ROBERTO GARCIA, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS
NO. PD-0556-25
IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TEXAS
June 25, 2026
ON APPELLANT‘S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW FROM THE THIRD COURT OF APPEALS COMAL COUNTY
Finley, J., filed a dissenting opinion.
This is an evidentiary sufficiency case. We are tasked with deciding whether the State proved, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Appellant had a prior domestic violence conviction. To prove the prior conviction, the State admitted the following: (1) a judgment of conviction; (2) a fingerprint card (and fingerprint comparison
I would conclude that the evidence is insufficient to show that the prior conviction was a domestic violence conviction. The State‘s evidence only proves that someone named Roberto Garcia married someone named Olivia Lopez, and that six days later, Appellant committed aggravated assault against someone named Olivia Garcia. Something is missing. The evidence admitted requires a jury to make two unsupported inferences. First, that the Roberto Garcia who was married on May 14, 2004, is Appellant. Second, that the Olivia Lopez who was married on May 14, 2004, was the Olivia Garcia who was assaulted by Appellant. It may very well be true that “jurors [are] free to rely on their common sense that a person‘s wife often takes her husband‘s last name when they marry.” Ante, at 8 (Court‘s Op.). But this assumption rests on a premise that lacks evidentiary support: The person whose last name an Olivia Lopez presumably took to become Olivia Garcia is the same person who assaulted Olivia Garcia in 2004 and is the Appellant in the instant case. Because
However, the evidence is sufficient to support a conviction for Class A misdemeanor assault, a lesser-included offense to felony family violence assault with a prior conviction. I would reform the judgment of conviction to the lesser-included offense and remand for a new punishment trial. See Bowen v. State, 374 S.W.3d 427, 432 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). Because the Court does not, I respectfully dissent.
I. Factual Background
Appellant was charged with family violence assault with a prior conviction. See
On or about the 28th day of July, 2004, in the 226th District Court of Bexar County, Texas, in Case No. 2004CR5483W, the defendant was convicted of the offense Aggravated Assault with a Deadly Weapon which was alleged to have been committed against Olivia Lopez, a person whose relationship to or association with the Defendant is described by
§ 71.0021 (b) ,§ 71.003 , or§ 71.005 of the Texas Family Code .
At trial, the State admitted a judgment in cause number 2004CR5483W. That judgment showed that an individual named “Roberto Garcia” was convicted on July 28, 2004, of the second-degree felony offense of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. See
Ronnie Womack, a fingerprint expert from the Comal County Sheriff‘s Office, testified at trial. The court of appeals described Womack‘s testimony as follows:
The next witness was Ronnie Womack, a CCSO fingerprint identification expert, who identified Garcia in court as the person from whom Womack had taken a set of inked fingerprints on a ten-print card. Womack compared the known set of Garcia‘s fingerprints with a prior set of fingerprints on a ten-print card—admitted into evidence as part of a certified criminal-history record—for a May 20, 2004 conviction for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. Womack testified that the known and prior sets of fingerprints matched. In addition to the ten print cards, Womack reviewed an information and a marriage license that were admitted into evidence. He testified that the May 20, 2004 information charged defendant “Roberto Garcia” with committing aggravated assault by using and exhibiting a deadly weapon, a knife, that was capable of causing death or serious bodily injury and caused bodily injury to the complainant O.G. by cutting her. When the prosecutor published the May 14, 2004 marriage license to the jury, she asked Womack, “Are these the two people that you identified earlier?” Womack confirmed that they were. He further testified that the May 20, 2004 date of arrest occurred after the date of marriage. Evidence of another prior offense, Garcia‘s 1995 judgment of conviction for deadly conduct, was also admitted during trial.
Garcia v. State, No. 03-23-00390-CR, 2025 WL 1910571, at *2 (Tex. App.—Austin July 9, 2025).
There was no affirmative finding of family violence made nor was the box labeled “DOMESTIC VIOLENCE OFFENSE?” on the judgment of conviction checked off. To prove the “domestic” aspect of the prior conviction, the State admitted a marriage certificate. The marriage certificate shows that a “Roberto Garcia” married an “Olivia Lopez” on May 14, 2004, six days before the offense date of the prior conviction. The State did not admit any further evidence to link Appellant to the marriage certificate. Appellant was convicted as charged in the indictment and was sentenced to fifty years’ confinement. He timely appealed.
The court of appeals affirmed. Garcia, 2025 WL 1910571, at *8. Addressing Appellant‘s sufficiency challenge, the court of appeals held the following:
After reviewing the information and the marriage license, Womack was asked generally and without objection whether these were the “two people” he had identified earlier, which he confirmed. This testimony, the unredacted charging instrument, and the unredacted marriage license support the jury‘s rational inference that the victim named in the information was the same person Garcia had married six days earlier. Thus, a rational jury could have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that Garcia had previously been convicted of an offense involving family violence. We presume that the jury resolved any evidentiary conflicts in favor of their verdict and defer to that determination. The evidence at trial, viewed in its totality and in the light most favorable to the jury‘s verdict, is sufficient to support a rational finding that the victim, O.G., was a member of Garcia‘s family or household when he assaulted her.
Id. at *4 (internal footnote and internal citations omitted).
II. Applicable Law
“A person commits an offense if the person intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causes bodily injury to another, including the person‘s spouse.”
Because the prior conviction is an element of the offense, our Court‘s normal sufficiency of the evidence jurisprudence applies. We must examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the State and determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime—here, the prior conviction—beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). To establish that a defendant has been convicted of a prior offense, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) a prior conviction exists and (2) the defendant is linked to that conviction. Flowers v. State, 220 S.W.3d 919, 921 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007); Beck v. State, 719 S.W.2d 205, 210 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986). A prior conviction may be proven up by certified copies of a judgment and sentence and authenticated copies of the Texas Department of Corrections records, including fingerprints, supported by expert testimony matching them to the known prints of the defendant. Beck, 719
But that is not the only method. Indeed,
[w]hile evidence of a certified copy of a final judgment and sentence may be a preferred and convenient means, the State may prove both of [the Flowers] elements in a number of different ways, including: (1) the defendant‘s admission or stipulation, (2) testimony by a person who was present when the person was convicted of the specified crime and can identify the defendant as that person, or (3) documentary proof (such as a judgment) that contains sufficient information to establish both the existence of a prior conviction and the defendant‘s identity as the person convicted.
Flowers, 220 S.W.3d at 921–22.
[O]rdinarily the proof that is adduced to establish that the defendant on trial is one and the same person that is named in an alleged prior criminal conviction or convictions closely resembles a jigsaw puzzle. The pieces standing alone usually have little meaning. However, when the pieces are fitted together, they usually form the picture of the person who committed that alleged prior conviction or convictions.
Human v. State, 749 S.W.2d 832, 835–36 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988) (op. on reh‘g).
III. Analysis
Here, there is a piece of the “jigsaw puzzle” that is missing. Cf. id. The Court says that a rational juror could decide that Olivia Lopez and Olivia Garcia are the same person based on the inference that an individual takes their husband‘s last name when they get married. Ante, at 8 (Court‘s Op.). But that inference presupposes a fact that has no evidentiary support: That the man whom Olivia
The evidence would have been sufficient had there been anything to link Appellant to the marriage certificate—for example, an address, phone number, birthdate, social security number, or signature, to name a few. See Henry v. State, 509 S.W.3d 915, 918 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (“[T]he State may . . . establish . . . the defendant‘s identity . . . by other means, including through . . . sufficient information or descriptors that show the defendant‘s identity or physical description.“). Evidence that the defendant merely has the same name as the person who was previously convicted of another offense is not sufficient to satisfy the State‘s burden. See Beck, 719 S.W.2d at 210. If a name alone is insufficient to prove identity for purposes of a judgment of conviction, it follows that a name alone is insufficient to prove identity for purposes of a marriage certificate.
Lower court authority, published and unpublished, paints a thorough picture supporting why the evidence in this case is insufficient. Consider, first, a case where the evidence was sufficient. In Wingfield v. State, the prosecution introduced evidence of the appellant‘s prior conviction for misdemeanor “assault FV.” 481 S.W.3d 376, 379 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2015, pet. ref‘d). The affirmative finding of
Now consider cases where the evidence was insufficient. In Ellis v. State, the only evidence that supported the appellant‘s prior conviction for family violence was the fact that “the trial court (Tarrant County Criminal Court Number Five) where the prior assault conviction was obtained primarily deals with ‘domestic violence assault bodily injury on family members.‘” No. 2-02-416-CR, 2004 WL 177851, at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Jan. 29, 2004, pet. ref‘d) (mem. op., not designated for publication). The court of appeals easily concluded that the evidence was insufficient. See id. at *1–2.
In Tanner v. State, the prosecution offered evidence of the appellant‘s prior conviction for assault. 335 S.W.3d 784, 785 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2011, no pet.). The judgment of conviction had no evidence of family violence. Id. The prosecution offered the plea agreement for the prior conviction which stated that the appellant had been “charged” with “assault—BI—FM.” Id. There was no testimony offered regarding the meaning of “FM.” Id. The prosecution simply argued in closing that “FM” meant “family violence.” Id. The court of appeals first considered whether the evidence in the case was similar to other authorities where evidence had been found to be legally sufficient. Id. at 785–86. The court of appeals in Tanner then
In Crawford v. State, the prosecution introduced the appellant‘s judgment of conviction for assault along with the complaint and charging information from that case. No. 12-05-00293-CR, 2006 WL 2062979, at *3 (Tex. App.—Tyler July 26, 2006, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication). The judgment reflected that the appellant had pleaded guilty to assault, and there was “no finding of family violence and no other indication that the offense involved family violence.” Id. There was a stay away order for an individual named Janet Whitworth who also appeared “in the complaint and charging information where it allege[d] that she was the victim of the assault.” Id. The prosecution also introduced a copy of a “Criminal Docket” page obtained by a detective “out of the Smith County computer system.” Id. The docket page had an entry that read “Off/Date: ASSAULT CAUSES BODILY INJURY FAMILY VIOLENCE.” Id. The detective testified “that he was satisfied that [the a]ppellant had been previously convicted of assault involving family violence.” Id. at *4. But,
his testimony was based on the one page document outlined above. The detective testified that he did no investigation into who Janet Whitworth was and was asked, “Do you know if she fits under the legal
definition of family or household member, as it existed in 1996, involving [Appellant]?” The detective answered, “No.”
Id. The court of appeals concluded:
The State was required to prove either that there had been an affirmative finding of family violence for the 1996 conviction or that Janet Whitworth was a member of Appellant‘s family or household. The evidence is insufficient to show either. The “Criminal Docket” may suggest that the case involved family violence, but we cannot determine who made that assertion. It is certainly not—and the State does not allege that it is—an affirmative finding of family violence made by the court. It is also not an assertion made by the State in a charging information. Had it been, Appellant‘s plea of guilty might have been an admission of that fact.
Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the document contains assertions made by an unknown person that the case involved family violence. Without knowing who that person is, the basis of the person‘s knowledge, or some notion of what it was the person was trying to express, we cannot conclude that the 1996 case involved family violence, especially in light of the burden to prove that fact beyond a reasonable doubt. The document is some kind of a summary of events surrounding the 1996 conviction. As with the detective‘s testimony, we cannot credit the conclusions reached without some understanding of the underlying components.
This case is similar to Ellis v. State, No. 2-02-416-CR, 2004 Tex. App. LEXIS 914, 2004 WL 177851 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004, pet. ref‘d) (not designated for publication). In Ellis, the only evidence to show that a previous conviction involved family violence was that the case had been heard in a court that primarily dealt with family violence cases. Id., at *4. The State conceded error in Ellis. There is no concession of error in this case, but we reach the same conclusion.
Id. (internal footnote omitted).
This case is closer to Crawford than the cases in which the evidence was found to be sufficient. The State introduced Appellant‘s prior conviction for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. There was nothing in the judgment of conviction or in the stipulation of evidence signed by Appellant which indicated that the offense was a family violence offense. Olivia Garcia was the named complainant in the aggravated assault conviction. To support the conclusion that the prior conviction was a family violence offense, the State introduced a marriage certificate which showed that an individual named Roberto Garcia married an individual named Olivia Lopez six days prior to Appellant‘s prior conviction‘s offense date. But the State did not introduce any evidence linking Appellant to the marriage certificate.2 Based on this, I would conclude that the evidence was insufficient to establish that Appellant‘s conviction was a family violence offense, particularly in light of the State‘s burden to prove the element beyond a reasonable doubt.
IV. Reformation
In Bowen, this Court overruled Collier v. State, 999 S.W.2d 779 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999), which prohibited courts of appeals from reforming convictions to lesser
Having convicted Appellant of third-degree family violence assault with a prior conviction, the jury necessarily found all the elements of the Class A misdemeanor family violence assault beyond a reasonable doubt. Because I believe the evidence is insufficient to support the prior conviction, I would reform Appellant‘s conviction to reflect a conviction for Class A misdemeanor family violence assault and remand for a new punishment hearing.
V. Conclusion
The evidence is insufficient to support, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Appellant had a prior conviction of family violence. See
Filed: June 25, 2026
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