),(4). attempt by Legislature to confer adminis- “trial,” Fox agree ex- We could not in the district court period 11.67, refers to a ten-day limit. ceed the section used Thus, that the judgment. we held 291-92. rendition of on the merits sought a continu- who permittee occurs, rendition of how regardless And beyond the discovery ance further well district prevent a 11.67 does not section action, lost his period for court ministerial act performing the court from in a rendition memorializing elapsed without a district ten-day period signed judgment Id. Garza asks has passed. conclusion Cook We reached similar to hold that the There, although the license v. Walker. point until some rendering defer filed an to the has ex in time after the 26, 1975, did judge March court on sug to do so. Garza’s pired. We decline 2,May until the matter for trial set “trial” gested term interpretation Because more 11.67(b) leave the dis section would under days expired filing the than ten between the time limita free of statute’s trict court date, we concluded that date and trial delay rendition indefinite and able to tions a court district applicant’s reconcile this result ly. cannоt We appeal expired day. at the of the end tenth express to con Legislature’s decision Id. rigid a licensing appeal fine trial a of Walker Garza contends and limit. See 524 ten-day time because, case, in distinguishable are this Considering the statute as S.W.2d at 291. heard actually the matter 11.67(b) whole, section a evident that is eight days appeal. Garza filed his after disposi speedy secure a designed was if, significant This as Garza distinction If we tion were of administrative 11.67(b)(2) asserts, in “trial” section position a district adopt Garza’s —that hearing to a on the merits and refers indefinitely may delay court rendition —a does not rendition of necessitate operating continue more business could In of his support argument, Garza cites days appeal is filed even than ten after the Medina, (Tex.App.- Fox v. (as here) court has conclud county writ). Fox, 1993, Corpus Christi no imperils general ed that the business court conducted its and district morals, welfare, health, safety peace, court judgment open rendered oral people. of the See Tex. Aloo. Bev.Code days of date 61.42(a)(3). itself forecloses The statute filed, until judgment did not but 11.67(b)(4) argument. Section Garza’s expiration statutory period. decision, order, or rul “the provides that require appel- Id. at 870. Rather than or administrator commission judgment within lant obtain a written by modified may suspended or reasoned days, ten merits, but the a trial on the court is to have trial that “the better course judgment of the district judges ‘try’ within 10 hear or the case ap suspended pending be modified judgment period, in that but render made Legislature certain peal.” strip their appellants not to safety endanger public found business if automatically appellees render pen- during the operations cease would judgment judge sign the written does not inter- appeals. Garza’s dency Id. n. of further days.” within 10 at 871 3. pretation would by contravene the statute 268th District judgment Court removing safeguard. remanding county the case to the court on 28, January 1998, that attempted rendition 11.67(b) requires

We conclude section occurred outside strict judgment be rendered no than later statute; therefore, by conferred perfects the licensee 28, January all subse- appeal to the court. district Because the quent proceedings are statute creates an absolute deadline for void. of judgment, rendition district courts have power render or entertain Entry III. The Docket Sheet

post-judgment after expiration motions ten-day period. See Spears, 524 Garza argues alternatively that the 292; S.W.2d at McBeth Riverside Inn did, fact, 268th District Corp., (Tex.Civ.App.- ten-day period, n.r.e.). [1st Houston writ Dist.] ref d evidenced January the court’s disapprove We holding cases recitation was rendered on plenary power ‍‌‌​​‌‌‌‌​​‌​​​‌​‌​‌​‌​​​​‌‌‌​​​​​‌​‌‌​‌​‌‌‌​‌​‌‌‍district court has grant January The TABC disputes vacate, new modify, trial or reform a recitation, arguing the order’s that the rec judgment after expiration ten-day- ord that the establishes did period. trial Beverage See Texas Aleo. not render Inc., Top Comm’n v. Strip, period. agree We with the TABC. 242 (Tex.App.-San Antonio denied); a Generally, judgment is pet. v. rendered El-Kareh Texas Bev Alco. Comm’n, is erage officially decision announced 874 192 (Tex.App. S.W.2d 1994, writ). court, open by in orally [14th Houston memorandum filed Dist.] clerk, or otherwise announced analysis Our is consistent with hold- our Dibrell, publicly. Aluminum Comet Co. in ings Lawyers other contexts. See 56, (Tex.1970); 58 Knox v. Webb, 107,152 Lloyds Texas v. 137 Tex. of 291, 289, Long, 152 Tex. 292 (1941) 1096, that “tri- (stating (1953), part on grounds Overruled in other al” ordinarily every step includes Hernandez, 249, by, Jackson v. Tex. par- determination of the issues between (1955); 285 S.W.2d 184 v. Zapp, Coleman including pоst ties on hearings (1912). 491, 1040, Tex. 151 S.W. trial, for defining motions new but “actual Despite pronouncement the order’s trial” writ of as the error statute the court “took this matter under advise court, open hearing leading up to the ment and January rendered decision on McBeth, judgment); rendition of see also 20, 1998,”nothing in the record shows that Lawyers at 736 (applying the district court rendered judgment orally Lloyds definition “trial” to a section 11.67(b) court, in open publicly or otherwise an appeal). Accordingly, a district decision, nounced its before ten-day court’s in a section Thus, expired. must be rendered ten deadline must deter days within we date the is filed. Although mine whether the record reflects a memo- January provides day A 1998 rendition would be that when last aof timely despite period Saturday, Sunday, legal the fact that the was is a or holi- — period filed day, eleven calendar earlier —because is extended to include next January King, day Saturday, Sunday, legal Martin Luther is not a Jr., 311.014(b); Day, legal holiday. holiday. see Tex. Gov't Code Code Gov’t 662.003(a)(2). The Act Code Construction also Civ. P. 4. Tex.R. to be a rendition. on or Janu- the docket Sheet randum of decision filed before Moreover, that the 20,1998. is no indication there ary on decision issued memorandum of In an question, effort to resolve publicly an- January 1998 or otherwise appeals ordered Fort Bend on We con- rendition that date. nounced County file supplemen- District Clerk to the court’s the recital in clude that neither “containing any tal record memo- clerk’s ren- regarding an earlier written me- randum of decision other document 20, 1998 docket January nor the dition filed morializing the rendition to effectuate ren- entry sufficient sheet in connection by 268th District Court” than judgment on a date earlier n withthis case. dition of response, 28, 1998, the court actu- date thе January supplemental record that prepared clerk ally signed We hold by deputy contained an affidavit clerk did not render the 268th District Court two hand- containing docket sheet section pertaining January entries written 11.67mandates. January 1998 and 1998. Both entries preceded by are a hand-written reference Challenges The IV. Constitutional judge’s

date and followed initials. January entry that the 16th indicates Concluding expiration appellant appellee appeared ten-day period terminated trial and that the court took the matter jurisdiction, 20th en- January under advisement. The proceedings conducted “[a]ll stated that try states: “It is the determination <& expiration Judgment of this Court that the ... at 165. are void.” 83 S.W.3d Garza deprived to 5 Court’s limitation witnesses argues prejudiced by if he is Tropieana process & due therefore sets hear and decide district court’s failure to Judgment aside the and remands for fur- under section hearing.” ther Garza contends that be- 11.67, violates his constitutional the statute cause the docket sheet contains the district due and due course rights process initialed, entry court’s hand-written recit- I, Texas Constitution article sec law under substance of the court’s final order to 19 Amendment tion and the Fourteenth expired, before the deadline also United States Constitution. He dis- timely court rendered We inter appeals’ that the court of contends agree. open- of the statute violates pretation provisions

Ordinarily, separation-of-powers is a courts and ques when there I, article section 13 concerning judgment tion was of Texas Constitution date II, rendered, argues 1. Garza that the date the was and article section for requisites docket he all signed prevails conflicting over a met Snell, court and should not be entry. Corр. v. to district sheet See N-S-W (1997); Knox, 798, for court’s failure to render penalized 257 timely predica The 292-93; judgment on a basis. v. American S.W.2d Grant 181, raise Co., arguably ment could 183-84 Garza describes Nat’l Ins. if district concerns constitutional (Tex.App.-Houston [14th dist.] writ). case, judgment within court’s failure to render In this precluded opportuni an January 1998. Because signed The the merits. ty for further on precedence takes over Court has held Supreme entry, do not consider United States the docket sheet we 11.67(b) although that the Due Process read Clause to section li- divesting a the Fourteenth Amendment not applicant does re- cense statutory right its quire review, to provide appellate state appeal when fails or refuses to an appeal “[w]hen is afforded ... it cannot act. be granted litigants capri- some clearly The statute does instruct ciously arbitrarily denied to with- others perfect how that dis- violating out the Equal Protection Clause.” timely trict court has not rendered a Normet, 56, 77, v.

Lindsey 405 U.S. ment. See Tex. Alco. Bev.Code (1972). 862, 31 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 36 11.67(b)(4), §§ 61.34. that We assume

Here, engaged the district court was in Legislature did not deprive intend to an eight-week jury trial when party appellate Garza filed on the remedies sole his appeal. January At the 1998 hear- ground the district court was unable ing, the court announced was “not going unwilling to perform statutory duty. by any be bound Ten-Day Brady Rule....”3 See Fourteenth Appeals, Court of (Tex.1990) (“Statutes Garza asserts that he had no con- way to timing trol the of the district rendi- given are a construction consistent with Although tion. recognizing the potential possible, constitutional requirements, when relief, for mandamus argues Garza a because the legislature presumed mandamus proceeding would be denied as compliance have intended state premature constitutions.”). if filed whilе the interpreta- ‍‌‌​​‌‌‌‌​​‌​​​‌​‌​‌​‌​​​​‌‌‌​​​​​‌​‌‌​‌​‌‌‌​‌​‌‌‍federal That still has opportunity render a would an express purpose tion frustrate 11.67, decision. After expiration period, section contemplates judgment, district court’s com- even one license has the pelled mandamus, by writ of would be adverse decision void. Cook v. Spears, 11.67(b)(4), See §§ See Tex. Alco. Bev.Code (Tex.1975). 61.34; see also Gov’t Code (stating cases “[a] statute, however, interpret As we party may appeal a final district court preclude section 11.67 does not an appeal ... in the provided manner to the of appeals after the time for generally”). civil actions the expedited appeal to the district court passed. has Accordingly, “[t]he statute states that hold if the we rules applicable ordinary civil suits court fails to render ply” exceptions time, with limited by op- detailed allotted is judgment rendered statute, “which ten-day appeal shall be construed literal- eration of law once the 11.67(b). ly.” Sec- the period expires. point, At that district Tex. Alco. Bev.Code 11.67(b)(2) tion designates duty sign judg- the time court has a ministerial to in decision, the “trial” the district Liter- court. administrative affirming ment the construed, ally provision this an appeal. is a limitation which can then form the basis of Dunn, on power the district court’s to render a Dunn v. Cf. (Tex.1969) (court beyond judgment days. duty ten But it would has ministerial to go rendition); beyond the literal terms of sign judgment the statute after oral Tex. hearing transcripts At the conclusion of the district the Rule when I have volumes of court stated: plus through lengthy I to read briefs. will get early possibly I’ll take these matters under I advisement to and decide as as my early possible. as issue decision as can. going by any Ten-Day I’m not to be bound R.App. ap- by the court tive order and review (requiring signed judg- P. 26.1 in disposition peals, to appeal to the court of strict adherence ment before an to the appeal an Spears would foreclose perfected); can be Alco. Bev. 11.67(b) appeals when the district (instructing “[t]he that court of Code in timely. fails act This Court’s decision ordinary suits to applicable rules to civil Walker, year which was decided same runs from ply”). appellate timetable approach. takes the better signs judg- Spears, the date district court ment, from the date the rather than for the Spears we cited In Walker by operation of law. See ment is rendered his “lost proposition applicant that Co., v. Ben E. Keith Farmer ordered right appeal,” trial on but we (“The (Tex.1995) appellate timeta- judgment proceed “to to run than ble does not commence other approving order of the Commission.” order, by signed, written even when the in Implicit 762-68. 529 S.W.2d at purely is ministe- signing of such an order holding assumption is an rial.”). was underlying judgment today appeal Our resolution court did not affirmed when district from our decision in Cook v. different days. Noth render in with our decision conformity but the license ing suggests in Walker In Spears, Cook v. Walker. appeal right perfect lost his on to the court was district first Indeed, our appeals. dispo court of forty-two days set after the in a final sition resulted the com- filed. 524 S.W.2d 291. There court, court of appealable to the district sought missioner set aside certain trial today pre Similarly, our decision appeals. ten-day peri- court orders issued after right serves ground on expired, od judgment affirming license de lost it failed to signs judg nial once judgment within ten operation of law. rendered We ment appeal was filed. Id. at 290-91. We de- reconciles the disposition best believe mandamus, clined to issue the writ of stat- the time directive to limit legislative clear ing expired, once in the district to decide order became “final and commission’s insistence that a Legislature’s with the enforceable,” conduct- proceedings right applicant be afforded the license beyond ed ten “were void because the in the an adverse challenge Id. to a trial on was lost.” overrule Cook court of We reasoning, 292. Under that read to the extent it expiration court action taken after perform the district court from preclude fulfillment days, including the court’s duty sign its ministerial duty of a ministerial denial affirming the administrative license order, affirming the commission’s would be rendered court has not when the district void. the deadline contained judgment within county judge’s Although 11.67. not address in the issue section

We did of by operation law was affirmed here —whether a district court’s decision presented the 268th ten-day period, judgment a at the end extinguishes fаilure to render judg a has never rights. Because section District Court party’s appellate conformity with that rendition. ment in appeal makes to the an valid, signed judgment, of a the administra- absence step an essential between interlocutory matter entry remains in the the district court’s docket sheet did district court. The court appeals appro- judgment not amount to a rendition of priately within appeal ten-day statutory period. dismissed want of jurisdiction. The district court’s failure to agree I cannot with the timely judgment render a does not fore- Court’s how to decision about resolve therefore, further close appeal; statute fundamental issue this case: How does preserves appellate Garza’s re- applicant an under exercise section 11.67 view. statutory right appeal the adminis- trative if decision to the court of V. Conclusion try apрeal the district court fails to judgment We hold that in section a 11.67 and sign judgment render and written appeal trial on district court must be days? ques- In answering this rendered within ten time the tion, acknowledges any the Court ren- appeal is filed. We further conclude that ruling dition or other statutory ten-day-trial requirement ten-day peri- occurs outside the strict section 11.67 not with does conflict Garza’s od is “void.” 89 at 7. But then constitutional rights under United that, ten-day holds Constitutions, States Texas because period. “the has a expires, the district court’s failure to render judg- duty judgment affirm- sign ministerial within statutory ten-day ment period decision, ing the can administrative not an appeal does foreclose to the court of appeal.” then form the basis of the appeals. Because the district court did S.W.3d at timely render a judgment not within the (1) I believe the resolution: Court’s period, ten-day judgment was wholly ignores our law that by operаtion affirming rendered of law jurisdiction court lacks to make rul- administrative decision. The district court (2) ings ten-day expires; perform retains the ministe- places unnecessary appli- on the burden duty rial signing judgment conform- if cant the trial court fails to render and ity appellate rendition. The sign a written within time judgment if perfect timetable to an appeal, any, to (3) period; legisla- thwarts obvious of appeals commences once that pow- tive intent that the court have Accordingly, is signed. we af- only er con- over the appeals’ firm the court of dis- that, if stricted timetable. I would hold missing jurisdiction. for want district court does not applicant from which the written dissenting BAKER filed a Justice pe- further within opinion. riod, the administrative decision is dissenting BAKER filed a Justice be- deemed final and enforceable but also opinion. by operation comes the perfect law so that the can I agree with the Court’s conclusion that to the court of Accord- section 11.67 of the Texas Alcoholic Bever- ingly, I dissent. age power Code limits the district court’s try ren- I. APPLICABLE LAW der a from party date Bev- aggrieved appeal the files the Section 11.67 of the Texas Alcoholic - Moreover, al- agree erage applicant the district court. I Code affords an whose appeal an to the refused, canceled, pending suspended or permit is sus- be cohol appeals. Tex. Alco. right a district court of pended appeal the Bev.Code 11.67(b)(4). The § and court then part relevant reads: of section In earlier versions construing (a) the An com- appeal from order 11.67, has held that statute this Court refusing, can- administrator mission or all complete district court requires that the li- permit or celling, or suspending days within ten from proceedings court may cense be taken to district Walker, Cook appeal is filed. date the county applicant, in which the (Tex.1975); Cook v. licensee, or resides or permittee (Tex.1975). More- Spears, 524 S.W.2d 290 per- or which the owner involved real over, have held that district we property resides. sonal occurring after the rulings or proceedings (b) appeal The shall be under sub- ten-day are officio” and “functus and against evidence rule stantial Spears, thus are void and have effect. alone defendant. commission And, at we have also held ordinary civil suits applicable rules that, and court fails hear if the district following exceptions, apply, with days, ten render literally: shall be construed final become and administrative decision (1) perfected shall be and at 292. Spears, 524 S.W.2d enforceable. filed within after the date order, decision, ruling or the com- II. ANALYSIS fi- or administrator becomes mission Ten-Day A. What StatutoRY appealable; nal and Requires Period (2) the case shall before a be tried judge days from within 10 the date Walker, In and this Court both filed; his recognized that an loses (3) a jury; is entitled to if party neither in the district court try district court does not (4) ten-day statu- order, decision, within ruling or 292; tory period. Spears, 524 S.W.2d may or the commission administrator In at 762-63. the court see also suspended modified merits, the Court original proceedings, a trial on but the these pending whether mandamus should is- considered court from preclude the district may suspended sue not be modified taking any further action after appeal. pending period expired. 11.67(a)-(b). § Tex. Alco. Bev.Code scheme, Com- Beverage the Alcoholic Under the five-day suspension its mission ordered hearing must conduct Spears, 524 S.W.2d an alcohol license. substantial-evidence district appealed See 290. The licensee is filed. 11.67(b)’s 11.67(b)(2). predecessor, The district court under section Alco. Bev.Code 666-15e, Though section 7a. suspend has the admin- article discretion days, required the hear- trial ruling’s istrative effect statute 11.67(b)(4). not the case court did set ing. Tex. Alco. Bev.Code time, later. At that until one month court’s final trial continuance, moved for the licensee ment takes immediate effect parties agreed try the case another right appeal licensee’s’ in the district date, month later. trial On the the licen- expired days ten motions, see two urged one for a continu- filed. 524. Spears, at 292. S.W.2d ance compel Moreover, and other to Commis- any we determined that orders sion to disclose certain information. The .ten-day issued after period, such as the granted both motions but district court’s discovery continuance and stayed the pending rulings, disclosure order Spears, were void. 524 S.W.2d at seeking Commission’s mandamus relief 292. We then determined that the Com- from rulings. these Spears, 524 at suspension S.W.2d mission’s order fi- became the 291. Spears, nal and enforceable decision. at S.W.2d 292. Based on these conclu- review, On mandamus the Commission sions, we held that mandamus relief would argued juris- that the district court “lost be “immaterial” and thus peti- denied the orders, diction” to enter because the Spears, tion. 524 S.W.2d at 292. ten-day period for a trial on appeal had passed. Spears, Walker, In S.W.2d at 291. In Cook v. reached Court discussing legislative history legal the same conclusion but ordered a article 666-15e, Walker, this Court noted that the statute’s different result. See 529 S.W.2d required only Walker, earliest version an ap- at 762-63. In the licensee peal be tried within at pealed ten an administrative canceling order earliest “in possible time thereafter his licenses. The stayed Judge event the try suspension is not able to such order the trial (10) сause within such day period.” set and that trial for over a month later. (citations Spears, Walker, 524 S.W.2d at 291 n. 2 at S.W.2d omitted). But, 1937, and emphasis therefore, Spears governed, held and Legislature provision amended the the licensee lost his to an language judge struck permitting to the district court ten after he filed extend trial beyond peri- appeal. However, that ten-day deny- than rather Spears, 291; od. at see Act of mandamus relief as in 22, 1937, R.S., 448, May 45th Leg., ch. art. Walker Court issued mandamus relief and I, 1937 Tex. Laws Gen. 1066. ordered the .district court to aside its set And, when the Legislature added article staying order the Commission’s decision 666-15e the Liquor Control Act in to proceed approving the terms, it declared that in- Commission’s order. rule,

cluding trial “shall at 763. literally.” Spears, considered Here, Garza contends that 291; 25, 1961, Act of May Leg., see 57th apply Walker do not the district because R.S., 1,§ ch. Gen. Laws actually heard 559, 561. therefore, ten-day period, and the district of the Legislature’s Because court’s out-of-time ‍‌‌​​‌‌‌‌​​‌​​​‌​‌​‌​‌​​​​‌‌‌​​​​​‌​‌‌​‌​‌‌‌​‌​‌‌‍full repeated judgment has force attempts to limit the time support and effect. To position his try appeal, district court could con- we af- rendered void, cluded “that the for an time en- ter the ten-day period is not Garza Medina, dured ten days and that on there no relies Fox v. [was] 848 S.W.2d 866 writ). authority extend that time.” Spears, (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi Fox, this conclu- Applying appli- tried facts, sion to the we orally determined that cant’s rendered

13 appeal, further purposes for ten-day open court within ment from the date to ten the district did period. lacks filed. This means the district statutory a sign judgment until a judgment, sign Fox, to render a jurisdiction at expired. 848 S.W.2d 870.

period otherwise entertain judgment, written or require did not appeals The court ten-day after that any motions or rule on signed obtain appеllant and, any orders instead, Consequently, period expires. held that the ten within ten-day court enters need hear the the district court Moreover, are period expires the ten void. and make a decision within peal Fox, is deemed affirmed If decision this days. 848 S.W.2d at occurs, held, ten-day peri- of law once the by operation further appeals at 529 S.W.2d sign judgment expires. re- od See district court can 762; at 292. Spears, 524 S.W.2d flecting that decision after the Fox, at period expires. time 848 S.W.2d My conclusion explained The court of the out- jurisdiction here to render lacked parties from auto- approach precludes this Spears. How judgment reaffirms of-time matically the district court losing ever, extent conflicts with Walker on a affirmance of ad- based deemed case, that, manda issued in that the Court losing and their ministrative decision from “to require mus the district court reliеf Fox, appellate rights. further the order proceed judgment approving n. 3. Walker, 529 See Commission.” because, contention, 763. This is under disagree I with and S.W.2d at Garza’s conclusion, and legal principles that section 11.67 allows announced Fox’s Walker, the sign recognized a district court to written jurisdiction have make days pass after the ten to memorialize a does not or rendering judgment rulings including that court made within the ten- decision — merely approv day period. Accepting position signing a written would decision'—after disregard enable the district court the administrative Accordingly, indefinitely period expires. limitations time ten-day statute’s time and the delay finality, disapprove further I of Walker case’s would Furthermore, has presume a district court purposes. this result entire- cases that ministerially judgment, render ly prior holding power contradicts our trial, judgment, any sign grant take a new district court lacks written vacate, modify reform a ten-day expires. after action Moreover, See ten-day period expires. trial Spears, 524 S.W.2d at 292. See Top Legislature’s express Beverage afoul Texas Alco. Com’n it runs Inc., (TexApp.- Strip, to limit the district court determination denied); El-Kareh pet. we have construed lit- San Antonio proceedings, which Com’n, (as Beverage Alco. erally Legislature requires) to v. Texas act, (TexApp.-Houston [14th power to S.W.2d mean Fox, 1994, writ); days. Dist.] See Alco. Bev.Code 11.67(b); at 291. 870-71. Here, tried the our I jurisprudence, Consistent 11.67(b) the matter under advisement limits the took conclude that section But it rendered period. hear jurisdiction to district court’s judgment outside case, its written written judgment, Thus, the statutory period. time the court creates a constitutional concern. The appeals correctly that, of concluded be- United Supreme States Court has held that, сause the district jurisdiction court lost to though process due not require does enter orders after ten days, provide review, appellate dis- state when a trict is void. state does establish an appellate right, “it

cannot granted litigants some and Right Appeal B. The to Further capriciously or .arbitrarily denied to others Appeals Court of without violating the Equal Protection Normet, Lindsey Clause.” 405 U.S. Here, because the district jur- court lost (1972). 92 S.Ct. 31 L.Ed.2d 36 isdiction over appeal after ten days passed, appeals the court of held that it too Section 11.67 does not expressly de- jurisdiction lacked and dismissed the ap- party scribe how a may appeal to the court peal. 83 argues S.W.3d 168. Garza appeals when the district court does not that the court of appeals’ interpreting sec- sign render and within the ten tion 11.67 prohibit exercising from days. But this Court must interpret stat- appeal over the violates his utes manner that renders them constitu- constitutional rights process of due and 311.021(1); § tional. Tex. Gov’t Code due course of law under the Fourteenth Andrews, Proctor v. Amendment (Tex.1998). of the United States Constitu- Consequently, I would hold I, tion and article section 19 of the Texas that a district court’s failure to render and Constitution. He also contends that this sign a judgment within the ten-day period interpretation open violates the courts and does prohibit not a party appealing from separation powers provisions of the Tex- the court of appeals. Consistent with I, as Constitution article section 13 and Spears, I would hold that the administra- II, article points section 1. Garza out that tive decision deemed operation affirmed complied he statutory requisites all enforceable,” law is not “final and for the appeal to the district court and but it apрealable signed also becomes the should not be penalized because that court judgment necessary perfect ap- timely failed to render peal to the court Spears, See 292; Tex.R.App. 524 S.W.2d at see also P. Walker, and both mandamus Therefore, 26.1. the time in which a li- proceedings, whether the district court’s cense has to to the court timely failure to sign render and ap- of appeals would run from the date the pealable judgment precluded the licensee’s administrative decision is deemed affirmed right to a further because the district court failed to squarely was not before the Court. render a judgment. This resolu- 762-63; Spears, 529 S.W.2d at express legislative tion best reconciles Instead, S.W.2d at 292. the Court had to literally intent that provi- we construe the determine whether mandamus should issue limiting sion the district court’s time to to preclude the district court making from decide аn with the equally express rulings and rendering judgment outside legislative party intent that a have a right the ten-day period. upon re- to the court of appeals. See Tex. viewing squarely issue now before the 11.67(b), 61.34(b); §§ Aloo. Bev.Code Court, I agree prohibiting party Spears, 524 S.W.2d at 292. from exercising statutory right to a Here, further if a district court jurisprudence existing fails within the ten-day period ten-day period expired Garza’s violates the rendition within required peal open sepa- courts became final Constitution’s administrative decision Texas Spears, law. by operation powers provisions. See enforceable ration Moreover, exist- Const, I, II, 524 S.W.2d at 292. under art. 1. Garza does art. law, how this construction vio- demonstrate ten-day period expired signed ‍‌‌​​‌‌‌‌​​‌​​​‌​‌​‌​‌​​​​‌‌‌​​​​​‌​‌‌​‌​‌‌‌​‌​‌‌‍after guarantees open any of three lates at 292. was void. Trinity provides. See provision courts advocate, although legal proрosition that I Consultants, Inc., 889 River Auth. v. URS our and the jurisprudence consistent with (Tex.1994); Texas Ass’n 261 S.W.2d of ex- legislative intent that section 11.67 Bd., Control 852 S.W.2d Bus. v. Texas Air not when Garza’s presses, was evident (Tex.1993). Further, the cases or in the district court peal was distinguishable, are be- relies on Garza appeals when the court dismissed challenges they open involve courts cause And, if Garza had the benefit appeal. allegedly impeded par- to statutes that ten-day period expired this rule when rights bring common-law claims. ties’ to court, in the he would have known district Nelson, 11, 11- Neagle v. See that the administrative decision that Krusen, (Tex.1985); Nelson v. be- deemed affirmed under also (Tex.1984). This case S.W.2d pur- came final for signed claim, a law but not involve common does Thus, appeal. un- poses perfecting an a only rights created under rule, have my der Garza would proposed scheme. to perfect known how to only in- Similarly, contends Garza appeals. require 11.67 hear- terpreting section to Therefore, to I remand this case would inter- ing and rendition justice. the interest of ability feres with the district court’s —not Tex.R.App. P. Exxon Corp. See 60.3; government’s abili- other some branch (Tex.1993). Tidwell, 19, 23 867 Thus, appeal. hear decide an ty above, For the the dis- —to reasons discussed of pow- a separation has not shown Garza jurisdiction trict court lack to make would Proctor, ers violation. See case, any in this and the rulings remand (The separation Texas Constitution’s court would for district here be provision provides “the three powers purposes for starting timetable government pro- of the state branches if perfect appeal, any, Garza to any departments of the three from hibits words, appeals. court of In other consis- exercising properly attached any powеr advocate, upon rule I tent with the remand branches.”). either other court of Garza could to the af- the administrative decision deemed

firmed and deemed the III. THE OPINION COURT’S by operation ment of law. The remand that, if the district The holds Court effective, the appellate would become fails to render court run, begin time would table min- time, has a “the district court allotted any rehearing filing time for motions affirming duty Tex.R.App. sign judgment isterial P. expires. this Court See decision, can then the administrative Challenges C. Other Constitutional to the court of appeal” of an form basis But the incorrectly inter- contends that Garza holding this with its require does reconcile preting 11.67 to section writing repeatedly recognizes to file additional or motions seek rebef —and previous appellate require declines to overrule —the cases from the courts rulings holding sign district proceedings occurring day outside the should not appellant bear onerous and Somehow, by designating costly are void. burden. often duty Finally, though recognizes the Court affirming the administrative decision Legislature’s intent that the in the “ministerial,” the Court this magi- believes strictly confined to the cally jur- empowers district court with ten-day period, holding entirely disre- none isdiction when exists. gards rationale behind this intent ex-

Moreover, misplaces the Court its reb- pressed plain language. statute’s anee on Dunn v. Dunn support its view provides Section that the district court retains may modify suspend adminis- ministerially after the deny decision to a bcense pending trative sign judgment affirming the administra trial. Tex. Alco. substantial-evidence Dunn, Dunn v. tive 11.67(b)(4). decision. But the district Bev.Code (Tex.1969). case, final not be judgment court’s modified simply validity Court affirmed the of oral suspended further appeal. pronouncements by 11.67(b)(4). from the bench hold As the Tex. AlCO.Bev.Code that, once trial cоurt renders orally recognizes, that a Court this ensures busi- court, open judgment entry its of a an alcohol because of ness denied license judgment written is a ministerial purely pubbe will not possible danger Dunn, act. S.W.2d at 832. operations pending able to continue Court hold court did not that a district pursuing appebate rights. business all its may sign judgment, However, a written even one See 89 S.W.3d at 6. under the merely affirming an deci administrative holding, suspends if a district court Court’s operation sion that became enforceable decision but an adverse administrative law, having the district despite a written sign judg- does render and lost over the case. Nonethe ten-day period, ment within the that sus- less, opinion this Court’s here allows order stands and the pension arguably Latty State ex Contra rel. Ow result. can until operations business continue ens, (Tex.1995) (“Judi to, to, compelled district court decides is jurisdic cial action taken thе court’s perform duty. its ministerial nullity.”) tion has expired over a cause is a

(citations omitted). IV. CONCLUSION Today, that section holding the Court reaffirms

Additionally, Court’s Beverage has ministe- of the Texas Alcohohc authority court to hear riaby sign requires the ad- a district affirming Code and render a ministrative decision outside the certainly pre- time the time the is filed. It also “fixes” Garza’s dicament; however, reaffirms a district any ruling resolve does not period expires is parties position may how future Garza’s makes resolving the funda- void. compel perform the district court to Undoubtedly, par- presented party such mental issue here —how duty. ministerial rights when enjoys appebate ties who obtain a its further timely do not of their forced court fahs to render and through no fault own will be com- sign written —the

pletely legal principles, contradicts these unanswered,

leaves and thwarts questions Legislature’s express directive. that,

I hold would a district

does not render and a written

ment from which to within the stat-

utory ten-day period, the administrative by operation

decision is deemed affirmed Then, ‍‌‌​​‌‌‌‌​​‌​​​‌​‌​‌​‌​​​​‌‌‌​​​​​‌​‌‌​‌​‌‌‌​‌​‌‌‍law. first impres- a matter of

sion, I would hold

decision that deemed affirmed also be- pur-

comes the

poses perfecting Because the Court’s resolution unnecessary

creates contradictions

problems, I dissent. C.H.,

In the interest of a minor child.

No. 00-0552.

Supreme of Texas.

Argued April 2001. July

Decided

Rehearing Sept. Denied

Case Details

Case Name: Garza v. Texas Alcoholic Beverage Commission

Court Name: Texas Supreme Court

Date Published: Jul 3, 2002

Citation: 89 S.W.3d 1

Docket Number: 00-1069

Court Abbreviation: Tex.