*1 however, light, pros- in another by prejudicing jury against him.” Viewed Id. hope legitimate 378. at ecutor could to elicit little by calling information Mrs. Newton as a significance of Roller is twofold. witness, goes to the fact heart of First, proposition stands for it holding in the instant case. The out- initially may innocent trial error be tainted nothing by prosecutor’s to ex- burst added of value to the trial a intentional efforts Second, jury and, indeed, coupled acerbate its effect. as a has with the infirm final improper its attention focused on testimo- arguments, posed significant potential a ny, impression the initial created said jury. inflame the instruction, testimony, by simple curable say com- Since we cannot errors in Both of escalates to cumulative harm. beyond mitted the trial were harmless large principles play these role doubt, Tex.R.App.Pro. reasonable see instant case. 81(b)(2), Ap- of the Court of harm, attempting show peals is affirmed. bystander’s exception perfected a bill proximity of the wit which he showed the ONION, P.J., DAVIS, J., concur jury, audibility of ness to the Newton in result. comments, and the fact that the witness’s WHITE, JJ., dissenting. MILLER and jury see and hear all members of the could suggesting transpired. The factors what ORDER harm lie in the cumulative effect of MILLER, improper arguments. Judge. Af outburst and the prosecutor jurors ter the invited Rehearing is de- The State’s Motion separate three consider the outburst on nied. occasions, great there is a likelihood that trial court appeal This is abated to the way. This is was affected some hearing instructions that it conduct a with judge particularly true because the trial procedure steps pursuant to the full prosecutor’s effectively ratified the final outlined Keeton v. plea to the outburst. As set out consider following 861, (Tex.Cr.App.1988) (opinion 7, appeals Brandley, ante note such “to abatement). improper. They dis abandon reason” are jury from the actual evidence of tract the IT IS SO ORDERED. or not the defendant committed whether Koller, he is the crime of which accused.
supra cases cited therein. at
Therefore, say cannot that the cumula we effect of these errors was harmless
tive See Tex.R.
beyond a reasonable doubt. 81(b)(2). App.Pro. HUMAN, Appellant, Daniel James suggests jury’s impo- State proves of a near-minimum sentence sition Texas, Appellee. The STATE harmless. This is an that the error was First, appellant position. untenable No. 042-86. in the face of a convicted of the offense Texas, Appeals of Criminal reasonably plausible hotly contested En Banc. Second, self-defense claim. the sentence imposed represent the minimum did March 1988. Appellant punishment under the law. Rehearing On Motion for im- years fewer could have received two 16, 1988. March probated sentence. prisonment or a 11, 1988. Rehearing May Denied argues Finally, the out- State because it was not burst was harmless any disputed fact issue. We
relevant to relevancy. agree as to with this observation *2 Dallas, Baskett, Gibson,
Mike Robert T. appellant. for Knize, Atty. Daniel Co. Gene Waxahachie, McBride, Atty., Asst. Co. Rob- Huttash, Austin, Atty., for the ert State’s State. APPELLANT’S MOTION
OPINION ON REHEARING FOR TEAGUE, Judge. Rehearing is
Appellant’s Motion for granted. Febru- opinions filed this cause on
ary
hereby ordered withdrawn
1988 are
following is
therefor.
and the
substituted
court
jurisdiction in the district
To vest
Human,
that James Daniel
and to establish
committed the
appellant, had
hereinafter
intoxicated,
driving
felony
while
offense
the fol-
the indictment
State
(1)
lowing:
appellant committed
driving
while intoxicat-
primary offense
ed,
finally
(2)
previously
he had
been twice
committing
felony offense
convicted
intoxicated,
(3) the
driving
while
had
alleged prior felony conviction
first
he was convicted
final before
become
alleged prior
conviction.
the last
6701Z-1,
see and
Also
Art.
V.A.C.S.
See
Code,
12.42(d),
V.T.C.A., Penal
compare
§
thereunder, which
collated
and the cases
regarding prior
pleading
proof
concern
alleged to enhance
felony convictions
to a
criminal
punishment of
“habitual”
and not
years’
of 25
confinement
minimum
more than
years’
prove
confinement or life
allegations
the State to
beyond
its
imprisonment in
Department
See,
of Correc-
reasonable
example,
doubt.
Lit
tions.
(Tex.Cr.
tles v.
App.1984).
found
“guilty of Driv-
ing
Intoxicated,
While
charged
deciding
question
of suffi
effectively
indictment.” This
ap-
convicted
ciency of the evidence that is based either
pellant of the felony
driving
offense of
on direct or circumstantial evidence that
*3
while intoxicated. Punishment was also
guilt,
relates to
this Court
views
evi
jury
assessed
year
at one
confine-
in
light
dence
most
to
favorable
ment
the Ellis County Jail and a
jury’s verdict.
any
We consider whether
$2,000.00 fine.
rational trier of fact could have found the
essential elements of the
beyond
crime
appeal, appellant,
On direct
through
doubt,
reasonable
adopted
which test was
counsel, presented to the Waco Court of
Virginia,
307,
from Jackson v.
443 U.S.
99
Appeals
points,
error,
grounds,
four
nee
of
2781,
(1979).
S.Ct.
narily proof (Tex.App.-13 is 672 that adduced S.W.2d 828 to establish Dist. P.D.R.), State, and see Hollins 1984) (No that the v. defendant on trial is and the one person same is alleged (Tex.Cr.App.1978). that named in 873 prior criminal conviction or convictions record reflects did not closely pieces puzzle. jigsaw resembles of a on complain appeal, direct nor does he com- pieces standing alone have lit- usually Court, plain allegations that the However, meaning. pieces tle when the prior went to convictions were insuffi- together, they are fitted usually form the give cient him what the notice of State picture person who committed prove against intended him. His real alleged prior conviction or convictions. complaint appeal was evidence And that is what resulted here. Consider- adduced was to establish insufficient ing pieces all of the of circumstantial evi- one he was and the same as that dence that went what the had to State alleged prior named convic- prove, picture appellant, only tions. appellant, being per- one and the same past It is true Court in the that this alleged prior son named in the convictions very strict has held State to a accounta was shown to exist. going alleged bility proof standard in its The issue as view it is we whether convictions, see, example, Corley evidence was rendered insufficient because State, v. 158 254 Tex.Cr.R. S.W.2d 394 there a material variance between State, (1953); Melancon v. 690 S.W.2d what was and what proved Boone (Tex.Cr.App.1963); the State. Green v. (Tex.Cr.App.1970); S.W.2d *5 273,
This
that
153
219
Court in recent times has held
Tex.Cr.R.
S.W.2d 687
State,
(1949);
Colvin v.
pleading
for a
the
and
and
172
variance between
Tex.Cr.R.
exist,
proof
310,
(1962),
rendering
the
to
thus
the evi
837
not
doned,
say
appellant
prevent
that
in the
numbers would
we
unable
are
surprise
finding
or
he was misled
has shown
that
from
the record of the
defendant
(381).
prejudice.”
to his
prior
presenting a defense.
conviction and
(Tex.
See
v.
exhibit and matched. judgment and copy Because the of the judgment directly copy A and sentence not shown to be sentence were Ap- alleged appellant, in Court of that related to the conviction connected to the “probative peals that such was not number F-80-11997-MN was admit- held cause Appellant per- that was the same objection. evidence without See evidence ted into Hernandez, supra, appellant's Number 1 causes us to over- failure to of State’s Exhibit 2. Under ground specifically object portions of error. rule his fourth to the inadmissible
839 A prints. copy of known appellant’s previously convicted of match had been son who that related to sentence alleged jurisdiction- in the first the and the offense F-78-8690-IQ to and paragraph of indictment.” We dis- number alleged al the cause agree. within Daniel person by information contained name of James Such a the certainly appel- could used as cir- our Human, the be same name exhibit which is the prove appel- to that has, cumstantial evidence evidence with- into lant was admitted in person same named lant one and the was judgment and sentence objection. out prior F- alleged the conviction numbered Daniel Human was con- that James reflect 80-11997-MN. District Court in the 204th Judicial victed 20, 1979, for County on March of Dallas although and hold that there findWe driving felony offense of while intoxi- the al- slight discrepancy was a between fine and court assessed a $500.00 cated and F-80-1197-MN, number, leged and cause costs. F80-11997N, number, cause proved is more adduced circumstantial evidence upon Appeals relied Court of every reasonable to exclude than sufficient of v. 583 Court’s decisions Bullard appel- of identity except of that hypothesis (Tex.Cr.App.1976),and Daniel S.W.2d any further find and hold that lant. We (Tex.Cr.App.1979), conclude from trier of fact could rational to that the evidence was insufficient hold that circumstantial evidence admitted one and the to that establish person and the same was one alleged in cause num- person named same in number F-80- who convicted cause F-78-8690-IQ. reading A careful ber 11997-MN, as in indictment. cases, however, easily the facts of those Littles, supra, a point out that We also they inapplicable are to this that shows majority of this Court held even Littles, supra, held In this Court cause. description though there was not a detailed ... “To the extent Daniels [sic] evidence, but the evi- of the defendant holding as any or other case can be read finger- upon expert dence was based proof are exclusive manners that there testimony print photographs person’s and identity felo- defendant’s as a defendant, the evidence was suffi- enhancement, they are over- nies used establish that the defendant was cient to (32). Daniel, supra, trial ruled.” person that named one and the same were re- judgment and sentence court’s alleged prior convictions. in its proof the State failed versed because alleged felony In order establish was one and that the defendant establish IQ, in cause number F-78-8690 had convicted person who same been records had custodian State particular of Louisiana. State Department County Sheriffs of the Dallas County jail held that a Dallas This Court testify. This was shown per- card, the fact that the which verified up “fingerprint” expert, and he matched finger- by testimony of the son identified fingerprints State’s contained within was booked print expert as the defendant “Appendixes see Nos. our Exhibit pursu- Dallas Jail out of the C”, print appel- A known with the check”, “probation but which did ant to lant, opinion they in his made were actually had defendant establish person, appellant. one the same our placed pro- theft and been convicted of Louisiana, to establish “Appendix failed our bation State’s Exhibit Number to in the party as the referred C”, personal data informa- defendant certain reflects conviction; thus, jail card security tion, height, weight, Louisiana such as social *8 the penalty phase of race, address, to the number, sex, cause num- was irrelevant and for and was inadmissible “F7808690”, person defendant’s trial related to ber that establishing the defendant’s Human, purposes of which is the James Daniel named 37.07, Art. V.A. pursuant record to appellant There was criminal name our has. same exhibit, the Louisiana only reference to C.C.P. photograph no in this however. entry on the Dallas to was the print on exhibit was shown “attempted County felony proof going Jail card: theft alleged to cause number F-78- Thus, 8690-IQ. probationer.” # 92803 Louisiana the Daniel, supra, absolutely make it facts of Fitting all of the circumstantial evidence proof the failed in clear that State its to pieces together, find we that the State identity being the establish defendant’s proved alleged prior the two convic- person one the same who had been and beyond tions a reasonable also doubt. We Daniel, in the Louisiana cause. convicted any evidence, find that there was not direct supra, clearly inapplicable is to this cause. circumstantial, or that someone than other Bullard, supra,
The facts
reflect that as
appellant
person
was
to
established
be the
alleged prior felony
to one
conviction there
in
alleged prior
named
the
convictions. We
testimony
was no
to connect the defendant
find
any
further
that
rational trier of fact
to
cause. The
failed
the
that
State
to ask
could have so found.
fingerprint expert
a comparison
to make
fingerprint
the unknown
in an
contained
alleged
The State
in
also
the indict
print
the
exhibit with
known
the defend-
prior
ment that
to the
commission
ant. This Court held that the
fact
mere
offense,
primary
appellant
finally
had been
name
that the
card and the name
F-80-1197-MN,
convicted
cause number
alleged
prior
the
the
conviction were
prior
and that
to the commission of both
same was insufficient to establish
the
that
primary
prior
offense and the above
was
person.
defendant
one and
same
finally
conviction he was
convicted in cause
Bullard, supra,
clearly inapplicable
is also
F-78-8690-IQ,
alleged
number
and that the
factually
prior
to this cause.
conviction had
The cir
become final.
appellant
cumstantial evidence reflects that
Although “the carelessness here involved
placed
was
Dallas
on
Jail
condoned,
say
is not to
we are unable to
pursuant
12/28/78
number
cause
appellant
surprise
that
has shown
or that
and
on
same
“F7808690”
released
that
prejudice.” Plessing-
he was misled to his
It
date.
was also established that on
er, supra. We
hold
find and
that the cause
20, 1979, appellant
March
went to court
“F-78-8690-IQ”
“F7808690”
numbers
and
convicted in cause
F78-
was
number
substantially
are
find
the same. We also
8690-IQ and
fine.
It
assessed
$500.00
although
slight
that
there
hold
was a
appellant
was further established that
was
discrepancy
between
numbers
finally
F-80-
convicted
cause number
F-78-8690-IQ”,
cir-
“F7808690”
Appel
on
11997-MN November
1980.
evidence,
cumstantially adduced
as to al-
appeal
not in the
court
lant did
trial
or on
leged
F-78-8690-IQ,
cause number
is more
challenge
finality
sequence
or the
every
than sufficient
exclude
reasonable
convictions,
prior felony
two
except
appel-
hypothesis
identity
that of
anything
appellate
nor is there
any
lant.
further
and hold
We
find
that
might
record
reflect or indicate that
trier of
rational
fact could conclude from they
were
final convictions. Cf. Jones
the admitted circumstantial evidence that
(Tex.Cr.App.1986).
concur. A
APPENDIX *11 B
APPENDIX
APPENDIX C *13 D
APPENDIX
CLINTON, Judge, dissenting. I. Appellant alleging After primary was convicted of the felony offense of driving offense driving while April 16, 1984, intoxicated. Arti- while intoxicated on 670U-l(e), cle prose- V.T.C.S. In order to alleges subsequent indictment para- cute the felony instant cause as a offense graphs appellant previously had twice court, district ap- State driving been convicted of intoxicated, while pellant previously had twice been convicted day March, once “on the 20th 1979in the driving offense of while intox- Judicial District Court of Dallas 204[th] Apparently finding icated. allegation County, Texas, in Cause No. F-78-8690- true, finding appellant again IQ,” again and then day “on the 7th operated upon public a motor vehicle road November, 1980 in the 195th Judicial Dis- 16,1984, while April intoxicated on Texas, trict Court of County, Dallas guilty found him punish- and assessed his Cause No. F-80-11997-MN.” At trial the year ment at one county jail and a State copies judg- introduced certified fine of $2000.00. against ments and sentences one “James Human,” Daniel appeal bearing respective On Appeals Waco Court of reversed the unpublished conviction in an numbers in the same courts as thus al- State, Human v. opinion. leged. No. 10-84-177- (Tex.App. Waco, CR delivered November — In order to establish was the 7, 1985). The Waco Court found that the “James previously Daniel Human” convict- State’s evidence appel- failed to establish ed as judgments reflected and sen- lant was the same as had been tences, upon expert the State relied com- convicted in either of the offenses of parison fingerprints between driving while intoxicated that had been al- trial, taken at the time of appear- and those leged in the Consequently, indictment. ing records of the Dallas Police cause was remanded to the district court Department and Dallas Sheriff’s transfer, “with an instruction to if neces- alia, Office, containing, inter cause num- sary, appropriate the cause to a court of almost, though entirely bers are
jurisdiction
[ajppellant may
where
be tried
appearing
identical
judg-
to those
primary
for the
offense as a misdemean-
ments and sentences.
or.”
Through the custodian of records of the
reversing appellant’s
conviction in this
Department
Dallas Police
the State intro-
appeals
cause the
in large
court
relied
1, consisting
duced State’s exhibit no.
of a
upon
panel opinion
measure
this Court’s
fingerprint
upon
master
card made
the ar-
Daniel v.
(Tex.Cr.
849 identity the a defendant number F-80- as the The cause 24, in fact dated October Daniel, 11997-MN1 is prior convicted a offense. as- indicates that sentence was 1980. It 691; [supra]. at v. S.W.2d Bullard $750.00, day at fine of and that sessed on Establishing [a]ppellant’s by connection on had been committed that the offense fingerprints one does not his with exhibit 27, August 1980. automatically his connection establish Dep- testify County a Dallas Next to was the merely another exhibit because with “expert fingerprint uty who was an Sheriff happen to reflect exhibits identical two analyst” and a custodian identification relating prior to a of- or similar details Through him the State introduced records. fense.” appellant only min- taken fingerprints of that, con- properly asserts State now before, exhibit no. utes as State's strued, supra, v. does not Bullard also, no. a “Dallas as State’s exhibit con- support This card that the evidence is County Jail bookin card.” the conclusion gen- right fingerprint index and a tains the prior the appellant tie insufficient to Hu- description of Daniel eral a “James fact, very opposite. the To an offenses—in man,” it seems to show arrested who was extent, agree. I 2ND.” It also lists for “DWI on “102878” “F780869O,”2but an “indictment” number II. particular disposition of that no reflects State, supra, separate two Bullard Deputy testified that cause. The Sheriff into “con- admitted finger- jail cards were evidence comparison revealed that the his (State’s jail cards exhibit prints fingerprints on both taining official records and 4) nos. and were identical to those known upon con- one Charles Edwin Bullard made (State’s 2). appellant’s exhibit no. re- County for causes viction” two Dallas alleged under spectively to find the for enhancement In order was same judgments as the one the Code, 12.42(d), “Human” for Penal which V.T.C.A. § reflect convicted sentences was judgments and sentences were certified IQ F-80-11997- numbers F-78-8690 ex- fingerprint A subsequently introduced. MN, that jury the must first found have County Of- Dallas Sheriff’s pert from the jail police department the records the from fingerprints one fice testified that appellant. were those of and sheriff's office to be jail matched those known the cards clearly fingerprint identification estab- defendant’s, the but failed to reveal However, the court of lished this fact. comparison prints on the his result of link appeals established be- considered those of the defend- jail card with second jail judgments records and the tween Accordingly, Court held ant. support to be too tenuous to and sentences iden- sufficient to evidence was while the jury finding also the “Bullard” convict- tify the defendant whose are reflected “Human” convictions conviction, ab- ined the first latter documents. Observed prints on testimony that sence of appeals: court of ren- defendant’s jail card were the second nor cause numbers “Neither identical to connect evidence insufficient are dered the identical names sufficient establish jury, Again presence of the police out of the presence of the 2. 1. Out of “F-78- letter at the end of the cause number custodian testified the cause number was difference between purposes judgment, of identification appearing IQ” court, any variance in the letters of the card number “F7808690” indictment change He be attributed of courts. could asserted that it was a dash in the explained the absence of unlikely ‘be there would system Dallas Sheriff's computer like N on it and one case number that with an Department. other the words, case number with an MN"—in same (All emphasis supplied indi- unless otherwise him, discrepancy as we understand cated.) *17 probably in would not indicate different letters causes. 850 prior
him second to the conviction.3 provide independent used to identification of a invariably convicted have been finding The basis of the Court’s part conviction, the record ob- prior evidence as to the first convictionwas governmental tained from the same enti- sufficient is not clear from the face of the 5 Id., ty.” held, at 691. Thus it was opinion, authority and no is cited. Presum- effect, jail County that a card out of Dallas ably, though “identity of names reflecting probation Daniel’s conviction and id., sufficient[,]” nonetheless, at identi- offense, for a similar under the same cause name, offense, number, ty of county undesignated number but from some Loui- and court was.4 parish, siana court and sufficiently was not State, supra, In Daniel v. records of a linked to the Louisiana records of convic- Parish, theft conviction from Caddo Louisi- tion to show that Daniel was the man then ana, 92,803, by No. Cause which one “Neil and there convicted. Douglas placed probation, Daniel” was perceive I can no irreconcilable conflict were admitted evidence to show the de- holdings between the of Bullard and Dan- prior fendant’s criminal record as autho- iel, and thus would decline the State’s invi- 37.07, 3(a), by rized Art. A V.A.C.C.P. § view, my tation to overrule the latter. jail later card from the Dallas Sher- the evidence in the instant case falls some- iff’s Office in the same name then where between that found sufficient admitted, containing fingerprints shown to Bullard, irrelevant, and that found and jail be Daniel’s. The offense noted on the inadmissible, in hence Daniel. Therefore “probation card was check” and the stated the Court should endeavor to draw the line “probation complet- reason for release was Instead, distinctly. more plurality space ed.” A for “remarks” reflected the Judges today simply deems these cases entry: “attempted felony theft #92803 cause, “clearly inapplicable” to this without probationer.” panel A Louisiana of this holds, plurality elaboration. The somewhat rejected the State’s contention that paradoxically, both that the “circumstan- identity jail of cause numbers on the here, tial” evidence was sufficient and that judgment card and the Louisiana was suffi- in the did not “variance” numbers work cient to establish Daniel was the man con- surprise to the and detriment of the ac- Along way victed Louisiana. it was straying express cused. To so far from the grant observed that search of our cases re- purpose of our of review in this “[a] cause, fingerprints I veals that which have been dissent. holding, 3. In so the Court observed: "The identi- dates and amount reflected on the docket sheet Id., ty conviction, of names was not sufficient.’’ at 816. prior in the were sufficient to link Ironically, independent sentence, review of the record in jail judgment card to the and and jail Bullard now reveals that both the card and prove man earlier thus to the defendant was the judgment corresponding sentence to the State, See also S.W. convicted. Anderson v. alleged prior second conviction in that cause (Tex.Cr.App.1974). 2d But see Rose v. relate to one "Charles Edward Bullard.” (Tex.Cr.App.1974), S.W.2d 547 in which it jail containing defend was held that a card (Tex.Cr.App.
4.
In Jones v.
851
offense,
similarity
III.
name and
and
between
jail
“indictment”
listed on the
card
number
Turning
to
jail
first
the
card and tran
judgment
and cause number of the
and
1,
in
script contained
State’s
no.
as
exhibit
discrepancy
Though
sentence.
the
be-
Daniel,
supra at
accept
in
we
the
partially
tween
was
ex-
these numbers
of the matters asserted
truth
in this exhibit
2, ante,
jury
plained, see note
the
was not
it was admitted
because
the trial court
explanation.
privy to
Neither the date
this
exception
prohibition against
as an
to the
offense,
it
of the
court in which
was
Thus,
hearsay evidence.6
State's exhibit
disposition
prosecuted, nor the ultimate
of
appel
1 establishes that on
no.
“08-27-80”
jail card. On
appears
the case
on the
this
arrested for some
lant was
manner of driv
jury
of
state
the evidence a rational
could
(“Inv.DWI”),
ing while intoxicated
con
was
card,
jail
not have found that the
shown to
offense under
victed for this
cause number
appellant’s,
sufficiently
be
linked to
“F80-11997 N” in the
court
“195th”
on
prove
judgment
as to
and sentence
“10-24-80,”
punishment
and his
assessed
beyond
a reasonable doubt that
judgment in
The
number
at
cause
$750.00.
“Human”
See
convicted.
Daniel
F-80-11997-MN,
of the
out
195th Judicial
State,
State,
supra;
Rose v.
of
County
District Court Dallas
and dated
(Tex.Cr.App.1974).
24, 1980,
October
shows a
for
felony D.W.I., states that the offense was
plurality
judicially
seems
divine
August 27,1980,
committed
and reflects
“that the
‘F7808690’
cause numbers
and
punishment
that
was indeed
at a
assessed
‘F-78-8690-IQ’
substantially
are
Though
of
num
fine
the cause
$750.00.
At
is
self
p.
same.”
840. That
not
evident
different,
slightly
my
bers are
in
view
Nevertheless, having
to me.
thus rendered
sufficiently
parallels
support
are
definite to
jail
the “indictment” number
card
finding
card,
jury’s
jail
a rational
that the
cause
“substantially similar” to the
number
containing fingerprints
appel
known to be
prior conviction,
plurality
then
lant’s, corresponds
judgment
to the
and tacitly
no
from
concludes what
case
prove
alleged
admitted to
up
sentence
held, viz.,
identity (or
has yet
that
prior conviction in cause number F-80-
number is
identity)
near
name and cause
State,
supra;
11997-MN.7 Bullard v.
enough,
more,
jail
to link a
card
without
(Tex.Cr.
Jones v.
(Tex.Cr.App.1984) prove up Texas, pur Appellee. defendant’s “habitual offender status” The STATE of 12.42(d), Code, suant to V.T.C.A. Penal § No. 395-83. during appellant’s precluded first trial retrying appellant State from as an habit Texas, Appeals Criminal primary ual offender under the same of En Banc. fense.) Moreover, pri- because the issue of or April convictions was submitted to the at 1988. trial, guilt/innocence phase
is entitled to a new trial on the issue
guilt punishment and innocence as well as offense, primary new Article 44.-
29(b), V.A.C.C.P., notwithstanding. The appeals of the court of should affirmed, remanding
therefore be the cause court,
to the district with instructions to competent jur
transfer same to a court of retried,
isdiction. There could be convicted, resentenced,
and if under the 6701Z-l(b) (c) (d),
provisions of Art. or Bullard, parte Cf.
V.T.C.S. Ex 679 S.W. (Tex.Cr.App.1984) (Though
2d 12 it was determined,
ultimately contrary to our first 816, viz;
holding at 533 S.W.2d at “the may again attempt prove
State purpose enhancing
convictions for the
punishment[,]” that Bullard could provi
retried as an “habitual” under the Code, 12.42(d),
sions of Y.T.C.A. Penal he § “repeat”
could nevertheless be retried as a 12.42(a),supra,
offender under since the § proven sufficiently
evidence had one of the prior convictions.)
two stated, respectfully
For the reasons I
dissent.
ONION, P.J., DUNCAN, J., join.
