Fried v. Snapple Beverage CompanyFried v. Snapple Beverage Company
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT‘S MOTION TO DISMISS
Pending before the Court is Defendant‘s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff‘s Complaint. (ECF No. 5). Plaintiff filed an Opposition, (ECF No. 8), and Defendant filed a Reply, (ECF No. 11). For the following reasons, Defendant‘s Motion to Dismiss is DENIED.
Plaintiff brings this class action on behalf of himself, all others similarly situated, and the public. (Plaintiff‘s Complaint (“Compl.“), ECF No. 1, Exhibit 2). Plaintiff is a consumer of Defendant‘s juice, tea, and element beverages (“Products“). (Id. at 6). Specifically, he claims to have regularly drank Defendant‘s Apple Juice, Peach Tea, and Lemon Tea. (Id. at 9). Plaintiff alleges that Defendant‘s labeling of its Products as “ALL NATURAL” is false and misleading because Defendant‘s Products contain manufactured citric acid (“MCA“) and coloring agents. (Id. at 3). His Complaint asserts six causes of action: (1) violation of the Unfair Competition Law (“UCL“),
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Under
In reviewing the plausibility of a complaint on a motion to dismiss, a court must “accept factual allegations in the complaint as true and construe the pleadings in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2008). But courts are not “required to accept as true allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences.” In re Gilead Scis. Secs. Litig., 536 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001)).
III. DISCUSSION
A. Judicial Notice
As a preliminary matter, the parties have requested judicial notice. While Plaintiff seeks judicial notice of two FDA warning letters issued in 2001, Defendant seeks judicial notice of labels on its Products. (Plaintiff‘s Request for Judicial Notice, ECF No. 9); (Defendant‘s Request for Judicial Notice, ECF No. 5, Attachment
B. UCL, FAL, and CLRA Claims
Plaintiff alleges violations of California‘s consumer protection statutes: UCL, FAL, and CLRA.
The UCL prescribes business practices that are “unlawful, unfair or fraudulent,”
At this point in the proceedings, Plaintiff need not prove he can satisfy the reasonable consumer test for this is generally a question of fact “which requires consideration and weighing of evidence from both sides and which usually cannot be made on demurrer.” Linear Tech. Corp. v. Applied Materials, Inc., 152 Cal.App.4th 115, 134-35 (2007). “However, in certain instances, a court can properly make this determination and resolve such claims based on its review of the product packaging.” Brown v. Starbucks Corp., 2019 WL 996399, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 1, 2019) (quoting Pelayo v. Nestle USA, Inc., 989 F.Supp.2d 973, 978 (C.D. Cal. 2013)). “[W]here a Court can conclude as a matter of law that members of the public are not likely to be deceived by the product packaging, dismissal is appropriate.” Pelayo, 989 F.Supp.2d at 978 (collecting cases).
Plaintiff makes two arguments as to why Defendant‘s “ALL NATURAL” labeling violates California‘s consumer protection statutes. First, Plaintiff alleges that the use of juice concentrates “for color” is unnatural. (Compl. 7-8). Second, Plaintiff contends that the use of citric acid renders Defendant‘s Products unnatural. (Id. at 6-7). The Court will address each in turn.
a. Coloring
Plaintiff asserts that adding juice concentrates to Defendant‘s Juices for color makes the Juices’ labeling misleading
Plaintiff relies only on an FDA policy defining the term “natural” as “nothing artificial or synthetic (including all color additives regardless of source) has been included in” the food. (Compl. 7-8). Courts in the Ninth Circuit have disagreed about whether FDA statements are relevant in analyzing deceptive labeling claims. Compare Brand v. KSF Acquisition Corp., 2023 WL 3225409, at *6 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 17, 2023) (“Allegations a product‘s label violates an FDA regulation can‘t form the basis of a deceptive labeling claim under the reasonable consumer test.“), with Ivie v. Kraft Foods Glob., Inc., 2013 WL 685372, at *12 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 25, 2013) (“The FDA‘s 2009 industry guidance statement is relevant to the issue of whether these labels could be deceptive or misleading to a reasonable consumer[.]“). Even acknowledging that FDA guidance is relevant to Plaintiff‘s allegations,1 the Court finds that the guidance alone is insufficient to show that
“members of the public are likely to be deceived.” Moore, 966 F.3d at 1017; Nacarino v. Chobani, LLC, 2021 WL 3487117, at *10 n.5 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 9, 2021) (“Although Ms. Nacarino has stated a plausible violation of 21 C.F.R. § 101.22(i), she may not use that violation alone as the basis for her deceptive labeling claims, which implicate the reasonable consumer test.“). Plaintiff‘s failure to plead any additional factual evidence of reasonable consumers’ beliefs is fatal to his argument.
Further, the Juices’ ingredient lists clarify any misunderstanding a reasonable consumer would have. According to the Ninth Circuit, “qualifiers in packaging, usually on the back of a label or in ingredient lists, ‘can ameliorate any tendency of the label to mislead.‘” Moore, 966 F.3d at 1017 (quoting Brady v. Bayer Corp., 26 Cal.App.5th 1156, 1167 (2018)). “[T]he front label must be unambiguously deceptive for a defendant to be precluded from insisting that the back label be considered together with the front label“, which is not the case here. McGinity v. Procter & Gamble Co., 69 F.4th 1093, 1098 (9th Cir. 2023). The back labels of Defendant‘s Apple Juice and
b. Citric Acid
Plaintiff next contends that Defendant‘s Products are unnatural because they contain MCA. (Id. at 6). To support this contention, Plaintiff cites Defendant‘s website, which states both that citric acid is “a food ingredient derived from starch” and “is present in citrus fruits“. (Id. at 7). In response, Defendant argues that Plaintiff has failed to allege that the type of citric acid used by Defendant is artificial and that MCA is “derived from natural sources“. (Def.‘s Mot. 9). Here, the Court agrees with Plaintiff.
Defendant is incorrect that Plaintiff fails to “allege—anywhere—that the citric acid in Snapple Juice Drinks is artificial or synthetic.” (Id. at 9). Plaintiff‘s Complaint links MCA to Defendant‘s Products three times. First, Plaintiff states that “[m]anufactured citric acid (“MCA“), which is in the Products, is an industrial chemical derived, not from fruit or vegetables, but from the fermentation of crude sugars (e.g., molasses and corn starch) by the mold, Aspergillus niger.” (Compl. 3) (emphasis added). Second, Plaintiff asserts “each of the Products contain MCAs“. (Id.). Third, farther down in his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges again that Defendant‘s “Products contain MCA, an industrial chemical“. (Id. at 6). These are factual allegations that, at this stage, the Court is required to accept. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Noohi v. Kraft Heinz Co., 2020 WL 5554255, at *2 (C.D. Cal. July 20, 2020) (designating Plaintiff‘s statement that “[a]ll of the Products contain artificial DL-Malic Acid” as an “unequivoca[l] alleg[ation]” of fact). Even if, as Defendant points out, citric acid can “be made naturally, here [P]laintiff alleges that th[is] ingredient[] w[as] not produced naturally, and the [C]ourt must accept th[is] non-conclusory factual allegation[] of the [C]omplaint in the light most favorable to [P]laintiff.” Roper v. Big Heart Pet Brands, Inc., 510 F.Supp.3d 903, 914 (E.D. Cal. 2020); Branca v. Bai Brands, LLC, 2019 WL 1082562, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 7, 2019) (“While Branca‘s assumption as to the type of malic acid contained in Defendants’ Products ultimately may be incorrect, at the pleading stage, this Court ‘does not operate as a fact-finder,’ but, instead, must ‘presume all facts plead as true.‘“). The main cases relied on by Defendant, Tarzian and Valencia, are out-of-Circuit decisions that are less persuasive to the Court on this matter.2
C. Common Law Claims
Aside from California‘s consumer protection statutes, Plaintiff alleges breach of express warranties, breach of the implied warranty of merchantability, and unjust enrichment. The Court will address each below.
a. Breach of Express Warranties
A seller of goods creates an express warranty by making “[a]ny affirmation of fact or promise . . . to the buyer which relates to the goods and becomes part of the basis of the bargain.”
Defendant contends that this claim fails because Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged that there is an “underlying misrepresentation“. (Def.‘s Mot. 11). This argument is unpersuasive. For the reasons explained above, Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged at this stage that (1) the Product labels convey to reasonable consumers that the Products are “ALL NATURAL,” and that (2) the Products nonetheless contain MCA, an industrial chemical, contrary to Defendant‘s representations. Accordingly, the Court DENIES Defendant‘s Motion to Dismiss the breach of express warranties claim.
b. Breach of Implied Warranty of Merchantability
A contract for the sale of goods implies “a warranty that the goods shall be merchantable,”
Defendant argues that this claim is implausible because its Products are “fit
c. Unjust Enrichment
In California, “there is not a standalone cause of action for ‘unjust enrichment,‘” but “[w]hen a plaintiff alleges unjust enrichment, a court may ‘construe the cause of action as a quasi-contract claim seeking restitution.‘” Astiana v. Hain Celestial Grp., Inc., 783 F.3d 753, 762 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting Rutherford Holdings, LLC v. Plaza Del Rey, 223 Cal.App.4th 221, 231 (2014)). “[T]he theory underlying” an unjust enrichment claim is “that a defendant has been unjustly conferred a benefit ‘through mistake, fraud, coercion, or request.‘” Id. (quoting 55 Cal. Jur. 3d Restitution § 2). “The return of that benefit is the remedy ‘typically sought in a quasi-contract cause of action.‘” Id. (quoting 55 Cal. Jur. 3d Restitution § 2).
Plaintiff alleges he is entitled to restitution because Defendant derived “financial benefits” from the class members’ purchase of the Products. (Compl. 18). He further alleges it “would be inequitable, unconscionable, and unjust” for Defendant to profit from its “wrongful conduct.” (Id. at 19). Plaintiff has sufficiently stated a quasi-contract cause of action: Defendant enticed Plaintiff and class members to purchase their products through fraudulent misrepresentations and was unjustly enriched as a result. See Astiana, 783 F.3d at 762 (plaintiff sufficiently states quasi-contract cause of action by alleging defendant had enticed plaintiffs to purchase its products “through false and misleading labeling” and that defendant “was unjustly enriched as a result“). Defendant argues only that the unjust enrichment claim should fail because Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged misrepresentations. (Def.‘s Mot. 11). The Court rejects this argument because, as stated above, Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged fraudulent misrepresentations at this stage. Accordingly, the Court DENIES Defendant‘s Motion to Dismiss with respect to the unjust enrichment claim.
IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER
Based on the foregoing, the Court DENIES Defendant‘s Motion to Dismiss. IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: October 11, 2024
Hon. Dana M. Sabraw, Chief Judge
United States District Court