Pablo FIGUEROA, et al., Plaintiffs, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, Defendant.
Civil Action No. 07-CV-1992 (BJR).
United States District Court, District of Columbia.
June 22, 2012.
Ellen A. Efros, Jacques P. Lerner, Melvin W. Bolden, Jr., Office of the Attorney General, Washington, DC, for Defendant.
MEMORANDUM AND OPINION DENYING MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS, OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
BARBARA JACOBS ROTHSTEIN, District Judge.
I. INTRODUCTION
This matter is before the court on Defendant, the District of Columbia’s (“the District”), Renewed Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, or, in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment. (Dkt. No. 79.). Plaintiffs filed an Opposition to the Motion on June 25, 2011 (Dkt. No. 81), and the District filed a Reply on June 30, 2011 (Dkt. No. 82). Having considered the parties’ arguments, pleadings, and relevant case law, the court finds and rules as follows.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This matter is on remand from the D.C. Circuit.1 Metropolitan Police Officers Pablo Figueroa, Michael J. Farish, Brian A. Murphy, Tyrone Dodson, Lance D. Harrison, Sr., Deryl M. Johnson, and Curtis R. Sloan (collectively “Plaintiffs”) brought this action against the Metropolitan Police Department (“MPD”) alleging that MPD failed to pay them basic and overtime compensation for fulfilling the job duties of the position of a detective sergeant. They allege that this nonpayment violated
Under District of Columbia law, any member of MPD “promoted ... to the rank of detective sergeant shall receive, in addition to his scheduled rate of basic compensation, $595 per annum.”
MPD requested review of the arbitration award by the District of Columbia Public Employee Relations Board (“PERB”). On September 30, 2005, the PERB ruled that the arbitrator acted “well within the ambit of his authority when he conclude[d] that the underlying grievance is timely” and that the award of back pay was neither improper under the collective bargaining agreement nor contrary to law and public policy. (Dkt. No. 50, Ex. 4 at 4-5 (Decision & Order of PERB).). MPD did not appeal the PERB ruling.
Following the PERB’s ruling, MPD took steps to compensate retroactively those officers who had served as detective sergeants. Figueroa v. District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Dept., 633 F.3d 1129, 1131 (D.C.Cir.2011). In 2007, it amended the personnel forms of three of the Plaintiffs to show that they had served and continued to serve as detective sergeants, and it gave them lump sum payments of $595 per year for every year they were assigned to the position. Id. The Department eventually did the same for the fourth Plaintiff. (Dkt. No. 81 at 7, ¶ 16.). It did not, however, recalculate Plaintiffs’ overtime pay based on the $595 stipend. Figueroa, 633 F.3d at 1131.
On November 5, 2007, the officers filed the present action against the District alleging violations of the FLSA. Plaintiffs alleged three violations: (1) willful failure to pay minimum wages in violation of
On appeal, Plaintiffs challenged only one aspect of the district court’s decision: its conclusion that the FLSA overtime claims were time-barred. Id. at 1132. The D.C. Circuit reversed the district court’s finding on this issue, concluding that Plaintiffs may recover if their paychecks failed to include properly calculated overtime compensation during the two or three years before they filed their complaint—depending upon which statute of limitations provision is applicable. Id. at 1135. As the district court did not determine the merits of Plaintiffs’ claims, or which limitations period applies, the D.C. Circuit remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. Id.
The parties dispute what issues are before this court on remand. Plaintiffs argue that the D.C. Circuit has reviewed, de novo, all of the legal arguments raised by both parties in this case. (See Dkt. No. 78.). As such, Plaintiffs assert, the only issues remaining are: (1) a determination on the merits as to whether Plaintiffs’ paychecks failed to include properly calculated overtime compensation during the time period between November 5, 2004 and present; (2) was MPD’s failure to pay willful, a result of which, will determine which statute of limitations period applies; and (3) whether the court should use November 5, 2004 (or 2005) as the date for application of the limitation period.3 Id. Plaintiffs request that the court either reconsider their Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Dkt. No. 38) or move to trial on the merits of the remaining issues. (See Dkt. No. 78 at 3.).4
In its current motion, the District argues that, first, if Plaintiffs are detective sergeants under
IV. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
Under Rule 56, summary judgment is proper “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”5 See
First, this court must address whether the District’s renewed motion is properly before it. Plaintiffs challenge the District’s right to renew its motion, arguing that the D.C. Circuit reviewed all of the legal arguments raised by both parties in this case, de novo, and determined that Plaintiffs could establish a claim for overtime compensation under the FLSA. (Dkt. No. 78 at 1; Dkt. No. 81 at 10.). They point out that the defenses to the FLSA overtime claim that the District is currently asserting are identical to those raised in its original motion. Therefore, Plaintiffs argue, in reversing the district court on the overtime claim, the D.C. Circuit necessarily rejected the District’s defenses to the claim. As such, Plaintiffs maintain, the District is prohibited from rearguing those defenses now. (See Dkt. No. 81 at 10-11.).
Plaintiffs are incorrect. The only issue before the D.C. Circuit was whether Plaintiffs’ FLSA overtime claim was time-barred. See Figueroa, 633 F.3d at 1132 (“On appeal, the officers challenge only one aspect of the district court’s decision: its conclusion that their FLSA overtime claim[][is] time-barred.”). As the Court stated: “In sum, the appellants may recover if their paychecks failed to include properly calculated overtime compensation during the two or three years before they filed their complaint—depending upon which limitations provision is applicable. As the district court did not determine the merits of the officer’s claims, or which limitations period applied, we remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.” Id. at 1135-1136 (emphasis added). As such, the District’s renewed motion is properly before this court.
Having determined that the District’s renewed motion is properly before it, the court now turns to the merits of the parties’ arguments.
(1) Whether MPD has a “Detective Sergeant” position, and, if so, whether Plaintiffs fulfilled the job duties of that position
The District contends that, to-date, no court has ruled on the question of whether the position of “Detective sergeant” exists at MPD. (See Dkt. No. 86 at 2, n. 3.). This court disagrees. The question of whether the position exists and whether Plaintiffs retained that position has been conclusively resolved in Plaintiffs’ favor. The arbitrator awarded Plaintiffs the “Status” of “Detective Sergeant,” the PERB affirmed the arbitrator’s decision, and MPD did not appeal the PERB’s ruling. Figueroa, 633 F.3d at 1131. The district court, sua sponte, found that the arbitration proceedings disposed of Count IV as a matter of res judicata. Figueroa, 633 F.3d at 1131. The District did not challenge this ruling. As such, the issue of whether Plaintiffs are detective sergeants has been conclusively resolved for purposes of this litigation and will not be revisited by this court.
(2) Whether detective sergeants fall within the executive exemption to the FLSA
Next, the District argues that if Plaintiffs are indeed detective sergeants, then they are not entitled to overtime compensation because detective sergeants are exempt from the FLSA’s overtime provisions. The District seeks refuge in section 13(a)(1) of the FLSA,
Determining whether an employee’s primary duty is management depends upon “all the facts in a particular case.”
The present record is devoid of any such evidence. Instead, the District argues that because the position of detective sergeant does not exist, there is no job description for the position. However, the District asserts, the “Court may and should infer that, if the Chief of Police were to create a Detective Sergeant position and rank ... including drafting a position description, she would insure that [the description] meets the requirements of the executive exemption.” (Dkt. No. 79 at 8.). The court cannot and will not make such an inference. The question currently before the court is whether Plaintiffs’ job duties, based on which the arbitrator awarded them the “Status of Detective Sergeant,” are such that Plaintiffs’ primary responsibilities consisted “of the management of the enterprise in which the employee is employed ... includ[ing] the customary and regular direction of the work of two or more other employees....”
Similarly, the arbitrator’s decision contains only limited factual findings as to Plaintiffs’ job responsibilities. The only reference to Plaintiffs’ duties, in its entirety, is as follows:
The Agency ... points out that Lieutenant Delgado who was called as an Agency witness testified that ... Sergeant Figueroa is a first line supervisor responsible for administrative duties such as filling out Forms PD42 or 43 for investigators and that he does supervise investigators ... Additional support for the Union’s claim, that the grievants did perform the functions of Detective Sergeants is evidenced by the fact that in their evaluation forms they were described as “Inv. Sgt.”
(Dkt. No. 38, Ex. 1 at 7-8.). It is impossible for this court to determine from the record before it the nature of Plaintiffs’ job duties. The District’s failure to meets its evidentiary burden mandates denial of the motion. See D’Camera, 693 F.Supp. at 1212. In the event that the District can remedy this failure, the court will allow it to file a renewed motion for summary judgment as to this issue.7,8
The FLSA generally requires covered employers to pay its employees overtime pay for work in excess of forty hours a week.
Therefore, the first step in many FLSA overtime disputes is to determine an employee’s regular rate. See Chavez v. City of Albuquerque, 630 F.3d 1300, 1304 (10th Cir.2011) (citing Walling v. Youngerman-Reynolds Hardwood Co., 325 U.S. 419, 424 (1945)) (“The keystone of Section 7(a) is the regular rate of compensation. On that depends the amount of overtime payments which are necessary to effectuate the statutory purposes. The proper determination of that rate is therefore of prime importance.”). The regular rate is “the hourly rate actually paid for the normal, non-overtime workweek.” Walling v. Helmerich & Payne, 323 U.S. 37, 40 (1944). The regular rate may include more than just an employee’s contractually-designated hourly wage if the employee is, in fact, paid more than that hourly wage. Contractual stipulations as to the regular rate are not controlling, because the regular rate is an “actual fact,” rather than “an arbitrary label chosen by the parties.” Youngerman-Reynolds, 325 U.S. at 424.
The District contends that the $595 annual stipend under
However, in making this argument, the District ignores entirely the fact that Plaintiffs’ overtime calculation must be made in accordance with the FLSA. See
Based on the forgoing, the court concludes as follows:
- The position of detective sergeant exists at MPD;
- Plaintiffs’ are detective sergeants; and
- The $595 annual stipend is part of Plaintiffs’ regular pay rate and must be included in the FLSA overtime calculation.
- Whether detective sergeants are executive employees within the meaning of the FLSA and therefore exempt from overtime pay,
- Whether MPD’s failure to pay was willful, the result of which, will determine the appropriate statute of limitations period; and
- Whether November 5, 2004 (or 2005) should be included in the limitation period.
As such, the court HEREBY RULES as follows:
- The District’s Renewed Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, or, in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment is DENIED;
- To the extent that Plaintiffs intended to renew their January 7, 2009 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Dkt. No. 38), the motion is DENIED without prejudice because it is not supported by updated affidavits and/or a statement of material facts as to which there is no genuine dispute;
- The court is of the opinion that further briefing by the parties might be helpful in narrowing the three remaining issues, and, therefore, orders that parties meet and confer and submit a joint proposed briefing schedule on or before July 9, 2012.