SHERRIE FOWLER, Worker-Petitioner, v. VISTA CARE and AMERICAN HOME INSURANCE COMPANY, Employer/Insurer-Respondents.
Docket No. 33,993
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO
June 5, 2014
2014-NMSC-019
Victor S. Lopez, Workers’ Compensation Judge
ORIGINAL PROCEEDING ON CERTIORARI
Rio Rancho, NM
for Petitioner
Butt Thornton & Baehr, P.C.
Emily A. Franke
David N. Whitham
Albuquerque, NM
for Respondent
OPINION
DANIELS, Justice.
{1} The New Mexico Workers’ Compensation Act (the Act),
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
{2} While working for Vista Care (Employer), Fowler suffered a back injury on April 7, 2003. Fowler began receiving TTD benefits pursuant to
{3} This case began when Fowler filed a complaint with the WCA on March 16, 2010, for reinstatement of her TTD benefits and for an increase in her PPD rating. See
{4} The WCA judge issued an order finding that Fowler was entitled to receive TTD benefits as of March 14, 2007, when the physician determined that Fowler was no longer at MMI. In a memorandum opinion, the WCA judge concluded that TTD benefits are not limited by the 500-week or 700-week periods applicable to PPD benefits under
{5} The Court of Appeals affirmed the WCA judge‘s order on the issue of Fowler‘s entitlement to reinstatement of TTD benefits because it concluded that Fowler was no longer at MMI as of March 14, 2007, see Fowler, 2013-NMCA-036, ¶ 27, but reversed the conclusion of the WCA judge‘s memorandum opinion that no time limit applies to TTD benefits, id. ¶ 23. The Court of Appeals held that
II. DISCUSSION
{6} The Act provides injured workers with a minimum level of financial security while they are receiving medical care for their work-related injuries and are otherwise unable to work. See
{7} The Court‘s guiding principle when construing statutes “is to determine and give effect to legislative intent.” N.M. Indus. Energy Consumers v. N.M. Pub. Regulation Comm‘n, 2007-NMSC-053, ¶ 20, 142 N.M. 533, 168 P.3d 105. To discern the Legislature‘s intent, we rely on the classic canons of statutory interpretation and “look first to the plain language of the statute, giving the words their ordinary meaning, unless the Legislature indicates a different one was intended.” Marbob Energy Corp. v. N.M. Oil Conservation Comm‘n, 2009-NMSC-013, ¶ 9, 146 N.M. 24, 206 P.3d 135 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). We will not read the plain language of the statute in a way that is “absurd, unreasonable, or contrary to the spirit of the statute,” State v. Smith, 2004-NMSC-032, ¶ 10, 136 N.M. 372, 98 P.3d 1022, and will not read any provision of the statute in a way that would render another provision of the statute “null or superfluous,” State v. Rivera, 2004-NMSC-001, ¶ 18, 134 N.M. 768, 82 P.3d 939. “‘Statutory language that is clear and unambiguous must be given effect.‘” Albuquerque Bernalillo Cnty. Water Util. Auth. v. N.M. Pub. Regulation Comm‘n, 2010-NMSC-013, ¶ 52, 148 N.M. 21, 229 P.3d 494 (citation omitted).
{8} There are two types of total disability: permanent total disability, see
{9}
{10} We know from other provisions in the Act that a worker is entitled to TTD benefits only until the worker reaches MMI, see
{11} Fowler is an example of the workers who may become eligible for TTD benefits any number of times throughout their lives so long as they are deemed totally disabled by their healthcare providers. See
{12} What is clear is that
{13} Although the relevant statutory language strongly suggests that a worker is eligible for TTD benefits for life so long as the worker has not reached MMI, we exercise “caution” in relying only on the plain language of a statute because “‘[i]ts beguiling simplicity may mask a host of reasons why a statute, apparently clear and unambiguous on its face, may for one reason or another give rise to legitimate (i.e., nonfrivolous) differences of opinion concerning the statute‘s meaning.‘” Smith, 2004-NMSC-032, ¶ 9 (quoting State ex rel. Helman v. Gallegos, 1994-NMSC-023, ¶ 23, 117 N.M. 346, 871 P.2d 1352). The plain meaning rule “must yield on occasion to an intention otherwise discerned
{14} Looking to other relevant provisions in the Act, we recognize that eligibility for PPD benefits is explicitly limited in time:
The duration of partial disability benefits shall depend upon the extent and nature of the partial disability, subject to the following:
(1) where the worker‘s percentage of disability is equal to or greater than eighty, the maximum period is seven hundred weeks;
(2) where the worker‘s percentage of disability is less than eighty, the maximum period is five hundred weeks.
{15}
{16} If a worker has received TTD benefits prior to an award of PPD benefits, only Subsection B of
{17}
{18} The legislative history of
{19} Also in 1990 when the Legislature amended
{20} The fact that the Legislature removed the duration limits from
{21} Employer points to
Subject to the limitation of compensation payable under Subsection G of
Section 52-1-46 NMSA 1978 and except for provision of lifetime benefits for total disability awarded pursuant toSection 52-1-41 NMSA 1978 :. . . compensation benefits for any combination of disabilities or any combination of disabilities and death shall not be payable for a period in excess of seven hundred weeks[.]
{22} We also must consider whether the WCA has in fact implemented a policy applying the PPD duration limits to TTD benefits, creating a “longstanding interpretation” that cannot be changed nonlegislatively. See, e.g., High Ridge Hinkle Joint Venture v. City of Albuquerque, 1998-NMSC-050, ¶ 9, 126 N.M. 413, 970 P.2d 599 (“An administrative gloss is placed on an ambiguous clause of a [law] when those responsible for its implementation interpret the clause in a consistent manner and apply it to similarly situated applicants over a period of years without legislative interference. If an administrative gloss is indeed found to have been placed on a clause, [this Court] may not change such a de facto policy, in the absence of legislative action, because to do so would presumably violate legislative intent.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); Pub. Serv. Co. of N.M. v. N.M. Taxation & Revenue Dep‘t, 2007-NMCA-050, ¶ 41, 141 N.M. 520, 157 P.3d 85 (“In construing statutes and regulations, courts will ‘give persuasive weight to long-standing administrative constructions of
{23} Even if the WCA had applied such a time limit to TTD benefits, we would not defer to it in this case because that application is not a reasonable interpretation of the Act. The plain language and legislative history of
III. CONCLUSION
{24} We reverse the Court of Appeals and affirm the WCA order.
{25} IT IS SO ORDERED.
CHARLES W. DANIELS, Justice
WE CONCUR:
BARBARA J. VIGIL, Chief Justice
PETRA JIMENEZ MAES, Justice
RICHARD C. BOSSON, Justice
EDWARD L. CHÁVEZ, Justice